Internal Security Management in Nigeria

“This collection of essays spread over twenty nine chapters plus the Introduction and Conclusion, by known and emerging scholars brings out in a highly illuminating and coherent style a nuanced understanding of the causes, nature and dynamics of insecurity in a fledging democratic environment. Its multidisciplinary approach expands both the theoretical and empirical or programmatic lens through which to view and analyse the pathogenic impacts of insecurity in Nigeria. The book remains readable and engaging, and serves as a useful companion to all those who are genuinely interested in the critical or dispassionate analysis of Nigeria’s security conundrum and the various options for mitigation, prevention, management, and resolution. The book is worth having as a useful resource for theoretical inquiry and policy development about serious risks and threats to Africa’s democratic gains and human security.”

—Professor Ernest Uwazie, Chair; Division of Criminal Justice; Director, Center for African Peace & Conflict Resolution, California State University, Sacramento, USA

“The centrality of the security dialogue in the context of the African Renaissance requires multiple learning spaces. This book takes up an important learning space to transform not only the discourse in Nigeria, but disseminates critical knowledge into the global space where scholars and practitioners are mobile, sharing their knowledge across boundaries and disciplines. This book contains an important collection about internal security management in Nigeria. The discussions about security management in one of the super powers of Africa are well grounded in intellectual thought of African scholars. The book opens up thinking about the possibilities for lasting peace in Nigeria and the countries where the country potentially projects power. The several case studies are not only relevant to the security situation in Nigeria, but is founded on a wealth of theory, making it a critical body of knowledge on security management in Africa and the world. This book contains something for every scholar and specialists in security management. Moreover, it contributes an important body of knowledge that promotes democratic governance and social cohesion in Africa, with potential to inform legal and policy frameworks in Nigeria and other African countries to promote peace within the ambit of the African Renaissance philosophy. This cutting-edge scholarship, in one condensation, is an essential read.”

—Professor Andreas Velthuizen, Head of the Institute for African Renaissance Studies, University of South Africa
“The complexity of contemporary security challenges facing the Nigerian state and the weakness in effectively addressing them remain one of the engaging subjects of concern in African affairs. The collection of scholarly articles in this book excellently simplify and break down the component parts of this complex subject into a readily digestible form for scholars, experts and practitioners. The publication is a major contribution to knowledge.”

—Professor Isaac Olawale Albert, Former Director, Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
Oshita O. Oshita
Ikenna Mike Alumona
Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha
Editors

Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons
To the memory of Professor Thomas Akbigbe Imobigbe, the doyen of defense and security studies, a friend and mentor, who had accepted to write the foreword for this volume but sadly passed away before it was completed.
A striking provision in Chap. 2 of the Nigerian Constitution provides that “security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.” Given the expectations from this constitutional provision, the episodic but recurring spate of violent conflicts in Nigeria, particularly during the past one and half decades, continue to amplify the breach of this important statement. As a matter of fact, Nigeria is replete with evidences of growing insecurity that constitute early warning signs of possible implosion, owing to the inability of statutory internal security agencies to secure the public as a primary purpose of government. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the six geopolitical zones of the country have been experiencing varying degrees of unprecedented security challenges. At different times, violence in parts of the country has been attributed to activities of the Niger Delta Militants, the Oodua People’s Congress, Egbesu Boys, Bakassi Boys, Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Yandaba, Yankaleri, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), cultism associations and various other localized groups of street urchins. In 2009, the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents marked a new level in the expanding nature of the insecurity confronting Nigeria.

In 2018, the killings attributed to the herders-farmers crisis were said to have exceeded those caused by the Boko Haram insurgency. These indicators sum up to epitomize the incapacity of internal security management apparatuses to fulfil the constitutional mandate assigned to them by the government and people of Nigeria. Against the backdrop
of the increasing rate of unemployment, absence of domestic industrial capacity for job creation, lack of basic infrastructural facilities, and the perception that Nigeria is an unsafe destination for foreign direct investment continues to hold sway, thereby worsening the already tragic conditions facing the youth-dominated population of Nigeria. Based on these troubling statistics, *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons* was conceptualized to provide perspectives to the expanding conundrum of insecurity in the country and how to explore pathways for effectively resolving the country’s security crisis.

Undoubtedly, the pervasive insecurity in Nigeria today may not be unconnected with the history of prolonged military dictatorship foisted on the country and its people after independence, coupled with the systematic underfunding of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as the foremost agency in internal security management.

*Internal Security Management in Nigeria* represents a multidisciplinary effort by Nigerian academics to explore the issues around the (mis)management of internal security in the country with a view to providing a pragmatic frame for analysing the sources and triggers of insecurity for the understanding of stakeholders with a view to addressing the root causes of insecurity. The authors deliberately provide historical, theoretical, and practical perspectives to the crisis of internal security management in Nigeria as opposed to the dominant sanitized and somewhat deodorized explanations often provided in the public space. Some of the contributors dare to implicate the state, government, and the statutory security management institutions in the near comatose level of the internal security architecture, which has left armed non-state actors with the control of chunks of territorial space than is tolerable in any well-ordered society. The issues of funding, lack of inter-agency cooperation, and collaboration, inter-agency turf wars, and corruption, among others, have been discussed from multidisciplinary perspectives as they affect the internal security management architecture in Nigeria. The authors hope that by igniting the frank discourse on the important and sensitive issues of internal security management in Nigeria, they would have contributed to sensitizing stakeholders on the need to build synergistic efforts that would prevent the implosion that could arise from the emerging phenomenon of
privatizing the instrument of force by armed non-state actors using warlord political tactics. The book should be a delight for academics, subject-matter experts, security operatives, policymakers, students, and general interest readers.

Abuja, Nigeria  
Igbariam, Nigeria  
Nsukka, Nigeria

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Ikenna Mike Alumona, Oshita O. Oshita, and Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha  

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<td>APC</td>
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<td>Coalition for Military Action</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>HAT</td>
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<td>Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate</td>
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<td>NDLEA</td>
<td>National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency</td>
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<td>NDLF</td>
<td>Niger Delta Liberation Front</td>
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<td>NDMFS</td>
<td>Niger Delta Militant Force Squad</td>
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<td>NDPF</td>
<td>Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front</td>
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<td>NDPVF</td>
<td>Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force</td>
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<td>NDRM</td>
<td>Niger Delta Resistant Movement</td>
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<td>NDRS</td>
<td>Niger Delta Red Square</td>
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<td>NDSF</td>
<td>Niger Delta Strike Force</td>
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<td>Niger Delta Vigilante</td>
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<td>NDVF</td>
<td>Niger Delta Volunteer Force</td>
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<td>NDVS</td>
<td>Niger Delta Volunteers Services</td>
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<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEEDS</td>
<td>National Economic Employment and Development Strategy</td>
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<td>NEMA</td>
<td>National Emergency Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NESREA</td>
<td>National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEST</td>
<td>Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Plan</td>
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<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>Nigerian Immigration Service</td>
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<td>NNPC</td>
<td>Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<td>NOSCP</td>
<td>National Oil Spill Contingency Plan</td>
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<td>NOSDRA</td>
<td>National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency</td>
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<td>NPF</td>
<td>Nigeria Police Force</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Adviser</td>
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<td>NSCDC</td>
<td>Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps</td>
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<td>NSTGs</td>
<td>Non-State Armed Groups</td>
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<td>NUJ</td>
<td>Nigeria Union of Journalists</td>
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<td>NYSC</td>
<td>National Youth Service Corps</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OPC</td>
<td>Oodua People’s Congress</td>
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<td>Pencom</td>
<td>Pension Commission</td>
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<td>PFA</td>
<td>Pension Fund Administration</td>
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<td>Pension Fund Custodian</td>
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<td>PHCN</td>
<td>Power Holding Company of Nigeria</td>
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<td>PPRD</td>
<td>Police Public Relations Department</td>
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<td>QONR</td>
<td>Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>REWL</td>
<td>Red Egbesu Water Lions</td>
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<td>RNDA</td>
<td>Reformed Niger Delta Avengers</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Retirement Savings Account</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Commission</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SAs</td>
<td>Security Agencies</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SEPA</td>
<td>State Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>SGF</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Federation</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>Sovereign National Conference</td>
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<td>SPDC</td>
<td>Shell Petroleum Development Company</td>
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<td>SSI</td>
<td>Strategic Spiritual Intelligence</td>
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<td>SSSLM</td>
<td>South-South Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>STF</td>
<td>Special Task Force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Social and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>UN Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
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<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value-Added Tax</td>
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<td>VGN</td>
<td>Vigilante Group of Nigeria</td>
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<td>WAFF</td>
<td>West Africa Frontier Force</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WMO</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Understanding the Crisis of Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Ikenna Mike Alumona, Oshita O. Oshita, and Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha

RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

Internal security management has taken a centre stage in political and academic discourses, particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States. It was the 9/11 attacks in the United States, together with similar attacks such as the one in Istanbul on November 15, 2001 and the Madrid train bombing in Spain on March 11, 2004 that brought to fore the need for states to reinforce their internal security mechanisms to meet up with the challenge of protecting citizens and other nationals living within their territorial boundaries. The resultant effect of these global indices of insecurity is that

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O. O. Oshita et al. (eds.), Internal Security Management in Nigeria,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8215-4_1
in contemporary international politics, the ability of a state to ensure adequate security has become a principal variable in measuring the success or failure of the state. Thus, state failure is associated with countries that have lost control over the instruments of security maintenance.

On the other hand, states have begun to redesign the architecture of their internal security network in order to forestall occurrence of threats of global dimensions. For example, the United States passed into law the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002. The act which now combined the efforts, authorities and powers of 22 different federal departments and agencies into a single and unified entity called the US Department of Homeland Security, also created the position of the Secretary of Homeland Security (U.S Department of State Archive 2002).

In the African context, the nature of insecurity has been worrisome. According to the 2017 report of the State of Peace and Security in Africa, in 2016, a total of 17,539 violent events took place in the continent. A total of 8050 conflict-related fatalities and 5098 migrant deaths were also recorded. The continent has also recorded progress in the use of African-centred solutions in managing armed conflict and insecurity (Institute for Peace and Security Studies 2017). The insecurity situation in Africa as argued by Nnoli (2006) points to the collapsed character of the state which is caused by the factors of political exclusion, economic marginalisation and social discrimination as the most serious impediment to security. As a result of this, much has not been achieved in terms of redesigning the security architecture of most African states because most of them are engrossed in the struggle for survival.

Nigeria exemplifies the insecurity situation in the African continent. Admittedly, the rising concern about insecurity cannot be explained outside the numerous terrorist attacks by the *Boko Haram* and other similar sects, the litany of kidnappings, increasing crime rate, the emerging culture of violence perpetuated by legal and illegal revenue collectors, youth militancy and cultism, the herdsmen-farmers conflict and other factors of insecurity that have been a regular feature of life in the country. Against the reoccurring incidents of these factors of insecurity and the continued reassurance of the Nigerian government to control the situation, there is widespread doubt about the capability of the Nigerian government to provide adequate security for her citizens and others living within its territorial boundaries. The implications of this include loss of confidence in the state, decline in foreign direct investment and the “privatisation” of security as increasing number of people and corporate organisations are now
relying more on nongovernmental security operatives for their safety (Abrahamsen and Williams 2006; Adesegun and Olumide 2015).

At the heart of the internal insecurity crisis in Nigeria are two critical issues. First, is the seeming inability of the state to meet up with the challenges of internal security management. Since the return of democracy in 1999, Nigerians have witnessed, on a daily basis, an upsurge of factors of insecurity that threaten their peaceful coexistence despite the assurances of the government to ensure their safety and bring to justice the perpetrators of various heinous crimes. Equally linked to this problem is that while there appears to be enough agencies that are meant to take care of the country’s security, there is still clamour for the creation of new ones such as the Nigerian Peace Corps whose enabling law the President has refused to assent to.

Secondly and as a corollary of the above, is the increasing participation of armed non-state actors such as vigilante groups, hunters, private security companies and ethnic militias in the provision of security. This has become so pervasive and is gradually eroding the monopoly of the coercive powers of the state. Fraught with its own challenges, the involvement of armed non-state actors has itself been identified as a trigger of insecurity. Evidences abound of situations where these non-state actors have used their arms against ordinary citizens. The seeming inability of the state to provide adequate regulation and supervision of the activities of these armed non-state actors is equally disturbing. These developments have cast some doubts on the veracity of the long-held view that the state is the sole guarantor of peace and security. In fact, to the discerning mind, the architecture of internal security and its management in Nigeria is bedevilled with a lot of disturbing questions that are in need of urgent answers.

It is against this background that this book focuses on a critical examination of the issues, perspectives and challenges in the management of Nigeria’s internal security architecture. The book basically seeks to examine the causes, nature and dynamics of insecurity in a fledgling democratic environment. This has become necessary because across various epochs, the continued existence of the Nigerian state has been more threatened by internal security challenges than external ones. More importantly, the hope that attended the restoration of democratic governance in May 1999 after 26 years of military rule appears to have placed the burden of solving Nigeria’s internal security crisis on the dynamics of democratic governance and practice. Unfortunately, the expectations have been dashed as the increasing nature of insecurity of lives and property has remained the greatest threat to democracy in Nigeria. Okoye and Alumona (2014) have tried to underscore
the nexus between the practice of democracy and the challenges of internal security in Nigeria. They rightly assert that “despite the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria more than a decade ago, the Nigerian people have not been provided security of life and property as part of the dividends of democracy that the leaders often flaunt” (Okoye and Alumona 2014, p. 195). In many ways, the character and dynamics of democratic politics appear to be fuelling the insecurity problem. The level of violence that has manifested in the interplay of power and forces since 1999 leaves much to be desired. The struggle for power among the political elites has remained a “do or die” affair as a good number of the elites have lost their lives in the struggle for power and control. The conduct of the political parties and the key political actors involved in the political process has not contributed to the process of democratic consolidation (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007).

The worrisome character of internal insecurity and the dynamics of its management have for some time commanded the attention and tasked the energies of various scholars. The research efforts of these scholars have been exposed in the different publications that seek to examine the nature, character and dynamics of internal security management in Nigeria. Among such scholarly works are Dapo Adelugba and Phillip Ogo Ujomu, Rethinking Security in Nigeria: Conceptual issues in the quest for social order and national integration, 2008; Ozoemenam Mbachu and Umar M. Bature, Internal security management in Nigeria: A study in terrorism and counter terrorism, 2013; Ozoemenam Mbachu and Chukwudi Mayor Eze, Democracy and National security in Nigeria: Issues, challenges and prospects, 2009; John Adewale Abolurin, Nigeria’s National Security: Issues and Challenges, 2011; Isaac Olawale Albert, Willie Aziegbe Eselebor and Nathaniel Danjibo, Peace, Security and Development in Nigeria, 2012; Okwudiba Nnoli, Democracy and National security in Nigeria, 2013; and Nwolise, O.B.C., Is physical security alone enough for the survival, progress and happiness of man, 2013.

This present volume complements the existing scholarly works on the subject matter. However, it moves beyond them to offer a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical foundations of internal security, the threats to internal security, the role of formal and informal agencies in internal security management and the challenges of internal security management in Nigeria.
**STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS**

This book, *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: Perspectives, challenges and lessons*, was initiated as a modest contribution of the editors and contributors towards solving the crisis of internal security in Nigeria. Specifically, the book critically explores some salient issues, perspectives and challenges that have tended to challenge the foundations of the internal security management paradigm in Nigeria. In addressing these concerns, the book has 30 chapters spread across four parts. In the introduction, the editors, Oshita O. Oshita, Ikenna Alumona and Freedom Onuoha basically set the tone of the analyses, justified the focus of the study and briefly highlighted the discourses about the internal security management in Nigeria.

The first part of the book sets out to examine the theoretical and practical nexus between the state and security management. The part contains three chapters. The first, by Oshita O. Oshita and Augustine Ikelegbe, interrogates internal security management as a legitimate human interest and an aspect of the broad concept of security governance. Drawing from the theoretical framing of issues in internal security management in Nigeria, the authors basically explore how the mix of historical and structural factors, together with governance, legislation, actors, drivers, dynamics and capabilities of stakeholders, has impacted on the efficacy or otherwise of the internal security sub-sector. The chapter provides a historical insight into the many challenges of internal security management and argues that outside the nature of management of internal security by the security agencies and the conduct of security personnel, which have alienated them from the ordinary citizens, interference by the political class in the management processes in the security sector has remained the greatest challenge to ensuring adequate security provisioning.

In the second chapter of the part, Ikenna Mike Alumona reflects on the theoretical nexus between the state and security management. He begins by contextualising the essence of the state which many authorities have acknowledged to be the provision of security and welfare for the citizens. He makes the point that since the state is an abstract entity that cannot be seen nor touched, the responsibilities of the state are exercised by the government. Thus, the government in the final analysis through the processes of governance takes responsibility of providing security and welfare. As he argued, “since it is in the processes of governance that state structures or institutions do perform the essential function of security maintenance, the
relationship between governance and security cannot be ignored”. In the final substantive part of the chapter, Alumona critically engages with the debate about the state of internal security and offers explanations for understanding the crisis of internal security in Nigeria. The chapter is premised on the thesis that the dysfunctionality of Nigeria’s federal system, which is a product of the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state, has resulted in the politicisation of security structures and governance processes involved in security management. This in turn has negatively aggravated and sustained insecurity in the country. In the last chapter of Part I, Rosemary Okolie-Osemene provides a historical discourse of internal security challenges in Nigeria since 1999 when the country returned to democratic governance. The author outlines the various factors of internal insecurity since 1999 and argues that the democratic dispensation has not abated internal security threats because most security agencies have either become victims of insecurity or faced criticism from the masses because of the capacity of non-state actors to overrun some communities and towns.

The second part of the book, which features 13 chapters, outlines and critically discusses the many dimensions of internal security threats in Nigeria. There is no doubt that Nigeria is in the throes of a major internal security crisis. On a daily basis, the national dailies are awash with reports of the horrifying incidents of internal threats to lives and property. The internal insecurity crisis is denoted by two major features, namely the increasing frequency of factors of insecurity and the changing character and dynamics of their manifestations. While some of the manifestations of the insecurity have a national character, different geopolitical zones have been plagued by a specific form of insecurity or another. On the whole, the rising level of insecurity has much left to be desired. Nigerians have lost count of the number of attacks by the dreaded Boko Haram and other similar sects and the value of life and property involved. On the other hand, the havoc caused by the Fulani herdsmen in many cases appears to have outweighed the impact of the Boko Haram menace. In another dimension, while the phenomenon of the kidnapping appears to be going down, the emerging culture of violence perpetuated by legal and illegal revenue collectors in many urban cities is becoming a serious matter of concern.

Francis Chigozie Chilaka and Ikechukwu Idika open the part with an examination of the menace of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. They trace the origin of the formation of the Boko Haram sect and argue that in order to downgrade the sect considerably and recapture outstanding
territories from the group, efforts should be made to deepen intelligence sharing with other regional military forces because evidence abound that Boko Haram operate more effectively along borders in Northern Nigeria. This is followed by Jude Odigbo, who looks at the security implications of the conflict between the Fulani herdsmen and rural farmers in the different parts of the country. From another dimension, Al Chukwuma Okoli and Onyekachi Ernest Nnabuihe, using the central region as a focal point of analysis, re-examine the phenomenon of communal conflicts in Nigeria. They contend that the existing knowledge about communal conflicts which generally attributes its cause to the dialectics of identity politics and ethno-religious convolutions is not completely correct. Within the context of the political ecology perspective, the authors basically try to explain how in reality primordial social and cultural factors serve as veritable fault lines for harbouring communal conflicts. This is particularly true when these communal conflicts are accorded strategic partisan attention through the political manipulation of the elites who are basically after their own interest.

The Niger Delta region is another hotspot in the crisis of insecurity in Nigeria. The nature and character of oil politics in the region has resulted in a legion of problems such as environmental degradation, kidnapping, destruction of oil facilities, oil theft, youth militancy and so on. Of all the problems created by the politics of oil exploitation and the distribution of oil wealth, none has threatened the stability of Nigerian economy as the phenomenon of youth militancy in the Niger Delta. In this regard, Ernest Tooch Aniche examines the phenomenon of youth militancy in Niger Delta. He provides a historical sketch of youth militancy in the region and also looks at the nature, methods and drivers of youth militancy. He argues that years of environmental degradation and total neglect in the Niger Delta region led to the emergence of many youth organisations that subsequently took to militancy as a bargaining tool to get a fair share in the distribution of oil revenue. He concludes that unless attention is paid to constitutional reforms that will ensure adequate distribution of oil revenue, the problem of youth militancy will continue to be a feature of politics in the region.

In a related vein, Cornelius Ozeh and Chukwuemeka Ohajionu explore the link between unemployment, migration and cyber criminality. They argue that the alarming rate of unemployment and underemployment has significantly contributed to cyber-criminality in Nigeria despite the existence of extant laws to address cybercrimes in the country. Relying on the
analytical framework of McClelland’s Needs theory, they further reveal that the motivation to satisfy needs for achievement, affiliation and power, which could not be satisfied due to unemployment or underemployment, remains the propelling force for the intimidating level of cyber-criminality in Nigeria. Thus, they recommend value reorientation, job creation and the implementation of the letters and spirits of the laws against cyber-criminality as the solutions to the problem which already has battered the image of Nigeria in the international scene. Ikenna Mike Alumona and Kingsley Onwuanabile shift attention to the close and complex connection between the environment and human security. They explore the nature and character of environmental insecurity in Nigeria. They further highlight the efforts of government towards ensuring a safe and clean environment starting with the promulgation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency FEPA Act of 1998. The basic contention of the authors is that the weak institutional capacity of the state institutions responsible for environmental management and protection accounts for the challenge of environmental insecurity in Nigeria. To this end, they recommended the strengthening of agencies involved with environmental management and attitudinal change among Nigerians as a panacea to the problem.

Olabisi James Ayodele looks at the concept of crime, its manifestations and the nexus between crime and internal security in Nigeria. He outlines the various dimensions and manifestations of crime. He further locates the link between incessant crimes and internal insecurity in the brazen violation of extant laws that are meant to prevent crime by the government and the governed. According to him, Nigeria cannot be secured internally in a situation where acts of criminality by both the citizens and the state are treated with levity. To guarantee public order and forestall insecurity in Nigeria, the author recommends that criminal violations should be addressed decisively by the government by strengthening and overhauling the relevant institutions involved in crime management.

The phenomenon of kidnapping has manifested in an alarming proportion in Nigeria since the return of democracy and has remained a constant feature of the landscape of criminal victimisation. Freedom Onuoha and James Okolie-Osemene explored the nature of kidnapping with particular attention to kidnapping for ransom which has remained a major source of security concern because of the growth in frequency, geographical spread and operational audacity. The authors develop a typological construct of kidnapping for ransom (K4R) which is based on insights gleaned from the character and modus operandi of kidnapping gangs. Utilising a theoretical
bridging framework that combines the lifestyle theory, routine activity theory and economic theory of crime, they argue that the escalation of K4R derives from, and reflects, the crisis of the Nigerian political economy. They further discuss the factors that underpinned the escalation of K4R. The chapter concludes that the upsurge in K4R seems to be overwhelming the Nigerian Police, necessitating the adoption of extra measures by the Nigerian government such as the registration of mobile phone users, adoption or amendment of anti-kidnapping legislation by some states to provide harsh punishment (death penalty), the deployment of military taskforce, and demolition of structures or buildings owned or used by kidnappers for their operations, among others. These and other measures have proven largely ineffective in addressing the menace. To this end, the authors recommend, among others, government’s implementation of measures to drastically reduce poverty, create employment for the teeming youth and curb widespread corruption, evolve a reliable national identification system and the capacitation of security and law enforcement agencies through proper training and equipment.

From the well-known threat of kidnapping for ransom, the part diverts our attention to the havoc caused in most urban cities in Nigeria by those who legally and illegally are involved in the all-important task of revenue generation for the different state governments. An emerging feature of revenue generation across most states in Nigeria is the involvement of contractors who collect revenue on behalf of the government to avoid the leakages and diversion allegedly perpetuated by the career civil servants. A disturbing character of this system of revenue collection is the culture of violence adopted by the legal and illegal contractors involved in the process. This ugly situation appears not to have attracted systematic academic inquiry. It is therefore interesting that Stephen Azom and Chukwuma Okoli decided to focus attention on the subject matter. They examine the effects of the emerging culture of (un)armed violence by legal/illegal revenue collectors in Nigeria using Enugu metropolis as a focal point of analysis. They observe that states and local governments experience fiscal challenges due to the lopsided federal structure of the post-colonial Nigerian state which concentrates major sources of revenue at the centre. This is despite the constitutional provision that empowers all the three tiers of government to collect specified rates and taxes concurrently. However, they note that states and local governments against the backdrop of rapid reduction in oil revenue, increasing cost of governance and growth of neoliberal ideology, which emphasise the need to increase tax
rates while reducing government spending, have continued to adopt the strategies that translate to the use of armed and unarmed agents to enforce rates and taxes. In this light, Enugu, like most other metropolis, has gained notoriety for the activities of armed and unarmed revenue collectors of state ministries, departments and agencies and local government who are turning the state into the Hobbesian state of nature by the crude and violent revenue collection strategies. As they have observed, the major victims of this violence are the helpless operators in the informal economy such as commercial drivers, owners of small and medium businesses, ordinary citizens who visit markets, inter- and intra-state travellers and tenants in residential apartments in the state.

Willie Eselebor interrogates the issue of human trafficking and its linkage with porous borders in Nigeria. The author examines the causative factors behind human trafficking in Nigeria and finds out that the causes are complex and interwoven and deeply rooted in poverty, unemployment, inequality and discrimination. He further explores the issue of security governance of borderlands and the capacity of border security agencies to contain identified challenges. He recommends effective border security which will transmit into the provision of improved technological equipment at the borders, training and retraining of border security operatives as solutions to challenge of human trafficking. Waziri Adisa looks at arms proliferation, *Boko Haram* extremism and insecurity in Nigeria. He argues that while the problem of *Boko Haram* insurgency is caused by multiplicity of factors, illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons is largely responsible for the widespread and lethality of the sect’s activities. Adisa further traces the origin and the political economy of arms proliferation in Africa to the 1970s and 1980s, when many African leaders began to seek for military assistance of foreign nations to end armed insurrections in their countries. The author observes that the neglect of illicit arms transfer, coupled with the inability of the Nigerian government to effectively control its borders, aided the radical Islamist sect, *Boko Haram* to exploit the existing criminal networks by conniving with other radical Islamist sects in the Islamic Magreb to get cache of arms and ammunition used in its eight-year insurrection against the Nigerian state. Adisa makes a similar recommendation with Willie Eselebor that an effective border control system is inevitable in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts. This will ensure that the government is able to cut off the sources of arms supply to armed groups in the country.

Across the globe, the police have been identified as the primary institution that is responsible for internal security management. In the Nigerian
context, they are constitutionally charged with the responsibility of maintaining peace, law and order. But the extent the police has been able to fulfil this responsibility has been a subject of debate in many circles. David Enweremadu in his chapter contributes to this debate by examining the relationship between corruption in the Nigeria Police Force and the challenges of internal security in Nigeria. Of particular interest to the author is how factors such as extrajudicial killings, arrest and illegal detention of citizens orchestrated by policemen aggravate the internal security problem in the country. The author argues that the problem of internal security management by the Nigerian Police is further compounded by the unwillingness of the citizens to report suspected cases of crime to the police, thereby making crime control a very difficult challenge. The citizens have been so alienated by the corrupt practices that bedevil the police. The panacea according to the author lies in independent and community policing and good welfare package for police officers.

Osisioma Nwolise closes the part by delving into the relatively new area of spiritual security. His thought-provoking chapter focuses on the dimensions and manifestations of spiritual threats and insecurity in contemporary Nigeria. The chapter advances the idea of human security further by focusing on the spiritual dimension of human and national security. He argues that the focus on physical security does not give the total picture of the security architecture of a person or nation. He further identifies and discusses with empirical evidence and examples the dimensions and manifestations of spiritual threats to human and national security in contemporary Nigeria. These, according to him, include ritual rape, ritual murder, yahoo-plus, cultism, curses, dream manipulations, violent ghosts, familiar spirits and controlled prostitution. On the strength of his findings, he makes recommendations to ensure that the state and its security agents are able to checkmate these new species of threats. These include new laws, upgrading of training of security personnel and public security education in schools, churches, mosques, radio and television.

A disturbing aspect of the Nigerian internal security problem is that there appears to be enough agencies that are meant to take care of the country’s security challenges. On the one hand, available evidence tends to point to the fact that the government has tried to provide resources to cater for the requirements for managing Nigeria’s internal security. On the other hand, it would appear that the agencies charged with the duty of maintaining internal security are facing serious setbacks in the course of discharging their constitutional duties. In this volume, this intractable
problem also attracted the scholarly attention of some contributors. Accordingly, Sec. 3 which is made up of six chapters devotes attention to the role of formal and informal agencies in the management of internal security in Nigeria. This has become necessary against the backdrop of the increasing level of the threats to internal security and the seeming inability of these actors to curtail the threats.

Jude Abdulkareem Momodu opens the part with an examination of the role of the Nigerian Army in internal security operations (ISOs) in the Fourth Republic. He observes that the deployment of the army in ISOs has dramatically increased since the return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999. This, he argues, is due to the liberalisation of the political space which came as a result of the demystification of the 33 years of military dictatorship that suppressed popular dissent and agitations from interest groups. Another factor that is responsible for the excessive deployment of army on ISOs is the fact that the Nigeria Police Force that is constitutionally charged with the responsibility of tackling internal security challenges is largely poorly funded, ill-equipped and ill-trained to handle them. These factors have often made civilian authorities to heavily rely on the expertise of army and its sisters’ forces, the navy and air force to manage internal security challenges. In effect, the regular engagements of its personnel have made the organisation to assume the position of the first line of internal security defence which ordinarily is the role of the police. The author found out that the Nigerian Army has so far successfully played the role of managing the country’s internal security effectively and efficiently to the extent that it has been able to prevent the democratic Fourth Republic from collapsing like the previous republics that were cut short by military officers with inordinate political ambitions. The army remains the bastion of Nigeria’s unity as its men and women have continued to keep the disparate entities within the country together as a corporate entity. However, the regular engagements of the army in ISOs have exposed its shortcomings, which include inadequate funding, personnel and training deficit, equipment and logistics deficit, human rights abuses and corruption within the institution. In order to address these challenges, the chapter recommends that the federal government and the National Assembly should ensure increased budgetary funding to the army which is very critical towards equipping the institution for better performance of ISOs. The army authorities should introduce human rights education in the army training modules as well as set up human rights desks in theatres of ISOs. These efforts will help to professionalise its men and women in conducting effective and efficient ISOs. More
importantly, the federal government needs to empower the police and other traditional agencies of internal security management through increased funding so that these agencies can adequately equip their capacities in order to effectively and efficiently carry out the function of internal security management.

A central message from Jude Momodu’s chapter is that the Nigerian Police which is constitutionally empowered with the responsibility of tackling internal security challenges is largely poorly funded, ill-equipped and ill-trained to handle them. To make up with the inability of the Nigerian Police to effectively manage the internal security threats, the Nigerian government has appreciated the need for collaboration among the security agencies. To this end, Joint Task Forces are usually set up for specific purposes and assignments to resolve different security concerns. Against this background, Mathias Daji Yake examines the challenges of Joint Task Force Operations but with particular focus on its ISOs in Plateau State, Nigeria. He posits that maintenance of security in Plateau State is beyond the presence of the Military Joint Task Force alone but also includes the need for collective responsibility and sincerity of purpose by politicians in the state. He concludes that even though the Nigerian 1999 constitution (as amended) backs the role of the military in ISOs, a robust policy framework for joint operations would help strengthen the operations, especially in providing the needed funds to procure and efficiently carry out its mandates.

In a related vein, Adebola Rafiu Bakare and Gabriel Temitope Aderinola look at the role of the Nigerian Police in internal security management. The authors observe that although the Nigerian Police could be commended for discharging their constitutional responsibility of providing security of life and property in the country, recent events have shown that Nigeria is no longer safe as it used to be in the past. Further, the authors provide an appraisal of the performance level of the Nigeria Police in the management of internal security. The authors conclude that despite its shortcomings, the Nigerian Police still possess the potential to be effective if the identified challenges such as manpower shortage and elite policing; poor public perception; public alienation and corruption; and overly centralised and non-meritocratic leadership among others are mitigated. Still concerned with the role of formal agencies in internal security management, Johnson Idowu critically examines the extent to which the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps has lived up to its statutory responsibility of providing assistance in the maintenance of peace and order and in the protection and
rescuing of the civil population during the periods of emergency. He observes that Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) has been faced with numerous challenges such as poor funding and inter-agency rivalry which has affected its performance. He concludes that the NSCDC has through dialogue, negotiation, debate and public enlightenment contributed positively to the management of internal security in Nigeria.

On the other hand, Saheed Owonikoko and Kelvin Ashindorbe also examine the role of the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) in internal security management. The main argument of the chapter is that NPS is yet to perform its role effectively due to challenges such as inadequate funds; problem of poor rehabilitation programmes; mixture of minor offenders with hardened criminals; problem of persons awaiting trial and the philosophy of operating Nigerian prisons as punitive rather than reformative system. As a result, they opine that Nigerian prisons have become avenues for criminalisation of inmates rather than reformation centres, thus complicating Nigeria’s national security. They recommended addressing deteriorating conditions of Nigerian prisons through adequate funding; de-emphasising imprisonment as a form of punishment except where it is absolutely necessary; addressing the problem of awaiting trial persons (ATPs) through judicial reform and separation of minor and major offenders during imprisonment as the means through which the Nigerian prisons can help positively in the task of maintaining internal security. The part closes with an examination of the role of vigilante groups in internal security management. Vigilante groups are part of what in the literature is referred to as non-state security actors (Risse and Ursula 2006; Merz 2010). Generally, vigilantes and other non-state security actors such as private security companies and ethnic militias have received greater attention because of their prominent involvement in providing security in developing and weak states. According to Omeje (2007, p.73), “as in many sub-Sahara African countries, vigilantism plays a prominent role as a concept and practice of security provision in Nigeria, having existed as local security arrangements for centuries”. As a result of the violent activities of vigilantism, not only in Nigeria but in other parts of Africa, the dominant view in the literature has come to see vigilantism as a “reversion to the violent indigenous institutions of law and order based on secret societies and occultist practices or as a product of the contemporary institutional environment of clientelism and corruption in which youth struggle for their share of patronage resources” (Kate 2007, p. 124). Arising from the existing perspective, Iloh and Nwokedi observe that the changing character of criminality has made it more difficult for the state security agencies alone to manage the problem of insecurity; hence, the involvement of
vigilante groups which itself is fraught with legion of challenges. They, therefore, argue that despite arguments to the contrary, vigilante groups should be seen as complementing the work of state security agencies instead of being seen as an indictment that the state security actors have failed in their constitutional responsibilities of securing lives and property in the country.

In the final part of the book which is made up of seven chapters, we devote attention to an examination of some of the challenges of internal security management in Nigeria. Although faced with numerous internal security challenges, Nigeria has always aspired to be a major player at the regional and global levels (Omotola 2010, 2015). Freedom Onuoha opens the part with a conceptual interrogation of the idea of the Nigerian project within the context of the quest for sustainable national security. He observes that the Nigerian project is about the national effort to resolve contradictions underpinned by the multi-ethnic nature of post-colonial Nigerian state in order to forge a peaceful, united and prosperous nation out of the diverse nationalities wielded into a geographic entity by a common colonial experience. His basic contention is that the increasing inability of the Nigerian state to handle the evolving factors of insecurity is largely tied to the perverse nature of the state. As he puts it, “the character of the Nigerian state itself undermines not only the quest for national security but also the very basis of the Nigerian project”. In conclusion, he opines that for the Nigerian project to be successfully pursued and consequently realised, there is the need for the total overhaul or restructuring of the character and posture of the Nigerian state through a process of national dialogue. “Failure to do this”, as he warns, “will only ensure a future where the Nigerian project will continue to falter, making the attainment of sustainable national security elusive”. Similarly, Agaptus Nwozor examines the changing character of security matrix and how it affects the management of insecurity in Nigeria. He links the seeming longitudinal ubiquity of insecurity in the country to the structural contradictions and superior economic payoff arising from institutional incapacity of its security apparatuses. According to him, the multi-ethnic, multicultural and multireligious nature of Nigeria motorise the centrifugal forces that give impetus to insecurity in the polity, and this is because of the unsatisfactory resolution of the national question. He further contends that the seeming upsurge in the spate of insecurity in Nigeria signposts the gradual erosion and delegitimisation of the state. Arising from this position, he recommends that the Nigerian state must decisively recover its supremacy by articulating a holistic, people-driven security reforms that will mainstream
the national question in the insecurity equation. Saheed Owonikoko
explores how the twin issue of transparency and accountability in the utili-
sation of security funds affects internal security management in Nigeria.
He notes that the whole idea of budgeting and utilisation of security funds
in the country is shrouded in secrecy all in the name of national security.
This is promoting fraud and corruption in the security sector. As a result,
Nigeria has not attained a level of security commensurate to the funds dis-
bursed in that respect. A particular area where the issue of lack of transpar-
ency and accountability in the utilisation of funds for security management
in Nigeria has manifested strongly is the issue of security vote allocated to
the executive arm of government at all levels. Rather than promote internal
security, security votes have been used to foment violence and insecurity.

Daniel Ikuomola approaches the matter from a different dimension by
looking at the seemingly neglected issue of social insecurity and how it
affects internal security. The author notes that Nigeria needs a social secu-
rity policy that will impact positively on the redistribution effects of eco-
nomic policy and the protection of the people from the vagaries of the
market. The absence of a social security policy has significantly contributed
to the country being ranked among the poorest countries in the world,
and this has directly and indirectly contributed to the security challenges
that have bedevilled the country. Aituaje Irene Pogoson and Moses
Ugbobii Saleh in Chap. 28 engage with the role of gender in internal secu-
rity management. The authors extend the perception of security beyond
its ordinary understanding as primarily a state concern to examine the
dynamics of gender in the internal security management. They observe
that gender is not just “about women”—but it is about men and women
and the different roles, characteristics and behaviour expected or assumed
of them in a society. They point out that “gender plays a critical role in
determining the types of crimes that women, girls, men and boys tend to
commit, and to be victims of. Gender factors such as age, disability, gen-
der, ethnicity and class—are central to our understanding of security.
Therefore, taking into consideration gender issues in internal security
management is crucial to maintain peace and security”. After an examina-
tion of the gender implications of unrest in the Niger Delta Region, the
growth of militant Islamism primarily in Northern Nigeria, the hazard of
raiding armed Fulani herdsmen and the Zaki Ibiam invasion among oth-
ers, the chapter concludes that gender sensitivity to internal security man-
agement is crucial to the overall objectives of any security measure or
decision to restore normalcy and that the management of internal security
can no longer be understood in one-dimensional terms—as protection
from external enemies. The other aspect of national security that is traditionally recognised as vital to any nation, the protection from the internal enemies of neglect, ignorance and despair, especially as it concerns women in particular, must be enriched.

Moses Duruji, Faith Olanrewaju and Favour Duruji-Moses explore the role of the youth in internal security management in Chap. 29. According to the authors, the army of unemployed and idle youth population in the country is a serious factor in the analysis of the increasing state of insecurity in the country. It is in realisation of this fact that the option of youth empowerment is believed to possess the capacity of not only keeping the youths busy but putting food in their table and thereby making incentive to engage in actions that promote insecurity unattractive. Further, they outline and discuss some of the youth empowerment programmes such as the amnesty programme You win and N-Power. Using documentary and descriptive analysis, they also examine the sociopolitical and economic impact of these youth empowerment programmes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Overall, careful reading of the various chapters in this book leads to some inevitable conclusions about the Nigerian state and internal security management. The Nigerian state is daily threatened by many factors of insecurity that have not been properly managed by the state. In its present form and character, the Nigerian state does not appear to have a clear and definite internal security policy to deal with the challenges of internal insecurity. This in so many ways is affecting the capacity of the security agencies to effectively discharge their responsibilities to its citizenry.

REFERENCES


PART I

Theoretical Perspectives
An Overview of Theoretical and Practical Issues in Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Oshita O. Oshita and Augustine O. Ikelegbe

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa with an estimated 190 million people spread across more than 300 ethnic and linguistic groups. Apart from her huge diversity in culture, ethnicity, religion and language, the sheer size of Nigeria’s population presents issues for internal security management. Internal security management is an aspect of the broad concept of security management. Security management involves planning, operational and tactical actions undertaken to prevent, contain or respond to a security condition with a view to strengthening the existing security regime, neutralise perceived threats and normalise the situation. As a human interest, security management, at the micro-, meso- or macro-levels, often involves certain internal as well as external dimensions. Internal security management, therefore, refers to the management of the
dynamics of security within a determinable unit of existence, which may be a community, town or country. On the other hand, external security management comprises those dynamics of security that, though external to a given context under examination, may affect it one way or another.

Nigeria is in the throes of a major internal security crisis. Perhaps, the last ten years or so has witnessed the greatest threats to internal order and national cohesion. Never since the civil war (1960–1970) has insecurity become so extensive, with fear, anxiety and suspense so high among citizens, and mass killings, destructions and collateral damage so extensive across the country, amidst sophisticated, organised and horrendous violence and criminality. Never before has the entire country been held captive by terrorists, militants and armed brigands, as has occurred with the Boko Haram terrorists, armed local and foreign herder militants, and disparate organised bandits, kidnappers and armed robbery gangs. Expectedly, the entire internal security architecture has come under severe scrutiny and open criticisms, with questions and doubts being raised in public discourses about the quality, effectiveness and performance of the security agencies (SAs) and their nature of personnel, equipment holding, command, deployment, management and political leadership.

This chapter presents an overview of some theoretical issues in internal security management in Nigeria by examining how a combination of structural factors, governance, legislation and institutions on the one hand, and actors, drivers, dynamics and capacities on the other hand, impact the efficacy, or otherwise, of the internal security management. The objective of this chapter is to provide a broad-brush analysis that mirrors the internal security management efforts and to identify challenges and lessons learned as well as prospects for improving the internal security architecture in Nigeria, including responses to new and emerging internal security threats, such as the Boko Haram insurgency, kidnapping, sectarian violence, youth radicalisation, violent extremism, militancy, pastoralists’ and sedentary farmers’ conflicts, and separatist agitations. The questions for reflection include, whether the existing internal security infrastructure in Nigeria can proactively deal with emerging threats like youth radicalisation and violent extremism. The responses take into account section 14 (2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), which stipulates that “The security and welfare of the people shall be a primary purpose of government”. The social contract upon which the transition from the state of nature to civil society is founded implies that the essence of every government is the guarantee of the basic
internal and external security requirements—protection of life and limbs of all members of society. Internal insecurity in Nigeria has reached very disturbing levels for both the government and the citizens.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Though security involves theory and practice, in this chapter, we shall focus more on the theoretical aspects. By focusing on theoretical issues in internal security management, this chapter concentrates on the analytical framing that often informs the practical and operational aspects of internal security management using Nigeria as the unit of scrutiny. In doing this, however, we recognise that global interconnectedness and advances in technology have continually narrowed the line between internal and external elements in the management of security as well as other contexts. Advances in internet technology and other platforms of instantaneous communication have shrunk the size of the world and cheated time and distance significantly. Ake (1995, p. 23) explains this as culminating into growing structural differentiation and functional integration in the world economy; it is growing interdependence across the globe; it is about the nation state coming under pressure from the surge of transnational phenomena; it is about the emergence of a global mass culture driven by mass advertising and technical advances in mass communication.

Security and conflict are inextricably interwoven human interests in the same way that insecurity and violent conflict are mutually reinforcing within and across “vanishing” and increasingly “fluid” boundaries. To appreciate the determinants of security, it is important to recognise the nexus of security with a host of other human interests. This linkage is aptly captured by Robert McNamara, when he says:

Security is not military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it encompasses it, security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is development and without development, there can be no security.

Security involves both tangible and intangible properties and does not necessarily mean the absence of ostensible violence. Like security, it can be
said that peace is not the mere absence of war, though it may involve it, peace is not the absence of conflict though it may include it; peace is not about the dissolution of identities, nor neutralisation of diversities. Peace is the harmonious coexistence of contending perspectives, views and empathic understanding and mutual management of essential differences for human progress and sustainable development. Peace involves trust and is a precondition for security and attainment of mental and physical development.

There are certain theoretical and analytical conceptions that are central to the understanding of the issues of internal security management.

The national security system could be divided, though not neatly, into the internal and external security. External security is concerned with detecting, confronting and managing external threats to the territorial integrity and survival of the nation, and is dominantly the terrain of the Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Agency. Internal security is essentially concerned with guaranteeing the protection and preservation of lives, property, vital institutions, economy and vital interests, ensuring a conducive atmosphere for citizen freedom and pursuit of their livelihoods and legitimate concerns, and a secure domestic environment for production, development and national progress. It is about maintaining civil and public order, social cohesion and national stability, preventing and containing violence, conflicts, crime and breakdown of law and order and preventing and managing domestic threats to citizens and the state (Nabhon 2013).

There have been some changes in the conceptions and management of internal security in Nigeria. From the preoccupation with crime, violence and threats to law and order, and stability, and mechanisms and actions for reacting to physical security threats such as security deployments, armaments and physical force, there are now more broad and inclusive engagements of issues such as natural disasters, economic crisis, human and environmental vulnerabilities and even governance crisis. Second, internal security management now engages issues that generate threats to stability and order such as poor citizen well-being, unemployment, poverty, inequity and injustice, and the management of diversity. Third is increasing concerns for providing the conditions that enable security to thrive, the environment that is more fertile for national security management and that facilitates sustainable internal security and peace.

The focus on theoretical perspectives for understanding internal security management is justifiable because the understanding, analysis, conclusions
and prescriptions of internal security challenges have been major problems in the looming internal security imbroglio that the country faces. This difficulty of sufficient knowledge and understanding of national security threats was raised by Ikelegbe et al. (2015):

Have the issues of causality, grievance narratives and the trajectories of evolution and actions; the driving forces for expansion, tenacity and capacity; the variegation of actors, foot soldiers, social basis, elite and community support; and the dynamics of operations, strategy and resources of insurgents, terrorists and bandits, and organised criminal networks been clearly studied, analysed, understood and explained?

The point has to be made that the country has often groped in the dark while forces driving internal insecurity consolidated and thrived. There was initial confusion and non-clarity of perceptions and actions concerning the Boko Haram insurgency. There were several theses that painted it as mere puritan Islamist practice, regional protest and intra- and inter-party political differences, all of which underpinned initial hesitation, inaction and caution while the terrorists blossomed. The failure of precise understanding and speedy actions is also plaguing the reaction to the very seemingly organised, armed and purpose-driven militant attacks against communities in North-Central, North-East, South-South, South-West and South-Eastern parts of Nigeria. Again, there is confusion even at the highest levels as to whether it is a herders-farmers conflict that is induced by blockage of grazing routes, anti-grazing laws and climate change, or a somewhat external aggression driven by ex-militants from the Sahel.

The first place to begin the presentation of theoretical perspectives is the issue of conception of security. The point has been severally made that the post-Cold War era conceptions of security was a major paradigmatic shift from state-centric and physical dimension that focused on warfare, armaments and extensive deployments to the security of citizens and society, to a focus on human security and development and the enabling environment for sustainable development, security and peace. However, state- and regime-centred security which was quite dominant during the periods of colonial and military rule still drives security management in Nigeria. It is hinged on state and regime survival, security of the ruling class and elite, extensive securitisation and physical security deployments against recurrent security threats, and reactive engagements characterised by excessive force, repression and rights abuse.
This is fairly contradistinctive from human-security-driven management that integrates people-friendly approaches and human development—human welfare and well-being, citizen rights and vulnerabilities, social stability, and individual and collective safety and peace into the internal security calculus. While the former fuels counter-violence, proliferation of small arms and militarisation of society while only creating fragile, negative and unsustainable security, the latter eliminates the conditions for insecurity, focuses on proactive security engagements and creates social and national stability, sustainable peace and security (Ikelegbe 2014, p. 115).

This very narrow conception and engagement with security is perhaps at the root of sustained insecurity in the country. According to Nwolise (2015, p. 171), the Nigerian ruling elite

have not seen the relationship between poverty, unemployment, hunger, injustice on the one hand and security on the other hand….There can be no real security without any meaningful job creation efforts, without the payment of workers’ salaries as and when due, without the payment of living wages, without paying pensioners and without micro-credit facilities. This is the beginning of Nigeria’s security or insecurity problems. The thinking behind the (security) agencies and policies is jaundiced.

The dominance of state and regime security has meant that the “assurance of the security of the people”, “obligations to the security of citizens” and the “access of citizens to security” have been subsidiary (Nabhon 2013, p. 233). The security of individuals in government and elite has taken priority in terms of deployments of personnel, operational responses and personnel motivation, while leaving out the communities, neighbourhoods and ordinary citizens to scanty security attention. A major fallout of this is the sustained detachment of the security delivery system from the people and its associated support and local knowledge.

Quite related to the issue of conception of security is the approach to internal security management, which, as Nabhon (2013, p.230) notes, is diversely conceptualised as military/coercive response versus the progressive; operational versus strategic; responsive versus preventive; and reactive versus proactive (Ekoko and Vogt 1990; Safir 2003; Bassey 2004; Okeke 2006; Arase and Iwuofor 2007). The coercive, operational or reactive strategies are focused on combating existing domestic security threats, and reacting to emergent security threat situations through large mobilisation of personnel, logistics, arms and communication systems, and deployments,
with a view to containment and subduing and punishing of offenders. Nabhon (2013, pp. 232–235) avers that the dominance of the reactive security perspective in Nigeria has been associated with high tendencies of excessive force, escalation of violence, extensive collateral damages, high personnel risks, high cost of security delivery, waste in security delivery system, proliferation of arms and, indeed, an arms race between criminals and state forces, militarisation of society, and unrestricted use of arms that has normalised and socialised arms power as right. Other consequences are the alienation of the public from internal security agencies and, more importantly, the failure of the internal security delivery system in attaining the goals of domestic order and security.

The reactive system of internal security management is further associated with extensive securitisation of the public sphere. What becomes a security concern and is responded to is dependent on what is regarded as an existential threat to society and the state (Buzan and Wilde 1998). It is the perception of what is a threat or causes threats that places such subjects outside the normal sphere of societal behaviour and within the sphere of “threat-defence sequence” (Nabhon 2013, p. 225). The securitisation of a subject justifies subsequent plethora of security measures and deployment of security forces and resources to confront the same. Conversely, de-securitisation means the removal of a matter in the public sphere from the existential threat-security action narrative into the realm of normal behaviour and actions (Nabhon 2013, pp. 225–226).

However, the success of narratives and legitimisation of securitisation or de-securitisation is not automatic, but dependent on the perceptions and acceptance of the political community and particularly what society regards as normal procedures, rules and behaviours (Buzan and Wilde 1998; Nabhon 2013). Placed in the Nigerian context, there has been an extensive securitisation of agitations, protest actions and other dynamics of political behaviour and participation in relation to the expressions of needs, problems, grievances, injustices, inequity and unfairness in the public sphere. Subsequent extensive security measures and deployments in the Reactive Approach to internal security management have tended to overstretched the internal security delivery system and the military while militarising society.

A major feature of the operations of the reactive system is the commodification of internal security. Extensive security threats have warranted proliferation of security operations, extensive deployments and the purchase and maintenance of sophisticated equipment and arms. In the
circumstance, security expenditures have become huge and much beyond the capacity of the federal government in a centralised federation. State governments, local governments and even government institutions have thus forayed into providing equipment, logistic support and incentives to security agencies and to indulge in huge budgetary allocations of monies to security. State officials and the political class have taken advantage of speculative and actual threats to security, the high cost of security infrastructure and the specialised security operations to hoodwink citizens and their representatives with presumed extensive security expenditures that are unaccounted for, being sometimes discreet, clandestine, discretionary and subterranean.

Consequently, the security vote has become a major instrument of official corruption that has made available loose funds to chief executives that are laundered, used for settlement of adversaries, inducement of supporters and patronage politics. The security votes of governors, for example, run into hundreds of millions of naira per month, which are spent “outside the norms of public accountability and probity”, and scrutiny, and most of which are “misused and misapplied” away from security, thus denying the security sector of much desired funding (Egwu 2016, pp. 153–161).

The Concentric Circles Theory of national security management is another perspective approach. The theory assumes that security concerns and actions exist at different levels of an environment, in relation to a centre, which can be regarded as “security communities” (Vogt 1990; Hullse 2006). This presupposes that the security of each circle or security community should preoccupy security concerns and operations in a sort of hierarchy, going on from the individual, community, region or nation to the international community. Though these security communities overlap in many ways, it is important that security at lower-level security communities be effectively focused on and tackled before progressing to higher levels, such that security vacuums are not created at such lower levels (Nabhon 2013, pp. 226–227). In the Nigerian context, it is clear that security vacuums exist at community levels and the rural areas, and that the failure to federalise internal security delivery systems has created a conceptual, focus, knowledge, experience and action vacuum, particularly at the local government and state levels.

Beyond conceptions, perspectives and strategies, there is need for comprehensive and holistic analysis of the relationship between the security institutions or internal security architecture as a major constituent of the state and the society which it secures. The systems theory presents a good
framework for such analysis, as it interrogates the relationship between the political system and its environment (Almond 1960; Easton 1965; Beer and Ulam 1968; Ikelegbe 2016). The political system is a set of structures, interactions and activities that perform functions crucial to society’s direction and progress, including security, and has binding authority, while society comprises the environment and its social, economic, ecological and demographic characteristics, social forces, resources, values and attitudes. The political system is able to direct and steer society, modify and ensure an environment conducive for its maintenance, persistence and survival, through sustained interactions, reception of stimuli (input) and responses (output). To enable survival and avoid system stress, the political system must have effective strategies for input reception and effective performance of output as responses to challenges from the environment.

The system theory highlights the interdependence of sub-systems within the political system and between the political system as a sub-system of the larger social system or environment, thus, ensuring that both mutually affect and shape each other. Consequently, the environmental inputs of demand and support orientations, emanating from society’s pressures, forces and dynamics affect the workings and dynamics of the political system just as its internal dynamics, operations and outputs could modify and shape the environment. The political system’s responsiveness, self-regulation through self-correction and change, capacity to produce effective output that assuages society’s pressures, capacity to adapt to change and manage stress from the environment through internal and external adjustments, and the strength of its institutions, leadership and workings determine societal stability and order, and the achievement of the goals of progress, development and security.

The systems perspective to the analysis of the state and state-society relations is relevant to understanding the dynamics of challenges faced and managerial issues in internal security management. It enables us to situate our analysis on the character of the state and its ruling elite, interactions between sub-systems within the state, the nature of public institutions, the dynamics of interactions and struggles between state and society, nature of effectiveness or otherwise of state responses, policy performance and outcomes, and how all these have impacted on security, stability, development and progress. The Nigerian security architecture has been very strategic to the state because it drove military rule for several decades and remains central to the consolidation of political power and the enforcement of the will of the state and its officials. The character of the state and its ruling
class impinges heavily on the character and behaviour of the security architecture and the conduct of internal security. There are several ways in which the crisis inherent in the nature of the post-colonial state manifests in the challenges of internal security management. The first is in the struggle between state security and regime security, or more precisely the recurring inability of state security architecture to maintain a delicate balance between state and regime security. The second is the dominance of security of state officials and the elite over the security of the citizens. The third is the instrumentality of the state security architecture in the struggles for power, the consolidation of power and, more specifically, in the decimation of the opposition parties, civil society, critics and activists. The fourth manifestation is the predominance of coercion, violence and excessive force in the maintenance of internal security.

The failure of the state to respond effectively by way of policy that produce performing outcomes that effectively manage, modify and assuage pressures and destabilising stimuli from society could be linked to the internal weaknesses of the state such as self-interested and decadent ruling class; the interference of primordial interests and loyalties; corruption, selfish motivations, nepotism and rent-seeking behaviour; and poor governance, particularly the lack of equity, fairness and justice among several others. These are at the root of the crisis of multiple conflict generation and the failure of management, as well as the weaknesses of the political and security institutions and overall management of development, security and order (Oshita 2007; Francis 2017). The distortions in the political system and in the relations with society are evident in the lack of security, stability and order.

The nature of political and administrative governance is at the bottom of most of the security challenges being experienced and the poor outcomes of internal security management efforts. The poor state of development, the economy and socio-economic well-being have huge implications for internal security management. The challenges of internal security and internal security management are further complicated by the crisis of nation-building, the challenges of the national question and issues of identity, and how they impact on and are affected by the nature of security institutions, management of internal security challenges and the emergent perceptions and reality of treatment.

Within the systems theory framework, the analysis of institutions as framework and process for internal security management can also be engaged for better understanding of internal security management. The institution is the mechanism for governance and management of public
and social affairs and order, and it comprises rules, procedures, regulations and processes that are established, routinised, standardised, stable and durable to constitute “guiding framework for actions”, interactions and the achievement of goals in both the public and private realms (Hodgson 2006; Leftwich 2006). Institutions have a character of their own, evolve and adapt in relation to pressures and nature of interactions, and reflect experiences and nature of society.

Strong institutions provide codes of conduct and governing behaviour; establish and abide by rules of the game and engagement; constitute systems of effective collaboration and cooperation; set, manage and enforce rules and regulations, and the prescribed ways and means of how things are done; achieve high levels of adherence and compliance with rules; and are effective as frameworks for the “production or distribution of public or private goods, or the mobilisation of prized values or resources” (Ikelegbe 2016). Strong institutions institute good governance systems—systems of high productivity, performance and morale; systems of merit, discipline, efficiency, integrity, fairness and equity; and are fairly insulated from political interference and primordial values.

Quite unfortunately, there is prevalence of institutional failure and breakdown in Nigeria’s public and private sectors. This manifests in disregard for standard ways of doing things; impropriety of behaviour and conduct; dominance of private and primordial interests and personalised contacting; lack of fairness, equity and justice; disregard for laws, rules and procedures; excesses such as impunity and indiscipline; and excessive political interference. These have denied public institutions of competent and effective staffing; organisational capacity and productivity; motivated workforce; competent and effective management and political leadership; institutional integrity and legitimacy; public confidence and trust; positive impacts and performance; and desired outcomes in terms of national security, peace, order and social cohesion. At societal level, weak institutions manifest in the failures of social compact, cohesion and capital; rupture of social values and disregard for rules, laws and due processes; indiscipline, lawlessness, impunity and malpractices; breakdown in the standards of merit, fairness, justice, integrity, ethics, honour and responsibility; rising levels of socio-political rascality and vagrancy; and gradual loss of respect for life and humanity (Ikelegbe 2016), all of which thicken the levels of criminality, conflicts and violence, and weaken the very social basis and capacity for managing security and order.
BACKGROUND TO INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA

Internal security management in Nigeria dates back to the pre-colonial period where various nation-states had their internal security management infrastructure for the maintenance of peace and stability. Some of these were managed by specific age grades, title holders and hunters or some other designated class of persons. Indeed, the pre-colonial non-professional “armies” that were found across what later became Nigeria consisted mainly of able-bodied men from communities that were called upon to defend their villages as the need arose.

There are certain things to note in the management of internal security in the pre-colonial political systems. First is that security agencies were drawn from the local communities and people, and their lineage groups, age grades, associations and social classes. Second was that security was a communal and popular concern, in which all engaged in terms of information, intelligence and action. Everyone watched the other and the community and all were expected to act to secure the community as a social and community obligation. According to Nwolise (2015, pp. 166–167):

Security in traditional or pre-colonial societies was every body’s business as a matter of duty and obligation, as every person worked for the safety and welfare of all. Each person was a strong pillar and useful contributor in the security framework of the society even though specific groups such as age grades, palace guards, masquerade groups or even secret societies existed for security and law enforcement.

Third was that the internal security institutions and management were supported by a strong system of social institutions, value systems, customs and traditions which constructed a strong framework of rules, ethics, acceptable behaviour and sanctions. These characteristics created a strong system of internal security management which contained security challenges, and enabled stability and order in many of the states until they were deceived into submission to colonialist authorities by dubious treaties or defeated by the colonialist armies.

However, with the incursion of colonialism, internal security became the responsibility of Her Majesty—the Queen, through the colonial government. The West African Frontier Force (WAFF), which served as the colonial military to ensure the success of colonial rule in Nigeria, was the
forerunner to the internal security management institutions in the country. The activities of the Royal Niger Company in 1900 and the subsequent amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates in the year 1914 provided the basis for understanding the historical evolution of the internal security management structures in Nigeria. In more specific terms, the various security constructs by the colonial authorities between 1862 and 1909, involving northern and southern regiments under the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), formed the basis for future security architecture. The first commanders of these regiments were Lt CHP Carter (1899–1901) and Col J Wilcox (1900–1909), respectively.

To meet the objectives of the colonial government, the military were used extensively to subjugate the people and facilitate in-country penetration for more effective resource exploitation in both the coastal areas and hinterlands. The major preoccupation of the colonial military was therefore internal security, focusing on securing the interest of the colonial administration and protecting the economic interest of the British Empire. The loyalty that “indigenous soldiers” had to their towns was replaced with a loyalty to the Crown. The British officers in the Nigerian Regiment who commanded the army were instructed to secure the Crown’s territory and suppress any ethnic political uprising (Ukpabi 1976).

Consequently, even after the Crown had consolidated its control over the disputed regions in Nigeria, some British commanders in the army were retained as political officers. Indeed, the colonial government deliberately selected political officers from the military because they possessed skills that made them effective at controlling the populace (Ukpabi 1976). Lord Lugard, as the first Commissioner and Commandant of Northern Nigeria was one of those officers. Beginning with the North, Lugard introduced indirect rule, arguing that it would be easier to control the local populace if it was done through their local leadership. However, in the South, the system excluded a newly emerged crop of educated elite from government and gave too much power to the Obas. In the republican East, there were no paramount chiefs, so the colonial administration had to “enthrone” paramount chiefs to implement the policy (Falola 1999). The challenge here remained the alienation of the educated elite, the people and their traditions in the selection of these chiefs. The appointments were more or less arbitrary and the people had no powers to dethrone erring chiefs. To the extent that these negated aspects of the philosophy of the colonial government, there were implications for the enforcement of internal security in Nigeria. However, some of the dynam-
ics began to alter at the inception of the independence struggles, when leaders from both North and South organised to press for independence for the country.

The colonial internal security management system left a variety of negative legacies which were not only inherited but have continued to dictate conduct, strategies and outcomes. Security focus and management was state-centric and regime-centred, driven by state security agencies, rather than the security of the people, and their livelihoods, social welfare and well-being. Daura (2016, p. 105) has noted that the colonial security institutions were pro-imperialist, coercive and anti-people, and were “reactionary instruments of conquest and repression with the aim of achieving the imperial objectives of resource extraction and political domination”. Thus, security management was dominated by excessive coercion and force, high handedness and repression. The security agencies were detached from the people, alien to them and deployed to enforce security by intimidation and force. Quite associated is a narrow conception of security centred on public order, maintenance of law and order, and physical use of force.

**INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE**

This may be further divided into the eras of military dictatorships and civil rule. The first period of civil democratic rule (1960–1966) was characterised by low levels of criminal violence. Criminality was more limited to petty crimes, and there was a system of fairly effective enforcement of laws and management of criminal justice administration. The greater problems were those of civil protests, political violence and electoral violence. There were riots against perceived political, governance and electoral issues in the Middle Belt of the Northern Region and the Western Region, which among others contributed to the demise of the First Republic through a military coup in 1966. The Second Republic however witnessed increased violent criminality, political violence and electoral violence. Criminal violence, particularly armed robbery, became more commonplace, while there were incidents of political violence. The 1983 general election was particularly plagued by electoral violence and abusive and excessive force by the security agencies. There were violent protests in several states of the South-West following massive rigging of the 1983 general election.

The prolonged period of military rule changed the face of and character of internal security challenges and management. Armed criminal violence
escalated, including the emergence of armed robbery just as there was more brazen and excessive force in the management of internal security such as public executions of armed robbers. The emphasis was on subjugation of criminal elements and dissidents. This eventually led to the replication and escalation of violence in social life, militarisation of society, the socialisation of the use of arms and violence, and an armed race between criminals and state security forces. The military set up special courts and tribunals, thus, interfering in the judiciary and management of the criminal justice administration.

The military privileged regime security and took extreme exceptions to dissidence, dissent and criticism, which led to repression of the opposition and extensive abuse of human rights. The period of military rule witnessed the proliferation of the offshoots of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) with attendant duplications of security agencies. The Federal Road Safety Corps, National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency, and State Security Service, among others, were established. The later period of military rule witnessed the emergence of militant challenges of the state. In the Niger Delta, militants and militias emerged that resisted military force and agitated for resource benefits between 1997 and 1999. Militant resistance also emerged with the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in 1994 in the South-West. Quite surprisingly, military rule witnessed the neglect of the internal security agencies and even the military with decline in the rate of recruitment, equipment holding and security infrastructure, thus weakening the capacity of the agencies to confront security challenges.

Civil democratic rule emerged in the midst of the experience of massive civil and anti-military protests between 1988 and 1999, and resistant militant movements in the Niger Delta and South-West between 1994 and 1999. Armed criminal violence and particularly armed robbery was at its crescendo. There were extensive internal security challenges associated with the militancy in the Niger Delta, the violent conflicts between the OPC and the police, and other ethnic groups in the South-West and the emergence of ethnic militias and militant youth movements across the country, particularly in the South-East and Niger Delta. Self-determination groups proliferated in the South-West and South-East, while secessionist groups such as the Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra also emerged. In the same vein, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was to emerge years later.

Violent communal, ethno-religious, religious and neighbourhood conflicts have since risen to unprecedented levels. Similarly, violent criminality such as armed robbery, bank robberies, kidnapping and ritual
killings have risen to unprecedented levels. Violent criminality and violent protests have become more brazen and daring. Insecurity has since risen to fearsome levels. Collateral damages have been quite extensive in terms of the loss of lives and property. Along with the increased security challenges there has been extensive proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Quite unfortunately, the capacity of the security agencies to confront and contain the security challenges has been disappointingly poor.

Civil democratic rule was associated with extensive security sector reform in the military, police and other security agencies. These included efforts to re-professionalise the agencies, reduce arbitrariness and rights abuses, introduce good governance measures, demilitarise security personnel and institutional conduct, and strengthen democratic control. There have been efforts to recruit more security personnel, increase incentives, improve skill sets and equipment holding, and improve performance of the agencies. Along with increased security challenges there has been the deployment of the military in joint or singular operations and the constitution of numerous special task forces and operations. To further confront these challenges, new security agencies in the civil defence and anti-corruption sectors have been established. However, there have been challenges of political interference in the management and deployment of the security agencies.

**Character, Trends and Patterns of Internal Security Challenges**

Certain characteristics, patterns and trends can be deduced from the contemporary challenges of internal security in Nigeria. Needless to say that the country has been on the throes of the most extensive and deepening insecurity, and violent crimes such as kidnapping, ritual killings, armed robberies, bank robberies, Internet fraud, pipeline vandalism, cult violence, killings and attacks on communities, homes, markets and public parks have become commonplace. There is pervasive sense of insecurity and uncertainty of lives and property because of increasing attacks on the streets, roads, banks, ATM cash points, markets, buses, farmlands and public parks.

There have been three major developments in the pattern of insecurity since the Fourth Republic. These are the increased span of political and electoral violence, the extensive engagements of non-state institutions of
violence in violence and criminality and the emergence of Boko Haram Islamist terrorists. Political and electoral violence has been on the rise since the inception of the Fourth Republic. Perhaps, the greatest threat to national security in the past ten years has been terrorism, driven by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgents. The extensive herders’ attacks on communities, churches, farmlands, homes and highways in Benue, Kaduna, Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa and Kogi States and across the country is raising suspicions about the involvement of foreign armed bands, herders’ militant groups and Boko Haram terrorist cells. The sheer scale of killings and destructions, the ferocity of attacks, the sophistication of arms and the recurring failure of the security forces to deal with the phenomenon may be pointing to more organised, funded and armed participants than mere herders.

These crimes and criminal violence are associated with increasing proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sophistication of arms holding of criminals and criminal bands. Drug abuse has become extensive in all parts of the country among the youth even with common drugs such as codeine, cough syrup and all kinds of ingenious local substances. There is an extensive youth frustration, rebelliousness and predisposition to criminal violence because of increasing unemployment, poverty, hunger and hopelessness. Cultism among the youth which used to be a campus phenomenon has extended to the secondary schools and urban streets, and has become a major driver of urban and neighbourhood violence, street fighting, drug abuse, arms proliferation, assassinations, kidnapping, robberies and killings.

The strength of criminal bands has been such that engagements in bank robberies, kidnapping and herders’ attacks have severe destructive outcomes. There has emerged an increased emulation and mobility of violent and criminal methods of conduct and engagements across the country. Kidnapping and ransom-taking which, for example, was an instrument of engagement by militants in the Niger Delta, to enforce their demands for the exit of foreign oil workers and raise funds for the struggle, has so quickly spread from the South-South, first to the South-East, then South-West and North-Central and now across the entire nation. Similarly, pipeline vandalism has spread from the South-South to the South-East and South-West.

The state of insecurity has been beyond the Nigeria Police Force, which is primarily in charge of internal security management. Alongside the police are numerous other security agencies including the Department of...
State Services (DSS), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). In response to the emergent scale of internal security agencies, the military has been extensively deployed in most of the states of the federation singly, or in joint task or special forces alongside the police, DSS and NSCDC. There are numerous operations involving cooperation between security agencies and the military to contain insecurity, in virtually all the geopolitical zones but more intensely in the Niger Delta, North-Central and North-East. These joint operations have entailed severe corrupting influence on the military that hitherto was not visible on the streets and highways in Nigeria.

**Contemporary Challenges of Internal Security Management in Nigeria**

The extensive insecurity and, some would say, a near-collapse of national security management, attests to numerous challenges in the management of internal security in Nigeria. There are both systemic and organisational challenges as well as conceptual and management challenges.

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is the lead agency in internal security management. Its functions of preventing and detecting crime, apprehending offenders, enforcing laws, protecting life and property, and maintaining public order and safety are central to the core themes of internal security which are security, stability and order. However, the NPF has lacked the personnel quality, discipline, material and equipment holding, funding, motivation and welfare, operational management, responsiveness, and fair and equitable treatment required for optimal performance in the management of internal security and enthronement of a fair level of law, order, security and stability. The NPF has not shed substantially of a coercive and anti-people force, having remained a largely oppressive, intimidating and distant force from the people. It has not been used to and has not actually operated as an agency that identifies with the interests, dignity and rights of citizens.

The country is grossly under-policed. Many of the rural communities and large swathes of urban neighbourhoods have no police presence; hence, the length of time taken to respond to crime incidents and security threats is appallingly long, most often after the incidents. The manpower of the NPF remains inadequate despite promises of extensive recruitment by several administrations since the Fourth Republic. Partly because of the colonial legacy, the NPF has mainstreamed the maintenance of law and
order, but scant attention is paid to the prevention, detection and control of crime. As a result, the NPF has neglected the technology and information and communications technology (ICT) frameworks for the latter and what exists are either grossly inadequate or totally obsolete.

The security agencies (SAs) have neither been autonomous nor apolitical. The dominant drive has been loyalty to the regime and the federal executive. There is a deliberate confusion of the state as a neutral entity with perpetual existence that serves everyone and government or regime as a time-bound and transient entity. Imobighe (2003) notes that most regimes have in most cases used the police and the country’s security enforcement agencies more as instruments for coercion and terrorising the people than for protecting and promoting the good benefit of all. The government has tended to see and use the NPF as its agent rather than as an autonomous agent of the law. Thus, the NPF has not principally functioned as an “agent of the law but as tool for the oppression and suppression of opposing views” (Igbini 2018).

Imobighe (2003, p. 7) rightly notes that governments in Nigeria have done little “to make the police truly independent of the executive or to develop an independent vision of its role in the society”. Thus, the police has largely remained as an instrument of the executive, used as the executive pleases, serving the interests of the governments, governing elite and favoured ruling class. Thus, almost all SAs while applying legitimate force are sometimes biased, partisan and deliberately ineffective or even unresponsive because of the dynamics of political control and opposition politics. The most extensive platform for federal executive deployment for partisan and pro-government purposes has been national elections. In the general elections in 1983, and to a large extent, since the Fourth Republic, the SAs have been deployed and engaged in actions or inactions in favour of the federal administration, the latter through turning their eyes away while atrocities and irregularities were being perpetrated.

The legitimacy of the SAs is poor, with being generally conceived as anti-people, arbitrary, abusive, punitive, ill-equipped and ill-motivated, and they have very poor positive orientations and confidence. The NPF, the largest SA which has the most extensive contact with the population, has very poor public image, reputation, trust and confidence. Professionalism in the SAs has also been poor. For the NPF, carrying out their tasks within a framework of professionalism and best practices has been a most daunting task due to a combination of factors.
The unitary and over-centralised internal security management structure has been a major challenge. The security infrastructure is managed from Abuja and is not decentralised in autonomous command system and personnel drawn from the geo-political zones and states. The security architecture is, therefore, not rooted in the indigenous people and is thus detached, if not alienated, from those that they are supposed to secure. In the circumstance, internal security management is devoid of the knowledge, language, culture, information and dynamics of the local people’s existence and life, and is unable to act and resolve security issues quickly and effectively. The fact that command is from a distant Federal Capital, Abuja, and that other dynamics of politics and governance may interfere further complicates the nearness and effectiveness of security solutions. Though the state governors are theoretically chief security officers of their states, they have no command or regulatory and supervisory powers over the security architecture, which only waits for and responds to directives from Abuja.

The unitarist structure is also linked to the issue of funding and equipment holding. The federal government alone is unable to adequately fund the NPF and other internal security agencies. Beyond personnel costs, these agencies lack basic infrastructure, equipment and technology for security management, such as vehicles, stationery and communication equipment. It has become obligatory for the state and local governments to supplement funding, provide logistic support and facilitate essential services of these agencies because of the crucial need to maintain security, law and order. There is thus an extensive outlay of material support even without their direct control over the agencies.

The state of well-being of the security architecture is a major issue. Beyond emoluments which are poor, running and operational costs are poor; personnel are inadequate; weapon holding, equipment, communication tools and security technology are obsolete and inadequate; office infrastructure are poor and inadequate; and accommodation for operational personnel are lacking or inadequate. The modern technology of data bank, fingerprint technology, forensic analysis laboratories and centres, DNA testing facilities and ICT for security management are poor. In the circumstance, the motivation, incentive systems, morale and job satisfaction are very poor, particularly among the rank and file. The management of criminal administration is thus very daunting, and is particularly slow, inefficient and poor in outcomes.

The nature of management of internal security by the security agencies and the nature of conduct of security personnel have alienated them from
the citizens and locals. The public perception of the security agencies is still centred on fear, lack of confidence, suspicion and lack of trust. There are fears that security personnel may make dubious demands, may require payment for services, may betray them when they give information, and that they may collude with the very criminals that they were supposed to prosecute. The security personnel still treat ordinary citizens with condescension, as subjects to be intimidated and harassed, and handled with brutalised and excessive force, thereby alienating them. As a result, local support, contributions and commitment to the security agencies are poor.

The security agencies are also elite-driven in the sense that they are very disproportionately committed to elite and ruling class security, as compared to citizen and community security. A large proportion of the NPF, for example, are deployed to secure political office holders, politicians, businessmen, traditional leaders and expatriates, leaving the communities, neighbourhoods and streets unguarded.

There are issues of institutional integrity and capacity. There is the challenge of quota system and federal character which compromises the quality of personnel, merit and performance as basis for career progression, and distorts institutional effectiveness because those who make career progress and hold leadership positions may not command the confidence of their colleagues and subordinates. These generate ill-feelings, dissatisfaction and frustration and cause poor performance and even sabotage. Besides, there are ethnic, religious, regional and other identity-based influences on promotions, postings and leadership which undermine leadership legitimacy, organisational effectiveness and job performance.

The synergy, synchrony, communication and cooperation among the security agencies is still poor, though has considerably improved in the past few years. The level of communication, integration, exchanges and sharing of intelligence, initiatives of joint actions and coordination of actions is still poor. The issues of overlapping responsibilities even in the legislative frameworks setting up the agencies; multiple actions and duplications; contentions, disputes and conflicts over who does what or should have done what; rivalry, mutual suspicion and distrust; and competitive tendencies such as some agencies seeking to outshine others or be loud in achievements, and even violent confrontations or threats of confrontations among the agencies are quite rife. Fortunately, the huge security threats emanating from terrorism and violent criminality are compelling some levels of cooperation and coordination which is strengthening synergy.
What can thus be generally asserted is that capacity in terms of manpower, funding, equipment, logistics, technology and motivation and morale of the internal security architecture to engage the extensive security challenges in Nigeria is poor and over-stretched. This is the reason for the extensive military engagement in internal security management. Though, within the internal security policy, the military is engaged when the NPF and associated agencies are overwhelmed, the extensive deployments in almost all the states of the federation is over-stretching the military and exposing them unnecessarily to the everyday challenges of citizens and nationhood. There are issues of command structure where the military is involved, as in the many task forces and ad hoc operational structures across the country.

The conception of security and security challenges is out-modelled, being narrow and centred on direct threats to law and order rather than broad issues of economic, food and health security, environmental security, insecurities rooted in livelihood and social vulnerabilities, material existential conditions, poverty, community and individual resilience challenges, climate-change-induced insecurity, deficiencies in infrastructure and social service deliveries, all of which threaten internal security and generate a proclivity towards crime and violence. Security management has also been reactive rather than proactive. Thus, the security agencies are often caught napping, being generally unprepared for incidents. Being essentially reactive has meant that intelligence-driven security management has been poor.

Politics has been a major negative influence on the management of internal security and the security architecture. Political interference occurs at the level of security responses and nature of actions, deployment and strategies of engagement and protection and release of suspects. There are also interferences in appointments, promotions, postings, job security and discipline of the staff of security agencies. The responses to security intelligence, propositions of strategies and plans, and security interventions and actions are sometimes politicised, leading to stalled actions, failure to act on intelligence reports, inactions in situations of security threats and release of suspects. There is, furthermore, the issue of symmetry or asymmetry of political perspectives in the management of internal security challenges. There are intense differences between the perceptions, perspectives and understanding of state government and federal government leaders, ruling party and opposition party leaders, and government and civil society leaders. These diversities generate divisions and accusations and counter-accusations, thereby leading to confusion and inaction.
Reconfiguring the Internal Security Delivery System for Effective Management of Security, Order and Peace: Lessons and Future Prospects

It is imperative to reconfigure the Nigerian security architecture if security, order and peace are to be maintained and effectively managed, particularly in the context of Nigeria’s robust diversity. Such rejigging has to be at the philosophical, structural, organisational development and operational management levels.

There has been the question of whether a national internal security policy exists or not, just as there is a National Defence Policy. Perhaps, if such a policy exists, there would be a well-articulated structure, streamlined relations and clear paths and regulations of inter-agency collaborations and synergy. Part of the problem is that the Nigerian state and the ruling elite have not privileged SAs and internal security as a strategic baseline national security infrastructure, worthy of extensive investments in policy, reforms, technology, equipment and professionalisation.

At the philosophical level, there is need for the design of a clear national security philosophy, vision and goals. Such should be hinged on redirecting securitisation away from regime security, political competition and opposition politics; power consolidation and political rivalry; and legitimate socio-political agitations of groups, identity interests and rivalry. Security has to be specifically redefined to focus more on crime prevention and control, law enforcement, human security and direct threats to internal security. Such re-orientation has to be hinged on managing security through the people, underlined by people’s rights and driven by respect for citizens and their lives and property. This would mean that the security of citizens is primary, and that they are treated well, fairly, equitably, justly and respectfully as contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

The issue of reforms of the security architecture has been on the table since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. There was considerable international support at the initial years of the Fourth Republic for reforms targeted at strengthening the SAs within the framework of democratic governance. Most of the reforms targeted the issues of civil control, human rights, professionalism, operational efficiency and technology. The overall effects of the trainings and re-orientations on the conduct of the SAs may not have been extensive, sustained and enduring. However, reforms must be on the agenda, if the SAs are to be constructed in professional, efficient and competent mode.
Community policing has to be at the centre plank of NPF’s operational management. It has often been recommended for strengthening effectiveness within a framework of more linkages and communication, partnership and collaboration between the NPF and the communities and neighbourhoods. It involves police and community partnership in detecting and addressing crime in a sustained and proactive manner, in such ways that community knowledge and intelligence are harnessed in solving security challenges. While community policing has been introduced for more than ten years, its broad implementation, effectiveness and contributions to security are not yet sustained and broadly impacting. There is need for more innovative and extensive community policing in which communities and citizens are actual partners. In line with community policing is the need to integrate traditional leadership into national security management. As community leaders, traditional leaders are at the centre of local information and intelligence, and command the loyalty, commitment and respect of their subjects. These could be put to good use in the management of security in the communities.

The institution of state police is an imperative for the effective management of internal security challenges. There has been frequent allusion to the partisan recruitment, deployment against opposition elements and use for oppressive and harassment purposes of the native authority and regional police in the First Republic. Alemika (2000, p. 4) notes that regional or local police forces were ill-qualified, poorly trained and behaved, and abusive of the rights of opposition. However, there is no gainsaying the fact that local police force would be more effective in maintaining law and order, being drawn from the environment and therefore capable of harnessing local knowledge, intelligence and social capital. Besides, as we have noted, the federal police force and other SAs are more or less instruments of the federal executive and are deployed and utilised sometimes in their interests and against opposition elements and perceived enemies. The much-centralised operational deployments and management of the SAs has meant that it is possible that the leadership, officers and men in a particular state could be alien forces, deployed in the interests of domination and suppression from the centre. The point being made is that a state police cannot significantly be anything else that the current SAs are not.

The legitimacy of the SAs has to be strengthened. Apart from the issue of building cordiality, friendliness, respect, politeness and courtesy with citizens, and reversing the current situation of extensive mutual suspicion, prejudice and dislike between them and the public, the SAs have to be completely insulated from partisan politics. The SAs should never be part
of a political warfare or seen to be deployed against political enemies and opposition elements. The leadership of the SAs has to be based on merit, excellence and competence so as to command the loyalty, respect and commitment of officers and men, and build institutional integrity.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has highlighted the immense challenges of internal security and internal security management in Nigeria. Some conceptual and theoretical perspectives were provided for understanding and managing the challenges. This is important because part of the current sluggishness in comprehending, responding and effectively managing internal security threats can be attributed to poor and, in fact, confusing interpretations of emergent security challenges. The challenge of internal security is likely to increase given the deepening poverty, mass unemployment, poor wages, underemployment, loss of farmlands and fishing waters, deepening inequality between rich and poor and the ensuing rising disenchantment, discontent, frustration, youth restiveness and aggression among the citizens. In practice, the national planning and governance priorities still fail to encompass the essentials of the socio-economic and political ingredients that promote social justice, stable social order and security.

Therefore, political leaders should mainstream the management of internal security while leaders of the SAs must be more adroit at managing institutions and effectively and proactively confronting internal security challenges. Several recommendations were made including streamlining national security policy, philosophy and structure; instituting reforms; designing a more innovative and effectively managed community policing; integrating traditional leaders into the national security management system; and instituting state police formations with access to local knowledge and culture. The point has to be made that managing internal security must not only be more innovative but has to be depoliticised.

**References**


CHAPTER 3

The State and Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Ikenna Mike Alumona

INTRODUCTION

Security is one of the most fundamental conditions required for human existence in the modern state. In fact, the modern state itself is principally a product of the realisation of the need for security by the different individuals inhabiting the state. This point has been ably demonstrated by political theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes who in their different treatises argued that security is the reason for the coming into existence of the state. This implies that the state through the agency of the government is the principal addressee of security challenges in any given political entity. Any state that cannot ensure the security of her citizens is therefore not worth existing. Hence the old maxim, salus populi est suprema lex—the safety of the people is the supreme law, the supreme duty of the state. Contemporary scholars have also upheld this position in different ways. As Bislev (2004, p. 13) succinctly argues, “the maintenance of security is a necessary function of the state, something without which it cannot exist … without the state to ensure basic security, there would be

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In a related vein, Loader and Walker (2007, p. 10) write that “the protection of its people from internal and external threats stands consequently as the first and defining priority of government”.

In contemporary international politics, the provision of security by the state has been an issue of great importance that it has become the principal variable in determining the success or failure of any state. In fact, the loss of the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force which essentially has to do with security maintenance is among the basic indicators of a failed state. However, despite the fact that the concept of failed state has become one of the “most used and abused concepts in the last two decades” (Vannoni 2011, p. 3), the dynamics of international politics has placed great value on the maintenance of security at either the national or the international level.

The security challenges facing every given state—whether strong and weak ones—are, according to Yusuf (2012, p. 60), “understood and protected from two dimensions: internal and external”. While the internal security challenges have to do with threats that affect peace and order within the territorial borders of a sovereign state, the external security challenges deal with threats that affect the territorial integrity of the state from forces outside the state. It is in order to deal with both the internal and external security challenges of the state that the state’s claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within its territory is assumed and exercised by the government through its coercive institutions such as the police, military and paramilitary forces.

Ordinarily, in most countries, while the maintenance of the internal security is the primary responsibility of the police, Prisons and Immigration, the maintenance of external security is the responsibility of the armed forces. However, Imobighe (2003) rightly states that the overlapping nature of the security functions of the state requires that the army can also be of assistance in maintaining internal security, especially in emergency situations. In a similar vein, Lutterbeck (2004) also argues that the dividing line between internal and external security in the post-Cold War era has increasingly become blurred as a result of the emergence of a growing number of transnational risks and challenges.

The ability of a state to effectively ensure the maintenance of internal security is conditioned by the nature of certain fundamental doctrines governing internal security management and the linkages that surround the state. Imobighe (1990, p. 14) has identified two basic principles that
affect the doctrines of internal security management adopted by different states. First is the military perspective. From a military and coercive perspective, it is believed that military might and hardware is very critical in ensuring peace and stability. Secondly, the progressive perspective argues that since the essence of society has to do with the general welfare of citizens, internal security therefore, guarantees the safety of life and general welfare of the people so that they can realise their genuine goals and aspirations.

Since the post-Cold War era, there has been a steady decline in the rate of external security challenges. But at the same time, states, especially the new ones, most of which are in Africa, came to be faced with the rising incidence of internal security challenges. According to Nnoli (2006, p. 6), security has become a big issue in Africa today because of the various forms of carnage, brutality, pogroms and even genocide associated with incessant civil wars and other forms of violent conflicts on the continent.

Despite the steady decline in the rate of external security challenges, new threats to the internal security have continued to manifest in the different states across the globe. Ranging from issues such as terrorism, kidnapping, hostage taking, bombing, cybercrime, climate change, ozone layer depletion, and so on; the increasing internal insecurity profile has also resulted in the deepening and broadening of the scope of internal security. Thus, the architecture of internal security has expanded to cover many new areas which hitherto were non-existent.

The Problematique

The history of challenges to internal security in Nigeria dates back to the period of colonialism. Internal conflicts such as the Aba women riots, the Abeokuta rebellion and the general strike of 1945 were all manifestations of the character of insecurity during the period of colonial occupation. From the era of independence to the return of democracy in 1999, the country also has witnessed several internal security challenges. Nigerians are not in a hurry to forget the numerous internal conflicts that culminated in a civil war in 1967 and the numerous conflicts that erupted in different parts of the country during the era of military rule. Since the advent of democracy in 1999, the situation has not changed.

Although the Nigerian state has experienced several internal security challenges in the past, the emergence of the Boko Haram terrorist group together with the phenomenon of kidnapping, youth militancy, pipeline
vandalism and militant herdsmen have added a new dimension to the country’s internal insecurity profile. The details of the impact of the phenomenon of kidnapping, youth militancy, *Boko Haram* and lately militant herdsmen on the security of lives are well known and captured in the literature. Yet, the capacity of the Nigerian state to effectively manage her internal security problem is seriously in doubt. The internal security architecture in Nigeria characterised as it were by the increasing number of checkpoints mounted by the security agencies—Police, Army, Navy, Immigration, Civil Defence corps and Customs—across all parts of the country points to the simple fact that one of the most sensitive realities of life in contemporary Nigeria is the challenge of internal insecurity.

Nevertheless, to manage the internal insecurity problem, special military operations and police squads have also been set up in different parts of the country to take care of the threats to the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. Going with scary and frightful names such as *Operation Crocodile Smile*, *Operation Lafiya Dole*, *Operation Python Dance*, *Safer Highways Squad*, *Anti-Terrorist Squad*, these special squads have come to be part of the features of Nigerian cities and highways. While these special operations and squads with their checkpoints might have recorded some successes in terms of preventing threats to the internal security of the country, the agony and trauma their operations have caused for the ordinary and helpless citizens deserves urgent attention. The untold hardship motorists and travellers alike have suffered in terms of inhuman treatment, molestation, loss of manpower hours and extortions of different kinds cannot be overemphasised. On a daily basis the activities of these special squads and other security agencies appear to aggravate the suffering of the ordinary Nigerian citizen.

Paradoxically, Nigerians have continued to witness on a daily basis, serious and increasing threats to the security of their lives and properties despite the strong military and police presence across the country. Across the country, different security threats abound. The phenomenon of kidnapping in different parts of the country has continued unabated. In many cases, high-profile citizens or their relatives have been involved in these kidnap. Recently, the fall out of the constant clash between rural farmers and Fulani herdsmen across communities in different parts of the country has come to aggravate the insecurity situation in the country. In another dimension, the constant attack on oil pipelines and installations by the Niger Delta Avengers and other similar groups in the south has continued to affect the revenue base of the federal government. In the north, the issue of *Boko Haram* is still raging despite all the assurances by the federal government that they have been defeated.
The strong military and police presence across the country when juxtaposed with the insecurity situation in the country has opened a serious lacuna about the whole idea and essence of internal security. A lot of questions such as these have been raised about the internal security situation: is internal security all about the uncountable military and police checkpoints manned by fierce-looking and unfriendly military and policemen who harass ordinary citizens that they are meant to protect? Or is it about the fact that the police and military personnel have practically turned these checkpoints into toll gates? Or is it about the procurement of military hardware and recruitment of more security personnel? On the other hand, is internal security about the large retinue of security personnel attached to government officials and the elites in Nigeria? Is it about the security of the ordinary citizens or that of the state? And who is actually responsible for the maintenance of internal security? Is it the state or the ordinary citizens?

The above questions and other such related ones have continued to raise disturbing concern that revolves around the Nigerian state and the management of internal security. A crucial aspect of the problem is the peculiar nature of Nigerian federalism that denies the constituent states the constitutional right to organise and provide security within their boundaries. With a Police Force and other security agencies that are centrally organised and controlled by the federal government, the prevailing security governance structure seems to be a partnership arrangement where the constituent states have become passive partners with the federal government in the management of internal security. The states periodically provide support to the security agencies, particularly the police, yet they make no form of input in the organisation and management of the security agencies.

The primary concern of this chapter is to provide the theoretical foundations for the empirical issues raised by the different chapters in this book. Though our main interest lies in the theoretical discourses about the state and the provision and maintenance of security, the chapter is also particularly interested in understanding the experience of the Nigerian state. In this regard, the central argument of this chapter is that the dys-functionality of Nigeria’s federal system, which is a product of the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state, has resulted in the politicisation of security structures and governance processes involved in security management. This, in turn, has negatively aggravated and sustained internal security in the country.
WHY THE STATE MATTERS IN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

The concept of the state has several contentious definitions because scholars have defined it from different ideological, historical, normative and descriptive perspectives. Despite the disagreement among scholars over the meaning and origin of the state, the concept of the state has continued to occupy a prominent place in political discourse. The concept of the state has also experienced varying status in political analysis as a result of the dominant approach adopted in the study of political science as a discipline and certain historical developments such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a new world order, the emergence of a unipolar world led by the United States and globalisation (Onyeoziri 2005).

Yet, the centrality of the state in the daily existence of individuals in modern times cannot be ignored nor overemphasised. Miliband (1969, p. 59) has captured this in the following words:

…more than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state. What they want to achieve individually or in groups, now mainly depends on the state’s sanction and support. It is possible not to be interested in what the state does but it is not possible to be unaffected by it.

The link between the state and the provision and management of security is in varying degrees deeply rooted in the different conceptions of the origin of the state. Political thinkers and scholars have in different ways espoused that the state is principally responsible for the provision and management of security. The Weberian conception of the state posits that it is the traditional responsibility of the state to provide security. In other words, the state is designed primarily to maintain order and security (Raphael 1976). According to Raphael (1976, p. 53), “the state is an association designed primarily to maintain order and security, exercising universal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries by means of laws backed by force and recognised as having sovereign authority”. It is the security provided by the state that ensures that a conducive environment exists for the citizens to pursue their legitimate needs. In a similar vein, Bislev (2004) opines that Max Weber’s classical definition of the state as holding a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence rests upon the notion that social order is crucial to the state. It is therefore in order to ensure social order that the state must provide security. Bislev captures this issue thus: “the maintenance of security is a necessary function of the state something
without which it cannot exist … without the state to ensure basic security, there would be no civilization, no civil society” (Bislev 2004, p. 48).

Social contact theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in their different treaties have also captured the essence of the state in security maintenance. Despite the differences in their postulations about man and the state of nature, the social contract theorists all agree that the movement of society from the original state of nature where according to Thomas Hobbes, life was short, nasty and brutish, to the modern state system, was basically propelled by the desire for security. Along this viewpoint, Nnoli (2003, p. 28) also argues that states are formed solely for the sake of obtaining security, especially against the aggressiveness of other men since men are essentially selfish and seek only their own good. Using the social contract theory, Nnoli (2003) further explains that the modern state emerged at the point where people, in order to preserve humanity, decided to give up their rights and liberties to the state and agreed to obey the laws prescribed by the government set up by the state. The state in return was required to ensure the maintenance of law and order and also the security of the subjects of the state. Nnoli concluded that if it could be shown that the state can no longer guarantee security and prosperity, then it has lost the justification for existence.

Gamble (1981) holds a similar view with Nnoli about the state and the provision of security. He succinctly argues that:

> The state emerged as a result of the contract between the citizens and itself. It is established to serve the interests of the citizenry so long as the state preserves security; individuals have a moral obligation to obey the commands and laws of the state. But if the state ceases to maintain the security of its subjects, they have the right to resist the state by force of arms if necessary. (Gamble 1981)

An emerging view in the literature on security sector governance and reforms points to the fact that despite the traditional role of the state in providing security, the processes of globalisation and privatisation, together with the weakness of some states, especially in developing countries, have necessitated the intrusion of the private sector in the provision of security. To that end, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 6) assert that “bringing the private sector into the business of security is crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the security situation in most countries and any attempt to ensure better security for all must take account of the activities and
operations of private security providers”. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 7) argue that this assertion comes to fore in the face of “the declining ability and/or willingness of the state to provide adequate protection of life and property”.

In practical terms, the state is an abstract entity that cannot be seen nor touched. It is “an artificial social construction” (Onyeoziri 2005, p. 56). Hence, the responsibilities of the state including that of security maintenance are exercised by the government which is an agent of the state. According to Onyeoziri (2005, p. 56), “the government is the most important agent of the state”. Appadorai (1968, p. 12) similarly states that the government is saddled with the responsibility of maintaining security because, “essentially it is the agency or machinery through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realised”. Government acts and speaks on behalf of the state, and is formally vested with state power (Miliband 1969). Government is represented by the executive, legislature and judiciary functionaries who take charge of the everyday running of the affairs of government. Since the state cannot be seen, and is represented by the government, it also implies that it is the government that fulfils the obligations of the state. It is in the process or set of activities through which the government fulfils the obligations of the state to the citizens that governance takes place. Governance according to Fukuyama (2013, p. 3) is defined as “government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not”. Similarly, Omodia (2013, p. 36) also asserts that “governance entails the proper management of state institutions and structures to enhance socio-economic and political transformation of society”. It is in the processes of governance that state structures or institutions do perform the essential function of security maintenance.

The relationship between governance and security cannot be ignored. According to Oyebode (2011, p. 27), “security has become the touchstone of governance in modern society”. Vohra (2008, p. 8) also captures the nexus between governance and internal security thus:

If internal security is not maintained, governance cannot be delivered and there would be grave threats to the very unity and integrity of the country. Likewise, internal security cannot be safeguarded if governance is delivered by an inefficient and corrupt administration.

Anah (2014) has tried to examine the nexus between governance and security within the context of Africa. According to him, the apparent
intractability of governance and security problems in Africa has resulted in insecurity and poor governance which also have provided the basis for the interventionist efforts of international donor agencies and non-governmental organisations. Anah (2014) also debunks the mainstream view that poor institutions and the instrumentalisation of disorder are responsible for insecurity and poor governance in Africa. Using a political economy approach, he links poor governance and insecurity in Africa to external factors such as the declining terms of trade between Africa and the industrialised economies of the world. He further highlights the following three major historical facts which to a large extent have shaped security and governance in Africa:

1. the quest for raw materials by the industrialised developed countries,
2. the scope and nature of international politics that characterise the Cold War era and
3. the institutional structures put in place at the end of the era of empires.

Since Nigeria is seen as the giant of Africa, we believe that Anah’s observations particularly present the Nigerian experience. For instance, the insecurity experienced in the Niger Delta, which is a fallout of the exploitative activities of the multinational corporations, is rightly linked to the quest for raw materials by the industrialised developed countries as opined by Anah. From another dimension, the seeming connivance of successive Nigerian governments could also be seen as part of the institutional structures put in place by the colonialists to ensure a conducive environment for the exploitation of oil wealth.

In the wider Nigerian context, the insecurity problem that has continued to threaten the stability of the Fourth Republic has been linked by several scholars to the failure of governance. According to Omilusi (2013), the crisis of insecurity in Nigeria can only be understood within the context of governance failure. He argues that the inability of the Nigerian state to ensure the security of its citizens stems from the fact that the state has not been able to meet the minimum requirements of the social contract it entered with the citizens because of the forces of bad governance. The resultant effect of this, as he puts it, is that “there is thus a disconnection between the governed and the government” (Omilusi 2013, p. 374). Omilusi also listed the following factors as some of the manifestations of the crisis of governance that are behind the problem of insecurity: inability
of the government to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living that is in accord with human dignity, lingering conditions of political instability, repression and violence, widespread petty and grand corruption, economic decline resulting in capacity underutilisation, structural distortion and huge debt burden, very high unemployment rate especially among young people, deterioration of socio-economic infrastructure and widening inequality among individuals.

The nexus between governance and security is further seen in the fact that the absence of good governance adversely affects the security of the state. It is along this line of thought that good governance became a reverberating variable in the discussions of the neorealist conception of security. In fact, the existence of human security is largely tied to good governance.

**Why Internal Insecurity in Nigeria?**

Events since 1960 when Nigeria became an independent state point to the fact the territorial integrity of Nigerian state has suffered more internal challenges than external ones. Since the return of democracy in 1999, events have also shown that the greatest threat to the current democratic dispensation is internal insecurity. The 2016 World Internal Security and Police Index showed that Nigeria (0.2554) ranked 127th out of 127 countries in internal security levels, while Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.2720), Kenya (0.2982) and Uganda (0.3119) were ranked 126th, 125th and 124th, respectively. The different chapters in this volume have critically discussed the incidence, character and implications of insecurity in Nigeria. Yet, it is important to note that the incidence of insecurity in Nigeria has led to the situation where there is a growing public resentment against the Nigerian state and its management of the internal insecurity problem. This resentment is further driven by the fact that insecurity is becoming more complex and widespread despite all the assurances by the government that they are in control of the situation. The fallout from this situation is that Nigerians have lost confidence in the ability of the state to provide security. People now rely more on non-state actors for their security. The increasing participation of non-state actors such as private security organisations and vigilantes of all sorts in the maintenance of security without adequate supervision by the government attests to this fact.

Our concern here is to theoretically offer some explanation why internal insecurity has continued to subsist in Nigeria. The debates about the
character and incidence of insecurity have been long standing. A survey of
the extant literature will suffice before our own understanding is high-
lighted. Mijah (2007) argues that the state of insecurity in Nigeria can be
traced to two main factors, namely the character of the Nigerian state and
the context of democratic politics. With regard to the character of the
Nigerian state, he argues that the problem of internal security in Nigeria is
derived from, and is aggravated by, the inclusion and/or exclusion of cer-
tain groups from access to opportunities and resources of the state, as a
result of the structural imbalance inherent in the Nigerian federation.
According to Mijah, the structural imbalance in the ethnic, religious and
regional composition of the Nigerian state and the manipulation of such
identities are responsible for the various ethno-religious and even com-
munal conflicts in Nigeria. Also related to this issue is the desperation for
political offices and the unrestrained access to state resources which
accompanies the occupation of these political offices.
Secondly, Mijah (2007, p. 4) also argues that there is evidence of a cor-
relation between the context of democratic governance and the state of
insecurity in Nigeria. This is derived from the fact that “since 1999, demo-
cratic governance has not instituted sufficient policies and programmes to
alter the structures of imbalance and inequity imposed on the character of
the state by the forces of colonialism and prolonged military rule”.
Locating the problem of insecurity in Nigeria within the context of the
politics of security decision-making, Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 13)
state that what constitutes security for the Nigerian state and political elites
is traditionally rooted in the state’s monopoly and control of all legitimate
instruments of coercion, and its ability to contain both internal insurgency
and external aggression. They also argue that the crisis of insecurity in
Nigeria arises from the character of the state and the character of the state
security agencies. According to Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 15), the
sincerity of the Nigerian state to respond to insecurity has repeatedly
appeared to be questioned by the citizens because the state has spent more
time on nation-building and far less on state-building. They further noted
that the character of the state security agencies threatens the security of
lives and property because of the politicisation of security. In their words:

State security agencies constitute a veritable threat to the security of the citi-
zens of Nigeria. More often, rather than restore peace and order, they
exacerbate crises, ramping up social and political tensions. (Ibeanu and
Momoh 2008, p. 14)
Nnoli (2006), in his discourse on national security in Africa, points to the collapsed character of the state as a serious aspect of the problem of African security. According to Nnoli (2006, p. 9), political exclusion, economic marginalisation and social discrimination, which are at the heart of the crises of the state in Africa, have so much threatened the security of the citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In this context, Nnoli further asserts that physical safety has become the preeminent concern of most Africans, since the state is no longer able to generate the fundamental conditions for the protection of life.

Isima (2007) shares a similar view with Nnoli (2006) on the relationship between the character of the state and the problem of insecurity. He asserts that the outsourcing of noncore security functions of the state to private military and security companies is not an African phenomenon, but rather a global development that is propelled by globalisation and privatisation. Isima further argues that the fragility of the states in Africa together with their weak institutional capacity is responsible for the expanding scope of the private sector into the core security functions of the state. As he succinctly puts it:

It is the low institutional capacity of the African state to deliver the public good of physical security for citizens efficiently and effectively that creates the security vacuum, which is increasingly being filled by the private sector in response to genuine demands of citizens for protection. (Isima 2007, p. 23)

In another work, Nnoli (2012) shares the same view with Mijah (2007) as he points to the undemocratic character of the Nigerian state as a serious aspect of the problem of national security. According to Nnoli (2012, p. 6), state violence and internal conflicts are at the heart of the security crisis in Nigeria. After a critical evaluation of the numerous violent internal conflicts which include the Boko Haram insurgency, he argues that “violent conflicts have persisted and even intensified in various parts of the country because democracy has remained elusive” (Nnoli 2012, p. 14). He further argues that the undemocratic character of the state also stands in the way of resolving the security crisis. This is because the alienation of the masses creates a problem for intelligence gathering which is a very important tool in maintaining security. As he succinctly puts it:
Since the central issue of national security in Nigeria concerns internal security, the need for good intelligence gathering in the country is critical. The consequence of the alienation of the masses from the undemocratic state is their unwillingness to provide the necessary intelligence as they need to. In fact, they tend to provide intelligence to those opposed to the state or they feign ignorance of what is going on. (Nnoli 2012, p. 22)

Olorode (2011) similarly shares the views of Nnoli (2006) and Isima (2007) on the relationship between the character of the Nigerian state and the problem of insecurity, only that he adds a cultural dimension to the debate. For Olorode (2011, p. 9), it is necessary to situate the Nigerian security crisis in a global context, “since insecurity cuts across national and international boundaries and has implications on the global economy and political stability”. To this end, the ideological struggle to entrench capitalism in developing countries and colonialism, which helped to ensure the propagation of the capitalist ideology, are important factors which he believes should not be ignored in trying to understand the security crisis. Olorode further asserts that “to understand the issue of insecurity and the attendant crisis in Nigeria, one must take cognizance of the involvement of the state (i.e governments at different levels), the state agencies (i.e the courts, police and similar agencies) and the cultural institutions (i.e religion, the media, educational institutions, etc)”. The cultural dimension that Olorode (2011) added to the debate on insecurity in Nigeria is informed by the fact that religious fundamentalism has been so manipulated by the political elites that it has also contributed to the problem of insecurity.

Achumba et al. (2013, p. 88) have also examined the character of insecurity in Nigeria. According to them, the remote and immediate sources of insecurity in Nigeria include lack of institutional capacity resulting in government failure, pervasive material inequalities and unfairness, ethno-religious conflicts, conflict of perception between the public and government, weak state security system, loss of sociocultural and communal value system, porous borders, unemployment, rural/urban migration and terrorism.

In another contribution, Imobighe (2013) argues that the cause of insecurity in Nigeria is closely tied to the attitude of Nigerian leaders to threat assessment. According to him, threat, which is part of the main determinants of defence and national security planning, has not been properly managed in Nigeria and some other African countries. To this end, he further argues that the misplacement of defence and national security efforts and the haphazard treatment of threats which focus solely on
regime perpetuation and how to silence opposition elements are crucial factors responsible for the increasing incidence of insecurity in the country.

Finally, Oarhe and Aghedo (2010) argue that the increasing internal insecurity in Nigeria is a result of the culture of corruption that has overtaken the security agencies charged with the responsibility of providing security. They also strongly believe that since the principles and ethical values such as integrity, precision, impartiality, courage, competence, teamwork, leadership, efficiency in the use of public funds, respect, trust, professionalism, patriotism, credibility, loyalty, reputation, responsibility, compliance with obligations under the law, diligence, discipline, fairness, accountability, commitment, transparency, innovation and objectivity that are paramount in the effective performance of security functions are lacking in the Nigerian security sector, the security sector cannot promote internal security. According to them, the prevailing images of corruption in the security sector have resulted to the following problems: poor quality of services by the internal security agencies, the proliferation of small and light weapons, the perpetration of crime, the manipulation of criminal records, the dented image and credibility of security agencies and the crisis of economic development. All these problems for them account for the reason why Nigeria is the “open sore” of the African continent.

The explanations offered by these scholars, when taken together, do not adequately explain the persistence of internal security threats in Nigeria. As good and incisive as they appear, they have failed to adequately capture the nexus between the character of the Nigerian state and problem of internal security. But we argue that the crisis of internal insecurity in Nigeria borders mainly on the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state. It is the dynamics of the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state that is responsible for the dysfunctional nature of federalism in the country. The dysfunctional character of federalism has resulted in the politicisation of security structures and governance processes involved in the management of security. This in a way has negatively aggravated and sustained insecurity in the country.

**Post-colonialism, Federalism and the Politicisation of Security in Nigeria**

Undoubtedly, the Nigerian federalism is riddled with contradictions and crises. The immanent contradictions in the Nigerian federation have resulted in what is commonly referred to as the national question
(Nwabueze 2016), which has often degenerated to varying degrees of protestations over resource control/revenue allocation and outright separatist agitations by cross sections of the country. In the face of the numerous crises and the frequent violent outbursts it has engendered, Nigeria’s security sector appears to have been politicised and the security apparatuses compromised as a result.

A proper understanding of these tensions, contradictions and crises of the Nigerian federation requires a return to Nigeria’s post-colonial foundations. Scholars such as Alavi (1973), Ake (1985), Ekekwe (1985) and Ibeanu (1998), among others, had developed the classical Marxist theory of the state and employed it in the elucidation and understanding of the peculiarity of the neocolonial state. The major contention of these scholars is that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism and, as such, has followed a developmental strategy dictated by the interest of imperialism and its local allies rather than that of the majority of the indigenous population. According to Ekekwe (1985), the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state whose major preoccupation was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie in alliance with the ruling elite would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources. Therefore, the post-colonial state that now emerged, though ostensibly independent and sovereign, was no less a creation of imperialism than the colonial state (Ekekwe 1985).

One basic character of the post-colonial state, as articulated by Ake (1985), is that it has very limited autonomy. This means that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and, so, is immersed in the class struggles that go on in the society. The post-colonial state is also constituted in such a way that it reflects and mainly caters for a narrow range of interests: the interests of the rapacious political elite in comprador and subordinate relationship with foreign capital. For Ake, therefore, “the political conditions in Africa are the greatest impediment to development” (Ake 2003, p. 1). He traced these political conditions to the political legacy colonialism bequeathed on Africa, and which manifested in the absolutism and arbitrariness of the post-colonial states.

Buttressing this point, Ibeanu (1998) conceived of the state as “the totality of the materiality of political class domination in a society”. He surmised that since the post-colonial state is all-powerful and there are few safeguards on how its tremendous power is to be used in a moderate and
civil manner, groups and individuals take a great stock in controlling the
power of the state. So it is characteristic of the post-colonial state that its
members put a premium on politics. Politics is everything and everything
is politics, including life and death (Ibeanu 1998, p. 11).

In applying the theory of the post-colonial state to the elucidation of
the crisis of the Nigerian federation, it needs to be understood that at the
time a federal system was being adopted in 1946–1954, the colonial state
had become a battleground for three rival pluralities: the plurality of eco-
nomic and geographic regions, the plurality of ethnic nationalities and the
plurality of colonial administrative traditions. The first two pluralities make
up what Afigbo (1991) described as the primordial federal features of
indigenous Nigerian society. Meanwhile, these two pluralities have since
intruded into the post-colonial state, shaping in a very decisive manner the
structure and evolution of that state.

Arising from the plurality of ethnic groups and colonial administrative
traditions, the struggle for power in Nigeria has been intense and whichever ethnic group that gets hold of power maximises it to the benefit of
the group. The fallout of the desire to maximise the powers of the state is
what is seen as the over-centralisation of the federal system. Of the numer-
ous pathologies arising from the over-centralisation of the federal system
in Nigeria, none threatens the stability of the constituent states such as the
maintenance of security.

In Nigeria, the powers of security governance lie solely with the federal
government, which exercises supreme control over all the security agen-
cies. The high degree of centralisation of the security sector has adversely
affected the governance structures, resulting in its politicisation. This
anomaly has become so glaring in the use and control of the police. As
regards the maintenance of public order and safety, the 1999 Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) makes it the concurrent
responsibility of both the federal and state governments. Yet, the coercive
institute responsible for the job which is the police is solely controlled
by the federal government. The controversy over the use and control of
the police has been a source of tension and confrontations between the
federal government and the states. The clamour for state police, which
began before independence in 1960 has also met with stiff opposition by
the federal government with the tacit support of a section of the feder-
ating units.

The politicisation of the security governance structures has resulted in
a situation where state governors as chief security officers of their respec-
tive states have minimal or no control over the security infrastructure in their state because they cannot control any of the security agencies. This clearly undermines security. The abduction and forced resignation of a sitting governor in Anambra State several years ago and the seeming silence of the Nigerian Police in the face of wanton destruction of lives and property in Nimbo-Uzo Uwani in Enugu State and across Benue State during the crises between rural farmers and Fulani herdsmen speaks volumes about the challenges of centralised control of the police. During the crises, the respective governors were helpless as they could not effectively take charge of the situation. Also, in the face of the crisis, the way and manner the police directed vigilante groups and militias to return all the arms in their possession appeared suspect, given that nothing was said about the Fulani herdsmen who have been carrying sophisticated arms and terrorising rural farmers across the country.

The sectionalism and nepotism exhibited in recent strategic appointments in the security sector by the President Muhammadu Buhari-led administration is another example of the politicisation of the security governance structure. In a state like Nigeria where there are sharp ethnic and religious divisions, the appointment of key security chiefs such as the Inspector–General of Police, Director of Department of State Security, Controller-Generals of Nigerian Custom Service and Nigerian Immigration Service, Director-General of National Intelligence Agency, Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as well as the National Security Adviser, from one geopolitical zone of the country has not only dampened the morale of the men and officers of the security agencies concerned, but has exacerbated insecurity. The resurgence of secessionist threats and the vociferous demands for the immediate restructuring of the Nigerian federation are clear pointers to the disaffection and ill-will that the politicisation of the security architecture has engendered within the polity.

The politicisation of the security sector has also resulted to the prevailing situation where the Nigerian state appears to be only interested in the security of those in power. The large retinue of security personnel that is attached to elected political office holders, their appointed allies and the financial oligarchs together with elitist orientation of these security personnel leaves much to be desired. More worrisome is the fact that the security personnel are increasingly alienated from the public they are meant to protect. In most cases, the lawlessness exhibited by the security personnel has also exacerbated insecurity. There are several cases of police brutality across the country.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has critically explored the theoretical nexus between the state and security management. It then focused on the Nigerian experience. The nature and character of internal security management in Nigeria have not only raised doubts about the role of the Nigerian state, but have also exposed how the contradictions of the post-colonial character of the state have undermined federal practice which turns around to affect the maintenance of internal security. What readily comes to mind from the analyses of the role of the Nigerian state in the management of internal security is that there is urgent need to reinvent federalism for it to meet the changing demands of the political society. One of such demands centres on restructuring of the security sector. This has become necessary considering the fact that security threats vary across the different states, and it requires some degree of self-rule, which is part of the dictates of federalism to respond to local security issues. Following Livingston’s (1952) sociological thesis of federalism, there is urgent need for the operators of Nigeria’s federal system to develop instrumentalities that will respond to the numerous demands of the different ethnic nationalities. As postulated by Livingston (1952), federal instrumentalities are expected to change and respond to the demands from the political society. When there is a gap between the demands from the political society and the state of the federal system, it basically leads to tension and crises. This is part of the problem of federalism in Nigeria which is creating the problems in security management.

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CHAPTER 4

A Historical Perspective of Nigeria’s Internal Security Since 1999

Rosemary I. Okolie-Osemene

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a nation that is richly blessed with both human and natural resources but has recently become growingly unsafe due to its mounting cases of internal security crisis, especially since 1999. Security is an important component of a state which naturally determines its pace of development and progress. Security is an important requirement in the existence or sustenance of every modern state in the international political system. This is based on the need for states recognised as independent to maintain their territorial integrity without the control of their territories by other states. In fact, security remains one of the most critical aspects of a nation’s existence that ensure social order in the society and should never be overlooked. This is because the development and survival of any nation is hinged on it. In essence, a country that cannot secure its territory from both internal and external threats in modern times is bound to fail. Internal security is one of the criteria for the survival of modern democracy, especially among the current African countries. It is based on the foregoing...
that Onodugo et al. (2015, p. 27) described national security as “the podium upon which democracy stands and its values for the people.” It then means that such security guarantees stability, which determines the success of politics and all sectors of the economy.

Although Nigeria’s national security goal since attaining independence has been focused on deterring external aggression and containment of internal security threats (Pogoson 2013), the country started becoming insecure after the Nigerian-Biafran War in 1970 when the proliferation of arms became the order of the day (Fourchard 2003). Nigeria continued to witness increased rate of crime and insecurity, which unfortunately offered people the opportunity to learn how to kill themselves after the war (Onibokun 2003). Most youths have become experts in murdering people to the extent that some are now being used to assassinate political opponents, or even engage in bank robberies among others.

The year 1999 is remarkable in the history of Nigeria democratically. Specifically, it represented the end of military authoritarian rule and also the re-establishment of democratic rule under the Fourth Republic. The return to democratic rule in Nigeria was greeted by much hope for speedy development, which would avert the growing nature of poverty among its populace and promote internal peace and security. But this great hope which initially characterised the minds of the Nigerian populace in 1999 is rapidly disappearing owing to several developments that have contributed to the intensification of internal security problems. In essence, the Nigerian state has recently been characterised by mounting cases of internal security crisis, which has escalated the economic and security challenges in the country, that has threatened the peace and unity of the nation at different points in time since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Such internal security crises range from the Niger Delta crisis, insurgencies, militancy, kidnapping, political assassinations, armed robbery, ritual killings, communal conflicts to terrorism, to mention but a few, and have since become part of the daily life issue within the country since this period.

Furthermore, Nwagboso (2016) argued that the internal security problems affecting most areas in Nigeria can be grouped into violent and non-violent internal security challenges. The latter include the outbreak of diseases like Ebola, HIV/AIDS, and yellow fever. As such, the country has continually experienced several security challenges in its different geopolitical zones which overstretched the security agencies due to government’s oversight, delayed action and even corruption. For instance, Nwogwugwu and Oluranti (2015, p. 47), argued that “militant activities
generated to the extent of it affecting the nation’s economy, before the adoption of amnesty policy.” Likewise, kidnapping in the southeast was allowed to escalate to the level of secondary school children as well as members of the Nigerian Union of Journalist (NUJ) being kidnapped in Abia state, before the situation was managed by military intervention that resulted in raids across various communities in some local governments within Abia south.

The lopsided federalism witnessed in the country manifests in the centralisation of the police which limits oversight of state governments (Matfess 2016). This has made it difficult for the police to swiftly respond to internal security threats as required by current realities. Boko Haram has been carrying out insurgency activities since 2009 unabated. The reason for this increase in internal security is due to failed government and mounting poverty amongst the populace in the face of endemic corruption within the political class. Therefore, the chapter argues that the widespread nature of corruption amongst the elite and even the security agents in Nigeria accounts for the increasing nature of internal security crisis in the country since 1999. This study is basically qualitative in nature. It combines the historical methodology with trend analysis in analysing major events within the period in other established cogent facts. The method has been helpful in tracking major efforts by the state in enhancing national security.

**Conceptual Clarification**

Security is a term that brings to the fore the need for survival of the state and the protection of individual and group rights within a state (Albert 2003). For Nwolise (2014, p. 47), “security connotes protection, meaning the safety of men, groups, nationals and the entire world from harm. In other words, when people are not threatened by any danger or disaster, they are said to be safe, while they are unsafe in vulnerable conditions.” In his attempt to categorise security, Okodoloh (2011, p. 319) maintains that “active security means the practical measures taken in security operations involving the use of visible objects such as weapons, security accessories, security equipment most of which are usually capital intensive, while passive security is social, psychological and economic measures taken to protect lives and property.”

According to Tsuwa and Okoh (2016), we talk about national security when the issue of protecting the people and political conditions are given
priority. This protection is aimed at saving the state and citizens from threats. In essence, a state that lacks the capacity to prevent danger to its territorial integrity can hardly guarantee the well-being of her people. Nwolise (2009) posits that the relevance of national security explains why the government puts measures to make the security sector effective to prevent people from losing confidence in the ability of the state from protecting them. In the context of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, the nation is expected to maintain a standing army, air force, navy, as well as other paramilitary forces and the police, with the aim of defending against any form of aggression to maintain the nation’s territorial integrity (see Pogoson 2013).

Historically, internal security has remained a primary duty of the state. In Nigeria, it dates back to the colonial period when the colonial agents mobilised all the machinery of cohesion (police and army) in their bid to suppress the indigenous people into total submission to the colonial state and also maintain order for the swift running of their regime. According to Malasowe (2016, p. 46), most people in the country were in need of adequate security, despite the indirect rule introduced by colonial administrators, and indigenous people became threatened by the security lapses during that period (Malasowe 2016). The chiefs became agents of law enforcement instead of protecting their own people. Being a colonial creation, the Nigerian state at independence inherited the state-centric nature of colonial internal security measures.

Internal security has remained an important area of concern in Nigeria prior to 1999 owing to its place in the enhancement of peace and development. The intra-party political crisis that erupted within the Action Group (AG), as well as the ethno-religious crisis which invited the military into politics where series of critical internal crisis within the nation’s first republic that not only shook the unity of the country but contributed in dragging the newly independent nation into a deadly civil war which lasted for about 30 months. Decades of dictatorship, especially from the 1970s, witnessed mass suppression and violation of human rights under the various military governments. This, among other things, instigated series of internal security challenges in Nigeria, which made violent conflicts to become a little much rampart within the nation’s environs. For instance, the series
of coups propelled more coups from 1966 when the first coup was executed and promoted some form of political killings and instabilities. Other crises included the Maitatsine crisis of 1980s, Zango Kataf crisis of 1992 and June 12 crisis, to mention only a few. In fact, Elaigwu (2005; cited in Alumona 2016) noted that between 1980 and 2005, there were 145 cases of violent conflicts in Nigeria.

However, it is important to state here that during the Nigerian Civil War, there was a mass mobilisation of the security agencies particularly the army in the war against the Biafran forces. At the end of the war, which ended in 1970, the majority of the Nigerian peace enforcement agencies particularly the military were redeployed and relocated to the barracks, and so they became relatively underused internally except in extreme cases or on foreign missions due to the scanty nature of internal crisis before 1999. Since the end of the war, most of the internal crises that occurred in the country before 1999 were very minimal and limited in both scope and effects.

Moreover, the rebirth of democracy in 1999 was supposedly thought to guarantee peace, security and development, which would ensure the fundamental rights of the Nigerian nationals. But the unfolding developments since 1999 in Nigeria have proven this popular expectation to be very wrong. This is due to the fact that there has been a multiplicity of internal tensions within the country from the Fourth Republic. The nascent democracy has not translated to the safety of people, as the capability of the state to sustain the maintenance of law and order remains questionable, considering the disturbances across the country (Malasowe 2016). The disappointments faced by Nigerians from the governing circles as a result of gross corruption and political neglect, coupled with rapid increase in poverty and unemployment among the majority of the citizens since the dawn of the Fourth Republic also worsened the problem.

The foregoing has contributed to an increase in internal security challenges in the country, which, in most cases, the security agencies like the police and other sister security agencies fail to handle. The prevalence of such internal crisis is rapidly overstretching the army. Rapid increase of intolerance and violence characterised the early years of democratic dispensation in the late 1990s (Hazen and Horner 2008). The transformation of Nigeria into democratic rule created new challenges, particularly internal tension within the country. Internal security challenges in recent times can be classified under the following: militancy; Boko Haram...
insurgency; Fulani herdsmen-farmers crisis; Shiites-Army crisis; humanitarian crisis; food insecurity; and crimes such as kidnapping, cultism and ritual killing.

Militancy is one of the intractable internal security crises that have become a common phenomenon since 1999. The emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta created new sources of security challenges, which gave a new dimension to internal security challenges facing the nation. The manifestations of its effects have been far too detrimental on the nation’s economy and internal security. The appearance of militancy reveals long periods of political marginalisation, economic exploitation/victimisation they had suffered in the region over the years due to oil exploration since 1956. Government’s lack of political will needed for ensuring equitable resource allocation, coupled with political corruption, marginalisation and the sense of neglect and alienation on the part of Niger Delta people culminated into high levels of militancy in the Fourth Republic (Akpan 2010). It is noteworthy that demands by the people of Niger Delta are people-oriented, focusing on the well-being of the communities that have suffered government neglect for years.

The failure of the government to respond promptly motivated proliferation groups that became restive. This group of youth not only adopted the violent processes such as pipeline vandalisation, they also engaged in bombing of oil facilities and kidnapping of oil expatriates so as to scare away the workers. In spite of military task force that was sent into the area, militancy continued to wax stronger by the day as new militants continued to emerge on daily basis. The prevalence of this situation thereby made the region very unsafe for both the inhabitants and also foreign officials. In fact many countries had to recall back their citizens for safety reasons.

The incessant attacks on oil facilities caused the country’s oil production to drop drastically. The attack on Atlas Cove Jetty/Depot, a major petroleum distribution on July 12, 2009, which was highly securitised on a 24-hour basis, resulted in the suspension of oil operation activities by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the time being. Atlas Cove jetty supplies products through pipeline network to NNPC’s depots in some parts of the country (Lawal et al. 2009). As a result of such activities, petroleum reception was transferred to Apapa depot. The militant attack on this facility made it difficult for foreign vessels to easily bring in imported fuel through NNPC and other companies with great implications for domestic supply. This incident equally prompted the former US President Barak Obama’s decision to visit Ghana instead of Nigeria during his African countries’ tour for security reasons.
The attack on Atlas Cove came with a shocking surprise on the Nigerian government. In fact it was the last straw that forced the Nigerian government under President Yar’Adua to extend the presidential amnesty programme, which involves a free vocational training and a monthly cash payment of about 30,000 militants to douse the militant anger. Several ex-militant commanders such as Asari Dokubo, Government Ekpumopolo and others were rewarded with the contract of guarding pipelines against vandals (Onuoha 2016). However, the issue of militancy, which was already a time bomb waiting to explode, resurfaced when the present government in an inaugural speech in 2015 revealed an intention to terminate the amnesty programme. This has probably resulted in resurgence of more deadly restive gangs within the region who had since resumed bombing pipelines since January 2016 till date. As a matter of fact, oil militancy has also spread the militant’s activities into other states like Lagos and Ogun, where there have been reported cases of pipeline vandalisation and other nefarious activities of the groups. It is important to mention here that the proliferation of militant groups made it difficult for the state to provide adequate security for the citizens for past two decades. As a result, such crimes, armed robbery, rape, kidnapping and cultism have recently become a daily occurrence.

Kidnapping for ransom remains one of the most dangerous internal security crimes that are spreading rapidly across the whole country. The rate of kidnapping incidence in both the rural and urban areas in Nigeria has become very alarming to the point that she ranks a third position in the rating of high-risk areas of kidnapping globally (This Day Live 2013). A recent Freedom House report indicates that Nigeria recorded kidnappings, which heightened insecurity (Ogunbiyi 2017). Moreover, it can be argued that the recent manifestation of kidnappings remains a spillover of the Niger Delta crisis. The militant groups had adopted the strategy of kidnapping expatriate workers in the petroleum industry and government functionaries as a way of attracting global attention and pressing their demands on the Nigerian government through the restriction of further oil exploration within the Niger Delta (Nwobueze et al. 2016). The scope of kidnappings has since been expanded from the Niger Delta creeks to other geographical areas in the country by some unscrupulous youth for the monetary gains attached to it. In essence, this menace is no longer limited to targeting oil workers alone, as the scope of its victims now includes school children, monarchs, community leaders, market women and even farmers.
This new development has increased the fear and suspicions amongst Nigerian citizens as no one knows who the next victim might be. For instance, the incessant attacks of kidnappers and armed robbers in Aba in 2010 compelled most of the existing financial institutions within the metropolis to stop operations (Nwagboso 2016, pp. 55–56). The high rate of insecurity occasioned by kidnapping also made certain manufacturing companies like the Nigerian Breweries Plc, Guinness Nigerian Plc Seven-Up Bottling Ltd and PZ PLC, to mention just a few, to relocate to other nearby states with less security tension like Enugu, while Guinness Nigeria Plc was relocated to Edo (Nwagboso 2016). Likewise, about five workers of a farm and two Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) members employed as security personnel on the facility at Igbodu community in Epe were abducted on February 17, 2017 (Ogunbiyi 2017). A more recent case was the abduction of the staff and six students of the Nigerian Turkish International College, Isheri by unknown gunmen, who demanded for a total of about ₦1.2 billion as ransom on January 16, 2017 (Rockcity Fm 101.9).

Another critical source of internal security which has remained a thorn in the flesh of the nation is the outbreak of insurgency since 2009. Boko Haram has continually launched very brutal and disastrous attacks on both government security agencies’ buildings, such as barracks, and police stations, markets, farms, villages and so on since 2009 (Omodia and Aliu 2013). According to Matfess (2016), the heavy-handed state response to the insurgency led to more than 50,000 deaths since 2009, with more than 2.8 million people already displaced from their homes. The unrelenting brutal attacks of this dangerous group have created an atmosphere of fear and chaos. This has reduced life expectancy in the region. The trend of Boko Haram’s insurgency attained a more sophisticated, dangerous and international dimension when the UN compound in Abuja was bombed in August 2011, killing about 23 people and wounding scores (Nwogwugwu and Oluranti 2015). In fact, it was in a bid to curb the excesses of this dreaded group within the northeastern states that prompted Goodluck Jonathan administration to deploy troops to volatile areas (Sodipo 2013).

Arguably, the Boko Haram insurgency is the most lethal internal security challenge facing the nation’s northeast, which has multiplied the security problems combating the nation at large. It has led to rapid conscription, particularly into the army and other military agencies in recent years, in order to keep up with maintaining internal peace. The violent attacks of this insurgent group across the northeastern states have not only created
humanitarian challenges through its widespread displacement of innocent citizens but also created negative peace and forced some businesses to shut down. The record of the International Organization for Migration reveals that by April 9, 2015, the number of people affected by the attacks in the north is in millions (Winsor 2015). It has also brought about food security challenges and crippled the economy within the area as well as the southern region, which depends on this geographical area for certain supplies like onions, tomatoes, beans and cattle, to mention but a few. It was reported in 2014 that Boko Haram’s crisis and the outbreak of Ebola virus disease had adversely affected business and economic activities, slashing the nation’s projected economic growth rate for the year from 7 to 6.5 per cent (Nigerian Bulletin 2014).

The northeastern crisis has been further compounded by the violence caused by herdsmen attacks which has spread even to the southern part of the country. The mounting security challenge in the country has resulted in the establishment of joint task forces with the aim of restoring law and order. This has further overstretched the security sector as most security operatives have been sent on counterterrorism trainings. Similarly, Bamidele (2012, p. 33) noted that “concerns with Boko Haram catastrophic terrorism and related challenges have led to the proliferation of security management policies, laws and programmes.” These policies are initiated to regulate the activities of non-state actors and to discourage people from sponsoring terrorism or militancy.

THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

Events have shown that insecurity affects all citizens, and that securing the state is everybody’s business. It should be noted that both the elites and ordinary citizens have been affected by security threats. The Fourth Republic has recorded numerous threats like insurgency, militancy, kidnapping, cult clashes, political assassinations and other violent crimes. Since 1999, the government has responded to the problems of internal security in different ways. The need to promote internal security and foster the protection of lives and property led to the formation of joint task forces as a response to insecurity. This is characterised by deployment of security forces to volatile areas either before or after declaration of state of emergency.
For instance, militarism has remained one of the ways of managing internal security threats in the Fourth Republic. Militarism is the deployment of coercive instruments of a state to restore law and order through the Ministry of Defence with implications for human rights (Okolie-Osemene 2015). Through militarism, state violence becomes a necessity and approved act of violence to forestall breakdown of law and order. Since then, joint security patrols and mounting of road blocks have characterised internal security. With the military option, the state makes violence a legitimate response to insecurity aimed at routing non-state actors, and this led to the formation of the joint task force to prevent internal aggression and protect Nigeria’s territory from being divided by non-state actors (Okolie-Osemene 2016). Most of the members of the military task force based in the northeast are members of the security sector among other stakeholders.

It is noteworthy that while the Niger Delta militancy was attributed to the politics of oil revenues, that of Boko Haram insurgency which escalated during former President Jonathan’s administration was attributed to politics and religion, considering how some political elites demonstrated their lack of will to confront the security challenge to avoid losing political patronage. The foregoing may have contributed to the escalation of the insurgency with attendant humanitarian crisis and fatalities recorded (Abolurin 2012). Most militants have accused both the government and security forces of being responsible for their restiveness, particularly in the mismanagement of the oil revenues and abuse of human rights, respectively. Also, the delay in taming the Boko Haram insurgency at the beginning stage made it possible for the group to gain and control some parts of Nigeria’s territory. In order to counter actors that threatened the state’s monopoly of violence, the government established joint security outfits to curb the activities of ethnic militias and thugs who became agents of insecurity in most parts of the country (Matfess 2016). Managing such threats began with the police and the military and later expanded to accommodate other security agencies due to the activities of criminals and drug traffickers, whose access to small arms and light weapons usually equips them to challenge security agencies.

It should be recalled that the need to promote national security led to the establishment of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) in 2002, based on various security lapses. Since then, the NSCDC has demonstrated its capacity to complement the role of other security agencies in protecting lives and critical infrastructure, including
oil and gas installations. The security agency has also played significant roles in intelligence gathering during times of crisis like the fuel subsidy imbroglio in 2012 when there were threats to public order. In addition, the NSCDC has also been actively involved in various joint security operations with the police and the army, especially along various highways across the country to curb the menace of armed robberies.

According to NSCDC progress report, it provides vital information for the government using its grassroots intelligence-gathering apparatus. Such initiative contributes to the eradication of crime in the country. The NSCDC has become an active player in the security sector since officers of the Corps began carrying arms.

Due to the escalation of insurgency and suicide bombings recorded across the northeast, containing the Boko Haram insurgency demands that government considers curtailing and managing the consequence of violence as well as exploring the option of dialogue (Ani and Onyebukwa 2016). Also, timely management of internal security challenges demands response to some of the concerns raised by Ani and Onyebukwa (2016, p. 431) thus: there is need for the “eradication of corruption in the police, prevention of nepotism and ethnicity in the security sector, timely promotion of officers, professional restructuring of the military and other security agencies, motivation adequate funding of security operations.” If the policymakers are able to address some of these problems, the security sector will be more equipped to counter all threats to national security. Given that security is for all—the rich, poor, civilians and security operatives—it then means that the society will be a safer place when poor management of internal security is addressed.

**Conclusion**

Insecurity has manifested in various ways since 1999. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been characterised by increasing cases of internal crisis which no doubt to a great extent have strained the capability of the various security agencies in the country since the return to civil rule in 1999. However, democratic dispensation has not abated internal security threats as most security agencies have either become victims of insecurity or faced criticisms from the masses over the capacity of non-state actors to overrun some communities and towns during attacks. This manifested in 2011 during post-election violence when restive youths unleashed terror in people in many northern states with late response by security agencies.
As far as reducing internal security challenges is concerned, an area that demands consideration is the issue of brutality and clashes between different security agencies. The earlier security agencies begin to work in harmony without occasional clashes, the better for the entire country. For instances, if they avoid the clashes between the military and police, or police with the civil defence, the public will take them seriously and develop high confidence in them. With such confidence in place, the security agencies would enjoy inter-agency-public relations, particularly in the area of information sharing, as far as curbing crime is concerned.

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Threats to Internal Security in Nigeria
CHAPTER 5

The Phenomenon of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria

Francis Chigozie Chilaka and Ikechukwu Idika

INTRODUCTION

In this twenty-first century, mankind has become more accustomed to a new wave of violence, in the form of terrorism, which uses the latest technology to unleash mayhem and violence on helpless individuals. In Africa, this trend has become so endemic due to the inability of the political leadership to provide robust counter-terrorism and insurgency measures to reduce the incidence of terrorism. More worrisomely, Nigeria, especially the northeast of the country, which is the focus of this chapter, has faced serious security challenges in the form of kidnapping, armed robbery, ethno-religious conflict, farmers-herdsmen conflict and terrorism. Of all these security challenges, terrorism orchestrated by an Islamic fundamentalist group known as Boko Haram appears to be the major security challenge of northeast Nigeria. In security terms, Nigeria is facing the most difficult time in her history as a result of the increasing rate of terrorism, which has kept all and sundry on the edge.

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O. O. Oshita et al. (eds.), Internal Security Management in Nigeria,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8215-4_5
Boko Haram is a religious terrorist group that became well known under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf (1970–2002). The terrorist group is based in Borno State. The origin of the of the group is shrouded in controversy, as the ideology has passed from the Maitasine sect of the 1980s to “Ahlulsunna Wal’ jama ‘ah jijra, under Abubakar Lawan who later left for further studies in Medina Saudi Arabia in 1995” (Onuoha 2012a, p. 135). The ideology further flourished under Muhajirun, Yusufi Yyah and the Nigerian Taliban (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013). Meanwhile, the trajectory of the deadly sect under Yusuf started with the establishment of an Islamic religious group called Markaz, following his expulsion from two mosques in Maiduguri, by Muslim clerics, for advocating and fostering radical views. The composite he created which included a mosque and an Islamic school attracted many poor children from both within and neighbouring countries of Chad and Niger. Within the first few years of its existence, their activities were relatively peaceful, as they only proselytized and criticized the northern Muslims for participating in what the group called an illegitimate state—a non-Islamic state. The group’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlul Sunna lidda’u Wati Wal Jihad, which simply means, “People committed to the propagation of Prophet’s teaching and jihad” (Onuoha 2012b, p. 2), which is derogatively called Boko Haram, meaning Western education is a sin.

Members of the group live in isolation from other members of the community and are estimated to have a membership of about 7000 people. The group is stubbornly and violently opposed to the erosion of Islamic values as a result of the incursion of Western values, ethics and norms among Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria. Members of the group are usually youths, based or living in northeastern Nigeria, primarily drawn from Kanuri and Hausa Fulani tribes (Agbiboa 2013). The cross-border tribal relationship and intertwined communities could be said to be one of the factors undergirding the weapon trafficking and granting of safe haven for the group members in case of onslaught.

The sect is governed by a Shura council of 30 members; which oversees the activities of different cells that make up the group. Members of this council do not meet in person but via telecommunication. This enables them to communicate and not be exposed at the event of the arrest of any of the council member. The initial ideology of this group was predicated on Sharia laws and principled on Islamic fundamentalism, extreme opposition to all man-made laws, Western education and beliefs. Boko Haram is akin to the Maitasine movement; many of the people
who are attracted to Boko Haram usually do so as a result of socio-economic and political challenges in the country.

The demise of the founder of the group in 2009, and consequent assumption of authority by Abubakar Shekau, saw the graduation of the group from a proselytization group to a full-blown terrorist group, from shooting sporadically at people to selective assassination. The dimension moved to the era of planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on roads and churches and ramming the same into government buildings. The first vehicle-borne IED incident occurred in June 2011, at the police force headquarters, Abuja, killing about six people. Another deadly attack at the centre of Abuja was the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja; the attack claimed the lives of 11 UN staff and 12 others with many severely injured. They also used rocket launchers, high-grade weapons, Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)—seized from the military and purchased through black market—to attack police stations, military posts, financial institutions and markets. Media houses and churches were not left out in the rain of attacks; the deaths arising from Boko Haram attacks were unprecedented as many others were maimed for life, not counting the psychological trauma it left on the residents of the area.

Suicide bombing came to bare as young men and women, strapped with explosives, detonated some in public places, not considering the ethnic, religious or economic affiliation or status of the affected people. The group graduated to a secessionist group with the declaration of the Islamic caliphate in some villages and local government areas (LGAs), including Gwoza, popularly known for the location of the mobile police training school. In a similar development, Bama, a town that is 700 km from the capital of Borno State, was captured by the sect on September 2, 2015 (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013), with surviving residents fleeing to Maiduguri. Mubi in Adamawa State fell on October 30, 2014, with over 200,000 residents killed, maimed or displaced by militants. BBC news of November 14, 2014, revealed that a total of 20 towns and villages were seized by Boko Haram, including Chibok. The Boko Haram modus operandi is alien to Nigeria but closely akin to the method used by the Al-Shabab in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, that of Al-Qaeda. This chapter is designed to explain the phenomenon of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. To achieve this, it attempts a theoretical explanation of the emergence of the sect, its philosophy and modus operandi as it affects Northern Nigeria.
Theoretical Explanation of Boko Haram’s Emergence and Activities

How can we explain the incidence of Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Northern Nigeria? There is no doubt that Boko Haram extremism may be an outcome of injustice, poverty and corruption in the country. However, many Muslims who live in developed countries and are sympathetic to the cause of terrorism do not do so because they are poor and corrupt. What then accounts for the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria? In this chapter, the incidence of Boko Haram could be better understood within the contest of Huntington’s theory of clash of civilizations. According to this theory, conflicts all over the world in the post-Cold War era will not be as a result of ideology or economic reasons but religious and cultural (Huntington 1993). As aptly noted by Ezeani and Chilaka (2013, p. 44):

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world is now faced with cultural conflict rooted in civilizations. He is of the view that conflict, essentially, will revolve around cultural and religious lines in years to come. As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict. (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013, p. 44)

The theory argues vehemently that conflict in the post-Cold War era will be driven by nations who try to defend their civilization as a result of their cultural uniqueness. It is the effort to secure one’s civilization that conflict will be inevitable. And this will be a recurring issue in world politics. By civilization, Huntington meant

a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity ...

A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from others. (Huntington 1993, pp. 23–24)

Very importantly, various civilizations give individuals contending answers on ways to live their lives, view their social norms, examine their relationship with others and allow them to pursue aspirations to realize the reason for their existence. Civilizations are markedly differentiated by language, tradition, culture and most fundamentally religion. The world is structured this way and makes conflict ineluctable (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013).
Huntington is of the view that civilizational conflicts will be more rampant between Muslims and non-Muslims especially Christians. The reason why Islam and Christianity are key to this conflict is because, as cited in Ezeani and Chilaka (2013, pp. 44–45), both are

- missionary, seeking conversion of others;
- universal, “all-or-nothing” religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one; and
- teleological, that is, their values and beliefs represent the goals of existence and purpose in human existence.
- Irreligious people who violate the base principles of those religions are perceived to be furthering their own pointless aims, which leads to violent interactions. (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013, pp. 44–45)

Hence, our central argument is that part of the reason why terrorism is rampant in Northern Nigeria is the feeling that Western civilization, with its inherent values, dominates or erodes Islamic civilization. Thus, Mansbach and Rhodes (2006), observed that after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, many in the West were of the view that the values of the Western world and of Islam were on a collision course. Again, the former president of the US George Bush (Jnr.) explained this point when he addressed the joint session of the US Congress after the September 11 terrorist attack. According to him, terrorists kill not merely to take lives, but to also disrupt and terminate a way of life (Onuoha 2008).

It is on this premise that we argue that terrorism in Nigeria is essentially but not exclusively a clash between Islamic civilization and Western civilization. Even though the causes of violence are many, complex and closely related, it is our duty as social scientists to provide a valid basis for the analysis of social issues. It is a well-known fact that Boko Haram is stoutly against Western education and its values in Nigeria. This arises from the erroneous view that Western civilization has usurped Islamic values and rendered them comatose. As a movement driven by Islamic principles, this also explains why it is entrenched in Northern Nigeria. More fundamentally, their ideology is akin to the principles driving any other violent extremist groups in the world which are united by Islamic principles, which they seek to secure and shield from termination by other civilizations, essentially Western civilization.
Boko Haram: Evolution, Philosophy and Structural Organization

The origin of Boko Haram is usually traced to 2002, the year that late Mohammed Yusuf assumed the leadership of the group. Nevertheless, the origin dates back to the establishment of Muslim Youth Organization in 1995 by Abubakar Lawan. During this period, it was non-violent in its operation but assumed a violent posture in 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf became the leader of the sect (Onuoha 2013). This explains why the late Mohammed Yusuf has become the rallying name for the sect. In its trajectory and evolution, the sect has answered various names ranging from Nigerian Taliban, Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Shabaab, Jama’atu Allissunnah Lidda’awatiwal Jihad and later to Boko Haram.

The group prefers to be known as and addressed as the Jama’atu Ablissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, that is, “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”, instead of Boko Haram. Despite the various nomenclatures ascribed to the sect, its philosophy and ideological goal has remained unchanged, namely, to destroy the secular and Western-prone Nigerian state and enthrone strict Islamic Sharia law in the entire country.

The ideology of the group is steeped in orthodox Islamic teaching akin to that of Taliban in Afghanistan, which views anything Western as being evil and un-Islamic. It is essentially driven by the erroneous belief that Western influence has occasioned the weakness of Islam. Hence, all Western institutions and ways of life must be avoided by Muslims because it causes nothing but evil to a Muslim. This is the reason the sect is popularly known as Boko Haram, which literally means “Western education is evil”. They are driven by the fact that the Nigerian state is nothing but corrupt and evil and the best thing for a devout Muslim to do is to extricate himself from this morally deficit state to a place of tranquillity devoid of moral and political corruption. As aptly noted by Onuoha (2013, p. 409):

Boko Haram’s ideology is part of a global Salafist Islamic ideological movement that seeks the imposition of its own interpretation of Islamic law. Salafism, for instance, seeks to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam practiced by the “pious ancestors”, that is Muhammad and the early Islamic community. It stresses adherence to a rigorous interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith and aims at reforming the personal behaviour of every Muslim. It also involves the duty to advise
other believers to change their ways of life in the same sense. Salafi thinkers insist on the right of believers to interpret the fundamental texts for themselves through independent reasoning. Only one specific interpretation of Salafism focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change and is commonly known as Salafist Jihadism. (Onuoha 2013, p. 409)

Hence those who do not ascribe to such a belief system are seen as disbelievers because they deny the truth or wrongdoers. According to Idika, the antipathy to a Western way of life can further be traced to the Hausa traditional rhyme which discourages the quest for Western education; this is encapsulated in a popular rhyme of northern origin:

Yan Makaranta Boko,
Ba karanta
Ba Sallah
Sai yawo zagin Mallam.
The above is literally translated as:
Pupils with western education,
They do not recite Koran,
And do not observe prayers,
Always wondering and abusing their teachers.

This rhythm was used in mocking and dissuading children from going to conventional schools; it also endangered the permeation of Western culture and education in the northern states. Consequently, the origin of Boko Haram cannot be traced in isolation of its ideological derivation. Generally, they are averse to Western values, but ironically all the technological innovations of the Western world which have aided their violent extremism such as handphones, cars, motorcycles and guns are well used by them.

Before Muhammed Yusuf died in July 2009, he was the Commander in Chief (Amir ul-Aam) or leader of Boko Haram. He was assisted by two deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II). They also have leaders or commanders in all the states and local governments they operate. The sect operates in cells due to its weakness to have a precise structure. The cells, though they constitute the smallest elements of Boko Haram as a terrorist group, serve as the building blocks of the group. This makes it difficult for the security agencies to fight the group. As aptly observed by Onuoha et al. (2012), those in a particular cell are unaware of the existence of other cells, this enables the group to ensure that information is adequately guided.
After the death of Mohammed Yusuf, one of his deputies, Abubakar Shekau, who is currently the Commander in Chief of Boko Haram, became the spiritual leader of the sect. Under Shekau, the operational organization of the sect was strengthened. “Under Shekau, the sect maintains a loose command-and-control structure, which allows it to operate autonomously. It now operates in some sort of cells and units that are interlinked, but generally, take directives from one commander” (Onuoha 2013, p. 410). At inception, the operational base of the sect was Borno and Yobe States, but its activities have also spread to Gombe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Kano States. There is a growing fear that the sect is anticipating moving into the southern part of the Nigerian state.

**The Problem of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria**

The attacks on the towns of Geidam and Kanamma in Yobe State on December 24, 2003, signal the intention of Boko Haram as a terrorist group. The affected areas were occupied by the sect for two weeks where they hoisted the flag of Afghanistan Taliban movement. From this moment, the sect maintained occasional hit-and-run attacks on security posts in Borno and Yobe States until July 2009 when it engaged Nigerian security forces in a major fight that lasted from July 26, 2009 to July 30, 2009, across five states, namely, Kano, Katsina, Yobe, Borno and Bauchi. This particular incident signified the intention of the group to overthrow the Nigerian state which it sees as evil, one that has eroded Islamic culture. Their intention was to eradicate the Nigerian state with its Western values. As aptly noted by Ezeani and Chilaka (2013, p. 48), Boko Haram abhors the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian state, invariably described as *dagut* ("evil") and unworthy of allegiance, and wishes to wage war against it in an effort to replace it with a “purified” Islamic regime. It is not just in Nigeria that the clash between Islamic civilization and Western civilization is raging. The Islamic fundamentalists have declared war against America and its Western principles. This explains why America has been attacked and continues to be attacked by Islamic and Arab sponsored terrorists organizations. A violent attack that does not espouse economic issues as reasons for it but the overthrow of Western values is a conflict of civilizations. (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013, p. 48)
The July 2009 revolt led to the capture of and extra-judicial execution of the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf, although the Nigerian Police claimed he was killed when he attempted to escape. Following the death of Yusuf, the sect retreated and re-strategized by redefining its tactics which moved from their traditional hit and run to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombing, assassination and open-armed confrontation. This change in tactics has led to devastating effects on the security of Northern Nigeria. The socio-economic and political effects of Boko Haram extremism in Northern Nigeria, especially the northeast, cannot be over-emphasized.

The activities of Boko Haram have had devastating and adverse effects on the socio-economic fortune of the country and the northeast in general. Goods and properties worth billions of naira have been destroyed due to the increasing attacks being carried out by Boko Haram. These have caused the drifting of investors from the northeast region to other more peaceful states in the country. The frequent attacks between the security forces and the insurgents have caused enormous loss of lives and destruction of properties in the northeast, and these have caused those from other parts of the country, especially the southeast, to flee from the region. Banks no longer operate on a 24-hour basis for fear of being attacked by members of this group. Mr Inuwa Bwala, Borno State Commissioner for Information, noted that it will take the state over 20 years to recover from the devastating effects of the Boko Haram insurgency (Ome and Ibietan 2012).

The activities of the sect have also impacted adversely on the educational sector of the northeast. This is also not helped by the fact that the sect frowns at Western education. Based on the UNICEF report of 2015, over 10.5 million children of primary school age were not in school and over 60 per cent of these out-of-school children were found in the north (UNICEF Nigeria 2015). These children constitute the Almajiris children, separated from their family and under the guardianship of Islamic teachers. These children, denied of parental care, form the bulk of Boko Haram members. Recruitment of these children is most times forcefully done. In a video on YouTube which was released in July 2013, the group leader Shekau was captured warning thus: “we are going to burn down the schools, if they are not Islamic religious schools for Allah” (Faul 2013, p. 1). This was not an empty threat and subsequent actions of the insurgents proved him right, because evidence abound that Boko Haram’s tactics of harassing teachers and students
and issuing threats and instilling fear in parents became more severe. The Boko Haram insurgents began unleashing mayhem by destroying school buildings and even burning other properties at both school and non-school hours; this went further by impacting negatively on the educational system in the north. This came to its head when the entire world was shocked with the abduction of 276 girls in their dormitories from a government secondary school in Borno State in the town of Chibok. The kidnap was justified by the sect on the grounds that they need to learn of true Islamic education instead of Western education.

A Human Rights Watch report indicates that a good number of the abducted schoolgirls who were formerly Christians have now been forcefully converted to Islam by their captors. Boko Haram believes that the abduction of the Chibok girls is a major achievement because it dealt a big blow on Western education the girls are accustomed to. Over time, the attacks on schools including institutions of higher learning have become more severe. In February 2012 over 12 schools in Maiduguri were set ablaze by the insurgents within a span of two weeks (Human Rights Watch 2015b). On September 28, 2013, over 100 insurgents attacked Yobe State College of Agriculture, Gujba, and left over 42 students and a lecturer dead. One staff who was with the security when they arrived, as reported by Human Rights Watch (2015a, p. 36), recounted thus:

I was awakened by the sound of gunshots when I peeped out of a crack in the door, I saw many students streaming out of the hotel in panic towards the exit gate. A young insurgent, who could hardly hold up his gun, began shooting at them. The others came behind him in Hilux trucks on one of which was mounted a huge light beam powered by a generator. Each of the about 20 motorbikes I saw had at least three fighters. They were dressed in black t-shirts, with their heads and half of their faces covered in checkered scarves. They headed straight for the male hostel near the gate. A female hostel was next door but they ignored it as students fled from the building. That was when I dived into the bushy shrubs behind the school. I laid there until the insurgents left. (Human Rights Watch 2015a, p. 36)

The truth is that the activities of Boko Haram in some parts of the northeast have induced fear in the minds of parents, who have had cause to withdraw their children from school for fear of being killed by the insur-
gents. The Yobe State education authorities noted that a good percentage of schools located in the state have been destroyed by Boko Haram. All these have caused the state in particular and nation at large to reinvest huge sums of money to rebuild the affected schools.

The phenomenon of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is also a disturbing consequence of the Boko Haram insurgents in the northeast. According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), in their 2015 report, 1,188,018 IDPs were identified in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba and Gombe States, another 47,276 IDPs were also identified in Nasarawa, Abuja, Plateau, Kaduna and Kano States, although it must be noted that some of these IDPs were as a result of communal clashes. Nevertheless, a large number of them are as a result of Boko Haram insurgency. An overwhelming percentage of residents in the states in the northeast have fled their homes, residential areas, business establishments and comfort zones to escape the devastating effect of the insurgents. Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States have the highest number of IDPs. The worst aspect of this is that the IDPs are also not safe in their various camps designated by the government. For instance, on September 11, 2015, an IDP camp known as Maikohi Camp, in Yola, Adamawa State, was attacked by Boko Haram, leaving seven people dead and several others injured. Similarly, on February 10, 2016, an IDP camp in Dikwa, Borno State, was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing about 58 people and injuring 78 others. Perhaps nothing could be more worrisome and ironic than to have a supposedly safe place being attacked by insurgents.

Agriculturally, the northern part of Nigeria is known as the food basket of the Nigerian state. And no state can survive without adequately feeding its population. However, due to the mindless killings by Boko Haram in the northeast, farmers have been forced to flee the area for fear of death. Also, the loss of lives has also caused a great shift in farming activities and other related businesses. The output or farm produce has been greatly hampered, and it has increased the fear of hunger not just in the region worst hit by Boko Haram, but in the entire country as the prices of commodities that are majorly produced in commercial quantities from the region have increased. Residents of the most hit areas were also forced to leave these areas, for other peaceful parts of the country with little or no business activity.

The security dilemma being posed by Boko Haram in the northern part of Nigeria cannot be underestimated. The rate at which the Boko Haram insurgency has killed many in the region calls for corner. However, it must
be acknowledged that government, though belated, has downgraded the sect in recent times. In March 2015, the head of the US Africa Command, General David M. Rodriguez, acknowledged that the Nigerian government has tried to push back the sect to the extent that it has lost some vital territories that it hitherto occupied. This achievement was made possible through intelligence sharing with other regional military forces. It is expected that the Nigerian security agencies should put in more effort to decimate the group. However, one way to achieve this is to deepen intelligence sharing with other regional military forces because evidences abound that Boko Haram operates more effectively along borders in Northern Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the Boko Haram problem in Northern Nigeria. It noted that Boko Haram is an offshoot of Islamic civilization’s effort to clamp down on the internationalization of Western civilization, which has vitiated Islamic values. All over the world and especially in Nigeria, Islam is ferociously confronting Western universalism, that is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western values.

The chapter notes that the violent activities of Boko Haram have led to wanton destruction of lives and property in Northern Nigeria. However, it must be acknowledged that the Nigerian government, though belated, has downgraded the sect in recent times. Nevertheless, to recapture outstanding territories from the group, efforts should be made to deepen intelligence sharing with other regional military forces because Boko Haram operates more effectively along borders in Northern Nigeria.

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CHAPTER 6

Grazing Conundrum: Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict and Internal Security Crisis in Nigeria

Jude Okwudili Odigbo

INTRODUCTION

Generally, many states in Africa in the aftermath of decolonisation have remained grossly unstable and crisis prone. As is evident, the scale of underdevelopment ravaging the continent cannot be unconnected with the deepening instability in Africa. In many cases, internal or domestic violence posed severe threat to state survival. In fact, in many African states, security of lives and property appears to be a scarce commodity. This is in spite of the fact that Africa has abundant natural resources that should assist the states to provide necessary security equipment and, indeed, fund the entire security architecture to be capable of responding to security needs of people. Thus, utilising these resources by individual states for the benefit of the populace remains one of the greatest undoing of many states in Africa.

Thus, Nigeria’s security crisis has degenerated from a brush fire to an all-consuming conflagration. As Nwolise (2017) succinctly puts it, in

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Nigeria, we are all restless and living in fear because of the combined devastating effects of a very sick economy and ravaging insecurity pathogens that are walking in the streets, some with impunity, as the state seems helpless, and with great negative effects on the economy and subsequently, the lives of Nigerians. As the Nigerian state flounders, its capacity to regulate or prevent the emergence of these insecurity pathogens also diminishes. The implication is the ever growing security lapses and emergence of several ethnic militias like Fulani herders, threatening the state and, indeed, inflicting monumental damages to the state and the people.

With the return to democratic governance in 1999, expectations seem to be upbeat that through the utilisation of democratic principles, the state will fashion out resourceful strategies to contain several symptoms constituting insecurity. But whether this optimism is well founded definitely has remained to be seen. In more than one decade since her return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed more internal conflicts ever in her history. For instance, communal and ethno-religious violence such as the Ife-Modakeke crisis, perennial Jos crisis, Kaduna communal violence, Jukun/Tiv ethnic violence, Wukari crisis and Aguleri/Umuleri communal violence; separatist agitations such as the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) separatist agitations in the southeast; militancy in the south-south; and terrorism such as the Boko Haram terrorism and the prevailing and rampaging terrorism of the Fulani herdsmen; the ever high-rising cases of kidnapping; and some highly induced state massacres such as the Odi massacre and the Zaki-Biam massacre are tendencies and pathogens of insecurity in Nigeria.

Thus, while the Nigerian state grapples with these crises, the rising incidences of the Fulani herdsmen attacks tend to have spiralled out of state control. Evidently, the protracted farmers-nomadic herders’ violence in Nigeria has constituted a major source of insecurity. In the last few years, the intensification and rising cases of the herders-farmers crisis raised issues of conspiracy, poor state attitude and the extent of state preparedness to providing security to the Nigerian people. Nigeria has been constantly racked by civil strife, particularly across the religious divide, and this has reconfigured the herder-farmer conflict in new and striking ways (Blench and Dendo 2003).

Incidentally, Kwaja and Ademola (2018) noted that more than 6000 people have been killed and over 62,000 people have been displaced in the Middle Belt States of Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau alone. They further stated that despite the escalating and expanding violence, there have been no systematic consolidations or assessments of what has been done to this
point to address farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria (Kwaja and Ademola 2018). Specifically, Duru (2017) explained that from 2013 to 2016, over 500 persons are still missing while over 500,000 people were displaced and the future of almost a million youths truncated. He also stated that over 9000 households were affected and over 2000 killed in various attacks carried out by herdsmen while properties worth over ₦95 billion were destroyed in 2014 alone.

Indeed, Fasona and Omojola (2005) contended that out of all the conflicts and other forms of unrest reported in the Northern region of Nigeria between 1991 and 2005, farmers-pastoralists conflicts accounted for 35%. For instance, between 2007 and 2015, the Nigeria Watch database recorded 615 violent deaths related to cattle grazing, out of a total of over 61,000 violent fatalities in Nigeria (cited in Olayoku 2016). Also, in 2016, an estimated death toll of approximately 2500 people was recorded and these clashes are becoming potentially as dangerous as the Boko Haram violence in the northeast (International Crisis Group 2017).

Considering the magnitude of destruction, complex strategies of attacks and perhaps more importantly, the government’s failure to apprehend and prosecute any of the architects of this crisis, interrogating herdsmen-farmers violence and security crisis in Nigeria becomes essential. This chapter examines the subject matter and panoramically x-rays the activities of the herdsmen in Nigeria. It also looks at the historical antecedent of herdsmen-farmers violence in Nigeria and changing patterns of the attacks especially between 2011 and 2018 to determine the extent of its impacts and provide solutions on how the state can nip from the bud the prevailing herdsmen-farmers conflicts and security crisis in Nigeria.

**Theoretical Underpinnings**

There are several theoretical standpoints explaining the farmers-herders violence, especially within the context of the causes of conflict, management of conflict and state-people relationship during and after a conflict situation. Among these theoretical viewpoints are Karl Marx’s conflict theory and the eco-violence theory. Karl Marx’s conflict theory is essentially important for the understanding of the problem of herder-farmer conflicts because it provides a well-articulated approach to the general perception of conflict situations. Crucially, reasons for escalation can be located by examining the sequence of interactions to explain why some conflicts escalate and others do not (Kriesberg 2007). Conflict theory,
therefore, looks at the societal inequality as an underlining factor that engenders competition which paves way for subsequent emergence of conflict.

On the other hand, eco-violence theory as developed by Homer-Dixon and Blitt (1998), Homer-Dixon (1999) and Soysa (2002), among others, hinged on the assumption that scarcity of environmental resources such as fresh water, crop land and forests, which are very essential to agricultural production, has the tendency to trigger conflicts. The issue of environmental pressure as a source of conflict revolves largely around resource degradation and resource scarcity (Soysa 2002).

While we are not oblivious of the analytical diligence and utilities of the abovementioned theories, it is our view that these theories have fallen short of providing major analytical ingredients that can unveil the underlining conjectures sustaining herders-farmers violence in the North in particular and Nigeria in general and indeed the dynamic changes in the killing spree. The above theories are also weak in explaining how poor herders and farmers appear to have unhindered access to weapons and persistent availability of expensive and sophisticated weapons for the violence. The theories seem unable to interrogate or rather explain the capacity of low-income herders and farmers in terms of sponsorship and sustenance of the violence. This is important especially when they are virtually categorised among the majority of people who lack the basic necessities of life and indeed do not have the wherewithal to invest in violence.

Following from the above, this study adopts conspiracy theory. We are guided by the fact that the extent to which a political system responds to domestic challenges and other related security issues remains vital in its ability to maintain peace and stability. Thus, disconnect between the Nigerian elites and the people, girded with socio-economic, religious and ethnic conspiracy, has prompted a myriad of conflicts. Only recently Nigeria has seen the Niger-Delta crisis, separatist agitations, kidnappings, political instability, the ongoing Boko Haram onslaught and devastating herdsmen violence, and economic and financial crises, which can also be associated with various conspiracy assumptions.

A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons—the conspirators acting in secret (Keeley 1999). More specifically, conspiracy theory can generally be counted as such if it is an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role (at least until their
aims are accomplished) (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009 cited in Bjerg and Presskorn-Thygesen 2016). It explains the underlining connectivity of everything and principally demonstrates that nothing happens by accident as many incidences of violence are pre-meditated. In fact, conspiracy theories appear to provide broad, internally consistent explanations that allow people to preserve beliefs in the face of uncertainty and contradiction (Douglas et al. 2017). Thus, conspiracy theories are stronger when the motivation to find patterns in the environment is experimentally heightened (Whitson and Galinsky 2008 cited in Douglas et al. 2017).

Consequently, the conspiracy theory explains the underlining dynamics that sustains herders’ violence and the increasing tempo in the last few years. In this study, the conspiracy theory explains herdsmen conflicts in two folds, the elites’ conspiracy and the state conspiracy. Elitist conspiracy is seen from the angle of the role played by the owners of the cattle in the conflict. It should be noted that herders are not the real owners of the cattle; they are only servants or apprentices who rear the animals for their masters. The masters are the traditional rulers, a large number of the elites, both ruling and non-ruling elites, in Nigeria. It is also important to note that the herders do not have access or capacity to purchase sophisticated weapons like AK 47. However, the owners of the cattle have and indeed are the people who sanction the manifestation of any deadly attack. In times of misunderstanding with the host community, the herders report to the owners of the cattle. Experiences in the last few years have shown that if the owners of the cattle (the elites) decide to attack such host, it is them who provide the weapons, hire the mercenaries and provide other logistics including settling the security agencies to stay off such areas during the period.

On the other hand, state conspiracy is seen from the failure of the state to prevent, foil, arrest, and prosecute the perpetrators of the conflicts. There seem to be several incidences where state security agencies ignore calls to assist distressed communities to avert further attacks by the herdsmen. For instance, the Governor of Enugu State in 2016 decried negligence of security agencies after informing them of impending attack in Nimbo. According to him:

I got security information from Uzo-Uwani Local Government Transition Chairman, that such an incident was likely to take place in the state. I immediately summoned a meeting of the State Security Council. After receiving assurances of deployments to Nimbo, I felt quite confident that we had done everything possible to forestall an attack on Nimbo. Sadly, in the early hours of Monday, reports of this carnage reached me. (Uzodinma 2016)
The implication of the above is that the elites in high places of authority who own the cattle heap pressure on the state, hence government leniency is on the crisis. In fact, the majority of the political leaders are the owners of the cattle and surreptitiously sponsor the violence. President Buhari argued in an official visit to the USA in April 2018 that Nigerian herdsmen do not carry guns. Unfortunately he was unable to explain how those with guns were involved in the same issues between those without guns and their host community. Thus, it is simple; the elites who own cattle are the “hirer and provider” of weapons. One can hardly subscribe to the unconnected conclusion that the murderous herdsmen are from Libya. In fact, how many herdsmen have been apprehended by security forces or even arrested and were found to be Libyans? For several years Nigerians are under herdsmen’s terror and no concrete efforts have been made by the leaders or the government to arrest the trend. Surprisingly, some elites, especially the owners of the cattle, question the disappearance of one cow than the death of an entire community. The conspiracy theory is essential if not the bedrock of this study as it enables one to understand the secret behind the rising herdsmen’s violence in Nigeria and the failure of the state to stamp out the tide of herdsmen’s conflicts in Nigeria.

**HISTORICISING HERDERS-FARMERS CONFLICTS AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA**

Traditionally, grazing in Nigeria is as old as the society. Open grazing precedes colonialism in most of African states and Nigeria in particular. Grazing reserves in Nigeria started during the pre-colonial era (Bako and Ingawa 1988), although in the traditional society, disturbances arising from grazing lands or routes were minimal. These may be attributed to two prevailing conditions of the time. First, lands seemed to be more available as compared to the contemporary Nigerian society. Secondly and perhaps more importantly is the fact that the level of division, animosity and ethnic bias among Nigerians, as mainly caused by the elitist conscious politicisation of issues of national importance, was at the lowest ebb in the traditional society. In that period, grazing still had its peculiar challenges but incidences of mass killing and destruction rarely occurred.

As Nigeria grows, same way numerous problems develop. The problems confronting the state (grazing challenges inclusive) tend to be either not adequately attended to or ignored for obvious interests or political reasons. Most of these problems and specifically the grazing in Nigeria
appeared to have developed resistance elements to curative measures. As can be seen, the genesis of grazing reserves and efforts at preventing herders-farmers violence in Nigeria could be traced to the colonial period. Although formally introduced by the British, grazing reserves were demarcated by the Fulani who conquered and ruled Northern Nigeria (Iro 2014). The attempt by the British in 1940 to separate the grazing land from the farmland, however, faltered because the Europeans imposed land use controls divorced from economic and demographic dynamics in the pastoral system (Frantz 1981 cited in Iro 2014). In spite of the failure to demarcate grazing land from farmland, the 1940 attempt formally initiated the process of rule codification with regard to grazing in Nigeria. It heralded the consciousness towards establishing rules guiding grazing activities. Thus, Iro (2014, p. 3) further enumerated:

Formal grazing reserves in Nigeria started accidentally in the 1950s when Hamisu Kano, working with pastoralists on livestock vaccination, foresaw the shortages of grazing land in Northern Nigeria. Supported by the government, he initiated the grazing reserve scheme from the abandoned government resettlement schemes (Fulani Settlement Scheme). The resettlement schemes collapsed because the government had neither the financial nor the managerial ability to continue with the financially burdensome scheme, and the best alternative use of the land, the government thought, was to convert it into grazing reserves that were less financially committed. Grazing reserve hatched in 1954 after a study of the Fulani production system contained in the “Fulani Amenities Proposal.” The proposal suggested the creation of grazing reserves, the improvement of Fulani welfare, and the transformation of the herd management system. By 1964, the government had gazetted about 6.4 million hectares of the forest reserve, ninety-eight percent in the savanna. Sokoto Province had twenty-one percent of the land, followed by Kabba, Bauchi, Zaria, Ilorin, and Katsina, with 11–15 percent each. The Wase, Zamfara, and Udubu reserves followed in succession.

For the cattle owners, the enactment of the Northern Region Grazing Reserves Law of 1965 was essential because it aims at providing and securing a good portion of land for purposes of grazing. According to Kwaja and Ademola (2018), the Northern Region Grazing Reserves Law of 1965 created corridors for the passage of migrating livestock and 415 grazing reserves throughout the country. They further explained that the reserves were envisioned to map out large swathes of land to be exclusively used by herders to graze their livestock. While initially considered a
legislative solution, population growth, urbanisation and migration encroached on these designated areas, reducing herders’ access and usage of the reserves (Kwaja and Ademola 2018). Unfortunately, the federal and state governments have been derelict in the upkeep of these reserves to meet these concerns of farmers and herders, and amidst the absence of a concrete response plan to label and enforce the law on cattle routes by governments at all levels, existing reserves are being distorted (Kwaja and Ademola 2018).

Thus, the tendency of discontinuity of policy implementation appears to be responsible for the deteriorating conditions and total abandonment of cattle routes and reserves in Nigeria. For instance, such policies were not targeted at developing cattle routes alone but there were also efforts towards developing the nomads through education and enlightenment. As a result, the government established National Commission for Nomadic Education (NCNE) in 1989 to ensure reductions, if not complete eradication of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty; to provide education to the majority of the citizens; to enlighten as well as stimulate and accelerate national development. The Commission is saddled with the responsibility of formulating policies concerning nomadic education in Nigeria. The objectives of the Commission are to

1. formulate policy and issue guidelines in all matters relating to nomadic education in Nigeria;

2. provide funds for

   (a) the research and personnel development for the improvement of nomadic education in Nigeria;

   (b) the development of programmes on nomadic education;

   (c) equipment, other instructional materials (including teaching aids and amenities), construction of classrooms and other facilities relating to nomadic education;

3. arrange effective monitoring and evaluation of the activities of agencies concerned with nomadic education; and

4. establish, manage and maintain primary schools for nomadic children (NCNE, ACT 1989, pp. 4–5).

However, decades after the existence of the NCNE in Nigeria, it appears the agency has done little towards achieving the above mandate. The nomads tend to be grossly underdeveloped in many respects and appear to have constituted a higher number of illiterate Nigerians. Beyond this
aspect of education, there were also previous efforts by the government to secure land for grazing purposes. For instance, at the close of 1992, the government identified over 300 areas with 28 million hectares for grazing reserve development, and about 45 of these areas, covering some 600,000 hectares, have been gazetted (Iro 2014). In fact Iro (2014) further explained that 8 of these reserves, totalling 225,000 hectares, are fully established, and already 350 of the projected 950 pastoral families and 11,600 of the planned 46,000 cattle are using these reserves.

Incidentally, the increasing violent confrontations between the herders and the farmers, especially from 2015 to 2018, tend to have re-ignited the need for rules to regulate the activities of both parties. The argument is anchored on the need to fashion out a legal framework that will engender a cordial relationship between herders and farmers to end the loss of lives and growing insecurity. As a result, some federal lawmakers in 2016 introduced the National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016. The aim of the bill was to put to rest the intermittent violence among the two groups. In fact, Amusan et al. (2017) stated that as a strategy for preventing such recurrent conflicts; the sponsors of the bill suggest that the federal government designates grazing routes and reserves across the 36 states of the federation regardless of the cultural and agro-cultural characteristics of the localities. For them, by implication, they seek rights for Fulani herdsmen to have access and possession of lands found suitable in any part thereof within Nigeria, including those situated in non-Fulani communities for the purpose of cattle grazing (Amusan et al. 2017). Unsurprisingly, the bill was killed. Kwaja and Ademola (2018) attributed this largely to the fact that the Land Use Act of 1978 vests all powers related to the regulation of ownership, alienation, acquisition, administration and management of Nigerian land with the state governors. As a result, such legislation may create more political dispute, hence its violation of the Land Use Act of 1978 and usurpation of the powers of the state governors.

The failure of the National Assembly to enact a new law on old challenges (herders-farmers squabbles) motivated state assemblies to assume their legitimate responsibilities of making laws in this regard. States like Ekiti, Benue and Taraba have enacted laws on Open Grazing Prohibition. Apart from the latter, other two states have begun implementation of the law. Unfortunately, the implementation seems to be counter-productive in Benue while Ekiti has enjoyed reasonable tranquillity.
The Benue State government on May 22, 2017 enacted an Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law which came into force on November 1, 2017. The main objectives of this law are the following:

1. Prevent the destruction of crops, farms, community ponds, settlements and property by open rearing and grazing of livestock.
2. Prevent clashes between nomadic livestock herders and crop farmers.
3. Protect the environment from degradation and pollution caused by open rearing and over grazing of livestock.
4. Optimise the use of land resources in the face of overstretched land and increasing population.
5. Prevent, control and manage the spread of diseases as well as ease the implementation of policies that enhance the production of high-quality and healthy livestock for local and international markets.
6. Create a conducive environment for large-scale crop production (Benue State Anti-open Grazing Law 2017, p. 3).

Section 19(1) of the law stipulates that no individual or group shall after the commencement of this law engage in open nomadic livestock herding or grazing in the state outside the permitted ranches. It further stated in Section 19(2) that any person or group of persons who contravenes Sub-section (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to five years of imprisonment or one million naira (₦1,000,000) fine or both. Section 19(3) stipulates that in the event of damage to farm, crops or property of any person, the owner or manager of such livestock shall, after evaluation of the damage by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, pay the prevailing value of monetary compensation of the farm, crops or property so damaged to the owner. In accordance with Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the law, the establishment of ranches remains the only option for cattle rearing in the state.

As can be seen, it could be stated that in spite of the numerous laws and attempts to gag the monstrous herders-farmers violence, the wanton killings of innocent citizens have continued unabated. The gory pictures of the dead and indeed the vestiges of war make one’s mind frigid and cold. The violence knows no bounds. Children, women and the elderly are not just caught in the web of the crisis but are the major targets by the invaders. Generally, Nigeria has evolved several laws, acts and legislations, yet all the efforts produced only one result—more violence, more blood.
CATALOGUES OF HERDERS-FARMERS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

The increasing Fulani herders-farmers violence in Nigeria has endangered the lives and property of many Nigerians in affected states. Ending the violence in the nearest future appears not visible, especially given the fact that security agencies tend to have compromised their onerous responsibility of protecting defenceless people. For instance, the former Minister of Defence, General Theophulus Danjuma (Rtd), recently alleged in a public lecture that the Nigerian military is colluding with the murderous herdsmen. According to Danjuma, “you must rise to protect yourselves from these people; if you depend on the armed forces to protect you, you will all die” (Mkom 2018, p. 7).

It is therefore clear why this crisis has become a daily routine. The act of slaughtering innocent Nigerians by Fulani herders is irresistibly deepening the existing resentment and disillusionment among Nigerians. In fact, the persistent spread of this crisis also questions the utility and vision of Nigeria’s democracy. The beauty of dialogue and negotiation in a democratic society is vital in containing and averting violence of this magnitude. Between 2011 and 2018, hundreds of Nigerians have been cruelly murdered for reasons many of the victims are unacquainted with.

Unfortunately, determining the exact number of victims in most conflict situations in Nigeria is virtually impossible. In fact, while the community where crisis occurs provides a certain number of loved ones lost, security agencies provide different and sometimes conflicting figures. So, in most circumstances, what seems to be the official figure contradicts community claims and the position of the people involved. Incidentally, conflicts in remote areas are sometimes either not attended to by security agencies because of the terrain or intentionally averted for unexplained reasons. All of these have remained major obstacles for data generation vis-à-vis conflict situations in Nigeria. Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in six states in Nigeria between 2011 and May 2018.

Following from the above, it can be arithmetically stated that herdsmen attacks in Nigeria have resulted in the death of over 2,454 people within the period under review. Table 6.7 and Fig. 6.1 show that 2011 recorded the lowest incidences of attacks and also the lowest death occurrences arising from Fulani herdsmen activities in Nigeria. Thus, the increasing manifestations and incidences of these attacks since 2011 cannot be unconnected to the fact that the Nigerian state has not devised any effective contain-
Table 6.1 Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Nasarawa State between 2011 and May 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Nasarawa State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>November 12</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Akpanaja, Ondon Rukubi in Doma local government area (LGA)</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Udeni-Gida, Nasarawa LGA</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>April 2</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Boarder communities between Nasarawa and Guma LGA in Benue Doka, Kwara and Ungwan Mada in Keana and Doma LGA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>January 16</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yelaw in Ekye, Dom LGA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>March 1</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Kotsona in Tunga Awe LGA</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>July 13</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Eggon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>January 15</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Agbashi, Eky development area</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>January 5</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Agbashi town in Doma LGA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>January 6</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Agbashi town in Doma LGA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>March 16</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Ambane-Egga Ladi Ende</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>August 10</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Kuduku, Ajo villages in Keane LGA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>October 9</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Kompany and Bakun Allu, Lafia, Nasarawa</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>November 8</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>April 6</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Giza town in Keana LGA</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>September 7</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Eggo community of Gidan Gambo in Lafia east development area</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Bature village in Giza development area of Keana LGA</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>April 10</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Uoosu village in Keana LGA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
ment strategy. This has not only availed the invaders (Fulani herdsmen) the temerity to continue to commit crime with impunity but has also elevated herdsmen crisis to assume more complex dimensions. In fact, with the level of indulgent dispositions of the Nigerian state, the crisis is gradually overwhelming peoples’ tolerance and undermining legitimacy of the state.

From Table 6.7, it can be observed that years preceding general elections in Nigeria tend to record more violence than other years. Herdsmen attacks are not exceptions as regards this trend. For instance, there are 346 deaths recorded in 2014, prior to the 2015 general elections, and the highest death incidence is between 2011 and 2014. There is also reduction in 2015. However, the rising trend started in 2016, with a total of 457 death incidences. By the first quarter of 2018, it skyrocketed to 600 death

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Nasarawa State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Kofar Gwari, Kokona LGA</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>May 25</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Adaiy and Loko areas of Nasarawa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>July 3</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Obi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>November 14</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Jangaru, Awe LGA</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Uloko development area</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>January 7</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Awe, Keana and Doma LGA</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>January 31</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Keana LGA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Over 300 people displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>February 11</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Kadarko, Keana LGA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30 people hospitalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>February 19</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Obi LGA</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Awe, Keana, Obi and Doma LGA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>April 10</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>April 6</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Awe, Keana and Doma LGAs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>April 19</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Obi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
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</table>

Source: Compiled by the author (Sun, February 8, 2011; Daily Post, March 1, 2012; Punch, July 13, 2012; Sun, February 3, 2013; Vanguard, May 22, 2014; The Nation, April 10, 2015; Vanguard, February 19, 2018; The Nation, November 14, 2017; Premium Times, August 21, 2016; This Day, July 11, 2016; Vanguard, July 26, 2016; Punch, June 19, 2016; Daily Post, February 23, 2016)
Table 6.2  Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Benue State between 2011 and May 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Benue State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>November 6</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Border communities of Guma in Benue</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 1</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Gwer west local government area (LGA) of Benue State</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>May 18</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Gwer west LGA of Benue State</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>July 21</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Border area of Guma in Benue</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>May 17</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Border area of Benue</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Logo LGA of Benue State</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30 persons displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>February 16</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Agatu LGA of Benue State</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>February 19</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Ikpele and Okpopolo communities of Benue State</td>
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<td>6000 persons displaced</td>
</tr>
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<td>February 10</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Agatu and Buruku LGAs of Benue State</td>
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<td>July 2</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Logo and Ukum LGAs of Benue State</td>
<td>81</td>
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</tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>June 3</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Uzaar in Tombo, Anyii in logo LGA and vase in Ukum LGA of Benue State</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Over 1000 persons displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>June 10</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<td>2016</td>
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<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<td>2016</td>
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<td>2017</td>
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<td>March 2</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>March 11</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Mkgovur Village, Buruku LGA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Tse-Akaa Village, Ugondo Mbamar District of logo LGA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table 6.2  (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Benue State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>May 13</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Three communities of logo LGA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>January 1</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Guma and logo LGA</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Omosu village in Ojigo, Okpokwu LGA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Omenge village in Guma LGA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>April 21</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Uzughul, Tse Ginde in Guma LGA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>April 8</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Okoklo in Agatu LGA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>March 6</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Omutu, in Okpokwu LGA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>May 18</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Mbakyondo, Mbakpa and Sengaev in Gwer west LGA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>April 24</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Ayar Mbalom in Gwer east LGA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>March 7</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Omosu village in Okpokwu LGA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors (Vanguard, November 6, 2011; Daily Post, March 1, 2012; Sun, May 17, 2013; This Day, June 14, 2016; This Day, July 12, 2016; Vanguard, May 13, 2017; Punch, April 21, 2018; Daily Post, March 7, 2018)

Table 6.3  Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Enugu State between 2011 and May 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Enugu State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>January 6</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nkpologu community in Uzo-Uwani LGA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 15</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Eke community in Udi LGA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>February 11</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Abbi community in Uzo-Uwani LGA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>April 25</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Nimbo, Uzo-Uwani LGA</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>August 25</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Ndiagu Attakwu community in Nkanu west LGA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors (Daily Post, March 15, 2015; Sun, January 6, 2015; This Day, April 25, 2016; This Day, August 25, 2016)
### Table 6.4  Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Taraba State between 2011 and May 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Taraba State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 11</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Karim Lamido local government area (LGA)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 23</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Buwa village in Ibi LGA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>May 14</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Kugwana in Bali LGA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>April 16</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Nwokyo village in Wukari LGA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>March 24</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ananum village in Donga LGA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>December 23</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Aungwan Agbadorough in Bali LGA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>April 20</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Tse-Gbaun and Gaza villages in Donga LGA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>January 31</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nwonko village in Wukari LGA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Dori and Mesuma villages in Gashaka LGA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>April 13</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Gashaka and Bali LGA</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Over 100 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Coromo in Gassol LGA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>December 30</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Minda in Lua LGA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>May 17</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Bali LGA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Over 15,000 displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Konkaen village in Ussa LGA and Tati village in Takun LGA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>June 22</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Mambilla Plateau in Sardauna LGA</td>
<td>Over 200</td>
<td>Over 200 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>January 20</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Gishiri, Dooshima and Danwaza villages</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>January 20</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Jandeikyula village in Wukari LGA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>January 10</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Lau LGA</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Takun LGA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>April 6</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Utile in Donga LGA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5  Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Plateau State between 2011 and May 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Plateau State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>November 22</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Barkin Ladi local government area (LGA)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Gashis District, Jos</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Langtang</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>May 2</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Foron town, Barkin Ladi LGA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>October 27</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Irigwe kingdom in Bassa LGA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>13,726 displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>October 16</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Nkiedonwhro Village in Irigwe kingdom in Bassa LGA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>September 9</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Ancha Village in Bassa LGA</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Five people injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>November 8</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Rim Village in Riyom LGA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>January 27</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Huke Village, Miango in Bassa LGA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>February 5</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Miango in Bassa LGA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>March 15</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Dong Village</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>February 14</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Jebu, Miango in Bassa LGA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>May 19</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Ancha Village in Bassa LGA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>January 25</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Josho Village, Daffo Chiefdom, Bokkos LGA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10 injured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors (Sun, November 22, 2011; Premium Times, July 8, 2012; Punch, June 29, 2013; Sun, October 16, 2017; Vanguard, February 5, 2018; The Nation, February 14, 2018)

incidences. Thus, this study does not suggest that herdsmen activities have political connotations, as it noted that in an intense political environment, sentiments can induce acts of violence.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it should be noted that variations in terms of the occurrence of attacks in the six states listed above can also be attributed to a variety of causes of the attacks. However general consensus is that lack of access to water, due to drought and desert encroachment in the far north, has caused herdsmen and their cattle to move towards the south in search of grazing fields, and consequently clash with farm owners. Thus, it is the position of this chapter that criminality and flourishing cattle rustling activities in some of these states, especially Benue State, contributed to the upsurge and devastating dimension of the violence. For instance, the president of the Benue State chapter of the Myetii Allah Breeders Association, Gololo, decried that members of the association frequently lose their cattle. According to Gololo:
Table 6.6  Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Kaduna State between 2011 and May 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Month/Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place in Kaduna State</th>
<th>Number of people killed</th>
<th>Number of people displaced and injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 2</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Kaura District</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Over 4500 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 16</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Sankwai, Tekum and Unguwarr Gata inhabited by Moroa people in Kaura LGA</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>June 14</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Kabamu in Fadan District and Ankpon in Nandu District</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Banono Village, Kajuru LGA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>July 21</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Northern Kaduna</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>July 16</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Kajuru, Kajuru LGA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>January 14</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Birnin-Gwari LGA</td>
<td>10 people</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author (Daily Post, April 2, 2013; Sun, March 16, 2014; This Day, July 18, 2017; Vanguard, July 16, 2017; Punch, January 14, 2018)

Table 6.7  Years and number of deaths recorded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of deaths recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation

While we were trying to relocate to Taraba State, through Nassarawa State to the border town of Nengere, some rustlers came and stole about 1000 cows from us and we have (SIC) to fight back. The communities affected by the fight include Gaambe-Tiv, Ayilamo, Turan. Umenger, Tse-Akor and Tomaater, near Tse-Aabi in Logo and Guma local government areas. The attacks by the herdsmen, were in self-defense against cattle rustlers, who stole into their camp in the night to steal their cows. (Cited in Oluwalana 2018, p. 3)
Unfortunately, state security failures tend to have been implicated in this rustling act. But more shocking is the horrendous murder of innocent citizens who perhaps did not know the rustlers and are not rustlers. The tendency of disrespecting the inviolability of human life underlies the drive to kill in retaliation for rustled cattle. Also, the fact that only few of these murderous herdsmen have been apprehended and none has been made to face severe sanctions according to the law seems to make killing a worthwhile venture for the herdsmen.

**STATE RESPONSES TO HERDERS-FARMERS VIOLENCE**

The Nigerian state has over the years demonstrated disappointing dispositions as regards the tackling of Fulani herdsmen violence. In spite of the huge number of deaths recorded, no herder has been convicted for crimes committed. Although the elites tend to have divergent positions on the security situation in Nigeria, their disparate views are mainly guided by primordial interests. Unfortunately, the challenge of the Nigerian state centres on the fact that the state expresses itself through the elites rather
than behave and act through institutions. Lack of strong institutions availed the emergence of strong personalities. Consequently, the expressions of these strong personalities are state thoughts and expressions. For instance, the Minister of Defence, Mansur Dan-Ali, recently blamed the massacre of innocent Nigerians by Fulani herdsmen on anti-open grazing laws in Benue and Taraba States. According to him, the blockage of cattle routes across the country is the remote cause of the killings by herdsmen, and the implementation of anti-open grazing laws in some states was the immediate cause of the killings (Nwachukwu 2018). Contrary to this assumption, the state governments are constitutionally empowered to make laws for good governance and peaceful coexistence in their states. Secondly, the killings were there before the laws were made. So, it presupposes that the laws are geared towards ending the killings.

It is important to also note that while rustling of cattle or blockage of routes, enactment of laws and any other sentiments that drive and indeed sustain the violence is condemnable, the state assumptions that tend to justify wanton killing of innocent citizens based on the aforementioned causes are most undignified. In fact, such claims signal the deteriorating level of state insensitivity and unfortunate abandonment of her primary responsibility of protecting lives and property. As Soyinka succinctly argues:

[T]he present national outrage is over impunity. It rejects the right of any set of people, for whatever reason, to take arms against their fellow men and women, to acknowledge their exploits in boastful and justifying accents and, in effect, promise more of the same as long as their terms and demands are not met. In plain language, they have declared war against the nation, and their weapon is undiluted terror. Why have they been permitted to become a menace to the rest of us? (Cited in Ibekwe 2018, p. 2)

In all, the contradictions that tangled the widespread herdsmen violence are incredible. But most unthinkable is the current effort by the incumbent government and many officials of the state to tender reasons why herdsmen kill people rather than the government policy framework towards apprehending and prosecuting the invaders so as to deter others from taking laws into their hands, or at least stop further killings. Most ridiculous are some state governments’ decision to pay compensation to herdsmen for the cattle lost and appeal to families to forgive for their loved ones lost in the crisis. The implication is that we appear to place more importance on cattle than on human beings.
CONCLUSION

From the analysis, it is clear that the protracted herders-farmers violence in Nigeria has constituted a deepening form of insecurity. In the last few years, the intensification and rising cases of the herders-farmers crisis from brush fire to an all-consuming conflagration raised issues of conspiracy of the state, poor attitude and inadequate preparation to providing security to the Nigerian people. With the increasing attacks, especially since the emergence of state laws to contain the violence, elitist conspiracy efforts became manifest. The intention and drive to escalate the violence is only to undermine the importance of the law, hence the agitation for its removal. This study is of the view that these laws are worthwhile and have the capacity to address the prevailing crisis if governments at all levels will ensure their implementation. It is based on the above that this chapter, therefore, recommends that the state should rise and perform her responsibility and refrain from the present trend of justifying impunity. Both the killers and sponsors of the conflict should be brought to book irrespective of their status or position. It is also the position of this chapter that there is a need for the gradual process of establishing ranches and the government’s proactive response to herdsmen attacks by ensuring decisive punishment of those implicated in the violence in a bid to end the prevailing crisis.

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CHAPTER 7

Communal Conflicts in Central Nigeria: A Political Ecology Perspective

Al Chukuma Okoli and Onyekachi Ernest Nnabuihe

INTRODUCTION

Communal conflict is a veritable instance of non-state collective violence. It is a dimension of conflicts whereby hostilities follow primordial or temporal communal identity lines. Scholarship on communal conflicts has been vibrant and rapidly bourgeoning. Hence the field has over the years evolved a body of knowledge that is progressively undergoing theoretical systematisation. The extant literature on communal conflict has been characterised by two fundamental epistemological pitfalls: (1) terminological chaos arising from unsystematic definition, clarification, and operationalisation of basic concepts, and (2) paradigmatic obfuscation resulting from the conflicting theoretical perspectives on the subject matter (Brosche 2015).

With reference to Nigeria, the phenomenon of communal conflict has been largely associated with the dialectics of identity politics, with disproportionate emphasis on the ethno-religious convolutions (Ngare 2012;
Ayokhai 2013). The prevailing anecdotal and scholarly narratives on communal conflict in Nigeria have, to a large extent, mirrored the essential deficiencies of the extant corpus of knowledge as indicated above. There is, therefore, a pressing need to re-interrogate the existing conceptual and theoretical perspectives on communal conflicts in Nigeria vis-à-vis their analytical utility with a view to advancing scholarly knowledge in that respect. It is this need that has informed this chapter.

The remainder of the chapter is organised under the following themes: situating the locus and focus of the study, analytical point of departure, theoretical framework, conceptualising communal conflict, overview of communal conflict in Nigeria, political ecology of communal conflict in Central Nigeria: the Nasarawa and Plateau examples, and conclusion.

**SITUATING THE LOCUS AND FOCUS OF THE STUDY**

The wider locus of the study is the central region of Nigeria. This comprises six states, namely, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Plateau. For convenience of investigation, the study concentrated on the two focal states—States of Nasarawa and Plateau. These two states are typically characteristic of Nigeria’s peculiar social-cultural diversity and heterogeneity. They embody a multiplicity of primordial cleavages and identities which make them highly susceptible to communal crises (Alubo 2009; Ngare 2012; Okoli 2016a).

There have been high incidence and prevalence of communal conflicts in the focal states. For instance, Plateau State has been prominently notorious for inter-communal disturbances, while Nasarawa State is ranked highly in terms of rural violence associated with inter-communal contestations (Okoli and Ayokhai 2015). Similar patterns of communal conflict have evolved in these states, namely, Christian-Muslim violence, indigene-settler crises, farmer-herder conflicts, and ethno-communal disturbances (Okoli 2016b).

Trajectories of communal conflicts in both states indicate a pattern of occurrence that implicates an intersection of political, ecological, economic, and social forces. There has also been the tendency for such conflicts to explore and exploit the existing social-cultural cleavages to assume ethno-religious complications. These shall constitute our focus of analysis as we reflect on the Nasarawa and Plateau States cases.

In choosing the focal study areas, the authors are not oblivious of the fact that the cases may not be representative enough to provide ample
grounds for legitimate and valid extrapolations or generalisations. Suffice it to note that the essence of the current study is to advance a new approach in the way the subject of communal conflicts in Nigeria is being understood. If this objective is met, no matter how scarcely, then the purpose of the study would have been sufficiently justified.

**Analytical Point of Departure**

The existing thinking on communal conflicts in Nigeria has privileged the viewpoint that communal conflicts are essentially social-cultural and, in effect, identity based. Our contention is that such a viewpoint is fundamentally reductionist and obscurantist. Although communal conflicts in Nigeria have, more often than not, been symptomatic of antagonistic ethnic, religious, sectional, or clannish relations, the root causes of such conflicts have been well beyond these social-cultural categories. To be sure, ethnic or religious consciousness, or any differences to that effect, can hardly be salient enough to bring about communal conflicts. Same goes for all dimensions of primordial identity. What happens in reality is that primordial social-cultural factors serve as veritable ‘faultlines’ for catalysing communal conflicts.

“Faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines between group members based on various social attributes (familial, communal, ethnic, religious, etc) that can potentially split the overall group into sub-groups” (Tian et al. 2016, p. 69). At faultlines, social categories can split and twist. So, when ecological, economic, or political contestations between social categories feed into existing socio-cultural faultlines, communal conflict becomes inevitable. Same goes for a situation when structural attributes of society present pretexts for deep-seated inter-group antagonisms.

As we are inclined to argue in this study, communal conflicts are not necessarily primordial. They are not innately ethno-religious as most extant literature in Nigeria would tend to suggest. Essentially, communal conflict results variously from political, economic, ecological, and structural factors, with socio-cultural factors serving as the faultiness. This argument can be illustrated with the aid of a diagram as indicated in Fig. 7.1.

The crux of our argument in this study is that communal conflict in Nigeria has been largely driven by political, economic, and socio-ecological factors rather than primordial concerns. In effect, such conflict has been more of a socio-political question than an identity issue. It is the political instrumentalisation of identity in the context of elite opportunism, electioneering, and distributive federalism that has privileged the prevailing identity-centric perspective to communal conflicts in Nigeria.
Fig. 7.1 An illustrative ecology of communal conflict. Source: Authors’ original concept, 2017
Theoretical Framework: Political Ecology Approach

This study appropriates the political ecology approach as its theoretical framework. Political ecology developed from the epistemological foundations of political economy and social ecology (Okoli and Ogayi 2016). According to Greenberg and Park (1994, p. 1), political ecology “is a historical outgrowth of the central questions asked by the social sciences about the relations between human society, viewed in its bio-cultural-political complexity, and a significantly humanised nature”. As an analytical framework, political ecology seeks to bridge the economic determinism and human-centricism of political economy and the ecological reductionism of social ecology (Okoli and Ogayi 2016). By so doing, “political ecology expands ecological concepts to respond to (the) inclusion of cultural and political activity within an analysis of ecosystems that are significantly but not always entirely socially constructed” (Greenberg and Park 1994, p. 1).

By ‘politicking’ the orthodox ecological discourse, political ecology provides an eclectic approach to the understanding of society by emphasising how the intersection between forces of ecology, economy, politics, and culture determines social occurrences. Hence, a political ecology of conflict would embody the following basic assumptions.

1. Conflict occurs in a dynamic and often dialectical socio-existential context.
2. Conflicts are fundamentally multi-dimensional and multi-causal phenomena; there is no single cause to conflict.
3. Conflicts result from struggles over scarce and mutually contested values/ends.
4. Conflict is a dialectical process that reflects both the structural and circumstantial attributes of society.
5. Every instance of conflict is pertinently particularistic and unique, reflecting the peculiarity in the conflict context (cf. Saferword 2012, pp. 2–5).

Applied to the subject of communal conflict, political ecology enables the analysts to come to terms with the roots, contours, dialectics, and dynamics of such conflict within its socio-ecological context. This makes for a rigorous and robust interrogation of the subject matter within an eclectic and dynamic analytical purview.
CONCEPTUALISING COMMUNAL CONFLICT

Communal conflict simply refers to conflict perpetrated along communal lines, wherein conflicting parties feel solidarity for their respective communal groups and victims are targeted based on communal group membership (MUNA 2015). More precisely, it is a “conflict between non-state groups that are organised along a shared communal identity” (Brosche 2015, p. 4).

Communal conflict can be characterised based on certain essential attributes, that is:

1. It is often a violent conflict.
2. It is waged along communal lines.
3. It involves non-state actors, although the state might be involved as a supporting third-party actor.
4. None of the conflicting parties enjoy monopolistic access and control of the organised force (national army).
5. The conflicting parties are less organised in terms of standing capacities; they only occasionally organise and mobilise for violence (cf. Brosche 2015).

Communal conflict differs from civil war or organised rebellion. To be sure, civil wars and rebellions necessarily entail state involvement as a direct ‘co-aggressor’. They both also involve a great deal of military organisation, sophistication, and mobilisation. This is practically unlike communal conflict that involves non-state actors who lack the capacity of a standing army.

Communal conflict can be categorised based on the patterns of communal identification and alignment that typify it. Prominent categories are included in Table 7.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Example(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Habe-Fulbe conflict: Hausa-Igbo conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Christian-Muslim conflict; Hindu-Buddhist conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood</td>
<td>Farmer-herder conflict; Farmer-miner conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian</td>
<td>Catholic-Protestant conflict; Sunni-Shiite conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigeneship</td>
<td>Indigene-settler conflict: Native-migrant conflict</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Compiled by authors, 2017
Overview of Nature and Patterns of Communal Conflict in Nigeria

Nigeria, over the years, has witnessed sundry dimensions of communal conflict. Most of the instances of communal conflict recorded in Nigeria have been associated with the contradictions of ethno-religious relations (Nigeria, 2012). The phenomena of identity politics and religious fanaticism are assumed to have played a dominant role in engendering such conflicts (Ayokhai 2013; Uduma 2013).

Conflicts between the adherents of Islam and Christianity have been pervasive and perennial in many parts of northern Nigeria. This pattern of communal conflict has not been motivated by religious identities per se; they have been largely orchestrated by self-interested political opportunists who exploit existing primitive religious differences to serve their partisan or egoistic interests (Soyinka 1991; Kukah 2007; Okoli and Uhembé 2014).

Land-resource-based hostilities constitute another critical dimension of communal conflict in Nigeria. The question of control and ownership of land and landed resources has often pitted communities against each other, resulting in dire communal conflagrations (Alimba 2014). This is also true of un-tempered competition between communities over access to, or ownership of, land-based endowments such as freshwater sources. Land and/or border (boundary) disputes have been a veritable pattern of communal conflict in contemporary Nigeria (Ajodo-Adebanjoko et al. 2015). Land-use contestations between competitive livelihood groups have also provoked communal conflict in Nigeria. This has been prominently exemplified in the phenomenon of farmer-herder hostility which has been prevalent in North-Central Nigeria (Okoli 2016a, b). Farmer-herder conflict is characteristically dicey and dynamic. This is because it can, over time, assume the complexion of ethno-religious violence in keeping with the nature of group dynamics that underlie it. The fact that most of the herdsmen are Fulani and Muslims while the farmers are mostly autochthons and Christians implies that livelihood struggles between them can also be framed in ethnic or religious terms (cf. Okoli and Atelhe 2014).

The indigeneship question has provided another veritable pretext for communal conflict in Nigeria. Within the politicised indigene-settler divide in some of Nigeria’s urban centres, those who are reckoned to be non-indigenes are often denied of certain civic entitlements such as the
right to stand for election, employment and scholarship benefits, and the like (Alubo 2009; Hatfess 2016). Apart from vitiating the prospect of inclusive social citizenship, the indigene-settler syndrome has often precipitated bitter inter-communal tension and violence in Nigeria. The orgy of internecine violence in Jos (Plateau State) has vividly demonstrated the destabilising import of this dimension of communal conflict.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the manifestation of communal conflict in Nigeria has been varied and multi-dimensional. Table 7.2 highlights the various instances of communal conflict in contemporary Nigeria.

Concerning the nature and causes of communal conflicts in Nigeria, it is pertinent to note that the conflicts have seldom been essentially primordial or innately ethnic based. Even the so-called ethno-religious incidents in northern Nigeria have mostly had their origins in local and national power contestations in the context of urban elite political mobilisation and electioneering.

**Political Ecology of Communal Conflict in Central Nigeria: Nasarawa and Plateau Cases**

To begin with, let it be reiterated that conflict is a dynamic process that occurs within a dialectical socio-existential context. Every instance of conflict has its own history, trends, dynamics, and dialectics (Okoli 2013). These characteristics define the process of conflict as a social phenomenon. Conflict context encompasses the structural and circumstantial social forces that underlie the occurrence of conflict. This embodies variables such as ambience, causes, actors, interests, and faultiness associated with the occurrence of conflict. Understanding the organic and dialectical relations between the process and context of conflict constitutes the crux of the political ecology of communal conflict being proposed herewith. Table 7.3 sheds vital insights into the foregoing perspective.

To what extent have the communal conflict scenarios in Nasarawa and Plateau States been amenable to the analytical schema being advanced in the foregoing? This question forms our major concern in the subsequent subsection.
The Nasarawa Example

Communal conflict has been a dominant feature of Nasarawa State since its creation in 1996. The foremost and most primitive pattern of communal conflict in the state is the phenomenon of ethno-communal crisis. Cases in point include the Bassa-Egbura conflict of the late 1990s, the Tiv...
versus allied ‘native commons’ crisis of early 2000s, the perennial Tiv-Fulani conflicts, the Eggon-Fulani conflicts, the Eggon-Alago disturbances, the Ombatse crisis, and so on.

The aforementioned crises have been naively described as ethnic based on their manifest appearances and ostensibilities. But beneath their apparent ethnic manifestation lie deeper political, economic, and ecological stakes and interests. The material foundations of the crises have had to do with ownership of land, entitlement to landed resources (rangeland, farmland, freshwater), local power struggles, and civic entitlements (employment, scholarship, standing for election, etc.).

The struggles for competitive advantage within a highly circumscribed political, economic, and ecological space have been one of the most critical objective drivers of the crises (Okoli and Atelhe 2014). For instance, the anti-Tiv violence of the early 2000s was not unconnected with the bid towards checking the rising dominance of the Tivs in the state’s public service. On the other hand, the virulent conflict between the Eggons and the Alagos was hinged on land ownership and land-holding contestations. Land in this context is not to be understood merely as a means of production. It is to be understood, as well, as a stake of ancestral heritage.

Another important dimension of communal crisis in Nasarawa State is the farmer-herder conflict. This has been between the nomadic Fulani and the native farming communities. The conflict has its essence in land-use-cum-livelihood struggles within an ever-shrinking ecological space—an ecological space that has been endangered by the untoward impact of climate change and urbanisation (Okoli 2016b).

Contemporary trajectories of the conflict indicate that it is fast degenerating into ethno-religious complications. Almost all the herders are Fulani. Also, most of the herders are Muslim, or at least non-Christians, while most of the native farmers are Christian or non-Muslim. This sce-

### Table 7.3  A profile of conflict context

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Which?</strong></td>
<td><strong>What?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambience</td>
<td>Ecological, social, economic, political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes</td>
<td>Structural predicators, proximate causes, triggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Parties, victims, handlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Power, resources, values: issues at stake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faultiness</td>
<td>Religion, ethnicity, primordial identities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by authors, 2017
nario presents ample pretext for the framing of hitherto ecological/eco-

nomic struggles in ethno-religious terms. Consequently, any aggression
carried out by the herders on a native farming community is pertinently
interpreted as either ethnic or religious violence. The reverse is also the
case. This tendency has provided impetus for the complication of farmer-
herder clashes in Nasarawa State in recent years (cf. Adamu and Ben 2016).

The indigene-settler conflict is also one of the crucial dimensions of
communal crisis in Nasarawa State. This arises from claims and counter-
claims of indigeneity (Alubo 2009). Elements of this can be found in
many cases of communal conflicts in the state. For instance, the anti-Tiv
violence of early 2000s was predicated on the fact that the Tivs are not
indigenous to the state. Similarly, the conflicts between the Eggon and
other ethnic entities in the state (Alago, Kambari, Hausa/Fulani) have
been, to a significant extent, occasioned by the hegemonic claim to indi-
geneity by the Eggon people (Okoli and Uhembe 2014).

On the surface of the communal crisis in Nasarawa State lies the issue
of ethno-religious identity. But what has made each instance of such con-

flict salient are the underlying material foundations: struggle for power,
resources, livelihood opportunities, civic entitlements, and so on. The
socio-cultural attributes of the state (its ethnic, religious, and primordial
composition and diversities) have provided ready faultlines for the preva-

lence of communal conflict.

The situation has been complicated by the sundry structural and func-
tional deficiencies of the Nigerian governance system, exemplified in the
indigeneship question, ambiguous land tenure/holding regime, resource
and security governance failure, and lack of an efficient conflict manage-
ment mechanism.

A DISCURSIVE INSIGHT FROM THE PLATEAU EXAMPLE

Communal conflict has characterised the political history of Plateau State,
particularly since the 1990s. The conflicts have often been attributed to
ethno-religious factors (Best 2007; Higazi 2011; Krause 2011), cultural
factors (Fwatshak 2006; Best 2007; Best and Hoomlong 2011), or land-
based struggles (Alubo 2009) which predate colonialism. While the exist-
ing studies help us see how these factors are isolatedly implicated in the
Plateau conflict, they have not explained why and/or how the combina-
tion of these factors has created a circle of inter-communal conflicts.
Besides, despite the preponderance of studies on communal hostilities in
Plateau State, there is a missing link in terms of understanding the dynamics of the conflict in utmost totality. Establishing this missing link requires an eclectic interrogation of the conflict situation in a manner that comprehends its social, political, economic, ecological, and cultural dialectics. Here, what has been observed concerning the Nasarawa experience with communal conflict succinctly applies, almost totally. The point of departure, nonetheless, is the fact that the Plateau case has historically borne trappings of land-based contestations. This viewpoint is discursively engaged at a very general level in this section.

Plateau State is a product of boundary adjustments arising, on the one hand, from the ambition of the British colonial administration to create a province which consisted largely of non-Muslims in order to, among other things, guarantee the sustenance of tin mining activities, which began in the area in 1902. On the other hand, it was a consequence of the strong desire of the peoples in this area for political self-determination (Ostien 2010). The colonial conquest of northern Nigeria was completed in 1903 by the British, who brought all communities in the region under the control of the substantive established emirate system. Then, Jos, Pankshin, and Shendam Divisions (which later became Plateau Province and later Plateau State) were placed under the Emir of Bauchi (Albert 2003). In 1926, Plateau Province was created, exercising Jos and Pankshin Divisions from Bauchi Province.

The mining industry attracted several people to Plateau State. With the introduction of railway lines linking Jos city with Port Harcourt and Lagos, the area was brought into the orbit of the world economy. The development of the tin mining industry generated both positive and negative impacts on Plateau State. With the influx of migrants, Jos-Plateau in particular became cosmopolitan, thus playing host to more migrant labour in the tin industry (Nnoli 1978). The processes of urbanisation and development in the area created communal tension and pitted groups against each other. The locus of the conflict, in the main, is the significance of land and land-based entitlements to the different parties involved in the conflict.

Of crucial importance is the relationship between land and living spaces. There are limits to the number of persons who can effectively dwell in a given geographical area. Lord Lugard, the first Governor General of Nigeria, in his famous *Political Memoranda*, outlined in the Township Ordinance how people should live in particular spaces and the limits to the number (Lugard 1970). In Plateau and Jos in particular, the increasing population amidst shrinking socio-ecological opportunities led residents
to worry about livelihood prospects. Although there is no conclusive argument about the shortage of living spaces in Plateau State, the fact that over 70 per cent of the population work on land has implications for communal conflict in the state. It suffices to contend that competition for available spaces is a strong driving force in the conflict.

The struggle for competitive space is predicated on the living that can be made from land. Since majority of the population of Plateau State live and work on land for subsistence, the continued importance of land for the prevalence of communal conflict in the state cannot be understated. The right to use such spaces and extract produce from them have been passed from generation to generation. Thus, it is a crucial factor for conflict. The import of land as a source of communal subsistence and heritage bears significantly on cultural identity, and that underscores the importance of land in explaining the Plateau conflict.

Another reason why land is important in the context of the conflict in Plateau is its strategic utility in terms of natural defence. Natural barriers—mountains, rivers, and cactus plants—have played a defensive role to native communities and settlements. Historically, these barriers have played a strategic role in protecting the inhabitants from invasion. The vast number of mountains and cactus plants had made the area largely inaccessible in the past to invaders (Ames 1934). Ullman (1991) had discussed how natural barriers defended the Russians against the aggression of Napoleon and Hitler. Most times, the natural landscape is fraught with cultural meanings and groups attach symbolic importance to such meanings. In different climes, land frequently is a key issue for indigenous groups seeking to preserve cultural autonomy (Friedman 1994; Occhipinti 2003). Yet, the connections between land and cultural identity in Plateau State have often been neglected in the literature. Some actors in the Plateau conflicts see land as part of their own history and as a way of guaranteeing the future or perpetuating their culture. Specifically, land has served as the central element in a political struggle that has spurred various communities to engage in violent conflicts.

These issues underlying communal conflict in Plateau State are dynamic and interconnected. Most often, whether the conflict assumes the nature of ethno-religious identity, farmer-herder clashes, indigene-settler disturbances, and the like, the core of the struggle is land and entitlements thereof. To say the least, the underlying roots of the struggle are often far from what is presented in prominent literature and anecdotal narratives: religion, ethnicity, indigeneity, and so on. Essentially, they are rather defined by economic and political motivations.
CONCLUSION

Political ecology of communal conflict is an attempt to inquire into the organic socio-existential context in which such conflict occurs. In effect, it probes the socio-structural, ecological, economic, and political bases-cum-dynamics of communal conflict with the understanding that such conflict is essentially far less socio-cultural than it is widely acclaimed.

From the standpoint of the focal States, the study observed that, in all instances, what are at stake are deep-seated, socio-economic, ecological, and political interests. The fact that these interests are vested in groups with shared primordial interests presupposes that conflicts arising therefrom can readily assume identity-based (socio-cultural) complexion. Hence, ecological, economic, or political contestations among communal groupings have more often than not exploited the existing faultlines of ethnicity, religion, clan, and sect to assume socio-cultural complications. This tendency has been complicated by the extant structural anomalies of the Nigerian polity which make communal conflict not only possible but inventible.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 8

Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta Region

Ernest T. O. Aniche

INTRODUCTION

The Niger Delta remains a trouble spot in contemporary Nigerian politics and a hotspot of youth militant activities (Oronto et al. 2004). This is because the nature of oil exploitation and the politics of sharing of oil revenues have created disempowerment, frustration and deprivation that underpinned outbreak of violence and conflicts in the form of youth militancy (Oromareghake et al. 2013). It suffices to say that the literature on the militarisation of the region by the Nigerian state is well documented (Osaghae 1995; Oronto and Okonta 2003; Ikelegbe 2005a; Okaba and Nte 2008; Okafor 2010; Aminu 2013).

Not surprisingly, the Niger Delta has assumed the notoriety of a crisis-ridden region in Nigeria. But perhaps our contribution to the narratives entails interrogating critically the drivers that underpinned the recent post-amnesty resurgence of youth militancy in the region spearheaded by Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) since 2016. Thus, this chapter sets out to comprehensively discuss the causes and consequences of youth aggressiveness in the Niger Delta, particularly the recent post-amnesty youth militancy in the Niger Delta as spearheaded by the NDA.
To do this, we divide the chapter into seven main sections. The first section is the introduction which provides the background, overview and outline of the chapter. The second section tries to conceptualise and delineate the Niger Delta region. The third section is the advent and evolution of youth militancy in the Niger Delta which traces the historical origin and evolution of youth militancy in the Niger Delta. The fourth section attempts to identify and describe the nature, methods, cases and instances of Niger Delta youth militancy. The fifth section identifies and explains various causes of violence in the region, whilst the sixth section is the consequence of youth restiveness in the Niger Delta which enumerates the numerous effects of Niger Delta youth militancy. Finally, the seventh section is the conclusion, which summarises the chapter by highlighting the salient points.

**CONCEPTUALISING AND DELINEATING THE NIGER DELTA**

The Niger Delta can be geographically conceived and delineated in two major ways: the narrower Niger Delta and the broader Niger Delta. In other words, there are narrow and broad definitions of the Niger Delta region. The narrower Niger Delta is considered as the core Niger Delta. For Ibeanu (2000) and Osaghae et al. (2011), geographically, the narrower or core Niger Delta region in Nigeria is the littoral low lands and waters, wetlands, rivulets, tributaries and lagoons of the Atlantic Ocean in the southernmost ends of Nigeria currently comprising the area covered by the delta of the Niger River, including the coastal states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. Thus, defined purely geographically, the oil- and gas-rich Niger Delta constitutes the ethnic homelands of the Andonis, Ijaws, Ikwerres, Isokos, Itsekiris, Kalabaris, Ndokwas, Ogonis, Okrikas, Urhobos and so on.

On the other hand, the broader Niger Delta is regarded geo-politically and geo-economically as the larger Niger Delta, which includes the core and periphery of the Niger Delta. For Aminu (2013) and Ugwuanyi et al. (2014), geo-politically and geo-economically or even administratively, the broader Niger Delta region includes all oil-producing areas covering 75,000 km² of land. This includes all the South-South, part of the southeast and part of the southwest. Based on this definition, the region currently comprises nine states such as Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers and 185 local government areas. According to a report of the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS) published in 2016, the estimated population of the Niger Delta region is 37 million people, about 23% of the total estimated 180 million Nigerians in 2015.

The broader Niger Delta region of Nigeria lies between latitudes 4° and 6° north of the Equator and 4° and 8° east of the Greenwich stretching over 20,000 km² of marsh land. The whole area is criss-crossed by a large number of rivers, streams, canals and creeks (Badmus 2010; Emmanuel and Duru 2010). The region is heterogeneous, multicultural and ethnically diverse. The region is homeland to a large number of natives, who live in about 13,400 communities (mainly farmers and coastal fishermen) belonging to over 40 ethnic groups—some of which include the Anangs, Andonis, Bekwaras, Efiks, Ejahams, Ekpeyes, Ibibios, Igbos, Ijaw, Ikwerres, Ilajes, Isokos, Itsekiris, Kalabari, Ndokwas, Ogonis, Okrikas, Orons, Urhobos, Yoruba and so on (Ikelegbe 2005a; Osaghae et al. 2011; Aminu 2013).

In this region also lies Nigeria’s over 35 billion barrels and 600 trillion cubic feet of proven oil and gas reserves, respectively. The region is sitting on gas reserves. About 95% of Nigerian revenue is generated from oil and gas exploration in the region. Oil and gas constitute approximately 99% of Nigerian exports and more than 90% of her earnings (Ibeanu 1997; Olusola 2013). Expectedly, most of the upstream oil and gas production in Nigeria is carried out in the Niger Delta (Watts 2007; Ifesinachi and Aniche 2014).

The Advent and Evolution of Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta

For convenience, we shall divide the historical evolution of Niger Delta youth militancy into two main phases, namely the pre-independence era and the post-independence era.

The Pre-independence Era of Niger Delta Youth Militancy

Perhaps it is important to state at this junction that under the pre-independence phase, the youths were not in the front burner and therefore were yet to take the centre stage of the Niger Delta agitations. Under this era, the elites still held sway. The youths were yet to be in the mainstream of the struggle for Niger Delta emancipation (Ukeje 2001; Osaghae et al. 2011). This era can further be sub-divided into two periods, the pre-colonial and the colonial periods.
The struggle in the pre-colonial period began prior to the 1914 Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates (the so-called mistake of 1914). Thus, the movements, struggles and agitations for self-determination in the Niger Delta pre-dated oil prospecting, exploration and exploitation in Nigeria. In the late nineteenth century, various emancipative resistance movements mobilised against external penetration, conquest, annexation, occupation, domination, repression, subjugation, enslavement, suppression and exploitation of the region. These movements were spearheaded by local kings against the incursion of British and other European traders (Obi and Rustad 2011).

The agitation in the colonial period spanned between 1914 and 1960. For instance, the 1950s heralded renewed resistance movements against the marginalisation of the Niger Delta. The movements include the Midwest State Movement (MWSM), the Calabar Ogoja Rivers State Movement (CORM) and the Conference of Rivers Chiefs and Peoples. These movements like the predecessors were also elitist (Obi and Rustad 2011). With the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in the region in 1956, the Niger Deltans incessantly engaged oil multinationals and the federal government in various demonstrations (Tekena 1970; Obi 1997).

The Post-independence Era of Niger Delta Youth Militancy

During this era, the youth began to emerge in the mainstream of the Niger Delta struggle. However, the post-independence era of Niger Delta youth militancy can be broadly sub-divided into three phases. The first phase of the post-independence era of Niger Delta militancy was least violent compared with the second phase and the third phase. The first phase of the post-independence era of Niger Delta youth militancy covers the relatively more confrontational Isaac Adaka Boro-led Twelve-Day Revolution and the relatively less confrontational Ken Saro-Wiwa-led agitation. The second phase of the post-independence era of Niger Delta youth militancy spanned between the 1998 Kaiama Declaration and the 2009 Amnesty Programme of Yar’Adua’s administration. The third phase of the post-independence era of Niger Delta youth militancy began with the post-amnesty resurgence of Niger Delta youth militancy under Buhari’s civilian administration. The third phase can also be called the post-amnesty phase.
The first phase of the post-independence resistant movement was led by Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, Samuel Owonaru and Nottingham Dick. Aggrieved by perceived social injustice, ethnic bigotry, political marginalisation and exclusion and economic deprivation, Isaac Adaka Boro with other youths in the Niger Delta Volunteers Services (NDVS) rebelled against the Nigerian state under General Aguiyi Ironsi in a Twelve-Day Revolution by declaring “The Niger Delta Republic” in the early hours of February 23, 1966 (Obi and Rustad 2011; Okumagba 2012). It further demanded the revocation of all oil contracts with the directives to end oil exploration by oil firms (Osaghae 1986; Osaghae et al. 2011).

The NDVS youth-dominated mobilisations clamped down on all oil installations and pipelines in Kaiama, Yenagoa, Imbiama, Oloibiri, Nembe, Patani, Odi, Sagbama and numerous other communities. The NDVS men were eventually subdued and finally surrendered to the superior forces of the federal troops. The impact is that it is now considered as the historical precursor to the present youth militancy in the Niger Delta. To demonstrate or underscore the youthfulness of the Twelve-Day Revolution of the NDVS, it comprised a core of educated youths between 18 and 30 years from the region (Osaghae et al. 2011).

The Twelve-Day Revolution thus laid the foundation of youth militancy in the Niger Delta. The worsening condition of the Niger Delta under the dictatorial military regimes led to the emergence of the late Ken Saro-Wiwa-led movement, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) (Ikelegbe 2001a). By adopting a pacifist strategy, Ken Saro-Wiwa avoided Isaac Boro’s militant tactics. Saro-Wiwa rightly reckoned that the MOSOP would be more effectual if it exposed the Nigerian government and oil multinationals to the global court of public opinion. As a writer and environmental activist, he massively mobilised the Ogoni people against the state and oil multinationals (Obi and Rustad 2011). Thus, the later first phase of post-independence agitations was more peaceful than the second phase. This has been attributed to the brutal response of the Nigerian state—through stationing an “army of occupation”—to the peaceful approach (Oronto and Okonta 2003; Okafor 2010; Aminu 2013).

Under the second phase of Niger Delta youth militancy, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in its December 11, 1998, Kaiama Declaration directed all the oil multinationals in the Niger Delta to stop operations and vacate the region by December 31, 1998. The main grievance of the IYC was that oil multinationals in the region caused enormous land damages, extreme food scarcities and serious environmental pollution to the region.
(Ugwuanyi et al. 2014). The expiration of the two-week deadline was followed by a peaceful protest march led by the Egbesu Boys. This peaceful demonstration eventually degenerated into violent protests as a result of police brutality (Ukeje 2001).

The fallout was that the youths militarised the agitation for resource control in defiance of state brutality. This triggered the emergence of numerous militant groups whose activities had serious implications for national security (Ukiwo 2007; Oromareghake et al. 2013). The emergence of the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo during this period intensified the armed struggle against the oil multinationals and the Nigerian state between 2005 and 2009 (Ukeje 2001; Ibeanu 2002; Kio-Lawson and Dekor 2014). The main strategies adopted by these youth militants included hostage taking of oil workers, illegal oil bunkering (oil theft) and massive attacks on oil installations like bombing and vandalisation of oil pipelines and facilities (Oriola 2013; Kio-Lawson and Dekor 2014). With the escalation of militant activities in this period, the militant youths almost succeeded in crippling oil production in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. The oil production was reduced to half the production as Angola and others overtook Nigeria in oil production (Omeje 2006a; Ugor 2013).

In the usual brutal or repressive style of the Nigerian state, Odi was raided by Nigerian soldiers in response to the murder of nine police officers. About 2483 deaths and the destruction of several properties, among other casualties, were recorded (Oronto et al. 2004; Isike 2005; Okumagba 2012). The raid of Odi was followed by the invasion of Odioma in 2005, Egbema, Olugbobiri and Ibebiri in 2004, Okerenkoko in 2006, Agge in 2008, Gbaramatu in 2009 and Ayakoromo in 2010. The invasion of Odi in 2003 was preceded by the Opia/Ikiyan invasion of 1999 (Okumagba 2012; Oromareghake et al. 2013).

In the post-amnesty phase or third phase of post-independence Niger Delta youth militancy, several new youth militant groups like NDA, Red Egbesu Water Lions (REWL), Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF), Niger Delta Red Square (NDRS) and Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate (NDGJM) emerged in 2016 to intensify attacks on oil installations and bombing of oil pipelines. The NDA was the major militant group leading the resurgence of militancy in the post-amnesty Niger Delta. In less than six months between February and June 2016, it
grounded oil production in the Niger Delta. For information on the timeline of NDA’s attack, see Table 8.1. Expectedly, Gbaramatu and several other Niger Delta communities were raided by the Nigerian Army under Operation Crocodile Smile.

Table 8.1  A compilation of the timeline on Niger Delta Avengers’ attacks, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Attacks/Damages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 10</td>
<td>1:30 am</td>
<td>The group claimed to have attacked the Bonny Soku Gas Export Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 13</td>
<td></td>
<td>The NDA blew up a major export line operated by the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>It claimed attack on SPDC’s giant underwater Forcados 48-inch Export Pipeline at the Forcados Export Terminal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 19</td>
<td>3:30 am</td>
<td>The group blew up the Clough Creek Tebidaba Agip Pipeline Manifold in Bayelsa State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>It attacked the Chevron Valve Platform located at Abiteye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>It launched a coordinated attack on the Chevron Well D25 in Abiteye and blew up major pipelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13</td>
<td></td>
<td>It bombed a Chevron pipeline at two separate spots near a military location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>It attacked the Escravos Gas Pipeline, Delta State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>The NDA group blew up Nembe 1, 2 and 3 Brass to Bonny Trunk Line belonging to Agip and Shell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDA struck the Chevron main electricity feed pipeline to the Escravos Tank Farm at Ciera Creek in Warri South-West LGA, Delta State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26</td>
<td>11:45 pm</td>
<td>The NDA group blew up another Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Gas and Crude trunk line close to Warri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>2.15 am</td>
<td>It destroyed Nembe 1, 2 and 3 Brass to Bonny trunk lines belonging to Agip and SPDC in Bayelsa State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>11.45 pm</td>
<td>It blew up NNPC Gas and Crude trunk lines in Warri, Delta State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31</td>
<td></td>
<td>It blew up Chevron Oil Well RMP 23 and RMP 24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1</td>
<td>3:44 am</td>
<td>It carried out twin attacks on wells RMP 23 and RMP 24 owned by Chevron, Dibi, Warri South-West LGA, Delta State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2</td>
<td>2.00 am</td>
<td>It bombed the Ogboinbiri to Tebidaba and Clough Creek to Tebidaba crude oil pipelines in Bayelsa State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 3</td>
<td>3:00 am</td>
<td>It blew up the SPDC Forcados 48-inch Export Line in Delta State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 3</td>
<td>3:30 am</td>
<td>An eleven-member strike team blew up the Brass to Tebidaba crude oil line in Bayelsa State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td></td>
<td>The group claimed responsibility for the attack on the NNPC pipeline in Oruk Anam LGA, Akwa Ibom State.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted and compiled from Vanguard, July 20, 2016, and Ventures Africa, July 20, 2016
The Nature, Methods and Cases of Niger Delta Youth Militancy

Niger Delta youth militancy refers to all manners of violent agitations for resource control, self-determination and separatist and secessionist movements manifesting in the form of abduction of foreign and local oil workers for ransom, blow up and vandalisation of oil pipelines; illegal oil bunkering; violent demonstration; hijacking of ships barges; and bombing of oil installations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Ikelegbe 2001b; Epelle 2010). The Niger Delta youth militants comprised aggressive or violent young people who launched their attacks from the creeks and retreated to the creeks (Ifeka 2001; Ukeje 2001; Omeje 2004; Ikelegbe 2006; Kashi 2008; Ugor 2013).

Thus, Osaghae et al. (2011) characterised the Niger Delta militant youths as: (1) composing of youths, (2) operating secretly in cities, (3) acting as activists in some cases, (4) operating in camps (deep in the mangrove swamps or creeks), (5) camping in the creeks (far from towns and cities) owned and controlled by “commandants”, (6) comprising over 2000 youths in numerous camps; (7) obtaining by force or threat, (8) carrying lethal weapons (9) and indulging in the abuse of hard drugs like alcohol (local gin), marijuana and so on. The youth militants are also armed to the teeth.

Niger Delta youth militant groups were the metamorphosis of various armed gangs and cults (Ikelegbe 2006). In fact, most of the Niger Delta youth militants are loose federations of university cult groups, street gangs, drug barons, illegal oil bunkering kingpins and political thugs. Thus, the relationship between cults/gangs/thugs and Niger Delta youth militants is very close (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 2010; Peel 2011). Some of the most potent and notable militant groups in the Niger Delta include MOSOP, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Niger Delta Force (NDF), the NDPVF led by Asari Dokubo and the Niger Delta Liberation Army (NDLA) (Ikelegbe 2006; Okumagba 2012; Aminu 2013). Others are the NDVF led by Ateke Tom, the Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), the IYC, the Isoko National Youth Movement (INYM), the Movement for the Survival of Itsekiri Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), the Urhobo Youth Movement (UYOMO), the Egi Youth Federation (EYF), the Icelanders Coalition for Military Action (ICMA), the Ikwerre Youth Movement (IYM), the Niger
Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS), the Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas (NDCG), the South-South Liberation Movement (SSLM), the Movement for the Sovereign State of the Niger Delta (MSSND), the Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), the Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front (NDPSF) and so on (Egwemi 2010; Okumagba 2012; Aminu 2013).

The Nigerian youths considered their educated and traditional elites to be weak and irresolute. The elders are considered to be ineffective in compelling the indifferent and suppressive state and manipulative and socially irresponsible oil multinationals to address the plights of the region. The youths decided to take the lead in mobilising, organising and engaging the state and oil multinationals. The youths have virtually taken over community leaderships. They have taken the position of the traditional rulers and community leaders in engaging the oil companies (Ikelegbe 2005a). The youth militant groups have violently or brutally dealt with chiefs and other youths who are suspected of colluding with oil multinationals or have defrauded communities of compensation funds and related benefits (Ikelegbe 2005b). The youths are now in the mainstream of the struggle such that the government and oil firms can only ignore them at their own peril.

There is also emerging evidence that the youth militants were initially connected with the illegal oil bunkering and trading syndicates who sponsored and financed them. Oil theft syndicates encouraged emergence of militant youth groups, enriched and armed them for the purpose of protecting and preserving their illegal businesses. Eventually, the militants began to participate autonomously in illegal oil bunkering due to their control of the creeks and access to bunkering. Thus, some of the militant leaders have become illegal oil bunkerers. They see illegal oil bunkering as part, or an extension, of the struggle for resource control. It is seen as taking, albeit illegally, what naturally belongs to them but appropriated by non-indigenes. They also see it as a source of funding for the struggle. Thus, the youth militants are now deeply involved in the sale of crude oil and refining of stolen crude oil for sale (Ikelegbe 2005b). Perhaps the import of this in sustaining, prolonging, perpetuating and intensifying youth militancy in the Niger Delta cannot be over-emphasised.

Also, there is emerging evidence that oil multinationals are encouraging youth militancy in the Niger Delta by deploying the youth to protect their production and storage facilities or using them for the purpose of bullying, threatening and intimidating other firms competing for juicy contracts with them (Omoweh 2005; Ugor 2013). Thus, with the spread
of militancy across the Niger Delta, oil multinationals became increasingly involved with youth militant groups so as to regain access to oil facilities closed or repair oil installations damaged by militants (Amunwa 2012). The above revelations are very important in understanding the drivers, complexities, dynamics and trajectories of Niger Delta youth militancy.

The Drivers of Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta

Generally, the post-Cold War studies of armed conflict have been dominated by the resource-conflict perspective (Ikelegbe 2006; Obi and Rustad 2011). However, Niger Delta youth militancy is so multifarious, multifactorial or multi-causal that it embodies or encompasses most of the theories of violent conflicts such as frustration-aggression theory, relative deprivation theory, resource-conflict theory, resource-capture theory, resource-curse theory, rentierism, Dutch disease thesis, Marxist political economy perspective and so on. Therefore, no single theory can sufficiently analyse or adequately explain all the reasons for the emergence and resurgence of Niger Delta youth militancy. We therefore adopt an eclectic approach to the causes of Niger Delta youth militancy.

Some of the causes of youth militancy in the Niger Delta include frustration, economic deprivation, political marginalisation, social inequality, abject poverty, extreme inequality, youth unemployment, environmental degradation, health hazards, infrastructural gap, ethnic and community rivalry, tussle for traditional authorities, greed, political corruption, electoral violence, political thuggery, land and resource dispute, militarisation by the Nigerian state, police brutality, structural imbalance in Nigerian federalism, skewed fiscal federalism, agitation for resource control, lopsided oil block ownership, separatist/secessionist movements, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and so on (Obi 2009; Ukiwo 2011).

The Contradiction of the Nigerian State and Militarisation of Youths

The oil multinationals and Nigerian state are implicated in collaborating to militarise the Niger Delta region (Oromareghake et al. 2013). Babawale (2002) rightly noted that the emergence and rise of youth militant groups in Nigeria can be situated within the internal contradictions of the Nigerian political economy. The militarisation of the Niger Delta is inher-
ent in the exploitative, oppressive and suppressive nature as well as the neo-patrimonial and rentier character of the Nigerian post-colonial state. There were thus phenomena of personal rule, low relative autonomy and the repressive nature of the state as well as the high concentration and over-centralisation of power by various military regimes that sought to destroy any group that was opposed to them (Saro-Wiwa 1992; Okumagba 2012). Rather than seeking political solutions, the Nigerian state preferred military solutions.

Perhaps the refusal of the Nigerian state to respond positively to the pens and placards of Harold Dappapiye’s and Saro-Wiwa’s era created the condition of frustration and aggression. Thus, it has been argued that violent agitation arose as a result of the use of force by the Nigerian state on initial non-violent protests by Niger Delta youths against the gross under-development of their area (Okonta and Oronto 2001; Ukiwo 2007; Oromareghake et al. 2013). In other words, the use of force, rather than quelling Niger Delta youth militancy, exacerbated it (Ukeje 2001; Ibeanu 2002; Ikoh and Ukpong 2013; Kio-Lawson and Dekor 2014). The Niger Delta has thus become a region of intractable conflict, protracted agitation, perpetual struggle, unending crisis and recurring violence (Ibaba 2008; Inokoba and Imbua 2010).

*Structural Imbalance, Skewed Fiscal Federalism and Youth Militancy*

Oil-producing states in the Nigerian federation have paradoxically benefited the least from oil wealth. The federal fiscal policy in Nigeria is structured in such a way as to favour non-oil-producing ethnic majorities at the expense of oil-producing ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta. This triggered the agitation for resource control, campaign for restructuring, the struggle for self-determination and the clamour for a sovereign national conference (Oronto et al. 2004; Oromareghake et al. 2013). Thus, the emergence of Niger Delta youth militants is attributed to the imperfections inherent in Nigeria’s federal system (Saro-Wiwa 1995; Okumagba 2012).

The agitations for resource control, restructuring, constitutional reforms, ‘true’ fiscal federalism and perhaps self-determination in the Niger Delta derive from the structural imbalance of the Nigerian fiscal federalism, which has continually been antithetical to the developmental needs and aspirations of the people (Obi 1997). Perhaps it was because of the need to redress this structural imbalance in the unjust 1999 Constitution or skewed
fiscal federalism that NDA included immediate application of the report of the 2014 National Conference as one of its conditions for cessation of militancy (see Table 8.2).

Table 8.2  Niger Delta Avengers’ conditions to the federal government of Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Immediate implementation of the report of the 2014 National Conference. Otherwise, this country will break up forcefully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>President Buhari, the Department of State Security (DSS) and Timipre Sylva should apologise to the people of the Niger Delta region and family of Late Chief D.S.P. Alamieyesegha for killing him with intimidation and harassment because of his party affiliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The ownership of oil blocks must reflect 60% for the oil-producing people and 40% for the non-oil-producing people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The only Nigerian Maritime University sited in the most appropriate and befitting place Okerenkoko must start the 2015–2016 academic session immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The Minister of Transportation, Mr Rotimi Amechi, should apologise to the Ijaws and the entire Niger Delta people for his careless and reckless statements about the siting of the University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Ogoniland and indeed all oil-polluted lands in the Niger Delta must be cleaned up and compensation be paid to all oil-producing communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mr Nnamdi Kanu, the Leader of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), must be released unconditionally as the court said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme must be well funded and let it continue to run effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>All Progressives Congress (APC) members that are indicted in any corruption-related cases should be made to face trial like the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) members. Otherwise Buhari should shamefully forget about this nonsense anti-corruption fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>All oil multinationals and foreign investors should observe this ultimatum, as their business interest in the country must be the first target.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted and compiled from Daily Post May 9, 2016; Naija News May 9, 2016; The Sun May 9, 2016; News Punch May 16, 2016

Agitation for Resource Control and Niger Delta Youth Militancy

This is agitation for access to oil wealth and a greater share of the federally allocated oil revenues (Kemedi 2002; Vitalis 2002). Perhaps the most coherent presentation of Niger Deltans’ idea of “resource control” can be found in the “December 11, 1998 Kaiama Declaration” (Osaghae et al. 2011). The agitation for resource control, the struggle for self-determination
and the clamour for a sovereign national conference have in turn triggered youth militancy in the Niger Delta (Oronto et al. 2004; Oluwaniyi 2010). By centralising the ownership and control of oil resource, the youths have become increasingly militant, thereby engaging in anti-state activities (Ikelegbe 2001a; Okumagba 2012). The escalation of the Niger Delta crisis is considered as politics of access to the oil resource which has over time assumed different dimensions (Oromareghake et al. 2013). The agitation for resource ownership and control is therefore very crucial in understanding youth militancy in the region.

**Lopsided Ownership of Oil Blocks and Niger Delta Youth Militancy**

Oil-bearing communities have been denied the financial and economic benefits resulting from the huge wealth or revenue derived from the exploitation of their natural resources (Oriola 2013; Ugor 2013). This was one of the causes of resurgence of youth militancy by the NDA in the post-amnesty era. As a result, one of the conditions of the NDA for cessation of militant activities to the federal government of Nigeria under Buhari’s administration was that the ownership of oil blocks must reflect 60% for the oil-producing people and 40% for the non-oil-producing people (see Table 8.2).

**Ethnic/Community Rivalry and Niger Delta Youth Militancy**

The skewed distribution of oil revenue is seen as the cause of the numerous inter-ethnic violence incidents, including the ongoing youth militancy in the region. Babawale (2002) observed that one of the reasons for the emergence of militant youths in the Niger Delta was the manipulation of the factors of ethnicity by the governing elites across the various regions, particularly as levers of political power. He further stated that these militant organisations were formed as a consequence of the mismanagement of ethnic grievances by the Nigerian state. Oil exploration and production have consequently led to family feuds, intra-communal disputes, inter-communal conflicts and inter-ethnic wars (Watts 2007; Olusola 2013). By resorting to divide and rule, the Nigerian state and oil majors have aggravated or worsened youth militancy in the region.
Ecological Pollution, Environmental Degradation, Health Hazards and Youth Militancy

There are over 1000 flare sites amounting to about 23 billion cubic metres (constituting over 13% of global gas flaring) and approximately 300 spills per years in the Niger Delta region (Aniche 2015). Gas flaring and oil spills have therefore contributed tremendously in devastating the ecology and degrading the environment of the Niger Delta, constituting enormous health hazard (Aniche 2016; Okafor and Aniche 2016). Oil production has cost the people their farmlands, fishing rivers and exposed the people to health hazards. The resultant effect is the devastation of the ecosystem of the region in terms of soil fertility loss, agricultural decline, forest loss, fisheries decline and biodiversity depletion. The oil economy has disinfected and displaced the indigenous people who are dependent on the primary economies of farming, fishing and hunting (Oronto et al. 2004; Oromareghake et al. 2013).

The Nigerian government has failed to implement the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) report on Ogoniland. Thus, rather than beget or facilitate development, oil has actually been a harbinger of devastation and under-development to the region. All these culminated in rendering Niger Delta as a breeding ground for a generation of militant youths and a political flashpoint of violence (Oronto et al. 2004; Oromareghake et al. 2013). This is the reason why NDA included cleaning up and remediation of oil spills in Ogoniland and all oil-polluted lands in the region and compensating all oil-producing communities as one of the conditions for cessation of destruction of oil installations and facilities (see Table 8.2).

Youth Unemployment, Poverty and Niger Delta Youth Militancy

Although oil from the Niger Delta is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, there is abject poverty in the region. Despite the 13% accruing to states in the region from oil revenues, the people remain extremely poor (Oronto et al. 2004; Okumagba 2012). Youth unemployment in Oloibori alone (the first village where oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 1956 and drilling began in 1958) is put conservatively at 50% (Ifeka 2001; Ukeje 2001; Omeje 2008; Kashi 2008; Ugor 2013).

The unemployed and idled youths thus become a readily available pool for recruitment and radicalisation into militant activities. Most of these jobless youths have also gained direct connections working for oil theft
syndicates in the creeks, thereby exposing them to illegal oil bunkering business contacts and supply networks. This eventually resulted in the exchange of oil for money and arms by the unemployed militant youths (Ibeanu 2000; Oliveira 2007; Watts 2009; Ugor 2013). This could be the reason why the NDA insisted that the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme must be well funded as part of its conditions to the Nigerian state for cessation of bombing of oil pipelines (see Table 8.2).

Infrastructural Gap and Niger Delta Youth Militancy

This is a case of the federal government’s historical neglect of the developmental and infrastructural needs of the region from which the bulk of Nigeria’s foreign exchange is earned. Even oil multinationals are not committed to alleviating the plight of their host communities. Thus, the youths have become increasingly militant, engaging in anti-state and anti-corporate activities (Okumagba 2012). The violent agitations of Niger Delta youths stemmed from infrastructural deficits of their area as a result of the neglect by both the federal government and oil multinationals operating in the area (Ukiwo 2007; Oromareghake et al. 2013). The point being made is that international oil corporations (IOCs) have not adequately discharged their corporate social responsibilities (CSRs) to their host communities, thereby fanning the embers of youth militancy in the region.

Economic Deprivation, Political Marginalisation, Social Inequality and Youth Militancy

The issue of economic deprivation, political marginalisation and social inequality became rife in the Niger Delta. The general perception in the area is that their marginalisation is attributable to the minority status of the region and that the dominant ethnic groups in the federation use the oil resources from the Niger Delta to develop areas inhabited by them (Saro-Wiwa 1995; Obi 2002; Osaghae 1995). This led to the emergence and proliferation of militant youth groups in the Niger Delta such that between 1990 and 1999 not less than 24 youth militant groups emerged in the Niger Delta (Okumagba 2012).

It suffices to say that the adoption of relative deprivation thesis in explanation of the seemingly intractable Niger Delta militancy is already well documented in the literature. The deprived and distressed youths
resorted to violence or militancy as a way of expressing their grievances. Consequently, the renewed post-amnesty militant activities in the region by NDA cannot be utterly dissociated from relative deprivation and extreme inequality.

Frustration and Niger Delta Youth Militancy

Frustration of the youths of the Niger Delta from the above factors eventually led them to aggression against the Nigerian state and the oil multinationals (including their employees, especially expatriates). The inevitable aggressive expressions of this frustration or anger were attacking of oil installations, destruction oil facilities, bombing of oil pipelines, kidnapping of oil expatriate workers and so on (Ikelegbe 2005b; Osaghae et al. 2011; Aminu 2013). The aggrieved and frustrated youths relied on militant activities as the only or best means of bending the unresponsive government and irresponsible oil companies. Suffice it to say that the application of the frustration-aggression thesis in explaining the protracted Niger Delta militancy is already well documented in the literature. The current post-amnesty resurgence of youth militancy in the region by NDA cannot be completely divorced from frustration.

Electoral Violence, Political Thuggery and Niger Delta Youth Militancy

Most of the militant youths today were used by politicians as political thugs for bullying, harassing and intimidating opposition parties/candidates. Some were even recruited from the creeks as assassins by politicians to assassinate political enemies. The tribal kings and elders were also involved in arming youths to murder and harass opposition political forces in their unbridled ambition to acquire power, consolidate it, retain their influence and in their quest to exercise authority and control over kingdoms/territories. Usually abandoned and ignored after elections, these youths used the weapons to help themselves (Omoweh 2005; Ugor 2013).

One of the reasons attributed for the escalation of the insurgency in the Niger Delta as an aftermath the 2003 elections in Nigeria was that some of the militant youths who were armed and used by politicians and political-office seekers against perceived political opponents were not demobilised, rehabilitated and reintegrated into the political mainstream. Having felt used and dumped by politicians, the youths used arms in mili-
tant activities (Okumagba 2012). The import of this is that the second phase of post-independence especially post-military youth militancy in the Niger Delta cannot be totally disconnected from the 2003 election violence and political thuggery in Nigeria.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Youth Militancy

There was a surge in the movement, proliferation and availability of SALWs in the Niger Delta region as a result of the escalation of violence and militancy. SALWs became not only the sources of strength and power but also the sources of illegal income as violence became commodified (Ikoh and Ukpong 2013). Some of these small arms were sourced from war-ravaged parts of the West African sub-region and war returnees from peacekeeping, politicians, traditional leaders, oil dealers, military and para-military officers and so on (Ikelegbe 2001b; Osaghae et al. 2011). Weapons were often exchanged for stolen or illegally bunkered oil.

There are indeed pull and push factors or demand and supply sides of SALW proliferation in the Niger Delta. The resultant effect is that the Niger Delta became a centre for the proliferation of lethal SALWs and inevitable intensification of armed conflicts, escalation of militancy and spread of criminalities. Consequently, youth militants raised arms against the Nigerian state and oil multinationals (Omeje 2006b; Watts 2007). Therefore, there is a link or nexus between the proliferation of SALWs and rising youth militant activities in the region.

The Consequences of Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta

The consequences or effects of youth militancy in the Niger Delta are legion. Some of the consequences include capital flight, loss of oil revenue, loss of lives and properties, unemployment, poverty, conflicts, insecurity and emigration, social deprivation, oil theft, illegal oil bunkering, abuse of cultural values and mores and so on (Osaghae 1995; Ibaba 2008; Monisola 2013).
Youth Militancy, Insecurity and Emigration in the Niger Delta

The violent and criminal activities of the Niger Delta youth militants like oil pipeline vandalisation, bombing of oil facilities, kidnapping of oil workers, sea piracy and so on create an atmosphere of insecurity and fear which can in turn lead to emigration of expatriate oil workers. These have devastating effects on national security and stability (Ikelegbe 2006; Osaghae et al. 2011). For example, over 600 expatriate workers were abducted and over 57 armed attacks were launched on oil installations from 2004 to 2009 (Ikein 2009). At its height, youth militancy rendered the region an ungoverned space unleashing tremendous security challenges. The state of insecurity in Niger Delta forced the major oil multinationals to withdraw their workers from the oil fields in the region and suspended production, thereby reducing national output by about 750,000 barrels per day (bpd) (Oriola 2013; Ugor 2013).

The recent post-amnesty revival of militant activities by NDA was so massive that Nigeria could not meet her Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota. Nigeria consequently lost her position as one of highest oil-producing and exporting countries in Africa and the world to Angola, Gabon and so on. The insecurity in the region has also scared away potential investors in the oil and gas industry. This has a serious negative impact on the economy of the federation.

Niger Delta Youth Militancy and Loss of Oil Revenues

The enormity of the effect of Niger Delta youth militant activities on the Nigerian economy resulted in 40% reduction in oil revenue from 2005 to 2008 (Ikein 2009). The militant activities of the youths resulted in several shut-ins of oil facilities by the oil multinationals and caused disruption in oil production (Aminu 2013). Ojieh (2010) noted that oil production in Nigeria dropped from 2.6 million barrels a day to about 1 million bpd at the peak of Niger Delta militancy between 2006 and 2009 (Ugwuanyi et al. 2014). The implication for oil revenue and capacity of the government to meet its expenditure in provision of infrastructures was enormous. The post-amnesty resurgence of youth militant attacks by NDA in 2016 was attributed as one of the major factors that plunged Nigeria into economic recession. The economy has been so devastated and crippled that the country is yet to fully recover from it.
Oil theft and smuggling were rampant in the late 1990s. It was reported by NNPC that there were 114 pipeline breaks in Port Harcourt and Warri areas between April and May 2000 alone. There were over 101 cases of pipeline vandalisation investigated by the Nigeria Police Force between April 2000 and December 2001 (Ikelegbe 2005b). Estimates of oil loss due to oil theft and illegal bunkering range from 75 million bpd to 300 million bpd. In 2001 alone, Shell lost on average about 30,000 bpd which increased to 100,000 bpd in 2002. The other oil multinationals lost about 100,000 bpd in the same year. The total loss to the country in 2002 was about 200,000 bpd, which was about 10% of total production of about 2 million bpd. Shell alone lost about 100,000 bpd and a total of about 9 million barrels in 2003. It is also estimated that the Nigerian government loses about $3.5 billion annually (Ikelegbe 2005c).

According to a report commissioned by Shell in 2003, it was estimated that “a staggering 275,000 to 685,000 bpd of crude were being stolen by oil thieves in the Niger Delta” (Omoweh 2005). The Nigerian government was losing an estimated “$22.5 million daily (on $90/barrel price)” between 2003 and 2008. Illegal bunkering alone accounted for at least 15% of annual output losses for the oil majors in the region. Much of this illicit fund was channelled back into fuelling the conflict in the form of liquid capital for the purchase of weapons by the militants (Peel 2011; Ugor 2013). Illegal oil bunkering has resulted in the proliferation of illegal refineries in the region with its associated health, environmental and economic implications for the region and the federation.

Youth Militancy, Communal and Ethnic Conflicts in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta region has witnessed a regime of terrifying intra-/inter-communal and intra/inter-ethnic conflicts, for example, intra-communal conflicts within Ozoro and so on; inter-communal conflicts between Basambri and Nembe, Ogbologbomabri and Nembe and so on; and inter-ethnic conflicts between the Ijaw and Itsekiri, Ijaw and Ilaje, Urhobo and Itsekiri and so on. The most far-reaching and intensifying of these conflicts has been the Ijaw/Itsekiri conflict in the Warri area, which has raged recurrently since 1997. There were further outbreaks of the conflict in 2002,
2003 and 2004. These conflicts have at different times escalated so much as to engender the state of insecurity and oil production disruptions (Ikelegbe 2005c). The intensity of these communal and ethnic conflicts has on various occasions turned the region into battlefields or theatre of battles.

**Niger Delta Youth Militancy and Capital Flight**

Due to the atmosphere of fear and insecurity created by youth militancy in the region as well as the enormous losses suffered by oil multinationals, many of them divested and left Nigeria for other oil-producing countries like Angola, Gabon, Ghana and so on. This has also scared away prospective investors. Some of the resultant effects of this include unemployment, loss of public revenues, poverty, hunger, reduction in public expenditures, abandoned projects, reduction in inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), rise in outflow of FDI, brain drain, economic recession and so on.

**Youth Militancy and Loss of Lives/Properties in the Niger Delta**

Niger Delta youth militancy has resulted in the tremendous loss of lives and properties. One of the consequences of the militarisation of the Niger Delta is inestimable casualties. The loss of lives and human casualties constituted an immense loss in human resources and a huge cost to human capital development, while the damage or destruction of properties created an enormous waste of physical capital or material resources. The economic implication for Nigeria in terms of material cost and financial loss is inestimable or immeasurable (see Table 8.3).

**Conclusion**

We noted that these militant youth organisations in the Niger Delta embarked upon a series of peaceful demonstrations against environmental degradation. They accused the government of economic disempowerment and handling of the environmental consequences of oil exploration with levity; hence, they resorted to violence leading to insecurity. They demanded for accelerated development of their region from oil revenues generated from their area. Some of such militant activities include incessant attacks of oil installations, hostage taking, kidnapping for ransom, destruction of oil facilities, oil theft or pipeline vandalisation (Okonta and Oronto 2001; Oromareghake et al. 2013).
We subsequently identified some of the causes of youth militancy in the Niger Delta. The paradox of the Niger Delta situation is that rather than oil being a blessing to the region it has become a curse. Oil has in fact under-developed and devastated the region rather than developed it. Oil explorations by oil multinationals in the region have bedevilled the region with environmental degradation, ecological pollution, health hazard, social neglects, political marginalisation, economic deprivation, abject poverty, youth unemployment, extreme inequality, infrastructural deficits, structural imbalance, oppression and various forms of human rights violations (Obi 1997). Yet successive governments and oil multinationals have

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Operating force</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1990</td>
<td>Umuechem</td>
<td>Security Protection Unit</td>
<td>Killed 80 unarmed demonstrators and destroyed 495 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Umuechem</td>
<td>Razed houses and destroyed properties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Odi</td>
<td>Army and Mobile Police</td>
<td>Razed the entire community as every house and property worth millions of naira were burnt down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>Uwheru</td>
<td>Operation Restore Hope</td>
<td>Killed 20 Persons and burnt down 11 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Egbema</td>
<td>Operation Restore Hope and Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>Used gunboats and military helicopters to bomb and destroy 13 communities. Razed a total of 500 buildings in which 200 persons, mostly women and children, were feared dead and are still missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>Olugbobiri and Ikebiri</td>
<td>State Security Operatives</td>
<td>Killed 16 youths for agitating for a better deal from oil multinationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Odioma</td>
<td>Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>Killed 77 persons, including youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Okerenkoko</td>
<td>Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>Killed several people and destroyed properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Agge</td>
<td>Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>Killed several people and destroyed properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>Gbaramatu</td>
<td>Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>Killed several people and destroyed properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>Ayakoromo</td>
<td>Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>Killed several people and destroyed properties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

failed to address the fundamental issues. They have been addressing symptoms rather than the syndrome or the effects rather than the root causes. The repressive approach of the Nigerian state thus contributed to the change from peaceful protests to violent agitations, leading to the emergence of various militant youth groups (Okumagba 2012).

We have also noted these drivers (as captured by the NDA’s conditions to the federal government) that underpin the recent post-amnesty resurgence or revival of youth militancy in the Niger Delta spearheaded by NDA in 2016. The consequences have been massive, enormous and reinforcing. The deepening, prolonged and recurring youth militancy has rendered Niger Delta a crisis region. Until the fundamental issues like constitutional reforms, resource control, fiscal federalism, enactment of the petroleum industry bill and other drivers of youth militancy are addressed, violence, militancy, insurgency, separatist movements and agitations for self-determination or secession in the region will continue to assume a more complex form. More militant youths will emerge even after NDA. Already a militant youth group called Reformed Niger Delta Avengers (RNDA) is now making its demands.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 9

Unemployment, Migration and Cyber Criminality in Nigeria

Cornelius Chiedozie Ozeh
and Chukwuemeka Chibuzo Ohajionu

Introduction

The inevitability of crime in every human community is definite and convincing since humans are not angels. Hence, crimes and criminal activities have since time immemorial featured prominently in the society irrespective of the glossary of strict laws and the accompanying sanctions against them. This is also true about the emergent virtual world of the Internet (cyberworld), which is being terrorized by cyber-criminals. According to Umeozulu (2012), cyber-crime connotes “criminal activities, involving information technology infrastructure, including illegal access of computer data from or within a computer.” With the application of the information and communication technologies, cyber-crime is not limited by
time and space, and, as such, it represents a step further from the classics of crime which are time and space bound. This fact explains why many a criminal have migrated from the streets to the Web for their criminal activities. This is captured in Umeozulu (2012), when he asserted that the Internet is now a safe haven for the criminals who have deserted the streets for the cyberworld. To some significant extent cyber-crimes are hardly onsite; they are online and mostly committed from the comfort zones of the criminals. According to Adeniran (2008, para. 1), series of chances offered by the Internet “for instance, electronic mailing, ‘chat’ systems and internet messaging (IM), often serve as veritable grounds for carrying out evil ‘webonomics’ and other fraudulent activities by the youths” (or rather, the criminals). However, Olaide and Adewole (2004) argued that the majority of the number of crimes committed in Nigeria are typically by the youth.

In today’s Nigeria, a number of cyber-crimes and the like are perpetuated on a regular basis in diverse forms, among which are included, but not limited to, fraudulent electronic mails, cyber-impersonation of characters, pornography, spamming and phishing or hacking of automated teller machines (ATM), just to mention these few. It is instructive to note that the aforementioned crimes are perpetuated through cyberspace, and assurances of huge financial gains are used to lure the online victims by the cyber-criminals (Okeshola and Adeta 2013). Internet crimes could be committed for several reasons but the enormity of economic undertone being commanded by cyber-crimes from Nigeria and/or by Nigerians piques interest for investigating the role of the economic realities in the country, such as high rate of unemployment, in the surging volume of the notorious crime. The possibility of establishing a significant correlation between the harsh economic condition in Nigeria and cyber-criminality is more palpable, given the fact that “the unemployment level of the youth is twice that of the adults unemployment” (Mago 2014, p. 33). Alabi (2014) corroborated this position when he wrote that the youth unemployment rate has been staggeringly very high in the past ten years compared to the national unemployment rates. Furthermore, the correlation is no less promising against the increasing urbanization and the attendant rural-urban migration, especially by the youths, in search of economic succor in the urban centres of the country. Against this background, this study assumes that unemployment and migration largely account for cyber-criminality in Nigeria.
Theoretical Orientation

This study is guided by McClelland’s Needs Theory. This theory also refers to Three Needs Theory—Acquired Needs Theory, Motivational Needs Theory and Learned Needs Theory. David McClelland propounded this orientation in his 1961 book, *The Achieving Society*, following the Abraham Maslow’s original idea of Hierarchy of Needs in 1941. McClelland highlighted three motivators which he claimed all humans possess: Achievement need (n-Ach), Affiliation need (n-Aff) and Power need (n-Pow), irrespective of our gender, culture or age. He argued that people will display different attributes, given their strongest and dominant motivator. And that the dominant need is a product of culture and life experiences.

The achievement-motivated individual (n-Ach) pursues in strong terms his dreams and goals not minding how challenging the process may be. Also, such individual aspires to the highest position of his career. Meeting his goals brings about complete fulfillment to the n-Ach. The n-Pow individual, on the other hand, is motivated by high position in the society, which we can call “authority motivated.” The individual desires to command public respect by working toward it. He also enjoys being influential, coordinating other peoples’ affairs and, very importantly, deriving satisfaction from his personal status and prestige which dignifies him. Lastly, the n-Aff individual is motivated by affiliation. This individual craves for relationships, friendship and association in various kinds. His ability to connect and be recognized gives him a sense of fulfillment, and they strive more within a team.

The McClelland’s theory of Needs is by all intents and purposes a management theory. Obvious, however, is the theory’s ability to explain people’s behavior not only in a work environment but in the larger society. These identifiable needs in the theory (n-Arch, n-Aff and n-Pow) are also the drivers of the behaviors of people in the society. It could explain why people choose any available means to satisfying their individual dominant needs. The paramount importance for satisfying the dominant need of an individual is certain, and deviant means could be adopted if the acceptable methods are absent.

Nigeria of today is faced with the challenge of increasing unemployment, and the young people are mostly affected in the country. Awogbenle and Iwuamadi (2010) observed that according to the National Manpower Board and the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria’s youth population is
about 80 million which represents 60 percent of the entire population of Nigeria. They went further to state that, from the numbers given, about 1.6 million are underemployed. Doreo (2013) also opined that Nigeria’s unemployment rate grows at the rate of 16 percent per year, and the youth have been the most affected. For young people, the impact of unemployment can be threatening. This is because some youth are tempted to engage in social vices to meet their daily needs and regain their sense of self. From the foregoing, the massive involvement of Nigerian youth in cyber-criminality becomes understandable. McClelland was succinct in his position that irrespective of age, gender and culture, we all possess the needs for achievement, affiliation and power, with one dominating and invariably conditioning the behavior of the individual in the society. The economic undertone of Nigerian cyber-crime is possibly therefore due to the bid to satisfy the individual’s dominant need.

**Methodology**

This study adopted qualitative method of data collection and analysis wherein it analyzed descriptively data collected from the secondary sources such as journals, newspapers, textbooks and the Internet.

**Conceptual and Empirical Reviews**

**Cyber-Criminality: Definitions and Classifications**

Just as with other concepts in the social sciences, the definitions of cyber-crime are equally faced with the challenge of a universal definition not even among the agencies charged with law enforcement in that regard (NHTCU/NOP 2002). As Wall (2001, p. 2) denotes, the concept of cyber-crime “has no specific reference in law; although, attention has been paid to it in the discipline of political science, media, criminal justice and especially academic debates.” where the word connotes a number of illegal activities aided by the tools of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Thomas and Loader (2000, p. 3), in corroboration, conceptualized cyber-crime as “computer-mediated activities which are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties and which can be conducted through global electronic networks.” Thus, cyber-crime is domiciled in the cyberspace, a virtual Internet world (Castells 2002). Britz (2009) in his position defined cyber-crime as the deliberate misuses and abuses of computers with
an Internet access or web of interconnected computers, which gives rise to Internet theft and other related crimes supported over the Internet. Clearly, the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime (2005) viewed cyber-crime as operational Internet actions that involve using digital technologies to commit an electronic offence.

Cyber-crime has equally been viewed from sociological and technological angles. From the former angle, Cohen and Felson (1979) held the opinion that cyber-crime is a form of criminality committed by the cyber-criminal against the unsuspecting and unguarded Internet user. Cyber-crime, therefore, is similar, if not the same thing, to other criminal offenses (Emanuelsson-Korsell and Soderman 2001). From the latter angle, Brenner (2007) asserted that it is the application of computer technology to commit crime.

Generally speaking, given the daily improvement and innovation in Internet technology, cyber-crime can transform into a novel era of criminal activities unseen and inexperienced (Wilson and Shun-Yung 2009). Within the above definitions, it is imperative to group cyber-crime within specific typologies such as the following by Wall:

1. **Cyber-trespass**—crossing boundaries into other people’s property and/or causing damage, for example, hacking, defacement, viruses.
2. **Cyber-deceptions and thefts**—stealing (money, property), for example, credit card fraud, intellectual property violations (a.k.a. “piracy”).
3. **Cyber-pornography**—activities that breach laws on obscenity and decency.
4. **Cyber-violence**—doing psychological harm to, or inciting physical harm against, others, thereby breaching laws pertaining to the protection of the person, for example, hate speech, stalking (2001, pp. 3–7).

The typologies of cyber-crime above followed different targets: The numbers 1 and 2 are typically “crimes against property,” number 3 borders on “crimes against morality,” while number 4 supposes “crimes against the person.” Given the above, one can also include “crimes against the state,” involving actions that prevent and contravene the established laws that protect the state and its institutions (e.g. terrorism, espionage and disclosure of official secrets). Such a categorization is vital, in that we are able to understand and analyze cyber-crime to existing conceptions of unlawful and dangerous acts.
Extant Laws Against Cyber-Crime in Nigeria

Until May 2015 in Nigeria there was no specific law to combating cyber-crime. The criminals were on a free ride without any particular legislation to checkmate their illegal acts. Although there were laws which was not specifically relevant to cyber-crimes but in a way maybe used to a limited extent to confront the matter. These laws are: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 and, Nigerian Criminal Code. In May 2015, according to Channels Television (2016, November 12), the “cyber-crime bill was signed into law, properly defining the act as unlawful with penalties attached to any disobedience of the law.” The conducts of the “cyber fraudsters” are detrimental to the country’s economy. And, as such, it is tantamount to economic crimes which the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Establishment) defined as:

the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objectives of earning wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner thereby violating existing legislation governing the economic activities of government and its administration. It includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt malpractices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and policy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods etc. (Channels Television 2016, November 12)

The other available law is the Nigeria Criminal Code, which is also used in charging for cyber-crimes and other related offences. And a number of the cyber-criminal’s activities are hinged on falsehood, pretensions and cheating and are contrary to Sections 419 and 421 of the Nigerian Criminal Code, respectively. According to Section 418, obtaining property by false pretense presupposes “Any representation made by words, writing, or conduct, of a matter of fact, either past or present, which representation of false in fact and which the other person making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true, is a false pretense.”

In the letters and spirit of Section 419:

Any person who by any pretense, and with intent to defraud, obtains from any other person anything capable of being stolen, or induces any other person to deliver to any person anything capable of being stolen, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three years.
If the thing is of the value of one thousand naira or upward, he is liable to imprisonment for seven years.

It is immaterial that the thing is obtained by or its delivery is induced through the medium of contract induced by the false pretense. The offender cannot be arrested without warrant unless found committing the offence.

There are, however, some draft bills initiated on cyber-crime which include:

- Computer Security and Critical Infrastructure Bill of 2005,
- Electronic Service Provision Bill of 2008,
- Interception and Monitoring Bill of 2009,
- Cyber Security Bill of 2011, and

One common thread that spanned these bills is the fact that none of them has been able to make it through the law-making process to becoming a real piece of legislation in the fight on cyber-crimes.

*Cyber-Criminality and Nigeria’s International Image*

Ogunleye, an ICT and security expert with the Nigeria Cyber Crime Working Group (NCWG) revealed that the increasing rates of cyber-crimes have outnumbered the rate of Internet usage in Nigeria. He was quoted saying that “Nigeria is the 56th out of 60 countries in embracing internet usage but third in the fraud attempt category.” This goes to support the fact that the implication of cyber-crimes in Nigeria and on her citizenry is detrimental. The international bodies on corruption, such as the Transparency International (TI), have listed Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. And this is not unconnected with the massive cyber-crimes perpetuated from a very significant number of Nigerians. This reality has the potential of impacting negatively on the socioeconomic development of the country which is a strong force for innovation and job creation in the state. The sorry tales have been that international financial institutions are even more critical and doubtful while conducting financial transactions. Little wonder that drafts and checks by Nigerian banks are not viable international financial instruments.

A major challenge facing the Nigerian state at the moment is that her Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and e-mail services have been barred in their systems online. In several cases, access is denied to some Internet
network traffic and segment of Nigeria’s origin. Better improved and stronger “technovations” have been deployed to aid easy identification and subsequent isolation of e-mail traffic coming from Nigeria. Very crucial and classified information are likely to be destroyed by the unhealthy character of the cyber-fraudsters if not checkmated. Really, one cannot determine the extent to which cyber-crimes will affect the Nigerian economy. Recent events have been showing that it could have a damaging consequence on both the economic and financial life of the state. This attributes the reasons why Nigerian financial transactions are often delayed by international banks not until proper verification has been conducted on such transactions. This in itself affects the prospect of international investment in Nigeria by foreign investors.

UNEMPLOYMENT, MIGRATION AND CYBER-CRIMINALITY IN NIGERIA

It is a household knowledge that unemployment rate in Nigeria has continued to be on the increase despite the abundant human and natural resources available in the country. Every year, thousands of graduates are produced, but there are no jobs for majority of them. According to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria is faced with up to 20 million unemployed people, with about 2 million joining the inglorious team of the unemployed every year. This among other things has resulted in rural-urban, urban-urban and cross-border migration in Nigeria. This is understandable as human beings are economic animals, and just like herds of cattle and other lower animals that go about in search of greener pastures for grazing, humans go from one place to another in search of better economic conditions. Migration has featured in Nigeria’s national existence following its independence in 1960. Since then, Nigeria, being the most populous country in Africa with over 180 million population and more than 250 ethnic groups, has battled a number of migration crises, from the monstrous brain drain occasioned by cross-border migration, to intra-regional and intra-national migration.

After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the federal government created additional states aside the existing regions, which encouraged massive internal migration of citizens from one state to another, especially in a bid to make both ends meet. This was as the emergent state capitals turned the hub of commercial activities attracting a great deal of job seekers, traders,
civil servants (Mberu and Pongou 2010). Along this line, Aigbokhan (1988) wrote that the massive rural-urban migration has since been part of Nigeria from the early days of the nation’s independence and got a little higher in the 1970s. He argued that the economic imbalance and the overconcentration of public infrastructures mostly in the urban centers are part of the factors for the rural-urban migration in Nigeria, and that the disparity in wages and salaries is also another crucial instance for the mobility. Thus, chiefly, the unemployment condition in the country has been identified as the cause of migration both within and beyond the country. Professor Osita Agbualso took that line of thought in an interview in *Guardian* (2015, 24 April, para. 3):

I believe the major factor is unemployment. Many secondary school graduates and university graduates who are frustrated due to inability to either get a job or a good paying job, often, believe that it is better out there. Many Nigerian youths believe life is better out there whereas it not that easy.

It is agreeable that life out there is not easy, given the pressure on resources, particularly on agricultural land, threat to food security, housing, urban land use and infrastructural amenities, employment and so on, which their availability and provision are always diminishing.

Migration beyond Nigeria, on the other hand, is also mostly economic, and Mberu and Pongou (2010) identified the economic migrants from Nigeria to different parts of Europe as an important dimension of recent Nigerian emigration, especially as it is mainly secret, involving risky passage through various transit points, such as through Senegal to Spain by way of the Canary Islands. A report in 2008 by Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that there were some 59,000 Nigerians without valid traveling documents in North Africa en route to Western Europe. And that about 8000 were in Morocco, 16,000 in Algeria, 20,000 in Libya and about 15,000 in Mauritania (Mberu and Pongou 2010).

On the whole, key drivers of migration include fat paychecks in the destination country, secure employment or job security, career advancement and/or training, access to the best facilities and technologies and also the pushy sociopolitical and economic circumstances at home. These observable factors of migration above make the destination countries the beautiful brides in the pursuit of the individual dominant needs of the migrants. But these promises for migration, more often than not, are fiascos or out of reach to the migrants in the destination countries or even
cities in Nigeria, and leave the migrants with a very high propensity to resort to criminalities such as cyber-crimes.

In Nigeria, the dimension of the migration is largely rural-urban. This trade of migration was initially seen as good for economic development of a society, but in recent times, it has become the most critical challenge Nigeria is faced with in her economic development policy (Omonigho and Olaniyan 2013). Rural-urban migration has been described as “the phenomenon of a historically unprecedented movement of people from the rural countryside to the burgeoning cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America” (Todaro 1997, cited in Omonigho, and Olaniyan 2013, p. 186). In Nigeria, “while the national population is growing at an annual rate of 2.8 percent, that of the urban population is growing at 5.5 percent. This rate is among the highest in the world today” (Nwakeze 2004, cited in Omonigho, and Olaniyan 2013, p. 186). This ugly trend results in a number of issues the government happens to be dealing with, such as increasing rate of urban congestion, social vices, poor infrastructure (portable drinking water, good road networks, hygienic sewage system, stable power supply etc.), unending youth unemployment and the explosion of shanty and slums centers.

Among these consequences of rural-urban migration, chronic city unemployment is the most malignant as it results into social vices in the society, for instance, cyber-crimes, riots, drug abuse, emotional imbalance, loss of self-worth, depression, sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS and other unwanted outcomes. It is simple—the migrants having moved to the city centers with the hope of securing white-collar employment most times get disappointed because of the non-availability of jobs. Thus, the fact of unemployment is real in Nigeria (Hassan et al. 2012), leaving Nigerian streets littered with youth hawkers who ordinarily would have been gainfully employed in a given business (Okafor 2011). Some of this set of people end up being redundant and, having no meaningful jobs to do, constitute themselves into nuisance in the urban areas, most times engaging in crimes and other social vices. Accordingly, with the relative availability of ICT facilities in urban centres and peer influence, cyber-crime is often the most favored by the migrants in the desperate bid to satisfy their various individual dominant needs.

Cyber-crime is a crime perpetrated through electronic communication network, particularly the Internet. This menace is very rampant among youth, and it has done incalculable damages to the image of the nation. Cyber-crime could be perpetrated through Internet calls, sending of scam
emails containing “get rich quick” proposals to entice unsuspecting victims in a bid to defraud them. In the case of email, sometimes, it comes in the form of marriage proposal, unclaimed fund, donation, lottery, help, bonanza, bank transaction notification/credit alert and so on. Some of the youth send as many as 10,000 of such scam emails every day, while others send more to increase their chances of getting victims who will fall prey to their motive (Onadipe 2015).

The popularity of social media such as Facebook made the website a destination of the cyber-criminals in which they create fake accounts with the pictures of a handsome man, a beautiful woman or celebrities in pursuit of their criminal intentions. There are also platforms for dating where singles push to mingle such as Match and other related websites which are also where the criminals target the unsuspecting users with promises of love and then pretend to be in one need or the other ask the unsuspecting user, “now in love” for assistance, and from that would more requests come. Business to Business transactional platforms such as Alibaba are also targeted by the criminals. They hack into the e-mail accounts of the manufacturers, study the email message exchanges between a manufacturer and a buyer, clone the two email accounts and then start pretending as the manufacturer to the buyer, and as the buyer to the manufacturer. The criminals eventually give the buyer a fraudulent account for payments which the unsuspecting buyer would accept as coming from the real manufacturer. In recent times, these cyber-crimes popularly called “Yahoo-Yahoo” are now done with charms in what they call “Yahoo-plus,” so that even the enlightened still fall prey to cyber-criminality.

The economic motive that laces across the forms of cyber-crimes as outlined above highlights the connection between unemployment and cyber-criminality since perpetrators of the crime having been unable to satisfy their dominant individual needs via the acceptable standard in the society, seek the satisfaction of the needs through the obnoxious means. Suffice it to say here is that it is not only the unemployed who engage in cyber-criminality. But, generally, as argued by Ademola and Olajubutu (2009), a critical causal of social vices in the society is unemployment, and it manifest itself in the form of kidnapping, armed robbery, political mercenaries, destitution and cyber-criminality. Similarly, Anderson (1999) submitted that the failure of a state’s macro-economy, will lead to youth recklessness, given that the majority who are unemployed are the most affected, and if not contained, they will degenerate into social vices and even cyber-crimes in the society. Their actions will be hinged on the fact
that the governmental institutions have failed them and the best way to get back at the state is to seize and engage in nefarious acts in order to survive. Little wonder, in Nigeria, the youth who are educated but unable to secure a decent employment are the ones at the forefront of crimes in the country not to mention cyber-crimes which is becoming more or less a safe haven for them (Obaro 2012). This situation is made worse by the fact that the social-cultural norms in Nigeria despise poverty but magnifies material wealth giving little or no room for hard work. Hence, many Nigerian youths just want to appear successful no matter how they made it.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between unemployment, migration and cyber-criminality is quite observable. This is worsened by the fact that in Nigeria, people are valued in terms of the resources they command economically. Consequently, those without economic success are undervalued and the pressure to achieve success is intensified despite the harsh economic conditions such as unemployment among others. This more often occasions the resolve for survival strategies such as migration (legal and illegal) or cyber-criminality, or both. Although a relatively new form of crime, cyber-criminality damages Nigeria’s economy and international image, and there is the need to reduce it to the barest minimum using strategies as recommended below.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is imperative that Nigeria should brace up to the occasion by adopting the following recommendations

(a) *Establishing formidable legal and regulatory framework for cyberspace:* Laws against cyber-criminality in Nigeria still leaves more to be desired. Kithi (2002) observed that the abuse of Internet is on the rise in Africa, and there is no law or even that the extant laws are too weak to confront it. Ojedokun (2005) highlighted that the institution charged with implementing the laws within the African countries cannot take proactive measures against cyber-criminals because there is no express legislation enacted to criminalize the activities. The lawmakers should properly understand the danger of not passing appropriate legislation to curb cyber-crime or the serious impacts it may have on the country’s economic growth.
and national security capability because of no legislation to protect the cyberspace of their state.

(b) **Strengthening an institutional framework for coordinating cyber-security efforts:** Enforcement agencies against cyber-crime in Nigeria such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) should be strengthened with more power and independence. This is very vital to their being able to lord it over the challenging and fast-evolving world of the Internet.

(c) **Ensuring adequate public enlightenment and value reorientation campaign:** Cyber-crimes are largely avoidable, especially with adequate enlightenment. Nigeria should consistently disseminate massive up-to-date enlightenment messages, through various media, against falling prey to cyber-criminality. Efforts should also be channeled to value reorientation against the high premium that the society places on wealth.

(d) **Promoting cooperation between actors and agencies in cyberspace regulation and enforcement:** It has been observed by T.G. George-Maria Tyendezwa, Head, Computer Crime Prosecution Unit, Federal Ministry of Justice that confrontation (supremacy disagreements) going on between the various intelligent institutions in the state is a serious challenge to cyber-security in Nigeria. It is therefore instructive that security agencies remove ego and see themselves as partners in progress and not watertight compartmentalized groups. The Nigerian government should accordingly show no discrimination or unwarranted preference for a group than the other.

(e) **Embracing international cooperation:** Cyber-crime is a global enemy. It is blight on the gains of the ever-increasing global interconnectivity which is epitomized in the supersonic rate of communication and connectivity mostly on the social media platform (e.g. Facebook & Twitter) and some $8 trillion in online commercial transactions (George-Maria Tyendezwa n.d.). If the common enemy must be defeated, there is an urgent need for forging a common front against it.

(f) **Creating jobs:** Unemployment to a very great extent causes cyber-crimes. There is an urgent need for job creation in order to engage the idle but enlightened minds of youth in Nigeria. This strategy will boost the economy and also reduce cyber-criminality to the barest minimum.
(g) **Strictly enforcing the letters and the spirit of laws relating to cyber-criminality:** This will send the right signal to the cyber-criminals and serve as deterrence against engaging in the crime. Toward this, the judiciary should adjudicate cases bothering on cyber-criminality expeditiously and pronounce deserving sanctions on convicted offenders.

**REFERENCES**


CHAPTER 10

Environmental Insecurity in Nigeria

Ikenna Mike Alumona
and Kingsley Maduka Onwuanabile

INTRODUCTION

All over the world, it is no longer in doubt that a clean and healthy environment is necessary for human existence and national development. A clean environment is essential for healthy living. According to Maller et al. (2006), contact with nature promotes health and mental well-being. Since the environment plays a crucial role in shaping people’s physical, mental and social well-being (European Environment Agency 2010), it is therefore imperative that man should always take actions that will secure his environment in order to ensure his continued existence. The need to ensure a sustainable environment is better appreciated when discussed against the background of the harmful calamity environmental hazards such as climate change, flooding, global warming arising from depletion of the ozone layer, air/water pollution, desertification and deforestation and

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so on have caused and are still causing in different regions of the world. As reported by Harmeling (2010), between 1999 and 2009, not less than 650,000 people died across the globe from severe weather conditions, and over $2.1 trillion losses were recorded globally. In Nigeria, the combined value of damages and losses recorded in the 2012 flood disaster alone was estimated at ₦2.6 trillion or US$16.9 billion (FGN 2013).

The impact of a harmful environment on human life brings to the fore the close and complex connection between the environment and human security. Both are like the two sides of a coin. Without a secured environment, human security remains an illusion. Khagram et al. (2003, p. 1) have aptly captured the nexus between the environment and security; thus, “a great deal of human security is tied to peoples’ access to natural resources and vulnerabilities to environmental change—and a great deal of environmental change is directly and indirectly affected by human activities and conflicts”. Given that environmental threats have come to be accepted as part of the concerns of the unconventional conception of security, and that it is the traditional function of the state to ensure the security of citizens within its territorial boundary, it has become logically clear that the task of ensuring environmental security is the responsibility of the state. The state being an abstract entity has entrusted the task of maintaining security to the government, which is, in the words of Appadorai (1968, p. 12), “the agency or machinery through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realised”.

In Nigeria, the challenge of environmental security was brought to lime-light in 1987. Although there were few laws governing the exploitation and use of environmental resources in Nigeria before this date (as shall be seen later), environmental regulations and institutional mechanisms for their implementation came to the forefront following the country-wide condemnation that greeted the dumping of waste considered to be toxic in Koko Village in Delta State, in 1987 (Fagbohun 2010a). Before this date, the Nigeria state had no institutionalised arrangements or mechanisms for the protection of the environment and enforcement of laws and regulations governing the environment and its resources. It was the events of the Koko toxic waste saga that the Nigerian state came to identify the need to secure its environment as a fundamental issue of concern necessary for national existence and development. For example, in 1988, shortly after the Koko toxic waste saga, the Nigerian government enacted the Harmful Waste Decree 42. It was this decree that laid the foundation for the establishment of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). Furthermore,
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) explicitly states that “the state shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air, land, forest and wildlife” of the country (see section 20 of the constitution). The implication of these is that the protection of the environment of Nigeria should be as sacrosanct as it is sacred, and that the state, through its relevant agencies, should ensure safe and healthy environment, not only for the present, but for posterity. However, evidences abound (as shall be seen later) that environmental threats, arising from negligence from both the Nigerian government and the citizens, have continued to plague the country.

This chapter, therefore, looks at what constitutes environmental (in)security in Nigeria. Following this introduction is conceptual clarification which is followed by brief historical background of environmental regulations in Nigeria. The chapter equally undertakes a study of the nature and character of environmental insecurity in Nigeria by looking at what constitutes environmental insecurity in the country as it pertains to the geo-political zones of Nigeria. The next section of the chapter is an attempt to situate the challenge of environmental insecurity in Nigeria within the framework of Common Good Theory. The chapter also looks at the efforts of the Nigerian government towards environmental protection. Following this section are problems militating against effective environmental protection in Nigeria and then the conclusion.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSECURITY

Conceptualising environmental insecurity appears to be a matter of definitional convenience and subjectivism rather than definitional uniformity. This owes to the fact that ever since the concept gained attention in both regional and international discourses, it has continued to change in form and scope, mainly due to ever-increasing and emerging manifestations of the phenomenon. It is germane to note that it was after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that the term “environmental security” originated (Mathews 1989), and it was used to refer to the possible rise of conflicts over natural resources. Due to its changing nature, it now focuses on how to guarantee the continuous functioning of the ecosystem as the basis for the existence and well-being of humans, as championed by the Sustainable Development Agenda. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (UNDP 1994) also contends that the aim of environ-
mental security is to protect the people from both short- and long-term damaging effects of nature, man-made threats on natural environment and deterioration of the ecology. There are varied opinions on environmental security, but all seem to agree that, in the long run, the concept itself has to do with the question of whether or not people have access to enough food, water and environmental resources to live in. In terms of environmental change, Lonergan (1999) opined that security entails a situation in which people and communities (a) have the necessary options that can enable them end, mollify, abate and adapt to risks to their individual, ecological and social rights; (b) have the freedom and capacity through which these options could be exercised; and (c) take active part in attaining these options. Therefore, environmental securitisation denotes the use of natural resources in a sustainable manner as well as the increased capacity of the people to mitigate or completely avoid (if possible) the damaging consequences of ecological change (Lodgaard 1992).

Conversely, environmental insecurity connotes the absence, or dearth, of environmental security. According to Swart (1996) and Brashares et al. (2014), the phenomenon is generally regarded as both a source and consequence of declines in biodiversity and social conflict. On the larger level, occurrences such as inability of individuals to have access to clean water resources, coupled with air pollution, climatic change and constant degradation of the ecosystem constitute some of the key environmental threats which affect both developed and developing countries of the world. Nonetheless, the worst hit remain the developing countries among which Nigeria is part of. At every stratum of the society, be it individual, household or community (including the traditionally defined and often described ones such as women, religious or ethnic groups), nations, states, regions and global, there are manifestations of environmental in security. The phenomenon is so criss-crossed that when it manifests in one country, according to Florini and Simmons (1998), it could constitute a serious threat not only to the individuals and citizens of other countries but to the right of self-defence and national sovereignty of those other countries. Therefore, the root of environmental security at the higher levels lies in security at the lower levels.

To react to the state of environmental insecurity in Nigeria, therefore, the following explanations suffice. Evidences abound that natural and human-induced disasters such as erosion, floods, drought, industrial wastes and so on are currently threatening Nigeria’s environment. This opinion is supported by the Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team
(NEST), which reported that not only will the problems of coastal erosion that are already a menace in Nigeria generally and more specifically (although not limited to) the Niger Delta and other parts of the region, including Anambra and Lagos States, worsen as a result of rise in sea level and constant surge of the ocean, but the associated inundation will increase problems of floods, intrusion of sea water into fresh water sources and ecosystem, leading to destruction of such stabilising systems as mangrove and affecting agriculture, fisheries and general livestock (NEST 2004).

Population increase is another factor of the state of environmental insecurity in Nigeria as the geometric increase of the population is exerting pressure on the environment itself. This can be seen in the areas where in trying to secure a safe ground far away from areas affected by overpopulation, the emigrating populace adds up to the teeming population who are likely contending with the limited resources in their abode to survive. Furthermore, uncontrolled deforestation, arising from unsustainable uses of forest resources for human use and survival (e.g. felling of trees for fuel and energy, wood, housing, etc.), which is a major contributing factor to land degradation, evenly amplifies as one of the factors of environmental insecurity in Nigeria.

Also, some parts of the country have been left bare and unproductive as a result of unsanctioned and inappropriate mining activities in the affected areas. According to FGN (2012) cited in Amadi (2013), while there are also concerns about water and air pollution, continued urban and industrial development in the country has led to concern about liquid and solid wastes in the country. The combination of these constitutes serious threats to environmental security in Nigeria.

**Brief Historical Background of Environmental Regulations in Nigeria**

The years following independence were characterised mainly by socio-economic and political problems, as those who found themselves at the corridors of power grappled with the problem of integration. Many years after, the policy thrust of the successive regimes in Nigeria remained the provision of basic social amenities and keeping the entities that make up the Nigerian state as one. Environmental insecurity was either not envisaged or not the priority of the government. Even when issues on environment were discussed, they were discussed only within the context of economic benefits the environment could attract to Nigeria. As Nwosu (n.d.) sums it, protection of the environment was therefore seen as the
same with natural resource conservation, while concerns for industrial pollution control and management of hazardous waste were treated as ambiguous and as an attempt to slow down the stride of industrial development. No legislations were put in place to check industrial pollution and hazardous wastes. It was believed that industrialisation was a key indicator of development; hence, anything that would hinder the pace of development was treated as anathema. Tax and other concessions were given by both the federal and state governments to lure investors and encourage industrialists to establish industries in their domain. Unfortunately, the citizens, being uninformed and ignorant of the consequences, welcomed the idea and therefore lived happily with the resultant pollution and wastes considered hazardous to both human health and environment.

While it is almost a general opinion in literature (Ogbodo 2009; Nabegu et al. 2017) that there was dearth of institutional mechanism for environmental security in Nigeria before 1987, the Nigerian government did promulgate domestic laws and signed and domesticated some international conventions and laws to that effect before and after the KOKO saga. Some of them are shown in Table 10.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Year of enactment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Act</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiquities Act</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Waters Decree</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil in Navigable Waters Decree</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Decree</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarries Decree</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Fisheries Decree</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Use Decree</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endangered Species (Control of International Trade and Traffic) Act</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmful Wastes (Special Criminal Provisions, etc) Act</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Environmental Protection (Management of Solid and Hazardous Waste) Regulations</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines and Standards for Environmental Pollution Control in Nigeria</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment Decree</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources Act 101</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals and Mining Act</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Nigeria was a participant at both the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972 and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). The country also boasts of being a signatory to quite a number of environmental-related international multilateral conventions such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; United Nations Framework on Climate Change (Climate Change Convention) in 1992; Convention on Biodiversity in 1992, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), among others (Ogunba 2016).

Despite the efforts of government, environmental security has remained problematic. There is hardly any part of the country that is not ravaged by one environmental disaster or the other. Currently, about 15 states of the federation are facing desert encroachment, whereas one-fifth of Nigeria’s landmass is currently “desertified” (Olagunju 2015). Gully erosion is also threatening many households and businesses in many states of the federation. For example, over 20% of the land of Anambra State are presently ravaged or threatened by sensitive or risky sites which are at various levels of development and stages of maturity. Apart from Anambra, in states such as Abia, Enugu, Edo, Osun, Ekiti and so on, farmlands, business premises, residential houses and roads are constantly being washed away by frightening gullies. This precarious situation creates worthwhile anxiety amongst the people. Flood disaster has also become an annual tragedy in the country. In 2012 alone, 363 people were killed, 5851 injured, while 3,891,314 were affected by floods (NEMA 2013). At another level, oil spillage destroys farmlands, pollutes drinkable water and causes drawbacks in fishing of coastal waters, even as it exposes the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region to numerous health hazards. While the problem of oil spillage has been given great attention in extant literature, there seems to be no hope that the Niger Delta region will ever regain clean and safe environment as the region continues to record incidences of oil spillage every year. For example, about 40,000 barrels of crude oil were spilled into Nigerian waters by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC’s) Bonga offshore platform in December 2011. Shortly after that, an oilfield owned by Chevron Nigeria Limited witnessed a gas explosion with high fatality on January 16, 2012 (Nwosu n.d.).

The challenges of environmental insecurity in Nigeria will, therefore, be better appreciated if we take a retrospective view of the phenomenon in relation to its peculiarity to different geo-political zones of the country.
The Nature and Character of Environmental Insecurity in Nigeria

The nature and character of environmental insecurity in Nigeria has different dimensions across the different geo-political zones in the country. Basically environmental challenges, which constitute threat to security in Nigeria, include climatic change and ozone depletion; lack of adequate rainfall resulting in drought and desert encroachment experienced mainly in the northern part of the country, acute and severe gully erosion in (but not limited to) the eastern and northern states; excessive and seasonal flooding in low-lying belt of mangrove and fresh swamps along the coastal region; oil pollution from gas flaring and oil spillage in the Niger Delta area; biodiversity loss arising from uncontrolled and illicit logging; hazardous wastes in mainly city and municipal areas; industrial pollution; inappropriate and unsustainable agricultural practices across the country; bad roadworks and mining practices which more often than not create burrow pits; urban decay and squatter settlements and so on.

These issues vary from one area to another. Though there are states and zones which are challenged by two or more of these environmental disasters, the severity and peculiarity of each will determine under what geo-political zone it will be discussed.

South-East

There are five states that make up the South-East geo-political zone in Nigeria. They are Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo.

Gully Erosion

One of the greatest environmental challenges facing southeastern states is gully erosion. The zone is the worst affected area in the country. Within the zone, Anambra State has suffered the menace more than any other as many houses, roads and farmlands have been washed away by gully erosion in the past. In fact, it was as far back as 1993 that Egboka raised an alarm that over 20% of the total landmass of Anambra State is being devastated at one stage or another by gully erosion. As a matter of clarity, the state has been identified as the worst hit, with over 1000 active erosion sites. Places like Nanka, Agulu, Nnewi, Ekwulumili, Obosi, Oraukwu,
Ekwulobia, Azia, Okija and so on are being swallowed by landslides. In Abia State, gully erosion has devastated places like Arochukwu, Isuikwuato, Amucha, Ohafia and so on. As indicated in Table 10.2, all the five states in the zone have and continue to suffer the menace of gully erosion with Anambra State ranking as the most susceptible.

The menace of gully erosion is not limited to the South-East alone, as other states of the country are equally being ravaged by the menace. For example, Edo State ranks among the top states in the country where gully erosion has wreaked havoc. From Ikpoba in Benin City, down to Auchi in Etsako West local government area, many residential houses have been washed away, farmlands rendered useless, roads destroyed and communities cut away from others. Kano State equally has its own gully erosion problem and so do other states. In the South-West, Ondo and Ekiti States are experiencing various degrees of gully erosion problem.

The security implications of gully erosion in Nigeria are enormous. Apart from loss of residential houses, which ultimately displaces the owners and residents of those houses, it also results in loss of agricultural land; commercial buildings; and destruction of social amenities such as roads, electric poles, pipe-borne water; cutting off communities from other communities and so on. On a daily basis, especially during the rainy season, families are rendered homeless and landlords rendered tenants due to the devastating effects of worrisome gullies. Motorists and road users are sometimes made to seek alternative (where available) and sometimes deplorable and farther routes to get to their destinations as the menace continues to ravage Nigerian roads. In all, gully erosion constitutes a threat to life and security, as it engenders poverty by depriving the people their sources of livelihood.

Table 10.2    Severity of gully erosion problem in southeast Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>No. of Gully Sites</th>
<th>State Description</th>
<th>Control Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Mostly active</td>
<td>Not successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Some active/some dormant</td>
<td>Not successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Mostly minor gully sites</td>
<td>No records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Some active/some dormant</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Some active/some dormant</td>
<td>Not successful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**South-South**

The South-South geo-political zone consists of the six major oil-producing states in Nigeria. These include Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. They are, as a matter of fact, referred to as the “core Niger Delta States”. The states in this zone are surrounded by waters, which is the major reason they are referred to as the riverine area. Hitherto to the discovery of oil in the region, the people were majorly known for agriculture. However, ever since the discovery of oil in the area, the environment has continued to suffer grave degradation arising from oil exploration activities going on in the area.

**Oil Spillage, Water Pollution and Flooding**

The Niger Delta is famous and notorious for its large oil deposits in Nigeria and that accounts for the region being identified by Annon (2006) as one of the most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems in the world. The UNDP (2006a) estimated that about 6800 spills which amounted to 3,000,000 barrels of oil occurred between 1976 and 2001. It is important to state that the said value is only but a representative of that reported to the Department of Petroleum Resource (DPR) by the oil companies; thus, it may not even reflect the magnitude of the problem. As a matter of fact, it has been proven by studies that over the past 50 years, not less than 9–13 million barrels of oil were spilled (FME et al. 2006). Kadafa (2012) observes that owing to oil prospecting and exploration, the Niger Delta area is now characterised by loss of biodiversity, forest destruction as well as streams and rivers that are contaminated. The livelihood of the host communities who depend heavily on the environment is therefore affected. The consequences of this have been enormous—environmental degradation, economic impoverishment, protests and litigations, military repression, militancy and an unending circle of instability. In other words, the neglect of the environment has resulted in serious environmental insecurity in the region as land clearing, dredging, oil spillage and gas flaring have considerably altered not only the nature of the landscape in the region but also the totality of the environment. Hence, the lives of the people continue to be endangered and their livelihoods short-changed.

In terms of environmental changes due to oil activities, UNDP (2006a) and Kadafa (2012) contend that large areas of mangrove forest from which the indigenous people generate wood have been destroyed. The ripple
effect, according to Ukoli (2005), is that farmers, fishermen, hunters and so on suffer varying degree of losses.

The results of this reckless exploration include poverty, diseases of many kinds, social and internal displacement, destruction of the infrastructural base of the people, partial and complete loss of human dignity, incessant political instability and unwarranted loss of human lives. By 2007, the situation in the Niger Delta had degenerated into full circle of instability as a number of armed youth groups emerged, fighting for survival and control of oil resources in their localities. These occurred in the form of kidnapping, oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to separate the twin monsters of environmental degradation and the spate of insecurity in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. The effect of which has been a general sense of insecurity in the entire country. As encapsulated by International Crisis Group (2007, p. 7):

The persistence of insecurity and deepening violence in the region over the years continues to have impacts on Nigeria’s economy and society, with the effects including the loss of oil revenues, exodus of foreign workers, alienation of capital investment, decline of businesses from oil service to the hospitality industry and the spread of hostage-taking to other parts of the country.

Apart from environmental degradation resulting from oil exploration activities, the South-South suffers from severe and devastating floods, which occur almost every year. Flood according to Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary is an overflowing or eruption of great body of water over land not usually submerged. It can as well be defined as a severe weather event caused naturally by rising global temperature, resulting in heavy excessive downpour, glacier melt and thermal expansion of the ocean, which, in turn, precipitates sea level rise, ultimately leading to the inundation of the coastal lands. Across Nigeria, flood has and continues to pose tremendous danger to lives and property. Although this environmental disaster is not peculiar to any particular state or zone in the country, states in the South-South suffer from it more than many other states, and, therefore, our analysis on how flood constitutes environmental insecurity shall be discussed here.

Like we highlighted earlier, the zone is surrounded by waters, and, therefore, at the peak of every rainy season, the environment is always in danger of being submerged. According to Okonofua (2011, p. 43), “the
Niger Delta is the territory that lies between the estuaries of the Benin River to the West and the Cross River to the East of the River Niger. It covers a distance of about 270 miles along the Atlantic Coast and stretches for about 120 miles inland”. Nseabasi (2005) and Saliu et al. (2007) averred that across the globe, only Mississippi could be said to be a larger wetland while in Africa, the region remains the largest wetland. Okonta and Douglas (2003) observe that “it is criss-crossed by an intricate watery maze of marshlands, labyrinthine creeks, tributaries, and lagoons, which link together the main rivers: Forcados, Nun, Benin, Brass, Bonny (all estuaries of the River Niger), Akwa-Ibom, Cross River and other separate streams”.

The impact of flooding in Nigeria is enormous, not just only in terms of physical damage it creates but also in terms of psychological trauma it creates in the minds of the affected people. The great flood of 2012 is a vivid example where most Nigerian states were submerged for months. As a matter of fact, while floods affect the country every year, the damage caused by the 2012 floods alone was unprecedented.

Heavy rains between July and October 2012 combined with rising water levels resulting from the runoff contributed to the flooding of human settlements located downstream of the Kainji, Shiroro, and Jebba dams on the Niger River; the Lagdo dam in Cameroun on the Benue River; the Kiri dam on the Gongola River; and several other irrigation dams. In some cases, the dams were damaged; in others, water had to be released at full force to avert an overflow. According to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), 363 people were killed, 5851 injured, 3,891,314 affected, and 3,871,53 (sic) displaced due to the resulting floods. (FGN 2013, p. xix)

The security implication of this annual disaster is that apart from lives that are usually lost, properties worth billions of naira are usually washed away while farmlands are not spared. Houses are destroyed; people internally and externally displaced; schools submerged; livestock killed; roads, markets and businesses closed; and medical facilities and other social amenities affected. Giving the account of the 2012 flooding alone, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported that

heavy rains between July and October 2012 in the country led to an overflow of river discharge, aggravated by a breach of irrigation reservoirs and causing the destruction of roads, bridges and other infrastructure, ruining property, killing livestock, and leading to the temporary displacement of
people whose homes were inundated. There was also a significant and sustained interruption of production activities. The disaster, which started as seasonal flooding in different parts of the country at the onset of the rainy season in April, suddenly became intensive in late August and mid-September. Unprecedented flooding was recorded in Adamawa, Anambra, and Taraba States. The North Central states of Nigeria were particularly hard hit, especially Kogi and Benue. Other states that were submerged by flood waters include Bayelsa, Edo and Delta, among others. (FGN 2013, p. 1)

Table 10.3 shows some states and the population affected by the flood disaster of 2012.

Generally, both artificial and natural factors are responsible for flooding in Nigeria. Naturally, flooding occurs when Nigeria experiences heavy and torrential rainfall. Artificial factors leading to flooding in the country include poor or blocked drainage system, poor urban planning, dam burst levee failures, dam spills and so on. Basically, poor urban planning and blockage of drainage systems lead to urban flooding in Nigeria, which occurs mainly

Table 10.3 Local governments and populations mostly affected by the 2012 deluge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Total Population Est (2012)</th>
<th>Number of LGAs Per State</th>
<th>Total Population in Affected LGAs</th>
<th>Number of LGAs Affected</th>
<th>Total Affected Population in LGAs</th>
<th>Number of Affected Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>3,764,021</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,470,990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>189,706</td>
<td>27,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>4,932,272</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,177,199</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>89,909</td>
<td>12,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>2,023,760</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,770,790</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>387,360</td>
<td>55,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>5,040,516</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,497,707</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62,303</td>
<td>8900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>4,950,041</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,359,262</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>483,517</td>
<td>69,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>3,74,746</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>838,832</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20,505</td>
<td>2929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>4,752,575</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>388,343</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1587</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td>5,166,630</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,564,528</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>491,843</td>
<td>70,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>3,890,292</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,654,871</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>362,355</td>
<td>51,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>3,916,641</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,641,503</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>199,511</td>
<td>28,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>2,832,619</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>521,215</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12,468</td>
<td>1781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4,832,087</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,452,419</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>248,934</td>
<td>35,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>3,728,276</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,304,916</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>123,316</td>
<td>17,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>2,733,504</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,025,064</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>96,100</td>
<td>13,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56,337,979</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>22,667,640</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2,769,415</td>
<td>395,631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FGN (2013, p. 53)
in towns located on flat or low-lying terrain. This is worsened when adequate provisions are not made for surface drainage, or, in most cases, where refuse, municipal wastes and eroded soil sediments have blocked the existing drainages. Widespread flooding in urban areas has become an annual phenomenon during every rainy season in cities such as Port Harcourt, Benin, Lagos, Calabar, Ibadan, Aba, Warri, Maidugiri and so on.

**North-East**

The North-East comprises six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. One of the major sources of livelihood to the people of this region is the Lake Chad which borders Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Interestingly, the people of these four countries surrounding the lake source their livelihoods from the rich water resources of the lake, with over 20 million people estimated to be occupying the catchment area. Of this 20 million people, 11.7 million are Nigerians, specifically from the North-East geo-political zone (Science in Africa 2003 cited in Onuoha 2008). Unfortunately, the lake has continued to diminish in size and resources in the past few years, the effect of which is felt mostly by the Lake Chad Basin population who are dependent on the lake for living. According to Onuoha (2008), over 150,000 people source their livelihood in the lake as fishermen, but, with environmental changes increasingly impacting negatively on the lake, there has been a continuous reduction on the quantity and quality of fish available for the fishermen. The Lake Chad Basin also provides employment to nomadic herders who are involved in cattle, sheep, goats and camel rearing. Harsh climatic conditions in the region make the Lake Chad Basin the point of convergence for pastoralists as it provides water and green pastures for animal grazing. Pastoralists often move their livestock closer to the lake during dry season for water and pastures and a little away from the lake during rainy season to avoid mosquitoes. However, after the great droughts of the 1970s, the lake could barely sustain the animals as herders struggled for grazing field within the lake. In other words, not only did the continuous shrinking of the lake lead to drastic reduction of land for cultivation, with serious implication for food security, it also led to reduction in the size of land available for animal grazing. This development, according to Fagbohun (2010b), has intensified the conflict between farmers, herders and fishermen, while also leading to the emergence and exacerbation of environmental refugees. On the other hand, in recent times, we have witnessed situations whereby the lake
overflowed its bank as a result of excessive rainfall, causing excessive flooding which destroyed lives and properties, including agricultural farmlands. Furthermore, the depletion of the lake has drastically reduced the quality and volume of freshwater available for irrigation and drinking. As result, there has been a growing concern for water security, and economic livelihoods have equally been appreciably disrupted to a point that local populations from the North-East who rely on the lake for livelihood and survival have followed its receding waters, a trend which poses serious food security challenges for Nigeria. This has, therefore, resulted in sporadic incidence of resource conflicts between and amongst the herders and farmers or as The Guardian Newspaper (2000, p. 20) puts it, “between downstream and upstream users within the basin”.

**North-West**

The North-West comprises of seven states: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara. One of the greatest environmental threats facing this geo-political zone is desert encroachment, resulting from drought.

**Desertification**

Like other states of the federation, these states have suffered from severe environmental degradation, chief among which is desertification. Dregne (1986) viewed desertification as a process of land degradation that involves a continuous change from slight to very severe and extreme degradation of plant and other soil resources, usually arising from human activities. Clarifying the concept, he further explained that it connotes improvement of the terrestrial ecosystems under human impact, the process of deterioration in these ecosystems that can be ascertained by reduction in productivity of desirable plants, alteration in the biomass in an undesirable manner, the diversity of the macro- and micro-fauna and flora, enhanced deterioration of the soil and increased hazard for human occupancy. In his own view, Barrow (1999) equated desertification to a process whereby the ecosystem no longer retains the capacity to maintain and repair itself. It denotes a process whereby the productive capacity of arid or semi-arid land falls by ten percent (10%) or more. On this basis, Miller (1999) categorised desertification into three based on soil productivity: mild, serious and severe. It is said to be mild when there is a drop of about 10–25% in productivity. On the other hand, desertification is considered serious when there is a 25–50% drop in productivity, while any drop above 50% is seen
as severe (Miller 1999; Emodi 2013). Desertification can therefore be seen to mean an advanced stage of land degradation in which the soil has the capacity and capability to support human communities and ecosystem.

As an environmental hazard, desertification or desert encroachment is most glaring in about 11 northern states of the federation, where its impact has become more severe since the famine of 1971–1973 (Mohammed 2015). As a matter of fact, Tercula (2015) argues that the country loses about 350,000 hectares of land to desert encroachment every year. According to the desertification map of the world produced by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNESCO, about 15% of Nigerian land is likely to be affected by desertification (Emodi 2013). Visibly, desertification begins with gradual shift in vegetation from grasses, bushes and occasional trees, to dry grass and bushes and eventually to expansive areas of desert-like sand. Though all the 19 states in the northern part of the country had at one time or the other experienced desert encroachment, the degree of its impact varies. Table 10.4 shows the states being ravaged by the menace.

Table 10.4  Degree of desertification in some selected states of the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Geographical region</th>
<th>Land area (km²)</th>
<th>% of Nigeria</th>
<th>Population (2006) Number</th>
<th>Density (/km²)</th>
<th>Rate of desertification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>27,825</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3,702,676</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>37,931</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>3,278,873</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>23,561</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>5,801,584</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>23,287</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>4,361,002</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>20,280</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>9,401,286</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>36,985</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>3,256,541</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>42,481</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>6,113,503</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>72,609</td>
<td>7.98</td>
<td>4,171,104</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>46,609</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>2,321,339</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>41,119</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4,653,066</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>17,100</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2,365,040</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>38,700</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3,178,950</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>56,282</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>2,294,800</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>68,925</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>3,954,772</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>27,147</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>3,206,531</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>580,841</td>
<td>63.83</td>
<td>62,061,067</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effect of Desertification: Nobody can overemphasise both the social and economic consequences of desertification in Nigeria. The encroachment of desert on lands drastically reduces the available land for agriculture and other economic purposes. The reduction in agricultural lands invariably affects food productivity and availability, not just in the affected states but the entire country. Northern Nigeria remains the agricultural hub of the nation; therefore, anything that impacts negatively on food production in the region affects the entire country. The extreme weather condition which brings about drought puts both the affected states and the entire country under serious threat of hunger. Inadequate and erratic rainfall has constrained farmers in the region; a large expanse of land for agriculture has equally been covered by dunes. Livestock and crop production in these areas have increasingly degenerated to low ebb and therefore can no longer meet the food requirements of the local communities in particular, and Nigeria in general. As Olagunju (2015, p. 204) summarised it:

Factors that affect soil quality affect agricultural productivity also and indirectly on food supply. Loss of soil structure and cohesion, soil crusting, soil compaction and soil erosion especially in arable lands has been enumerated as consequences of desertification which also reduce agricultural output.

Furthermore, desert encroachment is the harbinger of the herders-farmers conflict in many states such as Benue, Niger, Kwara, Enugu and so on. As a result of loss of grasses and freshwater in the desert-ravaged areas, herdsmen are forced to migrate to the southern or Middle Belt areas where they could find green pastures and freshwater for their livestock. The people of the South and Middle Belt are basically subsistent farmers with limited land mass. Consequently, there usually ensues competition between the pastoralists and the subsistent farmers over the usage of the available land; a competition which had more often than not resulted in conflict (resource-use conflict), loss of lives, destruction of farmlands and properties worth millions of naira.

According to the founder of Fight against Desert Encroachment (FADE)—one of the numerous non-governmental organisations determined to support government efforts in addressing challenges of desertification, Dr. Newton Jibunoh, the current desert encroachment in the northern part of Nigeria has serious implications for security in the country. He averred that
this has become a source of threat to food production while it is equally believed that the hostile impact of climate change in Northern Nigeria poses serious threat to national security and poverty alleviation strategies in the country as those mostly affected are the most vulnerable ones in the society that dwell in the villages ravaged by this scourge. *(Leadership Newspaper 2017)*

**NORTH-CENTRAL**

The North-Central comprises six states which include Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, and the FCT, Abuja. This zone harbours most of the smaller ethnic groups in the country, and like most geographical zones in Nigeria, the North-Central is replete with tales of environmental challenges which include flooding, overgrazing, deforestation, erosion and so on. For example, a study on Zumba community in Niger State reveals manifestations of environmental degradation such as drought, deforestation, erosion, flood, overgrazed land, heat wave and windstorm which were either non-existent or hardly noticeable some 40 years ago. In the 1970s, it was observed that climatic temperature was not as high as it is now (it was quite low), and there was more frequent and stable rainfall. Fertility of the land was quite good, with dense vegetation characterised by different plant species and abundant wildlife. Domestic animals such as cattle, sheep, goat, camel and so on grazed and roamed freely in a large grazing land. However, two decades later, extreme weather conditions such as floods, heat wave, deforestation and windstorms became a major source of concern, and currently, there has been an obvious intensification in droughts and erosion. Over the years, the environment started witnessing water scarcity and biodiversity loss as a result of gradual drying up of available surface water and vegetation, respectively. Furthermore, the intensity of windstorms increased as the effects of vegetation cover was reduced. While we acknowledge that contributory factors are varied, illicit mining activities in the zone remain worrisome with attendant environmental security implications as discussed later.

**Illicit Mining**

Mining has to do with all the processes involved in extracting mineral deposits from the surface and/or beneath the surface of the earth *(Ako et al. 2014)*. It means that the availability and economic viability (or otherwise) of mineral resources determine if mining will take place or not.
Although natural resources (metallic, non-metallic minerals and fossil fuels) are important in the development of any country, illicit and uncontrolled extraction and exploration of such resources could be disastrous and catastrophic to the host environment and people. In most African states, including Nigeria, mining is usually done in a small-scale level, usually by people who work with local tools and equipment. And that, in our opinion, makes the sector an informal sector in Nigeria because most of the activities in the sector are outside the legal and regulatory framework of the government. As a result, therefore, the activities of the sector, more often than not, impact negatively on the environment.

In Nigeria, the North-Central is rich in mineral resources such as gold, tin and lead. The mining of these minerals contributes significantly to environmental degradation in the area in different ways such as de-vegetation, loss of aquatic animals, water and air pollution and so on. Secondly, the use of illicit mining methods in the extraction of these minerals poses environmental health challenges to the people. For example, during mining, miners and their families and people within the surrounding communities are exposed to health risks and challenges due to toxic materials that are released into the environment (Azubike 2011). Illicit gold mining in Niger and Plateau States, for example, constitutes environmental insecurity in many ways—the natural landscape of the area is destroyed as a result of erosion, while rock wastes and tailings generated during mining are left in heaps as they cannot be easily disposed of. Also, large pits are created as a result of the mining activity. These pits can be death traps to both man and animals. Reptiles considered harmful to man such as snakes most times turn these pits into their habitat. A study by Ogezi (2005) revealed that within the city of Jos in Plateau State where tin and columbite are mined, there are over 1000 abandoned mine ponds which constitute death traps to humans and animals. Similarly, Salati et al. (2011) noted that artisanal mining of Azara barytes deposits in Nasarawa State has devastated over 1000 hectares of land suitable for agriculture, while flooding of abandoned pits constitutes death traps to both humans and animals.

Illicit mining in North-Central Nigeria equally leads to soil erosion and sedimentation. The major cause of erosion and sedimentation is the removal of vegetation during mining process. Erosion from overburden and tailing piles usually contribute loading of sediment into a nearby stream, which in turn modifies the morphology of the stream through disruption of a channel, diversion of stream flow and change of the slope or bank stability of the stream. As a result of decrease in the depth of
streams resulting from high sediment concentration, during times of high streamflow, flooding becomes inevitable. Equally, the quality of water in the streams and rivers are severely degraded by mine wastes and rock dumps. A study by Ako et al. (2014) revealed that mining activities in Luku, Minna, Niger State have rendered streams and rivers in the community unfit for human consumption. The contamination of water, therefore, poses environmental risk and insecurity to both humans and animals.

Illicit mining operations are equally dangerous, not only because of water pollution associated with them, but because of other health hazards they portend, as the miners often use mercury amalgamation process to extract these resources such as gold from ores (CDC 2010). The continuous rise in demand for gold, coupled with the unattractive nature of other means of livelihoods like farming in rural areas, has continued to increase the quest for artisan gold mining regardless of its dangerous nature. To underscore the danger inherent in illicit mining, a study by Medecins San Frontieres (MSF) conducted in Zamfara State of North-West Nigeria in March 2010 revealed that there was an epidemic of lead poisoning in the state, especially in Anka and Bukkuyum local government area (MSF 2010). According to Azubike (2011), the source of the outbreak was associated with the processes of gold mining in the affected area, but its spread was aided by food, drinking water, inhalation of contaminated dust, oral ingestion of particles especially by children, breastfeeding and so on. Further inquiry on the epidemic estimated that not less than 10,000 people were affected overall (MSF 2010), while the World Health Organization (WHO), Centre for Disease Control (CDC) and the Zamfara State Ministry of Health (ZMoH) confirmed that due to extremely high concentration of lead and mercury in the environment, hundreds of children under five years of age were at a high risk of death or serious acute and chronic effects (WHO 2011). These underscore the security implications of mining and other human-induced environmental degradation in the country.

EXPLAINING ENVIRONMENTAL INSECURITY IN NIGERIA
(THE ROLE OF THEORY)

The theoretical framework adopted in this chapter is the Common Good Theory. Throughout the history of Western political thought, the concept of common good has played a prominent role in the understanding of a political phenomenon. Its origin could be traced to the writings of Aristotle (384–322 BC), Plato (427–347 BC), Cicero (106–43 BC) and Thomas
Aquinas (1225–1274). Aristotle, in particular, emphasised that the city-state could be likened to a particular type of community, as a result, therefore, the city-state is established for the sake of some good (Aristotle 1998). He defined it as that at which all things aim. Cicero conceived it to mean *salus populi* which when translated in its literal form means “safety of the people” or “well-being”. In a more recent study, John Rawls conceived the common good as a certain general condition that is to the benefit of all in equal measure. The Catholic Social Teaching defined the common good as the “totality of those conditions of life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfilment” (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004). Other scholars who have contributed to the development of the theory include Argandoña (1998, 2001), Mahon and McGowan (1991), Naughton et al. (1995) and Hardin (1968). Common good includes physical spaces like parks, streets and public buildings. Some common good are technology based and virtual. Yet, others such as the air, the oceans and seas, the ecosystem and so on are part of the natural environment. According to Galston (2013), despite the differences that exist among them, they share a common attribute which is on the effect they have on everyone when used. In other words, the behavioural pattern of people in these places affects the ability of everyone to enjoy them over time.

In his Tragedy of the Common, Hardin (1968) made a useful contribution to the development and expansion of the tenets of the common good theory, especially in relation to the environment. He narrates a story of herdsmen who use a common grazing area. Each of them (herders) finds it economically rational to increase the size of his own herd so as to sell more in the market. Nevertheless, if all the herders are given the opportunity to do what they individually feel is rational, the entire group loses because the quality of the pastures will deteriorate as a result of overgrazing. This will lead to a decreased output for all the herdsmen because as each individual rationally attempts to maximise his own gain, the collectivity suffers and, invariably, all herdsmen suffer (Hardin 1968, in Mingst 2003, p. 225). The picture of the common grazing area which Hardin paints is a common or collective good. Regardless of what contribution each individual makes, the grazing area is available to every member of the group. The use of collective good involves activities and choices that are interdependent. Decision by one individual or group has effects for other individuals or groups, directly or indirectly.
Contemporarily, the common good theory has been adopted in discussions on the environment. The ecosystem or environment is a common good owned by nobody in particular; hence, available to all for use. However, over the years, this right and freedom bestowed on individuals and groups by nature has led to unnecessary quest by these individuals and groups to use maximally the resources of the environment, without recourse to the dangers and implications it portends, not only for others, but the environment itself. As the competition increases, the environment begins to deteriorate, and everyone begins to suffer the eventual consequence(s). To avert this, the society, individuals and groups enact laws to put limitations and checkmate indiscriminate use and abuse of the environment.

Indeed, the Nigerian environment is a good example of common good, owned by nobody in particular but accessible to all. Industrialisation and urbanisation led to “scramble” for land and the resources therein. People began to build indiscriminately; industries and factories began to emerge as investors competed with each other. Eventually, the country began to witness environmental pollution as a result of overpopulation, indiscriminate dumping of refuse and industrial waste, poor drainage system, carbon emission and so on. As a result, also, many areas began to witness flood disaster during rainy season, owing to poor urban planning, indiscriminate erection of residential houses, blockage of canals and drainage systems and so on. The challenge of global warming began to affect the country, not only as a result of misuse of the environment by Nigerians, but from the insensitivity of the entire world. However, Nigeria, with other developing countries, has continued to suffer the effect more, as drought and desert encroachment began to threaten the northern parts of the country, while at the peak of rainy seasons, many states of the country, especially the hinterland areas suffer flood disasters. Also, the availability of natural resources led to oil spillage and other related environmental security threats in the Niger Delta. Lack of environmental governance and absence of laws and institutions for the prevention and management of environmental risks and challenges exposed every part of the country to one form of environmental degradation or the other.

To address this, therefore, the Nigerian government began to promulgate laws and establish institutions that would safeguard this common good (Nigerian environment) from indiscriminate use. However, these institutions have been bedevilled by numerous problems, ranging from poor funding, administrative bottleneck, poor attitudes of Nigerians in relation to environmental laws and so on.
The Nigerian Government and Environmental Protection

Since 1988, the Nigerian government has shown serious commitment to issues that jeopardise her environment, and to promote environmental security in the context of national sustainable development, efforts have been put in place at all levels of governance. The Nigerian government recognises that sustainable development cannot be achieved without effective environmental governance. However, this commitment is apparently on policy formulation rather than implementation, as the country continues to be ravaged by a plethora of environmental security threats, as policy formulations rarely translate into policy implementation. For example, there was a revision of the 1989 National Environmental Policy in 1999. The broad goal of the revised policy was to achieve sustainable development in Nigeria, while specifically, it aimed at:

- Securing a quality environment adequate for the health and well-being of all Nigerians.
- Conserving and using the environment and natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations.
- Restoring, maintaining and enhancing ecosystems and ecological processes essential for the functioning of the biosphere and for the preservation of biological diversity and adopting the principle of optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural resources and ecosystems.
- Raising public awareness and promoting understanding of essential linkages between environment and development and encouraging individual and community participation in environmental improvement efforts.
- Co-operating in good faith with other countries, international organisations and agencies to achieve optimal use of transboundary natural resources and effective prevention or abatement of transboundary environmental pollution.

Additionally, specific policies and action plans have been put in place. They are as follows:

- National Policy on Drought and Desertification;
- Drought Preparedness Plan;
• National Policy on Erosion, Flood Control and Coastal Zone Management;
• National Environmental Sanitation Policy;
• National Environmental Sanitation Action Plan;
• National Policy Guidelines on (a) Solid Waste Management, (b) Market and Abattoir Sanitation, (c) Excreta and Sewage Management, (d) Sanitary Inspection Premises and (e) Pests and Vector Control;
• National Forest Policy;
• National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan;
• National Healthcare Waste Management Policy/Action Plan and Guidelines; and

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN NIGERIA

The importance of institutions in the achievement of the overall goal of every establishment cannot be overemphasised. More important, however, is the interdependent nature of these institutions in achieving a set of goal. To this end, the Nigerian government recognises that such goals such as sustainable development cannot be achieved if the institutions work in isolation more than they work in a coordinated manner. It, therefore, requires that all stakeholders get actively involved in both cross-sectoral and multilevel coordination. Against this backdrop, Nigeria has established a number of institutions and mechanisms that play different roles and responsibilities for environmental protection at different levels of government. For national sustainable development, the country is also working towards bringing about more coordinated and integrated policy development as well as engaging stakeholders in decision-making and action plans.

In addition, specialised agencies such as the National Park Service, National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria (FRIN) and National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) have all been established to tackle some specific problems confronting the environment.

For example, in response to the persistent degradation of the environment and the devastation of the coastal ecosystem, with particular attention to the Niger Delta area, the Federal Government of Nigeria, through
Act No. 15 of 2006, established the NOSDRA. Statutorily, the agency is empowered to coordinate the management of oil spillage and ensure strict implementation of the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) for Nigeria using the 1990 guideline of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation (OPRC) which has been ratified by Nigeria. It is germane to state that NOSCP was drafted in 1981 and has been reviewed in 1997, 2000 and 2006. It serves as a blueprint developed by Nigeria for checking oil spill through containment, recovery and remediation. By implication, NOSDRA has the mandate to play lead role in ensuring that responses to oil spills are not only timely but effective and appropriate. It also plays the lead role in the protection of threatened environment while also ensuring that already impacted sites are cleaned up to the best practical extent.

Another specialised agency involved in environmental protection is the NESREA, which was established in 2007 under the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The agency could be said to be an offshoot of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) because the NESREA Act of 2007 only repealed the FEPA Act Cap F 10 LFN of 2004. Essentially, NESREA is empowered to all environmental laws, guidelines, policies, standards and regulations in Nigeria. It is also authorised to enforce compliance in accordance to international treaties, conventions, protocols and other agreements relating to environment to which Nigeria is a signatory. More specifically, NESREA has the vision and mission of ensuring “a cleaner and healthier environment for Nigerians, and to inspire personal and collective responsibility in building an environmentally conscious society for the achievement of sustainable development in Nigeria”.

In order to ensure that Nigerian forests and the resources therein are adequately safeguarded, the Federal Government established the FRIN. Specifically, the agency conducts research into all aspects of forestry, conservation and management of wildlife, utilisation of agro forestry and forest products. The FRIN is also establishing colleges through which it trains technical and sub-technical personnel for forestry and other agro-allied services in Nigeria.

In furtherance of its efforts towards the protection and promotion of a healthy environment, Nigeria established the National Park Service in 1999. According to the Act establishing the Service, it is “responsible for the preservation, enhancement and protection of wild animals and plants and other vegetation in National Parks; and for matters connected there-
with”. In addition, Section 8 of the Act stated that the National Park Service shall thus, “prepare surveys and maintain up-to-date records of all the existing facilities for the growth and protection of the fauna and flora in the National Parks, for zoological or botanical species, and for wild or domesticated animals and advice the Federal Government and State Governments on their adequacy and efficient utilisation in the interest of the national economy” (FGN 1999).

Also, to ensure effective environmental management in many sectors of the society, the Nigerian government has put in place a number of laws and regulatory frameworks.

**Problems Militating Against Effective Environmental Protection in Nigeria**

As we saw earlier, Nigeria has over the years enacted numerous laws for the protection of the environment. This notwithstanding, environmental degradation continues to plague the country unabated. The following constitute the problems militating against environmental protection in Nigeria:

- Low commitment to implementation and enforcement: Though Nigeria has shown commitment towards environmental protection by enacting numerous laws to that effect, this should not serve as a yardstick for measuring their effectiveness, as there seems to be lack of political will to enforce such laws. The country has over the years gained notoriety for policy failure at implementation stage. There are enough evidences showing that enforcement of these regulations is still very poor. On a daily basis, industries and factories discharge untreated waste water into the environment. On Nigerian streets and markets, heaps of refuse are always in abundance; oil-producing companies still indulge in gas flaring and oil spillage; and there is still uncontrolled and illicit mining in the country. More worrisome is the fact that efforts to prosecute offenders are usually met with frustration. To underscore this, the enforcement of environmental laws has been rendered ineffective largely because of the paternalistic nature of the Nigerian judiciary whenever issues on environmental hazards are brought to the courts against resident companies. Corroborating this, Ebeku (2003) bemoaned the reluctance of some members of the judiciary in issuing order of mandamus to companies
whose operations are damaging the environment to mitigate and address such actions. This greatly affects the performance of the relevant agencies for environmental protection in the country.

- Weak institutional capacity: Both the federal and state environmental protection agencies (SEPAs) and their local government counterparts lack institutional capacity, equipment and adequate staff for effective implementation of environmental policies. It is intriguing that apart from Abia, Imo, Lagos, Niger and Rivers States, only very few SEPAs can boast of staff with Environmental Impact Assessment training and laboratory facilities monitoring the environment (Eneh 2011). Under such conditions, the institutions could be said to be a mere camouflage.

- Duplication and multiplicity of roles: Agencies involved in environmental protection in Nigeria are oftentimes involved in conflict of roles as there is overlapping and duplication of functions in the implementation process. Horizontally, there are role conflicts between environmental-line ministries/agencies while, vertically, there is role conflict between federal, state and local government agencies. These undue controversies have created loopholes for the continued abuse of the environment.

- Inadequate funding: Agencies and parastatals involved in environmental protection are one of the least funded in Nigeria. For example, in the 2017 Budget, only ₦2 billion was allocated to the Ministry of Environment for the preservation of the environment.

Other challenges of environmental preservation in Nigeria include:

- bad governance,
- dearth of requisite human resources for proper environmental management and
- poor commitment and attitude of Nigerians towards environment-friendly regulations.

**Conclusion**

In Nigeria, the question of national security has extended beyond fighting forces and inter-communal clashes to concerns about the depletion of the biodiversity, environmental resources and pollution of all kinds. The enactment of legislations and policies and the establishment of agencies
for the protection of the environment have been described as a step in the right direction. However, environment degradation continues to threaten the country unabated. As the country continues to be ravaged by frightening gully sites, desertification, seasonal flooding, uncontrolled mining, oil spillage and water pollution, illicit and unarticulated refuse dumps and industrial wastes in most metropolises, there continues to be a growing concern about the security implications these portend, not only for the citizens but the environment itself. While the efforts of the government towards mitigating these problems could be commendable, they remain inadequate in the face of the security threats associated with them in the country. Institutional weaknesses continue to serve as cog on the wheel of environmental restoration and preservation in Nigeria. To hurt the tide of environmental degradation and avert the catastrophic sociopolitical and economic security implication it portends for the country, there is need to strengthen all the agencies saddled with the responsibility of environmental preservation. There should be regular training and retraining of officers and personnel of the agencies to constantly equip them with current innovations on environmental management techniques. Improving the institutional capacity of these institutions will also entail adequate funding. Since most states in Nigeria are vulnerable to environmental disasters, special funds should be set aside for this purpose. Also, achieving environmental security and sustainability goal requires the collaborative efforts of all. Therefore, Nigerians should show more concern and commitment towards maintaining a clean, safe, healthy and secure environment. Conforming to environmental ethics and ethos and remembering that the environment we abuse today will surely take revenge on our children tomorrow will go a long way towards restoring the environment or, at least, averting further degradation. Indiscriminate waste and refuse disposal, felling of trees, building of houses in unapproved areas, bush burning and so on are all part of the challenges of environmental security in the country. If the citizens are conscious and mindful of these and adhere to environmental regulations, then the country can achieve environmental security.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

Society is an ordered life because some behaviour are allowed while others are disallowed; while some things are considered lawful, others are not. There are many reasons some behaviours are proscribed while others are not criminalised. Certain acts/omissions are criminalised or made unlawful to safeguard the society, regulate human’s hedonistic nature, mitigate unforeseen dangerousness of the act/omission and/or to protect elite’s interest. Usually, a society frowns at whatever threatens its survival, injurious to its members and contravenes the interest of the influential minority who control the law-making machinery. For instance, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) forecloses any attempt to dismember Nigeria by describing it as “one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state” (Section 2[1]). This is tantamount to statutory attempt at self-preservation on the part of the Nigerian society. Above all, the need for a society to exercise its legitimate power to control its members is key to determining which behaviour is considered criminal or non-criminal.

At the end of this chapter, readers should adequately understand the meaning of crime (as different from tort), the manifestations of crime and...
internal insecurity resulting from crime. Thus, the chapter is structured into sections dealing with conceptualisation of crime, manifestations of crime in Nigeria, the insecurity caused by crime and recommendations.

**Conceptualising Crime**

Crime (or offence) takes its existence from laws, which are enacted to delineate allowable from disallowable behaviours in every society. Put succinctly, without laws, there is no crime or offence (henceforth, crime and offence are used interchangeably in this chapter. Thus, criminologists prefer to define crime in relation to existing law. This preference is inevitable in that the scope of deviance accommodates the issue of morality on which members of a society would disagree (Clinard and Meier 2004). Across societies, countless synonyms such as unlawful, illegal, infraction, forbidden, breach, violation, offence, misdemeanor, felony, transgression and so on are deployed to describe offence. By implication, all crimes are deviant behaviours, but not every deviant behaviour constitutes crime more so that deviance “vary widely across space and time” (Doob 2000, p. 187). For instance, drinking beer and adultery are not considered as crimes/offences in Southern Nigeria (Okonkwo 2005) but are offences in Northern Nigeria (Penal Code, Section 96). Unlike morality, crime has little or nothing to do with “being good” or “being bad” but more with the standard created by existing laws in a society.

What then is crime? Crime is generally seen as an act or omission proscribed by existing law and punished by same after due trial and conviction. Used synonymously with offence, Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines crime as “an act or omission which renders the person doing the act or making the omission liable to punishment under [the] Code or under any Act, or Law” (Federal Government of Nigeria, FGN 2004). This definition implies that not all acts are considered unlawful, and that persons accused on any criminal infraction must be duly processed before a recommended penalty is pronounced (Okonkwo 2005). Again, this underscores the subtle negotiations and renegotiations of crime and punishment in every society. In other words, to proscribe or criminalise some (in)actions, prosecute and punish people for undertaken proscribed behaviours in any nation, a great deal of negotiations is involved.

Literally, crime occurs whenever there is an infraction on existing laws, but technically, this is not the case. Using only the “infraction” yardstick would amount to considering only the concrete act or omission (actus reus) to the
exclusion of the other more important factor, the *mens rea*. In determining whether or not an offense has been committed, the intention (*mens rea*) of the person committing the infraction must be taken into consideration by a court of competent jurisdiction. Usually, crime activates varying forms of penalty, implying that there is no punishment without crime (*nulla poena sine lege*), but this must be decided by a court with competent jurisdiction after due trial. In strict terms, Section 36(8) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) forbids illegal trials, mob-justice and the infliction of arbitrary punishment on any citizen of Nigeria.

No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed. (Federal Government of Nigeria, FGN 1999, S36[8])

Thus, any citizen accused of violating any section(s) of Nigerian laws is statutorily entitled to fair trial to determine her/his degree of culpability. In fact, the chapter 5 of the Criminal Code addresses the criminal responsibility of an accused by highlighting some legitimate grounds for defence during lawful trials. Stressing the importance of intention (*mens rea*), the code declares that a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission, which occurs by accident or coercion (FGN 2004, S24). Other grounds for defence include immature age, bonafide claim of right, mistake of fact, extraordinary emergency, insanity, compulsion and so on.

Due to the fact that crime imposes penalty, conscious legislative efforts are invested in stating all the possible conditions that constitute criminality in the law. In other words, unambiguous definition is usually given in the opening of every section that seeks to prohibit any act/omission. For instance, burglary is defined to happen when a person

breaks any part, whether external or internal, of a building, or opens by unlocking, pulling, pushing, lifting, or any other means whatever, any door, window, shutter, cellar flap, or other thing, intended to close or cover an opening in a building, or an opening giving passage from one part of a building to another, is said to break the building. (FGN 2004, S410)

And the Criminal Code acknowledges that a person enters any building unlawfully the body (in whole or in part) or the instrument used is within the building, whereas breaking into a building occurs when entrance is secured by any form of threat or by collusion with any person in the build-
ing or through openings (chimney or aperture) other than designated entrance (FGN 2004, S410). Also, homicide or murder is conceived as a situation in which “any person causes the death of another, directly or indirectly, by any means whatever” (FGN 2004, S308).

Despite the stern societal warning on criminality, not all violators are apprehended, prosecuted and penalised. Full immunity from criminal prosecution is conferred on certain public officers (e.g. President, Vice-President, Governor, and Deputy Governor), whereas judicial officers enjoy immunity in Nigeria only when exercising their statutory duties. The criminal code exonerates judicial officer “for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions,” while the constitution protects executive acting in official capacity.

No civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom this section applies during his period of office; a person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that period either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued. (FGN 1999, S308 [2a, b, c])

Even when a nation desires, no known nation has ever succeeded in apprehending, prosecuting and penalising all lawbreakers, and none will ever be successful because total enforcement of law is undesirable.

It must be stressed that not all infractions against the laws are criminal in nature. As a matter of fact, some infractions are tort-related because they are civil breaches which are only prosecuted at the instance of affected citizens, whereas crime involves violations solely prosecuted by the state. Although torts do cover contract/trust breaches, they often cause injury to people’s reputation and properties for which compensation is sought in the court of law. Thus, tort or civil wrongs are marked off from crimes by the person who initiates (or capable of initiating) prosecution and the likelihood of compensation. Torts could be Intentional (deliberate act against another person to cause harm), Negligence (resulting from failure to discharge obligatory duty) and Strict Liability (when a person has legal responsibility for which (s)he could be held responsible). On the whole, certain actions could consist of traits of criminality as well as that of torts simultaneously (Williams 1991), but each has to be dealt with separately.
To conclude this section, attention is hereby given to sources of information about crime. Every nation relies on its citizens to report infractions against the law to the statutory law enforcers, which the Nigerian Police represents in Nigeria. Thus, crime statistics are based on the reports that citizens make to the police of crimes against themselves, others and/or properties. At any given time, therefore, the crime rate in a nation could be assessed using the crime statistics, even though the volume of actual crimes might remain elusive due to unreported crime incidences. Nonetheless, victimisation surveys and self-reports do complement crime statistics in providing a better picture of the volume of actual crimes in a nation (CLEEN Foundation 2012).

**Dimensions and Manifestations of Crime in Nigeria**

The Nigerian Criminal Code delineates three types of crime, namely Felony, Misdemeanours and Simple, using the punishment parameters. Felonious offences are serious infractions that attract death penalty or imprisonment above 3 years), Misdemeanours consist of contraventions punishable on conviction, with imprisonment between 6 months and 3 years), whereas unlawful behaviour considered Simple attract imprisonment below six months. One major problem with these classifications is that the emphasis on punishment clouds every information about the victims of such unlawful acts/omissions. In terms of complexity, scholars have isolated white-collar or corporate crimes (perpetrated by elites in the course of lawful duties), organised crimes (involving many people undertaking multiple criminality across national boundaries) and victimless crimes (involving consenting adults for mutual benefits). However, for administrative purposes, the Nigerian Police adapted the Criminal Code by grouping reported crimes based on their outcomes vis-à-vis the recipients of the unlawful act/omission. On this basis, we have crime against the state, crimes against persons, crime against properties, crime against public order and crimes against morality. For instance, of the 125,790 reported crime cases across the Nigerian states in 2016, 51.9% were against property whereas 36.2% were against persons (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). It must be noted that infractions against the laws could be committed by both the state/government and its members acting individually or in groups. Our discussions are structured into citizens’ criminality and government’s criminality:
1. Citizens as Lawbreakers

(a) Crime against the state: Usually, laws are owned by a society, not its members, and it is only the society that is empowered to punish any violation of its laws. Due to the fact that society owns laws, all infractions are technically viewed as crimes against the state, but in reality, not all crimes are against the state. In practice, unlawful acts that touch on the basis of social life or threaten the continued existence of a society are viewed with more seriousness than those that strictly affect citizens. As earlier noted, torts are civil wrongdoings and are not treated as crimes. Principal among the crimes against the state is coup d’état—the unlawful act of attempting to overthrow a legitimate democratically constituted government by force, especially through the use of arms and ammunitions. Section 37 of the Criminal Code forbids any person/citizen to levy “war (or conspire to wage war) against the State, in order to intimidate or overawe the President or the Governor of a State, conspire with any person, either within or without Nigeria,” or else be guilty of treason punishable with death. Instigating invasion, concealment of treason or intention to remove elected officers (President, Governor) constitute treasonable felony. In addition, the Criminal Code (FGN 2004) lists Treasonably Felony (Section 41), Mutiny (Sections 44–45), Escape from Lawful Custody (Section 135), Counterfeiting (Sections 147–155), Defacement of Currency (Section 156) and Attack on State Security and/or their Uniform (Section 251) as some direct affronts against society. Due to its seriousness, many crimes against state are capital, and they attract death penalty or very severe punishment. Until the recent insurgency of Boko Haram, terrorism (proscribed in Section 80 of the Criminal Code) did not constitute crime against the state in Nigeria and that resulted in the enactment of Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (FGN 2013).

(b) Crime against property: Sometimes, personal or corporate properties such as buildings, pipelines, vehicles, farmland and so on could become targets of criminality. Any property targeted by criminals could be totally or partially torched or damaged. This explains why society enacts laws to safeguard valuable commonwealth and properties of its members as well. Crimes in this
category include arson and arson attempt (sections 443–446) and pipeline vandalism or oil bunkering, burglary, for example, house breaking (sections 410–413). The Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage Act) 1975 prescribed death penalty or 21 years imprisonment for oil bunkering or any act of vandalism against oil pipelines. Until recently, incessant pipeline vandalism was the major illegitimate weapon of the Niger Delta militants in its agitation for equitable access to oil derivation (Ayodele 2008) until this was complemented with ransom-induced kidnapping of expatriates. Arson involves wilful and malicious destruction of property with fire: Arson against government properties such as building/office and ship/vessel attracts life imprisonment, whereas arson against privately owned properties such as buildings and crops/farmlands attracts 14 years imprisonment.

(c) Crime against person: Human beings could become victims of the unlawful acts/omissions of other people or of themselves. When this happens, human beings become victims. Crimes in this category, according to the Criminal Code Act, include stealing with violence or armed robbery in section 401, murder (sections 306–329), suicide attempt (sections 326–327), infanticide (section 327a), abortion (section 328) and endangering life and health (sections 330–350). Notably, armed robbery experiences steadily rose from 11% in 2010 to 17% in 2012 in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation 2012) and 18% in 2013 (Sheriff Deputies n.d.). Basically, unlawful behaviours in this category which constitute serious threats to life are punishable with death, while those non-life-threatening cases attract imprisonment. Non-life-threatening crimes against persons include assaults (sections 351–356), indecent assaults (sections 357–363), obtaining goods by false pretence (sections 419), stealing (section 383) and so on.

(d) Crime against public order: Laws are made by society to make for the predictability of social life and peaceful coexistence of members. It is only when social life is predictable that public order could be guaranteed. In view of the fact that some infractions against law disrupt the social equilibrium and threaten public order, potential acts/omissions are proscribed. In this category, one finds crimes such as affray (section 83), unauthor-
ised protest, disorderly conduct (section 249), unlawful society (section 62), unlawful assembly (section 69), affray (section 83), insult to religion (section 204), violence against clerics (section 205) and disturbing religious worship (section 206).

One interesting thing about most of the acts considered injurious to general public order is that they are usually fuelled by intolerance, mostly of religious, ethnic and political differences.

(e) Crime against morality: Despite the fact that it was earlier noted that law has little or nothing to do with right or wrong, laws create its own standard for morality in every society. Under such arrangement, allowable and disallowable behaviours are clearly spelt out for members. For instance, sexual intercourse within or outside lawful marital relationships are considered serious issues in many nations as well as the issue of allowable parties to a marriage. In Nigeria, coerced sexual intercourse (rape) is proscribed in Sections 214–231 of the Criminal Code, while the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act (2013) forbids homosexuality. In fact, emotion-evoking labels such as carnal knowledge, “indecent treatment of boys under fourteen” (Section 216), “indecent practices between males” (Section 217), “defilement of girls under thirteen” (Section 218), “defilement of girls under sixteen and above thirteen and of idiots” (Section 221) and “indecent treatment of girls under sixteen” (Section 222) were used to describe these “unnatural offences” (Section 214). The commercialisation of sex and pornography are equally considered unlawful in Nigeria, as specified in sections 223–229 and section 233D of the Criminal Code. Apart from the sex-related offences, monetary or non-monetary inducement (bribery) to discharge one’s lawful duties is considered unethical and outlawed (sections 98–99).

2. Government as lawbreaker: As a key party to the social contract earlier alluded to, government often violates the trust bestowed on it. One notable area of government’s criminality in Nigeria is in weak adherence to the constitution. For instance, President Olusegun Obasanjo’s eight-year administration exhibited penchant disobedience for the Constitution and even Supreme Court’s rulings; the Dr Goodluck Jonathan’s administration disregarded the National Judicial Council’s order of May 11, 2013, to reinstate the suspended President of Court of Appeal, Justice Ayo Isa Salami
(Premium Times 2013), and successive administrations have openly violated the law that mandated free compulsory nine years of education for Nigerian children (UBE Act 2004), as advocated by the UNICEF (UNICEF 2014). The Budget Act, signed into law yearly, has suffered considerably the judicious implementation by successive governments due to factors identified by Arthur (2016) as corruption/mismanagement, nepotism/tribalism, unqualified personnel in government, poor public participation and finance. In fact, the “Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on the authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria” (Constitution, 1999, Section 1[1]). Stressing the non-negotiability of obedience, section 13 mandates: “all organs of government, and of all authorities and persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers, to conform to, observe and apply the provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution.” Also, contrary to the spirit and letter of the constitution barring the adoption of state religion (section 10), most states in the North-East and North-West of Nigeria have subtly adopted Islam as well as the Sharia Legal System. Although successive governments have subtly violated the constitution by funding Hajj Commissions and sponsoring/subsidising pilgrimages for Muslims and Christians, it was ex-Governor Ahmed Yerima (now a Senator) who led the northern rebellion in 2000 by openly instituting full-fledged Sharia Legal System in Zamfara State. “The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion,” is expressly stated in Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

**Crime as Cause of Internal Insecurity in Nigeria**

Nigerian laws do not only proscribe behaviour considered inimical to survival, they also harp on the obligatory duties of both government and citizens. This specificity of obligations is a particular necessity because society is a social contract between itself and members. In the social contract, the state/government is mandated by its laws to be responsible to its citizens and, by reciprocity, citizens to their government. Conversely, Section 24 of the 1999 Constitution provides that every citizen of Nigeria is to obey the constitution, project the image of Nigeria, respect the dignity and rights of fellow citizens, assist governmental agencies to maintain order
and pay appropriate tax promptly among other things. In this section, three different types of insecurity (life, labour and knowledge) are identified and discussed. Security is simply the state of being free from threats and/or actual danger.

(a) **Life Insecurity:** Nigeria is fraught with insecurities to the extent that its corporate existence is being threatened. For instance, the highest crime cases were reported in Lagos State, whereas Katsina State had the least in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics 2016). The spate of insecurity or vulnerability of citizens to danger is a pointer to cumulative governance failure, because Section 14(2b) of the 1999 Constitution puts “the security and welfare of the people” squarely on government’s shoulder. As an item in the exclusive list, security is an overarching duty of a government to citizens, and this is more the reason government solely controls the instruments of law enforcement such as the Police and the Army. “There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and … no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, S214[1]). The Nigerian Police is saddled with statutory duty of maintaining law and order within the country, while the Army, established under Section 217 of the constitution, is to safeguard her boundaries from external invasions. Regrettably, the Nigerian Police is overwhelmed due to personnel shortage, corruption and inadequacy of equipment (Ayodele 2012; CLEEN Foundation 2012; Akinola and Ayodele 2016) as well as unfavourable supports from citizens (Ikuteyijo and Ayodele 2013; Ayodele 2015). Nowadays, effective life security is a burden, which has been exacerbated by incessant religious conflicts, ethnicity, militancy, communal clashes, cattle-rustlings and Boko Haram insurgency. A cursory assessment of the issues of insecurity in Nigeria throws up crime as a key cause. Individual (fraud, homicide, etc.) or group violations of law for economic reasons (e.g. armed robbery, kidnapping, etc.), political vendetta (assassination, terrorism) and powermongering (e.g. election rigging) have heightened insecurity in Nigeria. The spate of violent crimes (murder, armed robbery, terrorism) in Nigeria was due to the proliferation of light ammunitions and firearms (Ayodele 2006, 2011), as 3% of Nigerians admitted owning firearms or with highest possession in the North (CLEEN Foundation 2012). Interestingly, both government and citizens are complicit in committing criminal infractions of laws even though only the citizens get frequently prosecuted in Nigeria.
(b) Knowledge Insecurity: Closely related to the life security is knowledge security. There is a general belief that ignorance is a disease, and that only an informed mind is sane. Knowledge security, the deliberate attempt to properly educate people, is central to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, especially Goal 4, which stresses inclusive and quality education. To underscore the importance of knowledge, Section 18(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) mandates government to ensure “equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels.” And to eradicate illiteracy or ignorance, government is to provide free and compulsory education at primary, secondary and, where practicable, university levels in Nigeria. Nigerian laws conceive the universal basic education as a right and mandate government to educate every Nigerian child through the first nine years in primary and junior secondary level (FGN 2004, Section 2[1–2]). As a matter of fact, it is criminal for any government and parents to deny citizens (or their children) quality education, as the Compulsory, Free Universal Basic Education (UBE) Act prescribes reprimand, fine or imprisonment on conviction for any parent who defaults in enrolling her/his children of school-going ages (Section 2[4]), while any person/entity who charges fee is liable on conviction to a fine of ₦10,000 or imprisonment or both (Section 3[2]). Despite these laudable statutory provisions, knowledge security remains a daunting task in Nigeria, considering the below par budgetary allocation by successive governments. A benchmark of 26% of the budget was set by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for education in less-industrialised nations, but budgetary allocations have never exceeded 15% in Nigeria. For instance, 9.86%, 10.21%, 8.44% and 6% of the total budget were earmarked for education in 2012, 2013, 2016 and 2017 respectively (Abdallah 2016; Oyedeji 2017). The sustained low budgetary allocations to education are unarguably an infraction against the UBE Act, and it is a confirmation of the government’s unwillingness to tackle headlong the myriad of problems in the sector (BusinessDay 2017). Due to poor funding, dilapidated structures, personnel shortages and meagre/irregular remuneration, effective learning in many Nigerian schools is difficult, and this has resulted in incessant industrial actions and closures. Sociocultural factors also weigh against schooling in Nigeria, especially in the northern part where Western education (Boko) is viewed with suspicions in favour of the Almajiri Islamic education (Ayodele and Onu 2006; Akinola and Ayodele 2016). Due to the preference for the Almajiri system, 52% and 50% of adult male population in the insurgency-ridden North-East and
North-West, respectively, did not attend formal schools (Afri-Dev 2015), and many parents are not likely to release their children for Western edu-
cation. Ben Murray-Bruce, a senator in Nigeria has expressed great fear about the dwindling fortunes of education in the country, especially the danger it portends for security of lives:

When a nation wastes the minds of her youth by not providing them access to education, those youths will WASTE that nation. If a nation does not invest her wealth educating her youth, that nation will INVEST that same wealth fighting insecurity amongst those same youth. (Murray-Bruce 2015, emphasis mine)

Indeed, provision of quality education became so overwhelming for government that the sector became privatised. Nonetheless, the private providers have worsened learning security at all levels because the entire process has become heavily monetised, thus certificates are awarded on cash-and-carry basis. The frightening proportion of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of 3.3 million as of 2013 (Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, NRC/IDMC 2014) has wors-
ened knowledge security in Nigeria. The North-East, which is the theatre of the Boko Haram insurgency is the worst hit, as the IDPs’ population soared to 2.2 million between April and August 2015 (IPU/UNHCR 2015), with Borno State accounting for 672,714 IDPs (IOM/OIM 2015). Women and children became increasingly vulnerable, as insecurity ravaged the North-East (UNICEF 2011; Odunmorayo 2015) with its attendant drop in school enrolment. For instance, of the Nigeria’s 10.5 million out-of-school children, constituting the highest globally, 60% were in Northern Nigeria among which 60% were girls (UNICEF 2011). Indeed, the invasion and successful abduction of 276 girls by the Boko Haram terrorists in Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State, in April 2014, as well as the sustained violent attacks on the University of Maiduguri and other schools nailed knowledge security, par-
ticularly in the North-East where teachers/lecturers have resigned in a big way (Marama 2017; Olokor 2017). As aptly captured by UNICEF (2011), many Nigerian children were deprived of access to education, teachers have been killed and schools burnt down or closed for security reasons. We could begin to fathom the implication of sustained school closures in
northern Nigeria by considering the popular saying that whoever opens a school is shutting doors to prisons, which also means closure of schools might inevitably result in more criminals.

(c) Labour Insecurity: Labour security is defined as a social justice in Nigeria as contained in Section 14[1]) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The constitution provides that government shall, through appropriate legislations, ensure that citizens have secured access to means of livelihood and job security (Section 17[3a]). It is equally the statutory duty of government to make workplace environment safe, just and humane with “adequate facilities for leisure, social, religious and cultural life” (Section 17[3b]), equitable gender representation and workplace security, among others. Cautiously, Fallah and Phillips (2015) have noted that the Nigerian labour law is quite liberal in terms of conditions of employment and more flexible than European employment law. In clear terms, the employment law in Nigeria proscribes casualisation, child labour in workplaces, arbitrary dismissal of employees and mass reductions or downsizing among other things, as well as it provides for employees’ leave, overtime, privacy, and so on (Fallah and Phillips 2015). However, the reality in Nigeria clearly violates these statutory provisions on fair labour environment in view of the incidences of casualisation of labour (Onemola 2012), wage theft (Johnson 2016), non-payment of or delayed salary by federal and state governments and non-payment of pensions/gratuity. The dehumanisation of Nigerian workers peaked in 2016 when governments in about 22 out of 36 States could not pay monthly salaries and had to be bailed out by the federal government in 2017. In addition, the rate at which spouses were transferred apart or posted away from their families has created rifts in families and even disintegration. Evidently, this is a criminal infraction against the Labour Act 1974 as well as the statutory provision, which mandates the “promotion of family life” (Section 17[3h]) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Sections 34 and 44 of the Labour Act 1974 provide for employees’ right to be accompanied by family members at employer’s expense as well as employees’ consent to any transfer requiring severance from family. Thus, the continued dehumanisation of Nigerian workers by both government and foreign investors constitutes gross criminality and a violation of their human rights.
CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter concludes that the brazen violation of extant laws in Nigeria by both the government and the governed is the major cause of internal insecurity in the country. Since laws are enacted to forge orderliness, sustained and unsuccessfully prosecuted violation by either government or citizens has inevitable implication for disorderliness. Usually, some violations of laws are provoked by good intention, so the government only needs to ensure that it gets its priority right by effectively sifting through volumes of violations to ascertain their threat levels. Criminal violations, such as terrorism, armed robbery, homicide (murder), insult to religion, cattle-rustling, armed banditry and poor funding of education, that pose serious threat to internal security should be decisively addressed by government. Government should divest itself of some exclusive responsibilities and open up the security provision space to accommodate community/private participation. Without any doubt, securing the social and physical spaces is a daunting task that no single government could effectively handle. In addition, an urgent overhauling of the judiciary is crucial to guaranteeing public order and reducing insecurities in Nigeria.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 12

The Evolving Threat of Kidnapping for Ransom in Nigeria

_Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha and James Okolie-Osemene_

**INTRODUCTION**

Kidnapping is a long-standing problem but has assumed a worrisome dimension globally in the wake of the twenty-first century. Acts of kidnapping are increasingly being adopted by different criminal elements such as militias, gangs, ritualists, rebels, and terrorists, among others, for a variety of purposes. However, kidnapping for ransom (K4R) is one of the “fastest-growing criminal industries globally, estimated to be worth $500 million each year” (Bickley 2003, p. 169). It is a common threat in Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, and Venezuela, among others.

Ever since the 1980s, kidnapping perpetrated for different reasons remains a feature of the landscape of criminal victimisation in Nigeria. Kidnapping has been perpetrated for vengeance (as a political or terrorist strategy), ritual (power and influence), and exploitation (ransom or sexual).

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O. O. Oshita et al. (eds.), _Internal Security Management in Nigeria_, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8215-4_12
However, what is astonishing is the unprecedented escalation in frequency and sophistication of organised criminal gangs that specialise in K4R. The growth in the frequency, geographical spread, and operational audacity of K4R in Nigeria is a major source of security concern to individuals, corporate organisations, the diplomatic community, and, indeed, the Nigerian government.

The threat of K4R now cuts across the length and breadth of Nigeria. The targets are as diverse as the actors who benefit from it, much as the factors that underpin its upsurge are many and varied. School children, women, businessmen, politicians, government officials, diplomats, expatriates, landlords, and traditional rulers, among others, are increasingly being targeted by these criminal gangs. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the evolving threat of K4R in Nigeria, with a view to highlighting the forms it has assumed, the factors contributing to the menace, and measures for combating it.

The chapter is subsumed under eight sections. Following this introduction, the second section conceptualises the term K4R, while the third section provides the theoretical framework of analysis. The fourth section discusses the evolution of kidnapping, while the fifth section delves into the evolving types of K4R. The sixth section examines the factors contributing to the scourge of K4R, and the seventh section highlights its effects. The last section concludes the discourse.

**Conceptual Clarification**

A clarification of the meaning of K4R is fundamental in this chapter, since most users of the concept feel no need to explain its meaning to readers. Often, the readers’ understanding is simply taken for granted, even when the term “kidnapping” is sometimes used interchangeably with hostage-taking. In order to gain a shared understanding of the meaning of K4R, it is logical that we begin with the meaning of kidnapping.

Greenawalt (1989, p. 92) defines kidnapping as “the unlawful removal of someone and confine him or her in isolation, and a situation of false imprisonment, to restrain the victim unlawfully, usually accomplished by threat of force that coerces him to stay where he is directed”. When a victim is kidnapped, it suggests that he or she was abducted in a criminal manner and taken away, especially to unknown location. In this way, Attoh (2012) posits that kidnapping entails an unexpected incident that takes place when a person is carried off surreptitiously by another person or
group of individuals for an illegal purpose. Hence, victims of kidnapping are taken away from the place they know or were seized to other places they do not know or wish to be. They are usually denied access to wilful communication, unless to those approved by the kidnappers. Thus, the defining elements of kidnapping will include seizure of a victim, transportation of the victim to unknown location, unlawful detention of the victim against his/her will, and denial or restriction of the victim’s wilful access to communication.

In criminal law, kidnapping “is the taking away or transportation of a person against that person’s will, usually to hold the person in false imprisonment, a confinement without legal authority” (Mbaegbu 2014, p. 31). In this light, Section 364 of Nigeria’s Criminal Code provides a penalty for kidnapping, stating that:

any person who unlawfully imprisons any person, and takes him out of Nigeria without his consent; or unlawfully imprisons any person within Nigeria in such a manner as to prevent him from applying to court for his release or from discovering to any person the place where he is imprisoned, or in such a manner as to prevent any person entitled to have access to him from discovering the place where he is imprisoned; is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990)

The purpose of kidnapping could be to hold the victim for ransom or as a hostage, to facilitate the commission of a felony or flight thereafter, to terrorise or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another, or to engage in sexual activity with the victim against the victim’s will. Kidnapping, however, is different from hostage-taking because hostage-taking targets victims to achieve some objectives rather than ransom payment. According to Etebu et al. (2010), hostage-taking is the act of forcefully abducting a person or group of persons with the sole aim of using such captives and circumstances or situations as a means of negotiation or to make a particular demand, usually not for money.

For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, K4R is defined as any unlawful act of luring, seizing, and/or transporting a victim—a person or group of persons—to an undisclosed location for detention against the victim’s wish and threatened with harm in order that money can be extorted directly from the victim or from those associated with the victim such as relatives, friends, employers, government, or any other third party as a
condition for the release of the victim. The difference between most kidnappings and K4R is that the primary motive of abduction in K4R is to extort money from the victim or those associated with the victim. The perpetrators use intimidation and coercion such as torture to ensure that money is paid as quickly as possible in exchange for the victim’s release. But the outcome of such criminal act is sometimes not certain. There have been situations where victims were killed by the kidnappers despite collecting ransom, died as a result of illness, or killed during botched rescue attempt. Some have been lucky to be rescued unhurt by security operatives.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter adopts a theoretical bridging approach that combines the lifestyle theory, routine activity theory, and economic theory of crime. The lifestyle theory posits that not everyone has the same lifestyle, and that some lifestyles expose people to more risks than do other lifestyles (Hindelang et al. 1978). For example, lifestyles such as dressing ostentatiously and driving very costly cars could expose an individual to criminal victimisation. Beyond lifestyle, certain social adaptations result in routine behavioural patterns that are associated with certain amount of exposure to crime. In this light, the routine activity theory states that a crime occurs when the following three elements come together in any given space and time, namely a motivated offender, an accessible target, and the absence of capable guardians (persons and institutions) who could intervene (Cohen and Felson 1979). For instance, routine (daily) activities such as going to work, school, or worship; vocational activities such as attending sporting events or vacation destinations could lead to heightened exposure and thus high victimisation risk, while others have much lower exposure and lower risks.

Notwithstanding the analytical strength of lifestyle and routine activity theories in explaining the relationship between demographic characteristics and crime victimisation, “they failed to offer explanation for inter-individual differences in victimisation risk even when potential victims take extra measures to reduce their vulnerability” (Ikoh and Okenyodo 2014, p. 56). Also, they fail to account for why criminal groups emerge in the first instance and their motives. This weakness is compensated for by the economic theories of crime.

Although several economic theories that seek to explain crime victimisation exist with divergent predictive capability, the variant postulated by Becker (1968) is pertinent to the Nigerian context. The theory approaches
criminals as rational individuals, just like anyone else. Criminals, like ordinary citizens, seek to maximise their own well-being, but through illegal instead of legal means. It suggests that the rich would become increasingly attractive targets to crime victimisation as the income distribution widens relative to the poor in the society. This theory emphasises the role of material deprivation or the desire of the would-be criminal to pursue his or her well-being as key factor in shaping the social and physical context of criminal victimisation in a society.

From the standpoint of this theoretical bridging, it becomes evident that K4R in Nigeria is a product of the interaction of vulnerability created by lifestyle and routine engagements that make some people attractive targets; material deprivation evidenced in income inequality, widespread poverty, and unemployment; and weakness of state institutions manifest in the absence (or even complicity) of state officials who should prevent such criminal actions or facilitate subsequent criminal prosecution of offenders. Having presented the framework of analysis, it is pertinent to examine how K4R emerged in Nigeria.

**Evolution and Expansion of Kidnapping for Ransom in Nigeria**

Kidnapping is not new in Nigeria. Its history dates back to the 1980s, when such acts were associated with rituals, especially for moneymaking. It, however, became a very serious crime in the late 1990s following the crisis in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. The first major case of kidnapping in the Niger Delta was recorded on 28 June 1999, when armed young men abducted two foreign helicopter pilots (an Australian and a Briton) working for Royal Dutch Shell at its Enwhe oil platform. A group, *Enough is Enough*, claimed responsibility for the abduction (BBC News 1999). Beginning from mid-2000, the menace became even more rampant as aggrieved youth took up arms to protest the marginalisation of the region by both the oil multinationals and the Nigerian state. They formed different militant groups, including the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo Asari. Although several other groups operated then, the NDPVF was at the forefront of the struggle.

State-orchestrated campaign against the NDPVF led to the arrest of Asari Dokubo in 2005 for treason and attempt to overthrow the federal government. The vacuum created by his arrest gave rise to the emergence of other groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), Martys Brigade, Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF), Niger Delta Militants (NDM), and the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA) in the Niger Delta, among others. Consequently, these groups began to make various demands which included, among others, the unconditional release of Asari Dokubo; the release of Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, former governor of Bayelsa State who was standing trial for money laundering; payment of compensation for protracted years of environmental degradation; upward review of the 13% derivation to oil-bearing communities to 50%; provision of employment opportunities for the youth from the region; and the provision of infrastructural facilities (Onuoha 2008).

In order to press home their demands, the militant groups mounted attacks on oil and gas facilities, abducted oil workers, and engaged in oil theft. They abducted oil workers, particularly expatriates, for the purpose of drawing local and international attention to the plights of the region. Initially, those abducted were usually released after few hours or days, once the kidnappers made their point or were able to negotiate a deal with government. On 11 January 2006, four foreign oil workers working on the AE fields of Shell petroleum were abducted by militants in Port Harcourt, Rivers State (Adelakun 2007).

The outbreak of abduction in the region later mutated into financially motivated kidnapping or “commercial hostage-taking”. For instance, on 3 October 2006, a militant group, the Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF), abducted seven expatriate oil workers of contracting firms to Mobil Oil, in Akpan Estate in Eket, Akwa Ibom State. They “demanded $10 million ransom for the release of the hostages” (Ajaero and Azubuike 2006, p. 15). The Nigerian government responded to growing insecurity in the region with the reinforcement of military deployment.

Aggressive military crackdown on the militants compelled them to add another dimension to hostage-taking. This time around, abducted victims were used as human shields to deter the military from launching brutal assault on their camps in the creeks. This was revealed in an open letter to the international community by the spokesperson of the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), Cynthia Whyte, in November 2006. While criticising what they called “commercial hostage-taking” activities of other militant groups in the region, Whyte warned that all future victims “will be serving the purpose of human shields and will never be used as bargaining tools” (Ajaero and Azubuike 2006, p. 14). Notwithstanding JRC’s abhorrence of commercial hostage-taking, some militant and organised criminal groups also exploited the security situation to engage in K4R.
By January 2007, “nearly 100 foreign hostages, mostly oil workers, have been kidnapped in the restive region” (Oduwole 2007, p. 6). While some militant groups used it as a strategy to rake-off huge amount of money from oil multinationals to partly fund their struggle, others saw it as purely lucrative enterprise for making quick money. Despite denials by government and oil companies that they pay ransom to free hostages or kidnapped victims, the then Inspector General of Police, Sir Mike Okiro, acknowledged in April 2009 that “kidnappers in Nigeria pocketed ransoms of over $100 million (about ₦15 billion) between 2006 and 2008” (Okocha and Ikokwu 2009, p. 1).

Gradually, the practice opened a window of illicit business venture with network of benefactors, such as criminal gangs, government officials, community leaders, oil company staff, security agents, and various individuals who posed as negotiators (Onuoha 2008, p. 272). As noted by Le Sage (2010, p. 66), sometimes “the entire village or communities are involved in the kidnapping industry, and share the burden of incarcerating and sustaining a hostage in return for a share of the final ransom”.

In order to arrest the growing level of militancy and criminality in the region, President Umaru Musa Yar Adua initiated an Amnesty programme, in 2009, for all Niger Delta militants. By the time the programme commenced in earnest, the act of K4R had permeated other zones in the country, particularly the South-East and South-West. Increasingly, K4R assumed both vertical and horizontal expansion in Nigeria. The vertical dimension entails notable increase in the frequency of K4R across the country. The Street Journal (2013) noted that the rate of kidnapping in Nigeria had risen considerably in the past ten years as not less than 1500 people were kidnapped on an annual basis. A February 2017 public opinion survey by NOIPolls (2017) revealed that majority of Nigerians (60%) agreed that kidnapping is very prevalent in Nigeria and 43% said they had heard about some kidnap cases in their locality in the past three months, further buttressing its prevalence.

Horizontal dimension reflects the expansion in geographical spread of abductions. Previously, K4R was more pervasive and prevalent in the South-South zone, but over time, it spread to other parts of the country. As evident in Fig. 12.1, further analysis in the NOIPolls survey by geopolitical zones revealed that respondents in the South-West (74%), North-Central (68%), South-South (65%), and the South-East (60%) zones accounted for the highest percentage of Nigerians who admitted that
Kidnapping is prevalent in the country, while the majority of respondents who opined that the issue of kidnapping is not prevalent in Nigeria are residents from the North-West (43%) and the North-East (33%) zones (NOIPolls 2017).

Although kidnapping generally has been an on and off scourge in the country, the growth in K4R has assumed a dangerous and very worrisome new dimension. K4R is now a big and lucrative business, with perpetrators making hundreds of millions of naira or dollars in the process. A typical kidnapping gang in Nigeria will compose of a leader, weapon handlers, arms couriers, drivers, guards, cooks, food vendors, and informants, among others. Criminal gangs behind the new wave of K4R involve largely individuals with previous experience in weapon handling gained from participation in militancy, pipeline vandalism, cattle rustling, armed robbery, human trafficking, car theft, or cultism, among other criminal activities. They are usually the leaders or original members of the gang, who then go on to recruit other individuals who may or may not have previously participated in crimes. The new recruits hone their skills as the group conducts more and more successful kidnapping operations. With high level of drug consumption among gang members, they can easily kill
their victim with the slightest provocation arising from delay or incomplete payment of ransom or attempt by victim to escape. The media is awash with reports of dreaded kidnapping gangs led by notorious kingpins who bear different aliases. Data in Table 12.1 show some of the notable dreaded kingpins who have been either arrested or killed by security forces. Usually, these dreaded kingpins use powerful charms that protect them against gunshots.

Table 12.1 Some dreaded kidnap kingpins killed, arrested, or still operating in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alias (AKA)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr. Chukwudumeme Onwuamadike</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>(6/10/2017) He has been arraigned on various counts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mr. Ossy Ibori</td>
<td>General Ossy</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>(1/5/2017) The dreaded criminal was responsible for militant attacks and several kidnappings in the states of Lagos and Ogun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mr. Chukwudi Solomon King Solomon</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>(14/3/2017) He was responsible for the abduction of several residents of Festac Town in Lagos and in neighbouring states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mr. Henry Chibueze Vampire</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>(2/3/2017) He confessed to having killed over 200 people in various kidnapping and armed robbery attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mr. Chinedu Oba Okeke Nchoo</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>(30/1/2017) He had been terrorising residents in Enugu state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mr. Dominic Nwakpa Alhaji</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>(1/1/2017) His gang was responsible for the kidnapping of several important personalities across the country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mr. Obioma Nwankwo Osisikankwu</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>(12/12/2010) He led a group that terrorised the South-East zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration
Patterns and Modus Operandi of Kidnapping for Ransom in Nigeria

In terms of patterns of K4R, different types of operations have emerged in recent times. These include routine model, invasion model, highway model, and insider model. A brief explanation of these models is pertinent at this juncture.

**Routine Model**

The routine model is the traditional type or K4R that involves well organised gangs carrying out regular abduction that follows the typical attack cycle of kidnapping. Security experts are of the view that kidnappings generally follow a process that involves six stages: target selection, planning, deployment, attack, escape, and exploitation. As noted by Stewart (2010), in the act of kidnapping, the group must identify a victim; plan for the abduction, captivity, and negotiation; conduct the abduction and secure the hostage; successfully leverage the life of the victim for financial or political gain; and then escape. Although other types of K4R may or may not follow some of these stages, the routine model usually follows this sequence of actions to optimise the success rate of their operations. This type of K4R is carried out by established gangs, that prowl the city or towns scouring for potential targets.

The confessions of members of a kidnapping gang arrested in April 2017, who specialised in serial abduction of people in Abuja, Kaduna, and Nasarawa, vividly illustrate their routinised operations (Okolie 2017a). Victims of the routine model in Nigeria cut across people from all walks of life—expatriates, movie actors, schoolchildren, journalists, priests, traditional rulers, politicians, doctors, academics, businessmen, and women, among others. Their main consideration is whether the individual is a highly attractive target (HAT). An individual or group is considered as HAT against two key indicators: (1) the target’s worth or value and (2) the likelihood of his/her successful abduction. Once these indicators are promising, such individual/group becomes a target of serious interest for the professional kidnapping gangs. Typically, most victims are released unharmed after ransom is paid, though there have been cases where the victims were murdered or died in captivity.
**Invasion Model**

This type of K4R entails a well-planned attack by a kidnapping gang, involving the raiding of a community, estate, school, or any population centre to abduct sizeable number of persons considered high-value targets. In terms of modus operandi, the act involves extensive pre-attack surveillance and information gathering about those living or frequenting such places, estimation of security arrangement in place in such locations, mapping of possible escape routes with the abducted victims, and selection of likely date and timing of planned attack. Hence, some individuals are identified beforehand and included in the target list. This kind of K4R usually requires huge resources in terms of the number of gang members; logistics for movement, feeding, and accommodation; and volume of ammunition needed in the lifecycle of the operation.

The invasion model is often conducted by well-organised, highly sophisticated, and operationally experienced kidnapping gangs. The outcome is usually mass abduction of targets, who will later be transported to the kidnappers’ den. Such hideouts or camps are usually located in creeks, bushes, or forests that are largely inaccessible to security agents. Although statistics in Table 12.2 is certainly not exhaustive, they are indicative of this type of K4R in Nigeria. It shows that schools and residential estates were targeted by the heavily armed kidnappers to abduct sizeable numbers of victims—between four and eight persons.

**Highway Model**

This type of K4R is highly opportunistic in the sense that the potential targets or victims are not known beforehand. The spot of attack is usually not locations within towns and cities, but expressways that connect states or major cities in Nigeria. The kidnapping gang usually combines such operations with robbing or raping of travellers. The modus operandi involves heavily armed members laying siege at the major highways. Sometimes the kidnappers disguise themselves by wearing army or police uniform to easily pass off as genuine state security forces. They will block the highway, force vehicles to stop, and proceed to rob travellers (Daily Trust 2016). Thereafter, persons suspected to be of high financial value will be seized and transported to their heavily guarded camps, usually thick bushes and forests. There, they will do preliminary estimation of the financial value of the victims and then initiate telephone conversation with
Table 12.2  Some selected recent cases of invasion model of kidnapping for ransom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Victims/Targets</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13 January 2017</td>
<td>Isheri, Ogun State,</td>
<td>Abduction of three students, three female supervisors, one female cook, and a female Turkish teacher of Nigerian Tulip International College (NTIC)</td>
<td>The kidnappers demanded ₦1.2 billion ransom for the victims to regain their freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6 October 2016</td>
<td>Igbonla, Epe, Lagos State</td>
<td>Abduction of four pupils, a teacher, and the Vice Principal of the Lagos Junior Model College</td>
<td>The heavily armed attackers, comprising five men and a woman, stormed the school and abducted six persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17 September 2016</td>
<td>Isheri North area of Lagos State</td>
<td>Kidnap of four landlords of Oshorun Heritage Estate,</td>
<td>It is alleged that family members of the victims paid ransom, before their release five days after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25 May 2017</td>
<td>Epe, Lagos State</td>
<td>Six students of Igbonla Model College, Epe, were kidnapped</td>
<td>They were released on 28 July 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>24 September 2017</td>
<td>Ogba, Benin City, Edo State</td>
<td>Kidnap of the Director and Chief Executive, Ogba Zoo and Nature Park, Benin City. The incident led to the death of three policemen.</td>
<td>He was released after some days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration

the victims’ families to negotiate ransom payments. Some lucky victims have been freed through rescue operations by security forces, while others regained their freedom after paying ransom. Those who are not so lucky have died during rescue operations or as a result of ill-health, or injuries sustained during attempt to whisk them away by the kidnappers.

Major highways such as Abuja-Lokoja expressway, Abuja-Kaduna road, Aba-Ikot Ekpene road, Benin-Ekpoma-Auchi road, and Akure-Ilesha expressway are the major hotspots of this type of K4R in Nigeria. Others are Lagos-Sagamu-Ore-Benin road, Lagos-Ibadan expressway, and Enugu-Port Harcourt expressway. Although several cases of this type of K4R abound, one high-profile abduction that attracted wide publicity reveals a practice that is ubiquitous in Nigerian highways. On 30 June
2016, the Deputy High Commissioner of Sierra Leone to Nigeria, Major General Alfred Claude-Nelson and his driver were abducted by kidnappers while travelling along the Kaduna-Abuja road. Their abductors held them for four days before releasing them after ₦1.5 million ransom was paid (Ajaja 2016). The intervention of both the police and Department of State Services (DSS) facilitated his negotiated safe release, although the culprits were later arrested. Also, on 19 October 2017, the Chaplain of African Church, Ondo Central Missionary Diocese, Reverend David Ayola was reported by the media to have been kidnapped along Imojo-Oye Ekiti road and later killed after it became clear to the kidnappers that the church could not raise the ₦100 million ransom they demanded.

**Insider Model**

The insider model is that type of K4R where someone who lives or is closely associated with the potential victim plays an active role by initiating, participating, directing, or enabling the kidnapping of such targets. Such insider could be the relative, driver, cook, gatekeeper, nanny, business associate, confidant, or any other person who is reasonably in close contact with the potential target. The individual is usually the one who provides the kidnapping gang with useful information that makes the individual an attractive target. Such information may include the victim’s financial worth, residence, hobbies, movement, investment, or, indeed, any fact that could encourage or inspire his or her abduction.

A typical example of this type was the kidnapping and eventual murder of Dr Edith Chinedu Aliyu, proprietress of Chelson Group of Schools and Chief Executive Officer of Grant Microfinance Bank. Her abduction was orchestrated by her driver, Ali Angba. She was kidnapped in her house on 29 June 2016 by the trio of Maxwell Ajukwu, Solomon Amodu, and Sunday Jacob. Two hours after her abduction, the kidnappers strangled her because she recognised one of her abductors as her driver’s friend. They later buried her in a bush near Yangoji Village, along Kwali-Lokoja Expressway. Meanwhile, they had collected a ransom of ₦5 million from the family, supposedly to secure her release. Ali Angba confessed to the crimes connived with the three other suspects to kidnap the victim (Mutum 2014). The main challenge in the insider model, much as in other types of K4R, is that once the victim recognises any of the member of the criminal gang, the chances of him or her being released alive are very slim.
FACTORS BEHIND THE OUTBREAK AND PERSISTENCE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM

Several interrelated factors contribute to the outbreak and prevalence of K4R in Nigeria. These factors derive from, and reflect, the crisis of the Nigerian political economy. They include mismanagement of the economy, proliferation of weapons, complicity of state actors, and weak institutional capacity for regulation.

The mismanagement of the Nigerian economy, which has deepened poverty, unemployment, and inequality, is the main factor responsible for the rising incidence of kidnapping in the country. Poverty and unemployment are socio-economic challenges that have plagued Nigeria since the 1980s. The situation appears worse with the current economic recession in the country. A recent United Nations (UN) report captured the poverty situation aptly:

Nigeria is one of the poorest and most unequal countries in the world, with over 80 million or 64% of her population living below poverty line. The situation has not changed over the decades, but is increasing. Poverty and hunger have remained high in rural areas, remote communities and among female–headed households and these cuts across the six geo-political zones. (Ujumadu 2016)

Additionally, the National Bureau of Statistics recently disclosed that Nigeria’s unemployment rate rose from 13.3% in the second quarter of 2016 to 13.9% at the end of the third quarter (Onuba 2016). The report further noted that unemployment was highest for persons between the ages of 15–24 and 25–34, which represents the youth population. As a result of widespread poverty and unemployment, some young people have taken to criminal activities such as K4R to survive.

The crisis of the Nigerian economy is not only evident in the increase in poverty and unemployment, but also widening inequality between the rich, who live ostentatious lifestyles, and the poor, who wallow in penury. With excessive materialism flaunted in an environment of abject poverty and privation, contemporary Nigerian society became mired in moral crisis. Those who have gained wealth want to display it, while those who do not have it but get inundated with the display of stupendous wealth want to acquire it by all means. The flagrant display of wealth by some people has made the get-rich-at-all-cost syndrome to gain momentum among
Nigerians, especially the youth. This situation leads to the erosion of moral values of hard work and honesty and the promotion of greed and corruption as means of acquiring wealth. The resultant moral crisis contributes to the problem of kidnapping. As Oyemwinmina and Osazuwa (2016, p. 208) captured it:

The craving for materialism at all cost in the country generally, has led to the high wave of crime in the country. People are ready to do anything to get rich and be celebrated in the society and a lot of the youth considered kidnapping as one of the short means to actualise this purpose.

This explains the involvement of people at the family and community levels either as informants or as providers of arms or those who supply foods and water to the kidnappers and their detained victims. The economic motivation behind kidnapping makes it difficult to be eradicated due to the payment of ransom by victims and their families. Confessions of arrested kidnap suspects indicate that most of them were apprehended either in their newly furnished apartments or while driving exotic cars they bought with the share of ransom.

Furthermore, ongoing banking reforms aimed at transforming Nigeria’s economy into a cashless society has partly contributed to the rise in K4R. For instance, the introduction and penetration of automatic teller machines (ATMs) have led to significant reduction in physical cash flow and transactions in Nigeria. In fact, the growth of ATMs in Nigeria has been explosive over the past few years with transaction volumes growing from 1.6 million transactions in 2006 to over 500 million transactions in 2009. The number of ATMs has also grown from just over 500 ATMs in 2006 to over 8000 ATMs in 2009 (Moses undated). As banks embrace electronic transactions and the use of ATMs, which leads to people carrying less cash with them, many groups hitherto involved in (armed) robbery are now turning to kidnapping as an alternative source of income.

Interestingly, while the economy has witnessed significant decrease in physical cash flow, the larger society has witnessed tremendous increase in the inflow of illegal small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Nigeria is believed to account for about 70% of an estimated 500 million weapons circulating in West Africa (Premium Times 2016). In January 2017, operatives of the Nigerian Customs Service intercepted a total of 661 pieces of pump action rifles concealed within steel doors and other goods smuggled through Apapa Port in Lagos (Salau 2017). With this volume of SALWs
circulating in an environment of worsening youth unemployment and poverty, it is not surprising that the nation is witnessing an upsurge in violent crimes such as kidnapping (Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino 2013). Thus, the scale and intensity of K4R have been compounded by the proliferation of SALWs. During a raid on a compound of one kidnapping suspect, for instance, the police was startled by the discovery of large cache of arms:

The arms and ammunition include 27 AK 47 rifles, one K2 rifle, two type-06 rifles, one general purpose machine gun, one rocket launcher, 17 rockets, six pump action guns, three dane guns, one Barrett pistol and 13 rocket grenades, as well as 12,800 rounds of AK 47 live ammunition, 530 rounds of LAR ammunition, 95 rounds of GPMG live ammunition, 1000 rounds of K2 live ammunition and 143 magazines. (Ujumadu 2014, p. 30)

The possession of such sophisticated SALWs emboldens and enables the kidnappers to abduct victims at will and, in most cases, overpower the police in gunfight. In a sense, SALWs’ proliferation has become both a contributing factor and consequence of violent criminality such as K4R in Nigeria.

Weaknesses in the ability of security, law enforcement, and regulatory institutions of the state to effectively discharge their duties make a tenuous security situation even worse. Experts are of the view that the police is poorly resourced and staffed to deal with organised criminal groups like kidnappers. Nigeria’s reliance on about 377,000 policemen to cater for the security needs of over 170,000,000 people in the country has proven grossly inadequate (Ogbozor 2016). In addition, “other factors such as the culture of corruption has created a hollowed-out police force—strong on paper but ineffective in practice” (Okenyodo 2016, p. 2). Worse still, pervasive corruption in security and law enforcement institutions has long meant that apprehending kidnappers is unlikely, prosecuting the few arrested less so, and securing conviction even more difficult. There have been allegations of cooperation and collusion between kidnapping gangs and state actors—police, prison officials, military, and government officials—who benefit from the shadow economy. The March 2017 successful rescue of a notorious kidnap kingpin, Henry Chibueze, by his gang members who stormed Owerri High Court where he was standing trial paints a vivid picture of the complicity of state actors in K4R. It was revealed that while in detention at Owerri Central Prison, Chibueze:
Coordinated several kidnappings and gave out his numerous rifles for hire to criminals. Sources at the prison disclosed that Vampire lived like a king in the prison. He reportedly had free access to his mobile phones and enjoyed regular visits from various persons including his gang members who brought food and money to him. In November 2015, he successfully recruited an official of the Nigeria Prison Service, Chukwuma Agim, into his gang and made him set up a kidnap gang that would enable them raise money for their cases. (Okolie 2017b, p. 28)

It is evident that without the assistance, connivance, and cooperation of the prison officials, the kingpin would not have been able to continue to plot and reap from kidnapping operations while in prison custody, let alone coordinate plans for his rescue from the court premises.

The ability of the kidnap suspects to coordinate their illicit activities via mobile phones also reveals how the weakness of private corporations contributes to the persistence of kidnapping in Nigeria. The use of Global System for Mobile (GSM) communications phones by some individuals to coordinate and execute acts of criminality “has been attributed as one of the causes of kidnapping in Nigeria” (Adegoke 2014, p. 209). In May 2011, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) mandated all telecom operators in Nigeria to register all existing phone subscribers before a January 2012 deadline. The registration of mobile phone users in Nigeria was primarily for security purposes, to mitigate the incidences of crime and criminalities perpetrated through the use of phones, especially kidnapping (Omoniyi 2010). The NCC had ordered that all unregistered phone lines after the deadline should be disconnected from operators’ networks. However, MTN Nigeria, the largest telecom operator in Nigeria, failed to comply with the directive. This, according to President Mohammadu Buhari “have facilitated activities of terrorists and kidnapping kingpins who perpetrated several of their murderous and nefarious acts that proved costly to the nation” (Omonobi 2016, p. 54).

Consequently, Nigeria imposed a record $5 billion fine on the company for failing to disconnect subscribers with unregistered phone lines bought before January 2012. The setback from non-registration of some mobile phone subscribers is further compounded by the lack of a reliable electronic national identity management system in Nigeria. Wide-scale corruption, incompetence, poor planning, and vested political interests have frustrated every effort since 1979 to have such a vital system in Nigeria (Odili-Idiagbor 2014). This situation has created a terrible security gap in
the form of absence of a national database for reliable identification of people, thereby severely constraining the evolution of robust crime management and efficient criminal justice administration in the country. This explains why a person with criminal history can operate for years with different names without being easily detected.

The nature of Nigerian politics is another major factor contributing to the rise in kidnapping in Nigeria. Politics in Nigeria—especially electoral politics—is defined and approached by politicians as a do-or-die affair. At every election cycle in Nigeria, there is often a role for godfatherism, thugs, hoodlums, and cultists. The stake in Nigerian politics is incredibly high, making politicians desperate in the struggle to win elections or determine those who get elective or appointive positions. As a result, many of them recruit “specialists of violence”—cultists, gangs, and thugs—to attain and retain political power (Onuoha 2010). In some cases, these “specialists” are compensated with sensitive elective and appointive offices. The danger inherent in this form of do-or-die struggle for power is the politicisation of security and insecuritisation of politics. First, those who are too ambitious of acquiring political power form or fund youth groups to help them win elective positions or even settle political scores. Second, the practice of arming youth, mainly unemployed, for electoral violence and subsequently dumping them after elections, is a well-established electioneering habit of most Nigerian politicians. Third, the youth groups or gangs so “empowered” through funding and arming by politicians, in turn, engage in criminal activities that undermine security. In Anambra State, for example, unemployed youth were armed and used by politicians to unleash terror on people in 2004 when the crisis between Chief Chris Uba and Dr Chris Ngige escalated due to the politics of godfatherism (Alumona 2016). After this period, kidnapping became a major security challenge in the state. Thus, Inyang and Abraham (2013, p. 535) drew the link between politics and kidnapping when they argued that “youths (thugs) who have been abandoned by their masters after winning elections are now busy kidnapping innocent persons and relatives of those persons they surged to be wealthy”. Thus, there is a nexus between “do-or-die” politics and organised crime such as K4R, with serious consequences for Nigeria.
Effects of Kidnapping for Ransom in Nigeria

The effects of K4R in Nigeria are many and varied. The significant loss of human lives and infliction of bodily injuries and trauma are the most serious effects of K4R. Although the primary motive of K4R is to detain a victim in order to receive money in exchange for the person’s freedom, innocent bystanders, victims, and security forces have been killed in violent attacks associated with K4R in Nigeria. The kidnappers, innocent individuals, and the targeted victims are usually at risk of losing their lives due to the use of arms in the process of trying to scare people away and enforce obedience before taking the targets away. Many families have lost their members to criminal gangs that engage in K4R. For instance, one of Nigeria’s most dreaded kidnap kingpin confessed that he had kidnapped and killed 200 persons across the country (Punch 2017). The killing of any member of the family by kidnappers leads to a deep fracturing of kinship structures. Some children have been left without parents, husbands without wives, and vice versa. For every person killed or injured by kidnappers, there are many more who must cope with the psychological, physical, and economic effects that endure in its aftermath.

Exposure to harrowing traumatic experiences is another effect of K4R. Usually, victims of kidnapping are injured in the process of whisking them away or when they are being moved from one location to another to avoid being rescued by security operatives. Victims are known to be subjected to several dehumanising treatments such as torture, rape, and starvation, among others. Thus, Ilechukwu, Uchem, and Asogwa (2015, p. 28) maintain that “victims suffer psychological trauma from the loss of freedom and dignity”. The psychological trauma that victims experience endures even long after they have regained their freedom. This exposes such people to post-traumatic stress disorder that makes it difficult for them to recover from the inhuman treatment. Sometimes, the traumatic experiences are also felt by the victim’s relatives who often live in fear over the safety of their loved ones in the hands of very cruel criminals. In this context, children are invariably the hardest hit, both when they are the direct victims of such cruel act or either of their parents falls victim.

Another effect of K4R is the deepening of material deprivation of families whose member has fallen victim of kidnapping. Kidnappers are known to demand huge sums of money before they release their victims. Some families have disposed their assets such as land, emptied their life savings, or borrowed huge sums of money to be able to pay ransom demanded by
kidnappers. Given this situation, the obvious consequence for such family is the exacerbation of poverty. For example, the gang that kidnapped a former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Chief Olu Falae, in September 2015, initially demanded ₦100 million ransom for his release, but later collected an undisclosed amount before releasing him (Oluwole 2015). There were cases where the kidnappers also kill the victim despite collecting money. As an example, the kidnappers who abducted a top management staff of Dangote Group, Istifanus Bello Gurama, in September 2016, killed him after three weeks in captivity. They had earlier made a demand of ₦200 million for his release (Okolie and Undu 2016).

Kidnapping for ransom holds triple tragedy for a family whose member died in the hands of the kidnappers. First, they will suffer the trauma of losing a loved one; second, they will likely shoulder the huge cost of burying the victim if the body is eventually recovered; and, third, they will bear economic hardship associated with the loss of a person who may be the breadwinner of the family.

Furthermore, K4R also induces forced change in the lifestyle of people. For fear of being kidnapped, people have been forced to change their lifestyle, such as not wearing the kind of dress or driving the type of car they would ordinarily prefer to use. Some people who have exotic cars often do not drive them to certain places or occasions (burials, weddings, and birthdays) to avoid being seen as very rich, thereby heightening their attractiveness to kidnapping gangs. Also, Alumona (2016, p. 376) opines that “kidnapping affects social and economic context of life, with negative impact on interpersonal relationship and social interaction that constitute the basis of society”. Such developments undermine much desired inter-group relations at the community level.

Another effect of K4R in Nigeria is the negative impact on business environment, manifest in the increase in the cost of doing business associated with insurance premium and discouraging of prospective investors. Investors are always sceptical of investing their money in an economy that is characterised by instability and insecurity. Since the escalation of kidnapping in many Nigerian cities, businesses have been affected while some companies relocated their headquarters from insecurity-prone areas to more secure towns. In the case of Rivers State, for example, Wilson (2016) revealed that kidnapping affected economic activities in Rudele where most farmers abandoned their farms as a result of the fear of being kidnapped by sea pirates and militants, and even fishermen have kept away from fishing activities, a situation that made fish scarce in Ahia-Gbo, the
biggest market in the community. This, in part, contributes to high price of commodities in the economy.

One other effect of kidnapping is the increase in the militarisation of many cities in Nigeria. Militarisation involves the deployment of the coercive apparatus of the state, mainly the military, to combat kidnappers and other criminals who have bases and camps in many ungoverned spaces within Nigeria. As of February 2017, the Army had been deployed in 32 states of Nigeria’s 36 states to assist in combating violent conflicts and criminality (Oyedele 2017). For instance, when kidnappers terrorised most parts of the South-East zone, the government responded by launching a military deployment known as “Operation Jubilee” in September 2010. Military deployments have attracted both commendations and condemnation from the civil society. For instance, the military was celebrated for the December 2010 killing of a notorious kidnap kingpin, Mr. Obioma Nwankwo, whose gang terrorised much of the South-East region. However, military operations have been criticised for adopting harsh tactics that have injured civilians and led to human rights violation such as dragnet arrests, unlawful detention, intimidation, and extortion. These are some of the unintended consequences of militarisation prompted by the upsurge in K4R.

Furthermore, the prevalence of K4R contributes to gradual erosion of public trust and confidence on the institutions of the state, especially the police. There is growing loss of credibility and integrity by law enforcement institutions in the eyes of many citizens, given accusation of the complicity of their officials in K4R. Some serving and dismissed security personnel have been arrested for their involvement in K4R, for being part of the gang, or providing them with weapons or other forms of assistance (NAN 2017; Odunsi 2016; Omonobi 2017; Punch 2016). The connivance, collusion, and complicity of military personnel, policemen, and prison officials in K4R informed the conclusion that “people in many towns across Nigeria have lost confidence in the ability of the governments to eradicate the crime” (Adegoke 2014, p. 213). The seeming inability of state security forces to stem the tide of K4R in the country cast serious doubt on the integrity of government as the primary guarantor of security in Nigeria.

The wave of K4R further slurs Nigeria’s image, given that some foreigners and many citizens have been killed in the process. As a result, many embassies and countries warn their citizens of the danger of traveling or doing business in Nigeria. This situation is made worse by the activities of
terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram that have added K4R to their means of raising funds to sustain their jihadi campaign. The Boko Haram began in mid-2012 to engage in kidnapping for ransom to fund its operation. On 19 February 2013, for instance, the group kidnapped a French family of seven (including four children) in Cameroon and then transported them to Nigeria, where they were freed on 18 April 2013 after allegedly collecting $3.15 million as ransom (Cocks 2013). Worse still, a splinter group of the Boko Haram known as the Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (abbreviated as Ansaru), became famous following a string of kidnappings of expatriates it pulled off in northern Nigeria. The February 2013 kidnapping and subsequent murder of seven expatriates by the group remain the largest of its kind since the outbreak of terrorist violence in Nigeria (Onuoha 2013). Before the 2013 kidnapping, Ansaru was linked to the May 2011 kidnapping of Christopher McManus (a Briton) and Franco Lamolinara (an Italian) from their home in Kebbi State. They were held for months before their captors killed them in March 2012 during a failed rescue mission by Nigerian security forces and British Special Forces in Sokoto. The negative publicity K4R attracts to Nigeria further discourages foreign investment and visitation by tourists.

**The Way Forward**

The menace of kidnapping has become a serious security threat in Nigeria, with diverse consequences for the victims, families, communities, and the country at large. The upsurge in kidnapping for ransom seems to be overwhelming the Nigerian Police, the agency tasked with the primary responsibility of preventing and controlling such crimes in Nigeria. This situation has necessitated the adoption of extra measures by the Nigerian government such as the registration of mobile phone users, adoption or amendment of anti-kidnapping legislation by some states to provide harsh punishment (death penalty), the deployment of military task force, and demolition of structures or buildings owned or used by kidnappers for their operations, among others. These and other measures have proven largely ineffective in addressing the menace.

There is, therefore, the need for robust interventions beyond legislations and adoption of punitive measures. Serious attention needs to be paid to the nature of the Nigerian political economy that fosters an environment permissive of the emergence and flourishing of criminal gangs. To this end, it is imperative that government implements measures that
would drastically reduce poverty, create employment for the teeming youth, curb widespread corruption, and cut down on the high emoluments and privileges of political and public officials that make Nigerian politics extremely attractive. Additionally, there is the need to evolve a reliable national identification system, capacitate security and law enforcement agencies through proper training and equipment, and prioritise community policing.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 13

The Emerging Culture of (Un)Armed Violence by Legal/Illegal Revenue Collectors in Urban Cities in Nigeria: Evidence from Enugu State

Stephen Nnaemeka Azom and Rowland Chukwuma Okoli

INTRODUCTION

Revenue is the lifeblood of every organised human society because it enables the government to perform the function of governance. Generally, sources of revenue for modern government include proceeds from export of natural resources or finished goods, proceeds from licences granted for extraction of resources and other businesses, aids from donors, proceeds from sales of government properties, proceeds for services rendered, rates and taxes levied within the territorial boundaries of the state and so on. Meanwhile, in contemporary societies, the sources of revenue for subna-
tional governments (i.e. states) depend on the structure of governance practised by the country and fiscal leverage granted to the subnational governments by the constitution or central government (in the case of unitary government). Thus, sources of revenue for subnational governments include allocation from the central government, revenue from commercial activities of government parastatals, funding from donor agencies, tax levied on individuals, and goods and other taxable objects, to mention a few. Of these sources of revenue, rates and taxes remain viable sources of internally generated revenue (IGR) but are also among the sources that pose serious challenges in terms of collection because of the possibility of leakages created by tax evasion/avoidance or even non-remittance/diversion by collecting officials (see Coker et al. 2015).

Corollary to the above, the success of any government in collecting rates and taxes depends greatly on its capacity to block leakages by adopting strategic collection methods that ensure all rates and taxes are properly collected. Thus, methods of tax collection have remained dynamic depending, in most cases, on the rate of compliance. During the pre-colonial era, the hitherto existing kingdoms, empires and principalities in the area today known as Nigeria adopted various strategies, including the use of violence to collect taxes from conquered territories. Violence was also utilised by the colonial state to collect taxes from the masses. In fact, one remarkable thing about colonial state is that it modified and formalised existing pre-colonial taxes through legislation and introduced new forms of taxation where there were none. For instance, it introduced the first tax legislation, which is the Native Revenue Proclamation No. 2 of 1906 in the Northern Nigeria. Although Okauru (2012) eulogised colonial tax administration and argued persuasively that the formalisation of taxation by the colonial state through introduction of legislations eliminated arbitrary and multiple taxation, and also made the taxpayers more satisfied with tax administration, available evidence suggests the contrary, as demonstrated by the widespread dissatisfaction with colonial tax administration especially in the East and West. For instance, there was resistance by the Egba people in 1918, the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko people in 1927, and the Aba women in 1929, to mention a few.

Nigeria practises three-tier federal system of government; this greatly impacts on the character of revenue mobilisation by each of the three tiers. While the federal government retains the major sources of revenue, the states (created without consideration of economic viability) have continued to depend largely on the federal government allocation for execution of most of their projects, including payment of salaries. The local govern-
ments experience financial atrophy arising from the double burden of poor economic viability and non-release of allocated funds by the states in which they exist. The result of this is the aggressive search for IGR by both states and local governments through the adoption of various obnoxious strategies, including violence by revenue collectors who have been unleashed on the masses. Available evidence shows that total IGR for states have mushroomed over the years. For instance, five-year statistics indicate that total IGR collected by all the states increased from ₦490.38 billion in 2011 to ₦784.13 billion in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). However, IGR remains an insignificant chunk of total revenue for states and local governments. Recent studies have shown that states have adopted various strategies such as use of contractors and automation of tax collection in order to increase the share of IGR (especially rates and taxes) to total state revenue (Odusola 2006; Rotimi et al. 2013). This study intervenes by analysing the emerging culture of violence by revenue collectors in urban cities with specific focus on Enugu metropolis.

**Insight from Extant Literature on Revenue Collection in Nigeria**

The dynamics of revenue collection in Nigeria has no doubt attracted attention of writers. In articulating the legality and *raison de ‘etre* of revenue collection by various agencies, Rotimi et al. (2013) identified three relevant tax authorities in Nigeria; they include the Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS), the State Board of Internal Revenue and the Local Government Revenue Committee (LGRC). Focusing on Lagos State, they argued that increase in IGR drive by various levels of government results from the increasing cost of running government and the need for socio-economic and infrastructural development. They remarked that the state adopted the Accelerated Revenue Generation Programme (ARGP) and utilised the services of tax consultants to raise IGR of the state. However, despite the increase in IGR, the challenge of tax evasion and avoidance continues to serve as leakages in the government collectible revenue. The study, however, did not analyse the strategies adopted by the consultants to increase IGR in Lagos State.

In another development, Agu (2010) studied the performance of IGR of the five South-Eastern states and blamed weak IGR generation by sub-national governments on the practice of state creation without consideration of economic viability of states created. This has resulted in weak
fiscal strategy and poor government-private sector relationship in the states. Contributing to this, Dandago (2015) identified some of the challenges of government revenue collection to include leakages arising from multiplicity of collecting agents, neglect of many revenue sources and weak institutional capacity, among others. Furthermore, Oladimeji and Monisola (2013) noted that there has been little effort in improving IGR by local government areas (LGAs) due to reliance on share of revenue from the federal government between 1993 and 1997, and the highest IGR collected by all the LGAs put together constituted only 1.6% of the total revenue received by the LGAs.

Meanwhile, Nwekeaku (2013) identified weak institutional framework, poor tax assessment and multiple taxation, amongst others, as the factors that undermine effective revenue collection in Nigeria. He argued that inability of the state to adequately block the leakages in revenue generation undermines capacity of the state to carry out its functions of providing basic social services, as contained in the 1999 constitution under the economic objectives and directive principles of the state. This position is buttressed by Oti et al. (2016), who remarked that state-owned enterprises may generate large revenues but incur larger costs in the process of collecting such revenue. Using Cross River State as a case study, the authors demonstrated that the Cross River State Revenue Administration Law (2011) stipulated collection cost of between 5% and 10%. Consequently, the cost of revenue collection dropped from 13.03% in 2011 to 4.00% in 2014.

In articulating the challenges of revenue collection by subnational governments, Odusola (2006) stressed that the dependence on oil as the major source of revenue and the imbalance in the fiscal structure of Nigeria’s federal system weaken effective tax administration. The writer explained that the federal government accumulates over 90% of the revenue, yet it accounts for 70% of the revenue, thereby emasculating the other tiers of government. While sharing this view, Oseni (2013) opined that the reliance on oil accounted for the dwindling of IGR in the post-colonial Nigerian state. Using data between 2007 and 2011, the writer demonstrated that the total IGR collected by all states constituted only a paltry 13.5% of the total revenue of the states. Specifically, the percentages of IGR to total revenue for South-West was 26%, North-West 11.6%, South-East 10.9%, North-Central 9.8%, South-South 9.5% and North-East 6.9%. For Coker et al. (2015), the dependence on oil revenue leads to neglect of IGR by local governments. Where efforts are made to generate IGR, a large portion of it is embezzled by public officials, contractors
and/or enforcement officials. Again, Odusola (2006) argued persuasively that the tax system in Nigeria focused on the formal sector while the informal sector, which forms the bulk of the economy, appears to be grossly under-taxed. The study further observed that another major challenge of revenue collection in Nigeria is the fact that the constitution empowers each level of government to collect various taxes, which engenders multiple taxation and use of tax consultants by the states and local governments to aggressively levy taxes on the masses.

Generally, extant literature tends to argue that the aggressive struggle by states to improve IGR is related to increasing cost of governance in the face of reducing oil revenue. They conclude that the concurrent revenue drive by the three tiers of government engender multiple taxation (Odusola 2006; Agu 2010; Rotimi et al. 2013). Much as this is true, such view mainly focused on the symptoms of a systemic crisis. Some other studies tend to focus on the successes, or otherwise, of various revenue mobilisation strategies and then proceed to assess which of the strategies enhance or undermine capacity of the state and local governments to improve IGR (Rotimi et al. 2013). We argue that this analysis is elitist in nature for focusing on the demand side of revenue without analysing what happens at the supply side. Again, it is important to appreciate how the structure of revenue mobilisation and allocation in Nigeria engenders use of violence by tax- or revenue collection agents. This study intervenes by examining the culture of violence adopted by revenue collection agents in urban cities in Nigeria with specific focus on Enugu metropolis.

**THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Our analysis of the violent character of revenue collection in Enugu State is rooted on the epistemological and ideological assumptions of the theory of post-colonial state. Initially developed by Hamza Alavi (1972), other major proponents of the theory include Ekekwe (1985); Ake (1985, 1989) and Omeje (2015). The theory of post-colonial state emerged mainly from intellectual struggle of scholars in the Global South to analyse how the structures inherited from colonialism continue to shape and determine the character of the post-colonial states. The proponents articulated the historically entrenched and exploitative structures, institutions, networks and process that tend to reproduce and perpetuate the character of the colonial state in the various post-colonial African states and went further to propose ways of overcoming the constraints immanent on
post-colonialism, redressing African underdevelopment and re-positioning the continent on the path to unfettered and robust development (Omeje 2015).

Furthermore, Omeje (2015) remarked that the post-colonial states “were in part conceived and constituted in the loins of precoloniality, mutated, incubated and produced in coloniality, and ultimately proliferated and aggravated through the incontinency of the postcolonial”. Drawing from the foregoing, the crises of the post-colonial state can be deduced from the organic unity between pre-colonialism, colonialism and post-colonialism expressed earlier. Such crises are the cross-cutting, embedded and enduring contradictions and conflicts in the post-colonial states which are related to colonial heritage (political and economic structures, practices, modes of accumulation, education and cultural patterns) as well as the nature and constraints of post-coloniality itself. Post-colonial theorists further attribute these crises of post-coloniality to the multifaceted legacies of colonialism, including the variegated, ambivalent and ambiguous experiences of decolonisation and declaration of independence in the ex-colonial states (Omeje 2015).

Explaining the transition from pre-colonialism to colonialism, and the implications of both epochs for the post-colonial state, the post-colonial theorists contend that in the absence of mutually legitimated Westphalian-type states, the pre-colonial Africa was characterised by the propensity for rivalry and wars of aggression and domination of weak communities by more powerful ones (empires, principalities, chiefdoms, etc.). Some of these African institutions and characteristics survived the onslaught of colonialism, albeit with monumental metropolitan distortions and acculturation producing deleterious and disarticulating effects on the entire political, social, legal and economic structures. Thus, colonialism created enough crises to go round and reproduce itself in perpetuity as seen in the post-colonial state (Omeje 2015).

Buttressing this point, Abubakar (2015) contends that the emergence of the post-colonial state in Africa did not fundamentally alter the structures and hierarchies of ideological and political domination resulting from the insertion of the continent into the global economy through the complex and violent processes of the slave trade which was followed by the subjection of the people under colonial rule after the partition of boundaries, territories and redefinition of sovereignties. Thus, the increasing rise of violence is not an inherent disease of the post-colonial state but the emerging transformative phase of Africa’s dual insertion and extraversion in the new global division of labour and subjection.
The Marxian theory of post-colonial state, therefore, reveals that the post-colony, being an organic composition of pre-colonialism, colonialism and post-colonialism, remains a theatre of war resulting from its internal contradiction and external influence of world powers. Thus, the theory sheds on how the post-colonial character of Nigeria engenders the adoption of violent strategy in revenue. Specifically, in a bid to retain themselves in power and sustain their extravagant life style, the political class employ various means to harass and intimidate the masses in order to extract taxes from them. In most cases, revenue collection is contracted to cronies who pay some percentages up front and are permitted to unleash violence on the masses in the process of collecting revenue in order to recoup money expended on bribing state officials while seeking the consultancy contract. Against this backdrop, this study examines the incidence of (un)armed violence by revenue collectors in Enugu metropolis within the context of the post-colonial state theory.

**Data and Methods**

This study employed a case study design which is a form of research design that enables us to carry out in-depth study of a small number of cases in their real-life context and understand how the cases influence and are influenced by their contexts (see Yin 2009). Thus, Enugu metropolis was isolated for in-depth investigation due to the location of Enugu as the capital of the old Eastern region amongst others.

We adopted the mixed methods approach for data collection and analysis. Mixed methods involve the collection and integration of both quantitative and qualitative data in a study. It allows for triangulation of various data sources in order to attenuate the weaknesses embedded in any single method of data collection (Creswell 2014). Accordingly, we triangulated by using questionnaires and key informant interviews to obtain information from respondents sampled from our area of study. We also relied on secondary sources to obtain other relevant information that borders on revenue collection especially as it concerns use of violence by the revenue collectors.

In line with the mixed methods, data collected were analysed using content analysis of documentary data and responses of key informants, while simple descriptive analysis such as frequencies and percentages were adopted to analyse the questionnaires and other secondary data in quantitative form.
SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

We adopted a mix of cluster and purposive sampling technique to select a sample of 450 respondents. Cluster sampling was employed to select 150 respondents from each of the three local governments that make up Enugu metropolis (Enugu East, Enugu North and Enugu South). To ensure that the sample is representative enough in terms of occupation of the respondents, we purposively selected 150 commercial bus and tricycle drivers, 150 owners of various small and medium scale businesses, and 150 occupiers of residential houses. The instruments were administered with the assistance of six research assistants who read out the questionnaire items to the respondents and filled same on behalf of the respondents, most of whom could not read and write. Of the 450 instruments administered, 443 representing 98.4% were returned while 7 (1.6%) were not properly completed and therefore rejected.

HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF REVENUE (RATES AND TAXES) COLLECTION IN NIGERIA

As noted earlier, revenue collection by states is not new, but the strategies have remained dynamic. From the pre-colonial era, the hitherto existing empires, principalities and kingdoms had levied various forms of fines and taxes on their citizens and conquered territories in order to raise revenue. For instance, the Sokoto caliphate had a well-organised system through which various forms of taxes were collected to run the caliphate. These rates and taxes were in form of *Zakkat* levied on Moslems for educational, charitable and religious purposes; *kudin-kasa* levied on the utilisation of land; *Jangali*, known as cattle tax; *Shukka-Shukka* known as plantation tax; *haraji*, known as Moslem community tax; *gado*, levied as death duty on deceased estate paid to Emir in the absence of recognised heir; *kudin sarauta*, an accession duty paid by a Chief or office holder upon appointment; to mention a few. The Yoruba traditional political system levied rates and taxes such as the *ishakole*, which is a form land tax paid to Obas for the use of land for agricultural purposes; *Owo-ode*, which is individual tax paid by men and women in cash and kind in return for services and *Owo-Asingbu*, which consisted of personal services and food contributions (ICAN 2009; Okauru 2012). In the Igbo pre-colonial political system, there were no generally acceptable rates and taxes because of the decentralised system. However, taxes were levied in the form of *Utu* on members...
of the society through institutions like the age grade, kindred, town unions and so on.

However, with the advent of colonialism, the colonial state driven by the singular interest of exploitation employed all forms of violent strategies to extract revenue for administration of colonial government and remittance of surplus to Britain. Thus, in addition to exploitation of natural resources through forced labour, legislations were passed to legalise imposition of fines and collection of rates and taxes in the colonies. Although the colonial government collected various rates and taxes like the canoe or boat licensing fee of 10 shillings per annum as in 1866 in Lagos, direct taxation under the colonial government could be traced to introduction of the *Native Revenue Proclamation No. 2 of 1906* in the Northern Nigeria; the *Native Revenue Ordinance* of 1918 in Western Nigeria by Lord Lugard. Direct taxation was gradually extended to all other parts of Nigeria and physical violence was employed to enforce such taxes and repress any form of uprising. For instance, with the introduction of taxation in Western Nigeria, the resistance by Egba people led to the killing of no fewer than 500 Egba people by a crack force of 1000 soldiers dispatched to Egbaland by Lugard to suppress the resistance to tax collection. Similarly, the introduction of direct taxation in the Eastern province led to violent resistance in 1927 by the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko people against the tax collectors who were mobbed and fined by the protestants for collaborating with the white men. The Aba women riot of 1929 was also in resistance to taxation in the Eastern province (see Okauru 2012 for details).

As a result of resistance from the masses, colonial tax administration in Eastern Nigeria has a chequered history. However, taxation in colonial Eastern Nigeria is better appreciated from Native Authority Ordinance No. 43 of 1933 and No. 17 of 1943, as amended by Ordinance Nos. 3 and 73 of 1945, all of which governed tax administration in Eastern Nigeria until the enactment of the *Eastern Region Local Government Ordinance, 1950*, which led to the creation of counties, districts and local councils empowered to collect rates for financing local services and personal income tax. To correct the anomalies of the previous tax laws, the *1955 Eastern Nigeria Local Government Law* was passed and was followed by the *Eastern Region Finance Law of 1956*, which empowered the Department of Inland Revenue to assess and collect income tax. By 1958, the Raisman Commission was set up to come up with a uniform tax system across Nigeria.
Upon independence in 1960, the *Income Tax Management Act of 1961* and *The Companies Income Tax Act of 1961* were enacted in line with recommendations of the Raisman Commission (ICAN 2009; Okauru 2012). One major feature of tax administration in the independence era is that both the federal and regional governments were empowered to collect various rates and taxes concurrently, leading to multiple taxation. To reduce the multiplicity of taxes of the local and state governments and to eliminate the need for consultants, the Joint Tax Board (JTB) publicised the taxes each tier is empowered to levy, effective 1 April 1997 as shown in Table 13.1. The publication by JTB, which received statutory backing with Decree No. 21 of 1998 federal authority, was limited to eight specific taxes. The table reveals that the state and local governments were restricted to 11 and 20, respectively. However, the taxes yielding large chunk of the revenue were retained by the federal government. This partly explains why IGR remains low in most of the states, given that the states were not created based on economic viability.

**Revenue Collection in Enugu State**

The Personal Income Tax (Amendment) Act (PITA) No. 20, 2011, Section 87(a) (b) and (c) and Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) empower all State Boards of Internal Revenue to assess, collect and account for personal income taxes and penalties from all taxable adults who are resident in the state. Accordingly, the Enugu State Board of Internal Revenue (ESBIR) has been saddled with the primary responsibility of collecting all tax revenues either directly or in collaboration with independent revenue agents or consultants. Table 13.2 presents list of the IGR items approved by the state government for collection by the ESBIR. Other ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that are involved in revenue collection include the state Ministry of Transport, Enugu State Capital Development Authority (ECDA) and Enugu State Waste Disposal Management Agency (ESWAMA) to mention a few.

Like many other states in Nigeria, Enugu State has continued to depend on federal allocation for execution of state projects and payment of salaries. The state budget has continued to depend on the performance of oil price and sales. For example, the Enugu State vision 2020 Medium Term Implementation Plan 2012–2015 was articulated based on an estimated oil price of $75 per barrel (Enugu State Government 2012). IGR contribution to the total revenue of the state has remained low over the years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Federal Government</strong></th>
<th><strong>State Government</strong></th>
<th><strong>Local Government</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company income tax</td>
<td>Personal income tax (applies to residents of the state)</td>
<td>Tenancy rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum profit tax</td>
<td>Withholding tax (individuals only)</td>
<td>Shops and kiosk rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-added tax</td>
<td>Capital gains tax (individuals only)</td>
<td>Fees for on-off liquor licenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education tax (applies to companies, residents of the federal capital territory and non-resident individuals)</td>
<td>Stamp duties (applies to instruments executed by individuals only)</td>
<td>Fees for butcher slabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital gains tax (applies to corporate bodies and Abuja residents)</td>
<td>Road taxes (e.g. vehicle licenses)</td>
<td>Fees for marriage, birth and death registrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamp duties (applies to corporate bodies)</td>
<td>Taxes on pool bets, lottery and casino wins</td>
<td>Fees for street name registration (except in the state capital)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withholding tax (applies to companies)</td>
<td>Business premises and registration fees in urban and rural areas:</td>
<td>Motor park fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income tax (applies to personnel of the armed forces, police, External Affairs Ministry and residents of Abuja)</td>
<td>Urban areas as defined by each state, maximum of ₦10,000 for registration and ₦5000 per annum for renewal of registration</td>
<td>Market taxes and levies (except any market where state finance is involved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural areas: ₦2000 for registration and ₦1000 per annum for renewal of registration</td>
<td>Fees for domestic animal licenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development levy (max of ₦100 per annum applies to taxable individuals only)</td>
<td>Fees for bicycles, trucks, canoes, wheelbarrows, carts and canoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street name registration fees (state capital only)</td>
<td>Fees for right of occupancy on land in rural areas (except those of federal and state governments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fees for right of occupancy on urban land owned by the state government</td>
<td>Cattle tax, applies to cattle farmers only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market taxes and levies where state finance is involved</td>
<td>Entertainment and road closure levy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous revenue (e.g. rent on property)</td>
<td>Fees for radio and television licenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicle parking and radio license fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Charges for wrongful parking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fees for public convenience, sewage and refuse disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Customary ground permit fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fees for permits for religious establishments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fees for permits for signboards, billboards and advertisements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For instance, Table 13.3 reveals that on an average, between 2007 and 2011, IGR has remained a paltry 16% of total state government revenue.

In order to improve IGR performance in the state in line with extant tax laws, the Enugu State government has taken various steps to block revenue leakages and expand and improve IGR collections in the state. Some of the steps taken in this regard include automation of motor vehicle licensing (AutoReg), number plate sales and automation of the collection process through introduction of the Pay-Direct platform, to mention a few.

The major challenge of revenue collection in the state is the use of untrained persons for revenue collection, non-automation of the collection processes, in most cases revenue are manually collected. Again, there is dominance of the informal sector in the state’s economy characterised by operators of unregistered small- and medium-scale businesses. This use of touts for revenue collection, non-automation of revenue collection and dominance of informal sector coalesce to engender violence in the process of revenue collection.

### Table 13.2 Approved taxes and levies approved for collection by Enugu State government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Personal income tax</td>
<td>ESBIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Pay as you earn (PAYE)</td>
<td>ESBIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Direct assessment (self-assessment)</td>
<td>ESBIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Withholding tax (individuals only)</td>
<td>ESBIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Capital gains tax (individuals only)</td>
<td>ESBIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Road taxes</td>
<td>ESBIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Development levy (individuals only)</td>
<td>ESBIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Market taxes and levies (in markets where government finances are involved)</td>
<td>ESBIR/Local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Stamp duties on instruments executed by individuals</td>
<td>Ministry of finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pools betting, lotteries and gaming and casino taxes</td>
<td>Ministry of finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Business premises</td>
<td>Ministry of commerce and industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Naming of street registration fees in the state capital</td>
<td>Capital territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Right of occupancy fees</td>
<td>Ministry of lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Various SHoA enactments</td>
<td>MDAs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Enugu State Board of Internal Revenue (2014). *Enugu State IGR Improvement Strategy and Implementation Plan*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FAAC (N)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>VAT (N)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>IGR (N)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total (H)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>22,173,023,248.98</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3,434,308,257.54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4,755,471,509.43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30,362,803,015.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>30,151,865,649.60</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4,774,401,266.37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,888,208,160.79</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38,814,475,076.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>24,972,457,409.90</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4,950,396,154.19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4,702,872,549.01</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34,625,726,113.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>27,865,981,340.13</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5,866,030,085.46</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9,346,797,669.56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43,078,809,095.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>44,485,977,290.51</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6,826,188,221.16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9,888,423,723.13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>61,200,589,234.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149,649,304,339.12</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25,851,323,984.72</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32,581,773,611.92</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>208,082,402,535.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE CULTURE OF VIOLENT REVENUE COLLECTION IN ENUGU METROPOLIS: AGENTS AND VICTIMS

Much of the taxpayers in Enugu State operate in the informal sector and most are oblivious of their tax liability and/or when such liabilities are due. Due to the poor tax collection system, which gives room for tax evasion, in most cases, some of these taxpayers try to evade tax payment. On the other hand, the tax collection agents deployed by the tax collection agencies are mostly untrained persons who also take advantage of the crude collection process and poor knowledge of the taxpayers to indulge in racketeering, intimidation of the taxpayers and adoption of violence to extract money from the taxpayers.

In Enugu metropolis, both the state government through the ESBIR and other MDAs and the three local governments that make up the metropolis are always in aggressive search for revenue. This sometimes turns the state to a theatre of war between the revenue collectors and the taxpayers, as pockets of clashes are witnessed on daily basis between the revenue collectors and taxpayers along the streets of Enugu metropolis. In addition to the three local governments, some of the MDAs that have gained notoriety for use of violence to extract revenue from individuals are the Enugu State Ministry of Transport, Enugu State Capital Development Authority (ECDA) and Enugu State Waste Disposal Management Agency (ESWAMA).

Some of the contentious rates and taxes collected by these agencies include: road taxes/traffic violation fines; radio licences; business premises; tenement rates and waste disposal (ESWAMA). These revenue items have been sources of clashes not just because of racketeering by the collecting agents but also because most of the touts used for direct revenue collection are ignorant of the provisions of the law establishing such revenue items. The traffic violation fines, for example, have remained a major source of violent clash between the residents/visitors and the revenue collectors. This is because most traffic control officers deployed to the roads are untrained and do not understand traffic laws, so it becomes problematic when such untrained officers try to place a fine on road users even when such road user has not violated any traffic law. Similarly, the tenement rates are levied on landlords, but most local government councils deploy touts, some of whom are armed with machetes to intimidate and harass the tenants from whom they collect bribes ranging from ₦500 to ₦2000 instead of getting the landlords to pay the approved tenement rates. Tenants who refuse to pay the bribe usually have their properties confiscated by these touts and are asked to produce the landlords or visit the
local government council and collect their properties when they are ready to offer bribes.

The above argument is supported by the field survey conducted in Enugu metropolis. Table 13.4 reveals that almost all of the commercial bus and tricycle drivers agreed that they meet revenue collectors on daily basis in the course of their business, 88% also agree that multiple transportation taxes still exist in the state as they pay transport levies to both state and local governments. Meanwhile, only 45% of the commercial drivers said physical violence has been meted out to them by the revenue collectors at one point or the other. Majority of the respondents said the revenue collectors are not armed. Again, 81% of the commercial drivers agree that their membership of union mitigate the harassment by the revenue collectors. However, majority (93%) of the drivers believe that the union has not reduced the taxes and rates paid. When questioned further, they indicated that the union leaders are complicit in the extortion of the commercial drivers. The drivers argue that the union introduced all forms of union dues, which increase the rates and taxes the drivers pay. They also allege that the union members negotiate taxes and rates with the government and revenue-collecting agencies in return for personal favours they may get from the government. The implication of this is that membership of union by commercial bus and tricycle drivers reduce the tendency by the rate collectors to use physical violence on the bus drivers. However, the union members tend to further increase the taxes paid by the drivers through introduction of union dues.

Table 13.4 Responses of commercial bus and tricycle drivers in Enugu metropolis on use of violence by revenue collectors to collect rates and taxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Do you meet revenue collectors on daily basis in the course of your daily business activities?</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Did the revenue collectors adopt physical violence to collect rates and taxes?</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Do you think there is multiple taxation by both the state and local governments in the state?</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Do you belong to any transport union?</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Do you think your union assists in reducing the taxes and rates charged?</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Do you think your union assists in reducing the use of violence by the revenue collectors?</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Are the revenue collectors armed?</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017
Concerning use of violence on small and medium business operators and tenants in residential areas of the state by revenue collectors, responses of respondents as contained in Tables 13.5 and 13.6 indicate that most operators of small and medium businesses (82%) and tenants in residential areas of the state by revenue collectors, responses of respondents as contained in Tables 13.5 and 13.6 indicate that most operators of small and medium businesses (82%) and tenants in residential

Table 13.5  Responses of operators of small and medium businesses in Enugu metropolis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Do government revenue collectors visit your business premises to collect any form of rates or taxes?</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Are all the approved rates and taxes demanded by the revenue collectors well known to you?</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Do any use any form of force or harassment to get you pay the tax and rates?</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Do they collect cash or confiscate your properties as a form of fine for non-payment of the rates and taxes?</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Do they issue receipt when they collect money from you as fine for non-payment?</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Are the revenue collectors armed with any form of weapon?</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Do you get protection from such extortion and harassment from any kind of union?</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017

Table 13.6  Responses of tenants living in rented houses in Enugu metropolis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Do government revenue collectors visit your home for collection of any government revenue?</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Are you well informed about all of the approved taxes and rates they are expected to collect?</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Do any use any form of force or harassment to get you pay the tax?</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Do they collect cash or confiscate your properties as a form of fine for non-payment of the rates and taxes?</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Do they issue receipt when they collect money from you as fine for non-payment?</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Are the revenue collectors armed with any form of weapon?</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Do you get protection from such harassment and extortion from any security agency?</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017
apartments (92%) in Enugu are not fully aware of all the approved rates and taxes they are expected to pay. This gives room for intimidation and harassment by revenue collectors. For example, 86% and 92% of business operators and tenants in residential areas respectively agree that the revenue collectors use violence to get them pay the rates and taxes. Again, 78% and 89% of business operators and tenants in residential areas respectively agree that the revenue collectors collect cash or confiscate their properties as form of fine for non-payment of the rates and taxes. Further, all of the respondents agree that no receipt is issued when such cash are collected from them. Our data suggest existence of widespread extortion and use of violence by the revenue collectors in the process of discharging their duties as revenue collectors. Again, the collection of cash without issuance of receipt indicates that such fines are not accounted for.

Concerning the tiers of government and agents that harass them the most, commercial bus drivers identified the local and state governments as tiers of government that harass them the most. While local government collectors of radio licences and stickers were identified as major users of violence in the local governments, and the State Ministry of Transport and ECDA were identified as the agencies that mostly adopt violence more in revenue collection (see Table 13.7). The tenants in residential apartments are divided: while some identified the state agents (ESWAMA), others identified the local government agents (tenement rate collectors) as major users of violence. Operators of small and medium businesses identified also both the state and local government revenue collectors as users of violence.

Table 13.7  Responses of respondents on which of the tiers of government use violence more in revenue collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Respondent classification</th>
<th>Federal revenue collectors</th>
<th>State revenue collectors</th>
<th>LGA revenue collectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commercial bus and tricycle drivers</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operators of small and medium businesses</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tenants in residential apartments</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017
violence in revenue collection. However, most of the respondents identified ESWAMA and local government agents for collection of business premises as major users of violence.

Generally, data in the table indicate that the local government revenue collectors are the worse in terms of adoption of violence in revenue collection as 51.7% of the respondents identified them as the major users of violence in revenue collection as against 48.3% who identified the state as major users of violence in revenue collection. These data have also been presented in a pie chart (Fig. 13.1) for clarity. More worrisome is the use of arms by some of the revenue collectors. For instance, data in Tables 13.5 and 13.6 indicate that some of the revenue collectors carry along arms in the process of enforcing rates and taxes. Further discussion with the respondents reveals that the type of arms carried by these collectors include jack knives, machetes, metals and sticks.

**CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS**

The study sets out to analyse the culture of violence by armed and unarmed revenue collection officers in urban cities of Nigeria with specific focus on Enugu metropolis. Our analysis shows that the states and local governments experience fiscal challenges due to the lopsided federal structure of post-colonial Nigerian state which concentrates major sources of revenue at the centre. However, in view of the fact that the constitution empowers all the three tiers of government to collect specified rates and taxes concurrently, the states and local governments have continued to adopt the strategies that translates to use of armed and unarmed agents to enforce rates and taxes on the citizens. This is especially so with the reducing oil revenue, increasing cost of governance and growth of neoliberal ideology which emphasise the need to increase tax rates while reducing government spending. Our study shows that Enugu metropolis has gained notoriety
for the activities of armed and unarmed revenue collectors of state MDAs and local government who are turning the state into the Hobbesian state of nature by the crude and violent revenue collection strategies. More so, the major victims of this violence are the helpless operators in the informal economy, such as commercial drivers, owners of small and medium business and tenants in residential apartments in the state. Apparently, in recent times, the state government has taken measures to reduce the violent activities of these legal and illegal revenue collectors, but more still needs to be done, especially at the local government level.

**Recommendations**

On the basis of the findings of this study, we put forward the following recommendations:

- Restructuring of the federal system should emphasise economic viability of the states and local governments by allowing states to collect big revenue-yielding taxes like value-added tax (VAT) and company income tax. This would reduce incidence of multiple taxation and the tendency of using violence to suppress resistance to multiple and obnoxious rates and taxes.
- There is need for the states and local governments to automate the collection system and reduce cash payment. Taxpayers should adequately be educated of how, when and what to pay in terms of rates and taxes.
- There should be state and local government tax tribunals for trying defaulting taxpayers who should be arrested, if need be, by obtaining arrest warrant from the appropriate authority. The tribunals should also try revenue collectors who use violence in the course of their duty. This would reduce incidence of harassment, intimidation and use of violence by the tax collectors.

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CHAPTER 14

Porous Borders and Human Trafficking in Nigeria

Willie Eselebor

INTRODUCTION

Trafficking in humans is not new. It is an age-old phenomenon, which has transformed over time from slavery to its present status. The scourge did not engage the attention of the international community until it was criminalised in 2000, under the United Nation (UN) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, referred to as the Palermo Protocol. Since then, issue-based problematics of human trafficking have gathered momentum among scholars and practitioners, due mainly to increasing political awareness of the dangers and the casualties resultant from plight of victims, who suffer from the abuse. However, researches have shown how little is known about this problem from the African perspective, prompting the interrogation of other factors, beyond the normative push-pull factors. As this study illustrates, porous borders are a major factor in the commission and operation of trafficking, which if addressed through proactive measures of early warning and prevention can be potent tools in eliminating the scourge. This chapter takes the analysis further through background
information, clear statement of objectives and clarification of key concepts. This is followed by methodology, discussion of causative factors and conventions against human trafficking. A broad analysis of the North-South dynamics is carried out, detailing the routes, pattern, open border linkages ending up with straightening border governance regimes, recommendations and conclusion.

**Background Information**

Human trafficking in Africa has its roots in the pre-colonial slave trade that was abolished in the wake of colonialism (Njoku 2015). However, the modern organised and non-organised trends of trafficking in humans are traceable to the creation of artificial and unrealistic borders by European colonialists (Asiwaju 1990; Adejo 2003). These borders were exploited for economic gains by cross-border criminals like smugglers and traffickers in the face of the prevalent economic hardship. The moral decadence that characterised post-colonial Nigeria also exacerbated the situation.

Since independence, Nigeria has experienced bad governance, poverty and looting of public funds, made worse by an ineffectual criminal justice system. This has cemented the linkage between corruption and organised crime and ensured that they are entrenched in the fabric of the society (Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Fayomi 2009; Ajagun 2012; Essien 2013; IMADR 2015; Iyanda and Nwogwugwu 2016). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2004) ranks Nigeria among the poorest countries in West Africa, but how this development connects with the scourge remains a subject of debate. Hardship and poverty is often connected to the failure of government to increase the living standards of the people (Merton, 1968, cited in Aborisade 2013). With abject poverty and pervasive ineptitude, the environment for unlawful migration is attained.

The excesses of the military regimes, which the country experienced for a significant period of years, have been pinpointed by some scholars as a causative factor for the surge in human trafficking. Thus, Olateru (2006) fault the severe political, social and economic crises as responsible for outward flows in human trafficking during the decades of military regimes. The International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR) (2015) asserts that corruption facilitates trafficking, when border security officials are induced, and they create the window of opportunity for traffickers to violate the border spaces with impunity.
Meanwhile, Fayomi (2009) posits that poverty, which cuts across gender, coupled with insecurity, accounts for the sustenance of the trade on humans. Similarly, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that was a feature of the Ibrahim Babangida military regime has been identified by Iyanda and Nwogwugwu (2016) as a major trigger for the rise in human trafficking in Nigeria. This is because this policy further impoverished the poor, with cutbacks on social investment, including education, employment, food and agriculture, thereby making the condition of living extremely difficult. Furthermore, IMADR (2015) asserts that corruption aids human trafficking and is networked in such a way that it involves several chains, right from transit to destination points, whereby illicit payments are arranged for border officials.

**Borders in Nigeria**

Nigeria is an ex-British colony, and it has a total land mass of about 923,768 square kilometres. It became independent on October 1, 1960 and it shares international (land, excluding maritime) boundaries with the following Francophone countries:

1. Benin Republic—773 kilometres;
2. Republic of Cameroun—1690 kilometres;
3. Niger Republic—1497 kilometres; and
4. Chad Republic—85 kilometres.

The conditions of most of the borders, especially in the North-East, are exceedingly appalling. A climate of porosity is glaring, which portends gaps in governance, as the absence of basic infrastructure alienates the government from the border communities that ought to partner the security agencies in the combat against human trafficking. Basically the borders have been turned into crime opportunity spaces for smuggling arms, humans, drugs and other dangerous substances. It provides a solid basis for enemies of the nation to violate the borders and travel to destinations of choice because the awareness that the borders are open and leaky aids in no small measure in clandestine migration. Permeable borders are added incentives that greatly assist in recruitment and transportation of humans.
Aim and Objectives

It is easy to discern from the profile of borders in Nigeria that the nation is at risk from openness of its borders, made possible due to colonial partition and the consequence of permeability due to unregulated mobility of migrants. Just as migration pressures are on the increase, the ease of migrating has improved, and these opportunities are supported by globalised and porous borders. Human trafficking, like normal trade, has benefitted from the global trend of reduced hindrance of crossing borders. The general aim of this study is to interrogate how porous borders help sustain the unintended consequences of traffic in humans for financial gains by

• identifying patterns and dimensions of trafficking routes,
• analysing the drivers and how they connect with opportunistic open borders and
• proffering solutions to strengthen border governance structures in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

Key concepts found important and germane to this study include borders, porous borders and border security. Others are human trafficking, forced labour and migrant smuggling. These terms are technical and are explained in the context that they are used in this discourse. The term “border” is used instead of boundary because of the contemporary connotation which makes border fluid and not fixated. Similarly, human trafficking is used interchangeably with traffic-in-persons as a concept, thus limiting the complexity of the dynamics of categorisation of potential victims of abuse. Fair enough, terms conceptualised herein are assigned meanings relative to what obtains in border studies.

Borders

Border, as a concept, will continue to take on new meanings due to its multidisciplinary approach in studies. Traditionally, borders refer to geographic and legal demarcations of political entities, notably sovereign states, federated units and other subordinate entities. In its broader form, borders connote identity and separation in that it emphasises what is to be
included and excluded, which is evident in the classifications of a border by scholars as either geographical or symbolic with the former associated with definite territories and the latter associated with social representations that cut across physical and official barriers. Definition of a border will sometimes capture it as a form of demarcation—geographical, historic, socio-economic, political or legal. For the purpose of analysis, the border remains that line which demarcates and separates two entities or countries, and must be crossed, for external traffic-in-person to have taken place. Eselebor (2008) refers to it as line delimiting the sovereign extent of a nation and its legal bounds. An example is the border between Benin Republic (Krake) and Nigeria (Seme) in the South-West or between Niger (Birni Koni) and Nigeria (Ilella) in the North-West. The difference in names assigned is also reflected in the features, perspectives and what it means historically. No one border is exactly the same, but they share common features as bridges, barriers or buffer zones. Transactions that take place within and around the border spaces are sometimes regulated, with the presence of key security agencies, as well as unregulated with the absence of security agencies, which makes the facility permeable.

**Border Security**

Borders serve as security space, with the function of keeping away undesirable elements and harmful substances from gaining access into and from the country. The ability to secure territorial borders is one of the features of a strong and vibrant government, and a factor in the designation of a state as sovereign, viable and secured. Security as a concept defies a single and consensual definition due to its broader scope, encompassing both tradition (hard) and human (soft) approaches. The concept also overlaps with the concept of power, authority and the monopoly of use of force. All these entail control measures, and the enabling laws provide for the basic regulation. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) provides in Section 14 (1) (b) that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. In context, it is the responsibility of the government to protect and provide security to its citizens, no matter where they are domiciled. Border security as conceived in this chapter includes protection from danger, violence, fear and want that impairs or is capable of impairing the rights of citizens and non-citizens alike, wherever they chose to live, including the border communities under the scope of this discourse.
This is not different from what Okumu (2010) visualised as an aspect of border management. Border security entails mechanisms designed and put in place to regulate and control the movement of persons, goods and service across borders, with due diligence and focus, safety and security. By virtue of the foregoing, the Customs, Immigration, Drug Enforcement Agency and Directorate of State Security among others are key security agencies saddled with the task of securing Nigeria from threats and imminent danger of violation. Traffic-in-humans, which also includes smuggling of migrants, has been identified as a part of transborder crimes that are of serious concerns to national security.

POROUS BORDERS

Porous borders are permeable and leaky borders, which do not have the presence of border security agencies. Porosity of borders also refers to the penetrability, fluidity occasioned by absence of any form of regulation and unofficial transactions outside officialdom in several contexts that are unhealthy and harmful. These unapproved entry and exit routes exist in borderlands and in the maritime domain. The borders are remote, least developed and far from urban centres, which experience neglect in terms of provision of basic amenities like health, education and other infrastructures. Some notable features include uncontrolled access routes, absence of security and rule of law and the existence of village clienteles as support group.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Human trafficking is used interchangeably with traffic-in-persons, though there are some levels of difference, which are becoming increasingly blurred by confusion over and between smuggle, meaning traffic sometimes and traffic meaning circulation as concepts. There are several definitions and meanings assigned to human trafficking concept from the perspectives of International Labour Organization (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and others. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) (Article 3.a) defines trafficking in human beings as:

> the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

This definition seems encompassing, which in terms means that the vulnerable groups are recruited (sourced), transported (transit) and harboured to other countries, other than that of origin (received). Nigeria is home to internal undercurrents of human trafficking that goes on locally, especially for domestic servitude, child labour and sex trade. While the impact of internal trafficking is significant, the external dimension of traffic-in-persons is more of global concern in this discourse. Nigeria is also a receiving country of minors trafficked for labour in quarries located in remote areas in Ogun State, South-West Nigeria and other forms of domestic servitude mainly in the urban centres of Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano, Abuja and other cities.

**Forced Labour**

Forced labour has to do with conscription and involuntary employment of persons. The Forced Labour Convention Act 1930 No. 29, an International Labour Organization document captures it to mean:

Forced or compulsory labour is all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily.

Aptly put, the above refers to a condition of use of coercion, deception and, in some cases, violence, in which persons are recruited to work. Other subtler means such as manipulated debt repayment conditions, bonding, retention of valid travel documents or threats of repatriation and deportation are employed in this regard. Employment-seeking persons, who migrate from the South to the North in search of opportunities, fall prey and are conscripted into labour in remote farms, construction sites, quarries and mines. They are not waged according to recognised labour laws on terms mutually agreeable to the contracting parties, and most often because of the low power base to negotiate a living income, they fall prey to manipulation of swindlers.
Migrant smuggling is another variant of transnational organised crime that is criminalised. What distinguishes human trafficking from smuggling is consent of the victim and the fact that the smuggler is doing it for a fee. It is a highly syndicated business that is profit driven and based on contractual agreement that is finalised, if the deliverable (journey) is successfully concluded. According to the UN General Assembly document The Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants (2000), Article 3 (a):

“Smuggling of migrants” shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.

This act is carried out without proper documentation and, in most cases, crossing of borders illegally. A very typical example is the current surge of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.

Literature Review

Many scholars have written on the different dimensions of human trafficking in Nigeria, ranging from internal trafficking within rural areas to cities and trafficking outside the external borders of the country. They include Gbadamosi (2006), Fayomi (2009), Abdulraheem and Oladipo (2010), Essien (2013) and Njoku (2015), among others, that tried variously to explain the dynamics of trafficking and the possible routes that traffickers embark on through clandestine movements. It is instructive that, while some of the literature surveyed have been dedicated to narratives on the causes and effects of trafficking, including women, children and those categorised as smuggled, the role of crime place is sometimes downplayed.

Several scholars have likened human trafficking to a modern-day extension of the abolished slavery and situated it as crime against humanity. Other scholars have also described it as a global phenomenon that cuts across borders, that has attracted global responses in the form of international statutes and conventions (Gbadamosi 2006; Abdulraheem and Oladipo 2010). Other extant literature views human trafficking as migration crisis, which is poverty induced, arising from unequal opportunities between nations that are classified as developed and developing, as con-
tained in the scholarly work of Gwary (2006). Certainly, inequality in standard of living and income are causative factors in the desire to migrate, but it must be carried out under lawful circumstances.

Furthermore, Njoku (2015) explained the permeability of the borders as an inherent factor that drives human trafficking, more so when there are noticeable deficits in manpower and technology required to effectively police the vast and expansive borders. Other internal triggers are youth bulge and unemployment, a condition which the syndicated traffickers explore in convincing unsuspecting youth to embark on migration to Europe. The non-inclusion of border communities in border security framework also has serious implications, and this also explains the near-absence of intelligence regarding the clandestine movement of traffickers and how it could be addressed.

However, the link between porous borders and human trafficking has yielded inaccurate details in terms of the statistics of outflows since the act is clandestine and largely undocumented in nature. The borders are classified as security constructs, and access to gathering information in such domains has been met with stiff resistance from the apparatus of security agencies. It is believed that the determination of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Person (NAPTIP) to reduce and sanction human traffickers is not yielding desired results, since the surge is noticeably not abating, as evidenced from the number of casualties and those rescued of the coast of Libya trying to reach Europe. While this position is critical, how porous borders aid human trafficking remains under-researched because field data collection in security-regulated environment is problematic. The border space in terms of accessibility and how the absence of capable guardians assists in crime occurrence are major factors which this chapter seeks to establish as part of new initiatives to reduce human trafficking occurrences in Nigeria.

Again, Njoku (2015) admits that Nigeria’s borders are hospitable to human traffickers, but did not go further to explain how the gaps in security governance of borders are exploited by human traffickers. Perhaps, Iyanda and Nwogwugwu (2016) made allusion to the fact that

for every trafficker that is apprehended, there are several hundreds who may be utilizing some of the many unmanned illegal routes across the country’s borders. This makes the war against trafficking a very difficult one in the country.
While these assertions paint a vivid picture of the problems of operational failures, current known figures of the number of authorised entry points and unauthorised borders in Nigeria are most unsettling. The erstwhile Comptroller General of Immigration—Martins Kure Abeshi—in 2016, during The Annual Comptroller General Conference held in Lafia, Nassarawa State of Nigeria confirmed existence of 114 legal routes and about 1400 illegal routes spread over the more than 4084 square kilometres of borders in Nigeria. The situation is pathetic because the Nigerian Immigration Service has a complement of only 23,000 staff, not sufficient to man the borders as required. It goes further to establish why the borders are porous and exploited by criminal gangs and why migration management is a significant aspect of security.

Adepelumi (2015) cited porous borders, limited commitments, human capacity gaps of immigration and other law enforcement agencies to control borders as a factor in reducing human trafficking but did not carry out an in-depth study on how porous borders aid human trafficking in border localities in Nigeria. Olateru (2006) extrapolated the lack of success in reducing human trafficking in Nigeria as a function of weak border controls within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region, while canvassing for the strengthening of border controls as a potential strategy for countering human trafficking. It is in recognition of the above gaps that this study is found necessary and relevant to strengthen the border security architecture of Nigeria.

**Crime Pattern Theory**

Paul and Patricia Brantingham developed, in 1981, the Crime Pattern Theory, which has been widely acclaimed as an improvement on deviance or non-conformity in criminal behaviours, as it relates to rational choice and routine activity theories. Crime Pattern postulation is firm upon the probability that there is a much stronger geographic resonance, which in this case is the existence of a porous border, which informs the thought process of committing crime like human trafficking. The porous border being the action space is the arena in which offenders will make a choice to smuggle or traffic in humans, since awareness of such nodes create opportunities to commit a crime with lesser probability of interdiction.

Familiarity with the geographical space, openness of the facility and increased frequency of commuting have influence and drive the impunity traffickers to undertake human trafficking under low-risk-assessment conditions. The trafficker is also familiar with the strength and capacity of the
Nigerian Immigration Service to deploy and take proactive measures. Most importantly, they build alliances with the border community people and local non-state actors to undermine countermeasures.

This theory aids our understanding of the string of indicators of how \(\text{(ways), when (timing) and where (Place)}\) human traffickers choose to commit crime. The indicators are critical in identification of crime nodes, which this chapter postulates as incidental and not accidental to traffic-in-persons. Traffickers engage in crime-related activities after an intelligence-driven assessment of the crime place and other opportunities, before a final decision is taken to embark on trafficking, which includes evaluating the risk of

- the likelihood of successful operations, made possible by porosity of borders,
- absence of capable guardians (border security—immigration officials),
- apprehension weighted against weak criminal justice system and
- returns on investment (profit) or net monetary gains accruing from the crime.

Trafficking and smuggling of humans are made easy because the border settings are porous and cannot work as security filters to deter harmful movements. We are better equipped in designing proactive countermeasures to human trafficking, if the recruitment process is understood to be in remote locations; the methods include deception and where the movement eventually takes place which is the border. This is in addition to cutting of the sources of repatriation of the proceeds of crimes after completion of a round trip of trafficking.

In dealing with the problems of trafficking and smuggling, we need to expand the scope beyond crime pattern, wearing the lens to visualise also the provider (sourcing), the travel agent or facilitator (broker), the transit holder (brothel keeper) and the market (consumer). Traffic-in-persons is demand driven. Without demand, the supply will be dormant, and the lure to engage in trafficking will be negative. It is a combination of a set of factors that makes human trafficking thrive, and the possible solutions must take into consideration multi-sectoral approaches. We need to understand that each phase of the trafficking process generates its own energy to bypass countermeasures to put in place to disrupt human trafficking, be it at the local, transit or destination circle.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

While noting that trafficking of humans is clandestine in nature and largely undocumented, characteristically it thrives on false identity. The international borders are important in tracking the number of externally trafficked persons; however, it remains a restricted area for research due to the bureaucracy of obtaining permission for field surveys, using questionnaires and interviews. This is in spite of the changing nature of state-centric approach to border studies, with emphasis on human security. The routes are also not regular, which predisposed field surveys to high-risk factors, and it makes the generation of accurate data on the outflow of trafficked persons difficult to achieve. It is therefore not an accident that statistics in this thematic area is limited in scope, and the reliability of any if available, is doubtful. The identified shortcomings leave no option for the chapter to weigh in on secondary sources such as published materials, reports, journals and newspapers. This is, however, complemented with field experience of non-participant observation in border settings.

CAUSATIVE FACTORS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Several factors account for the increase in human trafficking in Nigeria. Broadly categorised, they include both push and pull factors.

Push factors—bad socio-economic condition, poverty, corruption and injustice. These also include unequal access to welfare conditions, lack of employability, deprivation and human rights abuses, which traffickers most often exploit to prey on their victims. Conflicts, wars and recession in the economy also contribute in no small measure as push factors.

Pull factors—refer to factors that are eye-catching contributors which lure victims, such as expectation of higher income differentials, good welfare and social security systems contribute to the pull factors and the desire to seek better opportunities in destination countries. Though there is demand for cheap labour in countries of choice, the reality that living wage in destination countries is far higher than the pay-offs in home country attracts labour movement.

The above is supported by Pearson and Ezeh (2017), who identified living conditions that are harsh and unbearable as trigger factors. Again, Gbadamosi (2006), Olateru (2006), Fayomi (2009) and Adepelumi (2015) find justification for this development on conditions relative to poverty and unemployment, which generate outflow of persons. While
noting that push and pull factors are major themes in the analysis of trafficked persons, the causative factors go beyond such explanations to include elements such as:

1. **Dysfunctional family setting**—obviously, children from large families most often feel neglected, if not properly catered for, and may want to explore opportunities far away from the home, which also includes fending for oneself and a feeling of adventurism.

2. **Weak criminal justice systems**—apart from the very fact that the criminal justice system is weak, it stands to reason that it offers no protection for the most vulnerable in the society, thereby helping to sustain the human trafficking network. When people feel unsafe, they naturally will seek refuge in any other place that offers the hope and security.

3. **Lure of high profits**—reasonably tied to weak institutions is the lure of profit in the sale of victims into servitude, prostitution and forced labour. The victims are first made to believe that the movement is for their self-benefit and that living in poverty reduces self-esteem, which makes the need to risk embarking of risky journeys across the Mediterranean Sea a better option.

4. **Economic standpoint**—job opportunities are shrink in the developing world and, even if they are available, they are highly contested and corrupted. This leaves no option for a graduate to seek, through whatever means opportunities elsewhere, even if the income is menial and low.

5. **Emotional distress**—due mainly to loss of trust and confidence in governance, most youth run into emotional distress and resort to drug abuse, which further motivate them into undertaking dangerous journey through deserts and rough terrains to country of choice.

6. **Cultural tradition of extended family help**—unchanged cultural traditions of old practices of family help accounts mostly for internal traffic-in-persons. Parents in rural villages volunteer to send their wards to family members in urban centres to learn professional trades and apprenticeship skills.

7. **Tough visa regimes**—the desire to avail oneself to be trafficked can also be attributed to the tough and harsh visa regimes. There are high volumes of visa refusals from embassies in Nigeria, which
makes intending migrants predisposed to seeking alternative means. Narratives from traffic victims attest to the fact that youth between the ages of 16 and 40 are at risk of refusal of visas/entry clearance, even if the reason for travel is genuine. Conversely, the embassies hinge the large number of refusals on document fraud and lack of visible means of livelihood.

8. **Brain-drain syndrome**—human trafficking lures vibrant young men and women away from less developed economies by creating the illusion of better living conditions in destination countries. Brain drain deprives the country of the services of high-skilled manpower required for nation building, while various visa lottery programmes take away few who are lucky and the unlucky applicants follow-up through the route of illegalities due to increased remittances.

9. **Corruption**—corruption plays a crucial role, through bribery of border security agencies, brothel keepers and village brokers, including duly registered travel agencies that participate in the trafficking circle. There is a large army of border guides, escorts and crooks who engage in this business and eke a living from conveying and connecting potential victims to their clienteles. It is a complex web of transaction that is coded and highly syndicated.

10. **Permeable borders**—the nature and characteristics of existing border call to question governance regimes by border security agencies. Most of the 4045 kilometres of land frontiers that Nigeria shares with Benin, Cameroun and Chad are porous and constitute avenues for human traffickers to operate without interdiction.

The advent of globalisation and the widespread introduction of Internet facilities may have negatively triggered the misapplication of such communication technologies for criminal activities. Although it is not a causative factor, it greatly assisted in posting online lucid pictures for online dating and sex trade. Evidences abound of postings of pornographic pictures, which are processes in scam activities that finally dovetail into human trafficking events. The list of causative factors is inexhaustible, but what are the issues, opportunities and how does open borders promote these activities?
International conventions are instruments that are conduits for dealing with the problems of human trafficking. Most of the earliest attempts to criminalise traffic-in-persons dates back to 1926, when the Slavery Convention was first enacted. This was closely followed by the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery in 1956. There are other supportive instruments like The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979).

Certainly, some of these international conventions have specific areas of focus, though related to human trafficking, smuggling and other instances of women, child rights instruments are exactly the same, depending on the focus, be it labour matters, women and minors smuggled. Looking at the specifics, the most potent instruments to combat trafficking have been the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes called The Palermo Protocol, being a supplement to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, which entered into force in 2003–2004. There are other instruments from The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Status of Refugees (1951 & 1967). In addition, The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (2000) are important in the drive to reduce human trafficking. Recently in 2007, the UNODC established the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT).

The African Union (AU Commission in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in 2002, came out with a draft action plan to combat human trafficking, adducing reasons of poverty, inequality, corruption and lack of education as causative factors that should be addressed to reduce human trafficking. Other supporting continental instruments are as follows:

At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was conscious of the evils of human trafficking and initiated action plans against trafficking in persons in 2003. The plan of action contains measures to be taken, including legal, protection and support for victims of human trafficking, prevention and awareness raising, information exchange and training. Nigeria is a party and signatory to the UN Conventions, as well as African Union (AU) and ECOWAS plan of actions, which have been domesticated.

Cascaded down to the national level, Section 34 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) guarantees the right to the dignity of the human person thus prohibiting the subjection of any person to slavery and servitude. It prohibits the subjection of any person to slavery or servitude. In 2003, Nigeria passed the Child Rights Act, which broadly covers the crime of child trafficking. Also, Nigeria became the first African country to enact an anti-trafficking legislation with the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003. Subsequently, in order to broaden the scope of legislation and firm-up the penalties, the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act was enacted in 2015, which repealed the previous Act of 2003. Nigeria also adopted in 2008, the National Policy on Protection and Assistance to Trafficked Persons. This was aimed towards increasing the efforts of the country’s protection, rehabilitation and integration of trafficked persons.

**Implementation Strategies in Nigeria**

While noting that human trafficking is a global problem, strategies to combat the scourge cannot be limited to internal mechanisms. However, implementation strategies must begin with the admission that there is a problem to be solved and the setting up of structures to build strategies towards resolution. In the follow-up narratives, the implementation strategies can be disaggregated into three strands:

1. **Policy framework**—Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Trafficking
2. **Operational level**—setting up of an agency with statutory responsibilities for reduction
3. **Advocacy and activism**—the activities of non-governmental organisations
Policy framework—Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Trafficking:

Nigeria has signed several international treaties designed to combat human trafficking, but in 2001, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Trafficking was set up, which effectively recognised the problem at the strategic level of policymaking, with the mandate to bring together relevant ministerial departments and agencies (MDAs) to collaborate and respond to the problems of human trafficking in Nigeria. The committee is composed of the following ministries and agencies:

1. Justice
2. Interior
3. Women Affairs
4. National Planning Commission
5. Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation
6. Nigeria Police
7. Nigerian Immigration Service
8. Nigerian Customs Service

The Inter-Ministerial Committee activities were to be coordinated from Presidency, under the Office of the Special Assistant to the President on Human Trafficking and Child Labour. However, this committee did not function optimally and due mainly to lack of effective coordination and inter-agency rivalry, the tenure was short-lived. Another possible reason may well be the absence of an enabling legislation and lack of cohesion over implementation strategies.

Operation Level—National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP)

In furtherance of the resolve to deal with the problems of human trafficking in Nigeria, in 2003, the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP) was established, saddled with operational level functions. In 2005, the NAPTIP Act was amended to criminalise brothel keepers, found culpable in trafficking, sex trade and the exploitative use of children as house helps. The mission statement of NAPTIP is captured in four-Ps, which means prevention, protection, prosecution and partnership. The functions of NAPTIP revolve around administration of the Act in collaboration with key agencies like the Nigerian Immigration Service and the Nigeria Police. It must be stated clearly that NAPTIP is not fully deployed to border controls, a major gap in its operation, but the powers of the agency, among others, include:
1. arrest and prosecution of violators of the Act, 2015;
2. investigate any person, body or entity who may have committed human trafficking offence;
3. seek information to aid enforcement or prosecution of offenders;
4. enter into any premises for search purposes in furtherance of its functions; and
5. seizure of proceeds of crime associated with human trafficking.

NAPTIP is also involved in awareness campaigns, public enlightenment in schools, colleges and the university with a purpose to educate the young ones of the dangers of trafficking. It maintains eight zonal offices in locations that are focal points for human trafficking in Nigeria. The locations are Benin, Kano, Lagos and Oshogbo. Others are Makurdi, Maiduguri, Sokoto and Uyo. The agency also operates a whistle-blowers’ facility to aid reporting of suspected human trafficking activities, but its penetration into the network of criminal gangs hideouts remain unexplored. Nigeria presumed to have met the minimum standard for the elimination of traffic-in-person, being rated tier 2 on the watch list of 2017 report released by the United States. However, internal trafficking remains difficult due to the local dynamics and the lack of political will of the elites, who are the benefactors in reducing the demand for domestic servants in urban centres in Nigeria.

**Advocacy and Activism**

The fight against trafficking in humans requires multi-stakeholder approach, and hence the work of non-governmental agencies through activism is very crucial in this respect. The role of the traditional institutions, faith-based organisations and the family in human trafficking cannot be underestimated. Hence, advocacy including activism, awareness creation and information dissemination is very crucial in prevention and reduction. However, it is accepted that government alone cannot do all, but the support of private as well as non-governmental organisations are required and found to be cogent. The efforts of the Edo State government in enacting a bill to provide for the establishment of a taskforce on human trafficking is considered supportive, but enforcement alone will not work without the delivery of welfare packages for the youth in terms of social security and unemployment benefits. NAPTIP will need to support and fund NGOs to achieve the desired reduction in the eight focal states, identified earlier. Pioneering agencies already working the field of human trafficking, among others, include:
1. Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF)
2. Idia Renaissance Centre in Benin City
3. Women’s Consortium of Nigeria
4. Coalition Against Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children
5. Devatop Centre for Africa Development (DCAD)
6. Pathfinders Justice Initiatives

THE SOUTH-NORTH MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Classification, based on economic growth and development, has, to a large extent, had impact on the flow of migrants, and in this context, movement from the less-developed economies of Africa (South) to Europe (North). Attention is therefore focused on the drivers and the attractions. What can be obviously stated is that most of African are ravaged by conflicts, natural disasters and abject poverty. This is compounded by poor governance and lack of opportunity that makes people want to migrate to other stable and rich economies for survival. As development is sometimes attributed to the globalisation dynamics and the increasing structural disparity between the rich North and the impoverished South, migrants captured in this web are known to be in search of better living conditions and opportunities. Balancing this flow has remained problematic and the European Union has invested heavily trying to build structures to reduce and contain the flow, without corresponding success.

We also need to take into consideration that migration is dependent on economic well-being and most importantly, if the immigrant is not likely to be a liability on the host country. It is trite to believe that when the economy of Nigeria was stable and booming in the early 1970s, citizens of Nigeria had visa-free access to the UK. The situation reversed with economic downturn and greater exclusionary regimes that tend to restrict lawful migration, thus creating a market for transnational criminal networks that is profit driven and most often exploited by human traffickers and smugglers. The greater the barrier, the more the risks involved in illegal trafficking and the more profit that will accrue; hence, trafficking in humans continues to survive, since the market is viable.
The dimensions of human trafficking are not always North bound, but also regionalised and sometimes intra-African or intra-nation. The occurrences are not new but find explanation in several postulations. The Crime Pattern theory offers the framework that best fits the discourse.

**Discursive Analysis**

The chapter sets out to achieve three objectives of identifying the routes and drivers, including how they relate to opportunities created by open borders and to proffer solutions towards strengthening border regimes in Nigeria.

**Migration routes**—three types of migration routes are easily discernible for prospective migrants, and they include land, maritime and airside. While travel through the airport is more security compliant with vetting of travel documents to weed out unlawful travels, the same cannot be said of land and maritime borders. The land frontiers are particularly problematic due to its porous nature and because it is under-policed. ECOWAS member states enjoy freedom of movement of persons, goods and services, courtesy of the Treaty of 1975 and other related protocols. In addition to the above, it is important to note that Nigeria has visa abolition agreement with Cameroun and Chad, which are not member states of ECOWAS. What this means is that any person can migrate through shared borders (Benin, Cameroun, Chad and Niger) without visa requirements or restriction. This background is important for us to understand the enormity of the problem and that porosity of borders in Nigeria is not only generic from the regional policy regime in place but also some existing bi-lateral visa-free regimes that Nigeria entered into with Cameroun and Chad.

Generally, traffickers use same routes and methods for commuting. The land frontiers are mostly abused; however, they use ocean-going fishing boats and sometimes flotillas to evade clearance along maritime borders. The migration routes are not clearly defined, but they are conditioned upon the level of security and how easy it is to evade clearance from country of origin-transit-destination. A trafficked person can move possibly from Benin City, for example, to

1. Lagos-Abidjan Corridor–Libya-Spain or France
2. Kano-Agadez-Libya-Italy
4. Kano-Zinder-Agadez-Tripoli-Lampedusa—Spain
Sometimes preferred destination determines the routes, and Zinder, Agadez and Tripoli are preferred transit routes running through the desert. The instabilities and the absence of legitimate regime in Libya have also aided the trafficking business, and the Mediterranean Sea is now a zone of death for trafficked victims left unattended to in the dangerous Lampedusa sea arena.

**Trafficking Pattern**

Trafficking in humans is dynamic and follows a complex pattern. Just as human behaviour is unpredictable, the routes are not fixed, and the pattern of movement is mostly influenced by geography, means of transport, communication and how tight or porous the border can be at the time of mobility. Geographic landscape and proximity sometimes determine how flexible and cost efficient the mobility is undertaken. Sometimes, proximity from country of origin to that of destination is not reckoned with, and at other times, barriers such as mountains, deserts, rivers and seas are factored into plans to migrate. Similarly, the availability of easy means of commuting and communication are crucial to the choice of transit routes. Traffickers are also equipped with networked intelligence of routes that are tough and tight in terms of security patrols and policing. They also have insider information, which routes are porous and hospitable to movements. Traffickers monitor and follow routes where there are few or no checking points and sometimes work with the aid of local border community tour guides. While there are no border controls relative to internal trafficking in persons, traffickers also avoid police patrols and checking points especially in Nigeria.

**Drivers and Open Borders Linkages**

Crime opportunities are made possible in the absence of capable guardians and if, most importantly, the facility, which in this case, is hospitable to crime occurrence. This is why the Crime Pattern theory is found appropriate in this context of analysis. Prior to 1975 and before the ECOWAS Treaty came into effect abolishing visa restrictions to movement, human trafficking was at low ebb and not too prevalent. It is also assumed that the states in Africa were politically stable and the economies were relatively stable. However, when the borders in West Africa became open and fluid, criminalities started to manifest in various forms. The instabilities in Libya and the collapse of the regime eventually accelerated the outflow of migrants to Europe.
In reality, therefore, the abolition of visa requirements for travel with West Africa accounted for the increase in outward movement to destinations beyond Africa. The stable economies of Europe offer better opportunities as destination countries, and the trend reflects trafficked victims’ preference for Germany, France, Malta, Denmark and UK that have some semblance of human rights opportunities of accommodating persons fleeing from conflicts and violence. Most of the trafficked victims lay claim to asylum, stating that they are forced to flee their country of origin due to structural and cultural violence, human rights issues and other fathom excuses. Much as the drivers of human trafficking revolve around poverty, neglect and bad governance, the open and globalised borders have also greatly assisted in the new regime of undocumented outflow migrants to Europe.

This trend has remained a major challenge not only for the receiving countries but also for the transit and sending countries. The situation therefore requires concerted joint problem-solving approach.

**STRENGTHENING BORDER REGIMES**

The menace of human trafficking is not abating. It requires the total overhaul of the present governance structure of the international borders that Nigeria operates with Benin, Cameroun, Chad and Niger, in addition to addressing the push and pull factors. The borders in the northern axis with Niger are particularly troublesome because they are presently hospitable, due to its porous nature for smuggling and trafficking towards Zinder, Agadez and other transit routes to Morocco, Mauritania and Libya. Borders are in context supposed to be security constructs designed to filter what is harmful from what is potentially good. Since the management of border is a cooperative venture between two or more countries, then an integrated approach is the most viable option in dealing with problems of transnational organised crimes in Nigeria.

It is difficult also to imagine that while European borders are policed by FRONTEX, the borders of West Africa, though strategically merged, do not have the luxury of a body specifically empowered to carry out such functions. Presently, the policing of ECOWAS borders is still left to individual nations, which makes them vulnerable to other forms of criminalities. If the benefits of integration are to be enjoyed by the citizenry, ECOWAS needs strong borders to deter criminal elements and not ample routes for smuggling goods, arms, drugs and persons.
Recommendations

Incidents of human trafficking are most often linked to push and pull factors that are captured in the gaps in the pervasive level of global inequalities. Since some of the factors overlap, it stands to reason not to treat them in isolation, but how priority should be given towards a comprehensive approach involves diverse stakeholders.

The antidote to poverty and unemployment is good governance. Poverty can be effectively addressed when the citizens of any country, especially the youth, benefit from employment, reduced corruption and other dividends of democracy. These also include justice, fair play and rule of law. It is most often stated that Nigeria being an oil-producing nation has no business with poverty. The mismanagement of the sovereign wealth has led to infrastructural decay, abject poverty and unemployment—a condition which induces the youths to move and seek better alternatives out of deprivation. This must be addressed through concerted efforts in governance systems that are transparent and accountable to the people. The developed world will help reduce the propensity to steal and deposit funds in their home country by rejecting such overtures from corrupt politicians and government officials.

The questions of safety and security are also germane to the causative factors of human trafficking. The nation must be made safe and secured from internal and external security threats, which brings into focus the need for security sector reform. Citizens do not have confidence in internal security systems in Nigeria. The landscape is riddled with incidences of kidnap, robberies, hostage-taking, terrorism and herders’ clash with farmers, which have become perineal. The identified internal security threats should be addressed to restore confidence, which will reduce elements of bogus claims of asylum due to flimsy narratives from victims as justification for trafficking.

Paramount in dealing with human trafficking is the issue of good border management. Nigeria needs a strategic document on border security and how this fits well into the larger security architecture of national security. There is the need to urgently review the country’s border security policy so as to identify the key security agencies, their roles and responsibilities to avoid ambiguities and inter-agency rivalry in the management of borders. This will help in the neutralisation of the various illegal routes, disrupt opportunities available to traffickers and reduce the attraction to travel unlawfully. Nigeria may opt to fence its border facilities, if they
become security failures. However, this must be aligned to ECOWAS objective of good border management. Again, while structure upgrade is important in this regard, capacity building for border security agencies may well help in reducing the scourge.

Effective border policing and joint border cooperation with neighbouring countries is required and should be mainstreamed into regional security architecture. This is in consideration of the fact that human trafficking is transnational and not limited to Nigeria alone. If the routes must be disrupted, it requires sharing information on intelligence, tracking of profits from this trade and terminating the connections in source, transit and receiving countries.

The issue of brain drain can be reversed through curriculum review, by linking the local content of the educational system to industry needs of the economy. The educational package should connect with entrepreneurial production circle, so that employability is guaranteed and is private sector driven. Attention should shift to skills acquisition and what generates employment, rather than white-collar jobs. While the universities are graduating higher numbers of youths, employment placement is shrinking locally. Youths should be empowered through internship schemes, immersion and mentoring practices.

The development of border communities by the federal government through the Border Communities Development Agency (BCDA) must be prioritised. This strategy is important in winning the minds of the border community’s folks to the side of the law in the fight against cross-border crimes like human trafficking. When the communities become involved in border security management, then agents and brokers involved in trafficking may have to contend with alternative counter-force in same locality.

Finally, the government should show commitment—financial and moral—through consistent enforcement procedures. There is the need for a document on border security strategy that must align with the larger national security strategy, which clearly spells out standard operating procedures for all border security agencies. This entails the overhaul of the criminal justice system and other constrains to free up challenges of using technology to manage borders, training and re-training of border security operatives and transformation of border communities in Nigeria.
CONCLUSION

The attention accorded trafficking in Africa is indicative that multilateral cooperation, coordination and funding are required to prevent, detect and prosecute scourge globally. Trafficking as observed is not only understood from the standpoint of poverty and inequalities pervading Africa, but also from the opportunities that feed into illegal cross-border movements, resultant from porous and permeable borders, which must be addressed. While rescue missions for the victims have been partially successful, there is the need to put in place structures for protection and reintegration into the society to prevent incidences of re-trafficking. Reforms in the criminal justice system will serve as deterrent to traffickers and those caught up in the corruption web. There is need to develop an outcome-driven strategic plan to return the borders to safe commuting involving the local cross-border communities and civil society organisation. However, there is an increasing shift towards measures that look for solutions beyond enforcement to other alternatives such as good governance and institutional capacity building to serve as a bulwark against porosity of borders and the illicit flow in humans.

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Arms Proliferation, Boko Haram Extremism and Insecurity in Nigeria

Waziri Adisa

INTRODUCTION

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs) in Africa is one of the greatest sources of armed conflicts in the continent since the departure of the colonialists in the 1960s. With the rise of globalisation and unprecedented changes in the production of weapons of mass destruction and ammunition, Africa has remained the destination of a large cache of arms and ammunition sold and smuggled to the conflict-ridden societies in the continent. In the ensuring crisis of underdevelopment, Boko Haram and a majority of armed groups have benefitted immensely from this uncontrolled arms business and proliferation that have dominated the continent for some time (Onuoha and Gerald 2013; Adeniyi 2017).

While protracted conflicts and proxy wars may not be new to Africa, the rise of Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in these violent conflicts are a source of worry to security experts, the international community and the Nigerian government. Uncontrolled arms flow has not only led to the proliferation of extremist groups, it has consequently emboldened different armed groups, militias,
warlords, terrorists, Fulani herdsmen and so on (Schroeder Lamb 2006; Sharife 2010; Wezeman 2003; Adeniyi 2017; Eriksson et al. 2017), in such a way that one violent conflict can lead to mass casualties. In the process, armed groups have caused deaths and fatalities to their nations and threatened the internal security of the states.

Although illicit arms trade is opaque in the developing world, in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is the source of prolonged violence against the state, individuals and the international community. Illicit arms transfer to conflicts-ridden areas in Africa usually comes from different parts of the world. Small arms are sold to Africa by some European nations in violation of UN arms embargoes. A good example is the shipment of arms and ammunition to Ivory Coast in July 2000 by a Ukrainian arms company. The business of arms transfer has not only enabled the merchants of deaths and smugglers to make huge profits from the gains of globalisation, it has provided them the opportunities to finance terrorism in the Horn of Africa, the Islamic Maghreb and the West African sub-region, leading to the birth of Nigeria-born Islamist sects (Musa 2013; Financial Action Task Force 2016).

In Africa, the sale and transfer of small arms and light weapons have exacerbated tensions, threatened democracy and destabilised nations causing untold hardships, atrocities and deaths to many people that are already ravaged by extreme poverty. It is estimated that 500,000 people die every year from violent conflicts worldwide, the majority of who are from Africa and other developing countries (Adeniyi 2017). Reports also indicate that uncontrolled arms transfer has deepened armed violence in many poverty-stricken African countries such as Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Kenya, Somalia Lake Chad Basin, Sudan, South-Sudan, Nigeria and Cameroon (Inter-governmental Action Against Money Laundering in West Africa 2013; Financial Action Task Force 2016; International Crisis Group 2016; Adeniyi 2017; Burke 2017; Mohamed et al. 2017).

This chapter argues that one of the major causes of Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria is the illicit arms trade business in the West African sub-region. The chapter argues that illicit arms trade and proliferation help terrorist groups have access to cheap arms and ammunition and can prolong counter-terrorism efforts. In order to provide a critical analysis of this issue, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section addresses the origin and challenge of Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria while the second part examines the issue of arms trade in Nigeria and the West African sub-region. The third part provides an analogy of the nature
of the relationship between arms trade, arms trafficking and Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria. The last part discusses possible solutions to the problem of illicit arms trade and internal insecurity in Nigeria.

**Boko Haram: The Rise of an Islamist Terrorist Organisation in Nigeria**

Boko Haram, otherwise known as *Jama’atul ahl al Sunna li-da’wa wa-l-qital*, is an Islamist terrorist organisation that was established in 2002 in Borno State’s capital of Maiduguri, northeastern Nigeria, by Muhammed Yusuf, a 32-year-old Islamic preacher. However, many analysts have argued that the history of the sect dates back to the 1980s and 1990s when Yusuf and his co-worshippers were brainwashed by virtue of their exposure to the radical Salafist movements in northern Nigeria (Thurston 2016) and the Sunni reforms of Islam across the African continent.

Pantucci and Jesperson (2015) stated that the emergence of Boko Haram can be traced back to the idea of Islamic revivalism that sprang up in northern Nigeria in the 1980s, particularly in Kano and Borno States. At this time, Yusuf and his friends were reported to have been inspired by public movements in religious activities in the north spearheaded by the “Shia Cleric Ibrahim Al Zakzaky’s Iranian-funded Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) as well as the Salafist scholar Jafa’ar Mahmoud Adam” (Pantucci and Jesperson 2015, p. 3). The IMN insisted on the return of orthodox Islam, which supports the full implementation of Sharia Law. Although ideological differences exist within the association, the IMN was said to have drawn its ideological inspiration from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, particularly from Hassan Al Banna and Said Qutb. In the second half of the twentieth century, the two men were reported to have revived the idea of an Islamic state governed by Sharia Law.

With Nigeria’s return to democracy in May 1999 amidst growing public resentment against absence of governance in the polity coupled with the renewed terrorist attacks on the Western world by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Islamic Magreb, Yusuf and his group shifted their allegiance from local Islamic movements to radical Islamic movements in other parts of the world which wanted the imposition of full Sharia law in Islamic nations (Manni 2012; Onuoha 2012; BBC 2016). Boko Haram’s decision was reported to have been partly informed by the high level of corruption in government and the inability of the secular government to
address the problem of abject poverty among the youths. Walker (2012, p. 3) offered a lucid analysis of the origins of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria when he observes thus:

Boko Haram’s origins lie in a group of radical Islamic youth who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri a decade ago. In 2002, an offshoot of this youth (not yet known as Boko Haram) declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable. The group declared it was embarking on *hijra* (a withdrawal along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad’s withdrawal from Mecca to Medina). It moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe State, near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hard-line Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused anti-state ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life under “true” Islamic Law, with the aim of making a perfect society away from the corrupt establishment.

The departure of sect leader Abubakar Lawan to Saudi Arabia for further studies led to the appointment of Muhammadu Yusuf as the new leader of the group. Yusuf transformed the non-violent Islamic group to a radical Islamic movement following attacks on its members by the police and government forces. The first known major clash between Boko Haram and government forces was in December 2003 when a confrontation broke out between the sect and the police following a dispute over fishing rights with regard to a local pond. During the incident, members of the radical Islamist sect overpowered a squad of police officers and seized their weapons (Walker 2012). The violence, which killed over 70 members of the group in a siege in the sect’s mosque that lasted into 2004, marked the beginning of Boko Haram’s transition from a non-violent Islamic movement to a violent Islamic group (Walker 2012).

The few survivors of the 2003–2004 incidents returned to Maiduguri to regroup and solidify their activities in Maiduguri. Led by the oratorical Muhammed Yusuf, Boko Haram was able to expand its frontiers to other northern states such as Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Niger, while also spreading its tentacles outside Nigeria. Ostensibly for reasons of radicalisation and reinforcement, the group was not involved in any major anti-government uprising until 2009 when the group staged a short-lived uprising.

Boko Haram reportedly transformed from a radical Islamist group into an extremist terrorist organisation when it carried out repeated attacks on police authorities, religious leaders, churches, mosques and security forces
in the city of Maiduguri and in other northern states in 2009. Walker (2012, p. 4) captured the transformation as follows:

Much bloodier events soon followed. In July 2009 the group came into conflict with the authorities in a strikingly similar way to the events of years before. Traveling en masse to the funeral of a fellow member, the group was stopped by police traffic officers, who were enforcing a tightened restriction on motorcycle helmets, an argument ensued. The circumstances are unclear, but a member of the group is reported to have fired on the police, injuring several officers. The group then attacked police stations in Bauchi and Yobe, killing scores of police officers. Yusuf released video sermons in which he explicitly threatened the state and the police with violence. They were circulated on DVD and gained a widespread audience. These events led the Bauchi government to crackdown on the group, arresting more than seven hundred members. In Maiduguri, the police surrounded the group’s mosque, but members of the sect managed to break out and for days they had the run of the town. They roamed the city acting independently, fighting police when they came across them and killing Muslim and Christian civilians indiscriminately.

The clash persisted until Yusuf was arrested by the police. He was reported to have died in police custody but there were claims that he was in fact shot by the police (Onuoha 2013; Pantucci and Jesperson 2015). Yusuf’s killing, which was supposedly meant to douse tension, actually spurred the group into further attacks on Nigerian authorities such as the police, the army, political leaders, politicians and so on. It also emboldened the sect and provided it with the opportunity to gain support from other international organisations in the Islamic Maghreb and the Sahel.

After a lull in its activities following the 2009 crackdown, Boko Haram resumed violent action in mid-2010. It repeatedly carried out a series of hit-and-run attacks on police checkpoints, killing police officers and seizing their ammunition. Gunmen also forced their ways into the houses of local and religious leaders suspected to have supported the government in the 2009 crackdown which led to the death of their leader. In August 2011, the sect launched itself into the global spotlight by detonating a suicide bomb at the United Nations House in Abuja, killing 23 and wounding scores of people (Adaji 2011; Onwuamaeze 2011; Walker 2012).

The international outcry that followed the UN House bombing failed to deter the group from further attacks on the Nigerian state, as it executed even deadlier attacks on churches, mosques and government
institutions. On December 25, 2011, Boko Haram carried out a suicide attack on St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, an outskirt of Abuja, killing about 37 people and injuring over 50 others (Maiangwawu and Uzodike 2012). In 2012 Boko Haram massacres occurred more in churches and schools, with suicide bombings occurring in churches in Kaduna, Yobe, Bauchi, Plateau and Borno states. Sulaiman (2012) noted that the federal government had in January 2012 declared a State of Emergency in 15 local government areas (LGAs) across five states in the north—Adamawa, Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobe—which it regarded as the hotbeds of Boko Haram violence. In May 2013 the government extended this partial State of Emergency to a full State of Emergency in three northeastern states: Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.

Undeterred by the State of Emergency, on the night of April 14, 2014, into the morning of April 15, 2014, Boko Haram besieged a boarding school for girls in the town of Chibok, carting away no fewer than 276 schoolgirls. The incident was deemed an attempt to embarrass the Goodluck Jonathan administration, which had boasted that it would soon crush the insurgent group. As of late 2017, the Muhammadu Buhari administration, after a series of negotiations, had rescued only around 100 of the Chibok girls (Punch 2017).

Prior to the rescue of a set of 82 of the Chibok girls, a crisis had broken out in the Shura Council leading to the emergence of splinter groups among Boko Haram ranks. The crisis, which came into global spotlight on August 3, 2016, when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) proclaimed former Boko Haram leader’s son Abu Musab Al Banawi as the leader of Boko Haram (the Islamic State in West Africa), had first occurred in 2012, when Ansaru claimed it was seceding from Boko Haram because of Shekau’s attacks on Muslims (Guita and Simcox 2014).

Ansaru is the splinter of Nigeria’s largest Jihadist group which specialises in attacking foreigners and is believed to be affiliated to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Guita and Simcox 2014; Onuoha 2016). Its origins date back to 2002 (Guita and Simcox 2014) when Bin Laden dispatched one of his aids to Nigeria to distribute $3 million to radical Islamist groups that were sympathetic to Al Qaeda. But the 2016 factional crisis exposed the prolonged battle between Shekau and Abu Banawi. Despite the ideological and leadership cracks in the sect, Boko Haram is believed to be vociferously committed to its war on the Nigerian state (Onuoha 2016). The persistence of the sect on the terror battle is said to have been aided by its access to illicit arms and ammunition in the West African sub-region.
Illicit Arms Trade in Africa and Boko Haram’s Extremism in Nigeria

While the arms trade is one of the major sources of income for many developed countries, in Africa, only a few countries have the capacity and capability to produce arms and ammunition. And in countries where local goldsmiths manufacture arms, national governments lack the capacity to tightly monitor their markets. What this implies is that the large stock of arms and ammunition that is used by armed groups and terrorist organisations on the continent comes from illegal sources (Schroeder and Lamb 2006).

As a continent on the periphery of the world system and one that is ravaged by poverty and conflict, Africa receives more arms and ammunition, especially small arms and light weapons, from other parts of the world. Apart from poverty, Africa’s high vulnerability to illicit arms trade is caused by many other factors.

Since independence, many African countries have not known peace, and governments have been struggling to overcome separatist movements. Although most African conflicts have been attributed to the inability of African leaders to develop their individual countries, the Western world-imposed role which Africa played during the Cold War, and African leaders’ shipment of small arms and light weapons to the continent, are largely responsible for the problem of arms proliferation in contemporary Africa (GIABA 2013). Sharife (2010) noted that before the Cold War, Africa’s political independence and the accompanying armed struggles were the first drivers of arms into the continent.

Independence and the Illicit Arms Trade in Africa

Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons existed during the early days of Africa’s independence from colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s but it was to a limited extent. In the period leading to political independence, illicit arms shipment to the continent was either tightly monitored by the colonial government or designed to protect the interests of the colonial imperialists. At the local level, only a few African countries went to war or launched revolutions allegedly designed to get rid of the European colonialists. Algeria was a typical example of an African country where skirmishes broke out between the colonial government and pro-independence leaders (Fanon 1963; Mamdani 2004).
At independence, most ethnic nationalities were united by the resolve to eject the Europeans. The consensus was that colonialism was detrimental to African development and would slow down the process of economic growth and economic development. Thus, decolonisation was supported by many African leaders as an opportunity to end over 100 years of colonial occupation of Africa (Mbaku 2003; Mamdani 2004).

A few years after independence, politics became a national problem as it became the only way through which leaders of different ethnic nationalities could amass wealth from the state and empower their people. Ake (2000, p. 36) argued:

The coming of political independence did not change this. Independence changed the composition of the managers of the state but not the character of the state, which remained much as it was in the colonial era. Its scope continued to be totalistic and its economic orientation highly statist. It presented itself often as an apparatus of violence, its base in social forces remained extremely narrow and it relied for compliance unduly on coercion rather than authority. With few exceptions, the elite who came to power decided to inherit and exploit the colonial system to their own benefits rather than transforming it democratically as had been expected. This alienated them from the masses whom they now had to contain with force.

At the crossroads over unresolved national issues, many African countries descended into civil war due to violent agitations to address local grievances. The long-term effect of this on the security of lives and property was the proliferation of armed conflicts since armed groups could easily buy cheap arms from the black market and government forces (Schroeder and Lamb 2006). With military intervention, large stocks of arms freely went into the hands of regional armed groups within the countries and this factor led to the prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to mention but a few.

The 1980s Global Economic Recession, the Cold War and the Arms Trade in Africa

The Cold War is a key player in the clash of civilisations and the ongoing armed conflicts in many parts of the world (Huntington 1993; Harshe 2008). In the 1980s, a large cache of arms entered the African continent from the developed world owing to forces at the global level. Two factors
played critical roles in the shipment of arms and ammunition to African countries, including Nigeria. The first factor was arms support received from the Western world in exchange for oil minerals and natural resources, which were supposed to wipe off huge debts that had weighed heavily on African countries since independence.

At independence, many African countries had sought development finance from the World Bank and IMF but a majority of these aids were plundered by government officials. Consequently, the theft of public resources and other economic problems had brought the continent to its knees in the 1980s. Sharife (2010) noted that to stem the tide, the World Bank and the IMF recommended structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) which they thought would open up African economies to the outside world. Eventually, many African governments embraced the idea of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Nnoli 1993; Ake 1996).

With SAPs, a lot of European extractive companies entered the ailing economies to boost the extraction and exportation of natural resources. This entry led to what development scholars have called “the politics of resource control in Africa”. Armed with the control over oil blocks, self-centred African leaders exchanged oil minerals for arms and ammunition and these arms subsequently got into the hands of insurgent groups such as Niger Delta militants and criminals profiting from illegal oil bunkering (Sharife 2010; GIABA 2013). Because the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is not restricted to any region, the tendency was for such arms to move from one armed group to the other and enter a vicious circle of conflicts now ongoing in Nigeria.

The Cold War presented the second reason for illicit arms flow to Nigeria and many African countries. During the Cold War, large stocks of arms were shipped to Africa by the US and Russia to aid armed groups as well as the Jihadist groups who were in support of the Cold War. For those countries on the side of communism, Russia was reported to have empowered them with arms and ammunition, as well as provided training. The US also used its clout in the continent to train and arm insurgent groups against its Cold War rivalry. Eventually, the US won the war but the stockpile of small arms and light weapons that had gone into circulation remained with the groups. The inability to retrieve many of these arms was initially responsible for the emergence of Islamist fundamentalist groups in the North and West African sub-regions, with Algeria and Sudan serving as the hub for the radical Jihadist movements (Wezeman 2003; Saul 2005; Harshe 2008).
Harshe (2008, p. 68) summed up the scenario thus:

The rise of contemporary terrorism has its roots in the new cold war between the US and the former Soviet Union. Under President Reagan, in the 1980s, the US began to flex muscles as a global gendarme to contain the rising Soviet power by declaring the former Soviet Union as an “evil empire”. Certain significant developments in the 1970s such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the US reverses in Vietnam, Angola and Iran were demanding a more aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union from the US standpoint. Eventually, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 had set the pace for the new Cold war. The Soviets in their quest to get access to warm waters had moved into Afghanistan by stationing 1,000 troops. To wipe out the Soviet influence in Afghanistan, the US opted to rally all such forces that were ideologically averse to communism. Thus, Pakistan under president Zia-ul-Haq became the frontline state to combat the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan, in its turn, became the hub to recruit different Mujahedeen groups as holy warriors and Saudi Arabia financed these religious extremist or radical Islamist groupings.

Clearly, then, Cold War politics provided the grounds for the emergence of Al Qaeda and other radical Jihadist groups in Africa, including the Boko Haram sect.

Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling Operations in the West African Sub-Region

Boko Haram’s eight years (2009–2017) of extremism thrives not only because the insurgent group has highly trained members but also because there is an ongoing illicit arms trade in the West African sub-region that has not been effectively tackled by the region’s national governments. Boko Haram’s attacks on the Nigerian state are reported to have benefitted significantly from this illicit movement of small arms and light weapons in West Africa (Onuoha 2013; FATF 2016).

For many years, West Africa has served as the hub of the illicit trade in SALWs in Africa. The “merchants of deaths”, otherwise called international brokers, move SALWs such as AK 47 guns, rocket launchers, self-loading pistols, assault rifles, locally made guns, mortars, short, long and double barrels, revolvers, hand grenades, pump action, Beretta guns and Kalashnikov across the region. Because of the porosity of Nigeria’s borders, Boko Haram and other armed groups in the north have been able to
obtain or traffic large stocks of arms and ammunition from some West and Central African countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Mali to the northeast where they have continued the eight-year-Jihadist war against the Nigerian state (GIABA 2013).

Given the porosity of Nigerian borders, Boko Haram’s arms smugglers have adopted and been able to use different methods to move arms into the country. There are reports that Boko Haram members often conceal arms in sacks, trucks and at the back of camels and donkeys to avoid being arrested by Nigerian security forces (GIABA 2013; Onuoha 2013; FATF 2016). Musa (2013) posited that some border towns in the northeastern flank often serve as the locus for the trafficking of arms and illicit goods.

Being familiar with these towns, Boko Haram members have been able to move arms and ammunition in and out of over 250 border routes linking the Damaturu/Maiduguri axis to Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Musa 2013). Research into Boko Haram’s arms smuggling strategies has also shown that some cows and grains merchants in the northeastern part of the country have devised a means of hiding the cache of arms and ammunition in empty fuel tankers, under vehicles’ engines and inside bags of grains that are mostly undetected by security agencies at the border posts. While it may be possible to detect and arrest arms stocked in small vehicles, it is usually almost impossible to detect arms loaded in large numbers via trucks, trailers, lorries and old model pick-up vans (Musa 2013).

The Inter-governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2013) reported that Nigeria has about 2.5 million arms and light weapons in circulation. This is closely followed by Cote d’Ivoire (458,677), Senegal (263,714) and Mali (174,752). The regional estimates given by the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (GIABA) may not actually reflect the volume of arms in circulation in the region because the clandestine nature of the illicit trade in SALWs always makes it difficult for governments to arrive at accurate statistics on the volume of arms in circulation. Table 15.1 provides a further breakdown of such arms across West Africa.

GIABA also gave a lucid analysis of the types of arms and likely countries of origins of the illicit arms supply to West Africa and Africa in general. As Table 15.2 shows, arms smuggling operations from Libya and Liberia as well as production by local manufacturers dominate the major sources of arms transfer to Boko Haram and other militant groups in the continent.
There have also been reports of arms seizure by Nigeria’s security forces in a bid to break Boko Haram’s arms supply and terrorist financing in the northeast. Onuoha (2013) reported that on July 12, 2013, soldiers arrested a petrol tanker in Kebbi which was loaded with three AK 47 rifles, one rocket-propelled grenade, nine AK 47 magazines, two bombs, three Rocket-Propelled grenade (RPG) chargers and 790 rounds of 7.62 mm of special ammunition which were hidden in the fuel compartment of the tanker. In May 2017, the Nigerian Customs Service intercepted a cache of arms and ammunition imported through the Tin Can Port in Apapa, Lagos. The arms seizure revealed that a total of 440 pieces of assorted pump action rifles originating from Turkey were concealed in a 40-feet container alleged to be carrying POP powder. That was the second-largest

Table 15.1 Estimates of West African SALWs in or out of Circulation (2000–2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of country</th>
<th>SALWs in circulation</th>
<th>SALWs seized</th>
<th>SALWs surrendered</th>
<th>SALWs lost</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>135,505</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina</td>
<td>83,913</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faso</td>
<td>12,188</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>458,677</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>136,850</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>3387</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>130,884</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>1270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bissau</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>3732</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>6491 destroyed by the Nigerian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>263,714</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>49,785</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9237</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15.2  Types, Sources, Routes and Destinations of SALWs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of destination or use</th>
<th>Types of SALW</th>
<th>Likely countries of origin/ Suppliers</th>
<th>Means/Routes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, pistols, long- and double-barrel guns and Kalashnikov rifles</td>
<td>Libya, Chad, Somali, Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria, Burkina Faso and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land borders and footpaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, pistols and short-, long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Remnants from the independence struggle, Liberia, Sierra Leone and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land and sea borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, pistols, revolvers, assault rifles and short-, long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Liberia, Guinea, the US, Britain, Russia, France, China and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land and sea borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Niger Delta, northeast)</td>
<td>Pump action guns, AK 47 guns, revolvers, self-loading guns, assault rifles and short-, long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Chad, Cameroon, South Africa, Europe, Niger, military and police officers, local manufacturers, Great Lake regions and Russia</td>
<td>Land and sea borders, creeks and air strips.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, local pistols and long rifles, pistols and short-, long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Nigeria, Ghana and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land borders and footpaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Pistols, AK 47 guns, revolvers, pump action guns and short-, long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Remnants of the military era and local manufacturers</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, revolvers, rockets, self-loading pistols, rifles, assault rifles, locally made guns, mortars and hand grenades</td>
<td>Guinea, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, remnants of the civil war and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land, sea borders, and footpaths through Guinea Forest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, assault rifles, locally made guns, mortars and grenades</td>
<td>Guinea, Burkina Faso, East Europe, Libya, remnants of the civil war and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land and sea borders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table 15.2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of destination or use</th>
<th>Types of SALW</th>
<th>Likely countries of origin/Suppliers</th>
<th>Means/Routes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (Casamance Region)</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, pistols, rockets and short-, long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau, Gambia, Iran and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land borders, maritime borders and footpaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, pistols, rockets and short-, long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Local manufacturers, Iran and Senegal</td>
<td>Land and sea borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, assault rifles and locally made guns</td>
<td>Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and local manufacturers</td>
<td>Land borders and footpaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>AK 47 guns, revolvers, assault rifles and long- and double-barrel guns</td>
<td>Local manufacturers, Niger Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania</td>
<td>Land borders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


arms seizure that the Nigerian Customs Service would intercept in that year. The Customs had in January intercepted 661 pieces of pump action rifles, which were neatly packed in 49 boxes by the arms smugglers (Salau 2017). The continued interception of arms by security forces shows that arms smugglers and “the merchants of death” are still very active in the country.

The Collapse of the Gaddafi Regime, the Libya War and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling in the Northeast Region

Boko Haram insurgents and a majority of the armed groups in West Africa and the Sahel are believed to have profited significantly from the cache of arms and ammunition stolen from the Gaddafi regime in 2011, after the collapse of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-old regime. The surge of these illegal arms was responsible for the Malian Tuaregs’ uprising in 2012, an uprising that was eventually quelled by French forces (Keenan 2013).
When the regime collapsed, Libya went into civil war, a situation which allowed rebel groups to invade Gaddafi’s armouries and steal rocket launchers and other sophisticated arms that had been stockpiled for years. Reardon (2016) observed that with two governments now competing for power, ISIS and Al Qaeda are more likely to strengthen their strongholds in Libya and use that to supply more arms to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Islamic Maghreb. Gaddafi’s arms do not only provide cheap arms and ammunition to the various armed groups in the Islamic Maghreb but have also emboldened the groups and increased their capacity to carry out more dangerous and audacious attacks on civilians and security forces.

It remains a mystery that Boko Haram, being a movement founded by the dispossessed, has access to hundreds of armoured tanks and anti-aircraft guns with which it attacks villages, confronts the military and causes havoc in its strongholds. It is believed that most of these weapons come from three main sources: continued funding and financing of Boko Haram extremism in the north, illicit sale of stolen arms from Libyan armouries and Boko Haram’s looting of military bases in the last eight years of its so-called holy war. Matazu et al. (2017) cited an instance where some members of Boko Haram surprised a military base in Sabon Garin Kimba in the Damboa local government area of Borno State where they attacked residents and carted away arms and ammunition, including rocket-propelled grenades, anti-aircraft guns and armoured personnel carriers. The Damboa incidence is one of several ways by which the radical Islamist sect has sustained its years of insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin states.

Existence of Trafficking Business Between Arms Smugglers, Drug Traffickers and Terrorists

Studies have also shown that terrorists do not operate alone, they operate in conjunction with other criminal networks in society. Curtis and Karakan (2002) opined that there is a nexus between the trafficking in illicit goods (such as diamonds, gold and drugs) and arms trafficking. The relationship is such that traders in illicit goods may exchange their goods for arms and ammunition at the borders. Similarly, terrorists who specialise in the trade of some of these illicit goods can exchange them for arms and ammunition at the borders (Curtis and Karakan 2002; Onuoha 2013). The International Crisis Group (2016) noted that one of the strategies adopted by the
Cameroonian government in 2016 in its war against terrorism and Boko Haram extremism was to cut off the sources of financing of the sect especially its sale of illicit goods at its borders with Nigeria.

**National and Global Efforts at Curbing the Illicit Arms Trade, Terrorism and Insecurity in Nigeria**

Uncontrolled arms have continued to generate global security concerns especially with the rise of Islamist terrorist organisations and the attendant deaths from the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as well as ISIL’s six-year-old civil war in Syria and Iraq (FATF 2016). Like its counterparts in the Sahel and the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram has remained adamant, resistant and audacious in its campaign for the establishment of an Islamic State in northeastern Nigeria. This armed struggle has killed over 20,000 people and displaced close to 2.7 million people. At a time when Nigeria is consolidating on its policy and political reforms, the Boko Haram threat has come to rub off on these gains while also threatening the country’s corporate existence. This is why the insurgency is potentially a threat to internal security in Nigeria.

One of the most significant global efforts undertaken by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was to sign the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The ATT has several provisions that are targeted at tackling the illicit arms trade to Africa and the possible termination of the transnational organised arms smuggling in West Africa. Adeniyi (2017) specified what the UNODA expects countries to do to control arms influx into their territories. According to Oxfam, the ATT calls for the establishment of arms control management system by state parties. Articles 6–12 provide the necessary guidelines on what should be controlled, as well as how to control, with respect to brokering, preventing arms diversion, record keeping and reporting of arms transfers. This requires the establishment of institutional control mechanisms based on the terms of the ATT and respective national laws. If done properly, an arms control management system will essentially keep the state updated on the movement of arms within its territory. A proper control system must also be accompanied with the resources and personnel to stem the flow of uncontrolled arms.

It is also significant to mention the role of the Financial Action Task Force (the global anti-money laundering and terrorist financing organisation) in the war against terrorist financing and illicit arms trade in Africa. Through
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (GIABA), policy and institutional supports have been given to member nations to strengthen governments against arms smuggling and also end the spread of violent extremism ravaging the region (FATF 2016). In 2013, the Nigerian government strengthened its anti-terrorism war by signing into law the amended Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011, which covers the financing of terrorism and the supply of arms and food to terrorist organisations. The law also prohibits anyone in Nigeria from giving any form of material assistance to terrorist organisations by way of biological, nuclear and chemical weapons. This law has been complemented with the regional task force and Nigeria’s Operation Lafia Dole in the northeast. It is believed that these aggressive efforts will effectively curtail the Boko Haram insurgency by blocking illicit arms shipment as well as their manufacturing, transfer or sale to Boko Haram and other insurgent groups in the country.

**Conclusion**

The persistence and lethality of Boko Haram’s eight-year (2009–2017) insurgency is significantly linked to the proliferation of arms and ammunition as exacerbated by Nigeria’s porous borders. This crisis has not only claimed thousands of lives but has also remained a major threat to the security and stability of the Nigerian state. It has been argued in this chapter that one of the major causes of Boko Haram extremism and internal insecurity is the problem of illicit arms trade that is opaque and amorphous in West Africa. To curtail this menace and reduce the capacity of the armed groups, it is suggested that the government continue with its holistic approach of tackling the insurgency while strengthening border security to prevent easy access by arms smugglers both in the northeast and in the southeast of Nigeria.

**Recommendations**

In view of the above, the chapter recommends the following:

1. The Nigerian government should strengthen the security of its porous borders and tighten the notorious routes by deploying more security agents there while increasing interdiction and border patrol.
2. There is a need for the government to work with the United Nations Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to ensure that the provisions of ATT are not only domesticated but also that arms movement into the country is tightly monitored and controlled.

3. In line with FATF and GIABA, the Nigerian government must ensure that the financiers of terrorism in the country are brought to book and the wealth derived from such illicit trade confiscated.

4. There is a need to work with border communities to prevent the use of these communities as loci of illicit arms trade and arms proliferation.

5. Public enlightenment should be intensified by the government on the danger of small arms and light weapons for human and national security.

6. Appropriate government agencies and the media should mobilise the public against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in their communities.

REFERENCES


Understanding Police Corruption and Its Effect on Internal Security in Nigeria

David U. Enweremadu

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Nigeria has experienced a rising level of internal insecurity. This has seriously affected the nation’s socio-economic and political development, as seen, for instance, in foreign investors’ reluctance to come and invest in Nigeria (Alemika and Chukwuma 2007, p. 63) and the worsening levels of brain drain, which has seen the departure of hundreds of thousands of talented Nigerians overseas (Mba and Ekeopara 2012). In response to these challenges, successive Nigerian governments have created several new law enforcement agencies (NDLEA, NAPTIP, EFCC, ICPC, NSCDC, etc.), while making attempts to strengthen the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), which is the oldest institution for maintaining law and security. But despite such efforts, crime rates remain steadily on the rise (Naagbanton et al. 2009; Enweremadu 2012; Adebayo 2013).

In Nigeria, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is the lead anti-crime and internal security agency (The Police Act of 1943; Police Act CAP 359 1990). This is in line with global best practices (Isima and Chukwuma 2010, p. 14). As Alemika and Chukwuma (2007) observes, the police is an embodiment of the coercive powers of any modern state, to the extent that among all the security agencies that may be found in any state, it is the agency with the closest and most frequent contacts with the citizens(Alemika and Chukwuma 2007, p. 68). In other words, it is through the police that the state performs what can be regarded as the basic function or raison d’être of a modern state—the protection of lives and property. This is why the performance of the police is a big issue in virtually every country. Most citizens usually judge the effectiveness of their government or political leadership on the basis of the performance of agencies charged with public security, especially the police. It is in that light that the NPF has often been a target of public criticism by citizens who have generally adjudged her performance over the years as poor. Contrary to popular and reasonable expectations, the police in Nigeria has been seriously implicated in crimes, including corruption, which has affected their capacity to prevent crime and protect lives and property. Similarly, they have also been used by those in power for largely negative purposes such the oppression and repression of opposition figures and suppression of civil liberties (Heywood 1997, p. 365). These developments led Heywood (1997, p. 370) to conclude that rather than be the solution to Nigeria’s national security, development and integration problems, the police has compounded and perpetuated them. This situation has allowed crimes to proliferate in Nigeria.

Although crimes are not the exclusive preserve of Nigeria, in the sense that they are common features of life in many parts of the world, in Nigeria, public impression is mostly that criminals are invincible. This is because any who has had a complaint to bring to the police often goes away with the impression that criminals will or can get away with their crimes. This impression has been severally proven to be true of high profile politically motivated murders, which require the political will of the minders of the state to investigate, expose and punish. But, even the petty non-political complaints are treated with levity, further eroding public trust and confidence in the police. This general attitude fosters and perpetuates criminal behavior and preventable crimes because criminals are assured that they will not be exposed and brought to book. (Isumonah 2016)
Yet to say that Nigerians’ perception of the police is only about lack of capacity to investigate and punish crimes is to grossly underestimate the problem. Indeed, if one probes deeper, the impression one gets is that the Nigerian Police is not only an institution that is incapable of checking crime, but also itself an enabler and vector of violence, criminality and corruption. It is a known fact that policemen in Nigeria, either acting alone or in concert with outsiders, routinely engage in several forms of corrupt practices. These include extortion, bribery, electoral malpractices, diversion and embezzlement of public (police) funds or properties (Enweremadu 2006; Aremu 2007; Isima and Chukwuma 2010; Ladapo 2011). Some members of the Nigeria Police Force have also been widely implicated in other types of criminal malefactions, among which are illegal detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, rape and armed robbery, all of which compromise the security of the entire society in the sense of constituting a threat to the lives and properties of the citizens or the security of the state.

Fighting crime and insecurity is within the ambit of the Nigerian Criminal Justice System which includes the police, the judiciary and the prison service. The police are in the forefront of detecting and apprehending culprits, including suspects, and arraigning them in the courts if they are convinced of their culpability. These powers derive from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as well as Section 4 of the Police Act CAP 359 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, as cited earlier (Police Act CAP 359:4). Unfortunately, the same police who is constitutionally charged with the responsibility of checking crimes has been found to be neck deep in criminal activities. Many persons refer to police personnel as initiators and practitioners of corruption and crime (Uhakheme 2006). The irony of an organization set up to enforce the law turning into a criminal organization was succinctly captured in a 2009 report by the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) which observed that:

By virtue of section 214 (1) of the 1999 constitution and section 3 of the Police Act, the Nigeria police is supposed to maintain law and order, protect lives and property throughout the country, but the police is a problem in this society. They are the worst violators of the law, they receive bribe from poor citizens and residents at gunpoint, frame up people, kill and commit other atrocities. (CEHRD 2009, p. ix)
One may wonder why the focus on corruption here, since Nigerian police officers are also implicated in several other crimes? The reason is that, unlike other forms of crimes involving members of the force, police corruption, and particularly its effect on public security, has received very little scholarly or policy attention. This is in spite of the extensive scope of such corrupt practices and substantial evidences of a link between police corruption and the deteriorating security situation in the country as being daily reported by the media. This suggests that there is an urgent need to interrogate police corruption in Nigeria. Why is corruption such a pervasive phenomenon among Nigerian policemen and policewomen? What types or forms of corrupt practices are more commonly associated with Nigerian police officers? In what specific ways do they interact with and affect internal security in Nigeria? What anti-corruption measures are needed or are more likely to help produce a more honest police force and by extension a more secure society? This chapter relies on secondary data (newspaper articles, books, journal articles and official publications) and some primary data sourced from a questionnaire administered to a purposively selected group of 200 stakeholders (police officers, legal practitioners, private and commercial vehicle owners) in two major local government areas (LGAs) of Oyo State, namely, Ibadan North and Ibadan North East. These LGAs constitute the main business community in the state with relatively heavy police presence. Due to limited time, only 150 questionnaires were eventually distributed out of which 112 were successfully completed and returned. The questionnaire was carefully constructed to extract information relating to the major forms of corrupt practices perpetrated by members of the Nigeria Police Force, their causes and effects on internal security.

The chapter is organized in five sections including this introduction which is the first. The second section contains conceptual clarification of the two key terms used in this study, namely corruption and internal security. In the third section, we provide a theoretical framework which explains the origin and causes for the prevailing levels of corruption within the police in Nigeria. The fourth section examines the extensive nature and dimensions of corruption in the police and their negative effect on public security in Nigeria. The fifth section offers some concluding remarks, including some recommendations for reforms.
CONCEPTUALIZING CORRUPTION AND INTERNAL SECURITY

Two concepts are central in the analysis presented in this chapter. They are corruption and internal security. This section provides a clarification of the two terms.

Corruption

Corruption pervades all strata of society, from the highest levels of the political and business elites to the ordinary person in the village. However, there are divergent opinions on what really constitutes corruption just as is commonly the case with other concepts in the social sciences. Indeed, its definition now becomes, according to Akindele (1990), ideologically, morally, culturally, politically and intellectually elusive to the point of losing sight of its detrimental and parasitic influence on people and the society at large. Divindi, citing Aluko (2002), argued that corruption includes several wrong behaviours such as nepotism, favouritism, bribery, graft and other unfair means adopted by government employees and the public alike to extract some socially and legally prohibited favours. In the word of Akinyemi (2004), corruption is the acquisition of that which one (as a member of society, not public official alone) is not entitled to. Doig (2009) described corruption as the use of official positions, resources or facilities for personal benefit or possible conflict of interest between public position and private benefit. This, of course, to him involves offences of misconduct in public offices, which are usually covered by a variety of internal regulations.

Certainly, constructing an acceptable definition of corruption is a task that has attracted considerable attention of many people, including not only scholars, but international institutions, policymakers and even street people. Yet, despite their efforts, the search for a clear and universally acceptable definition of the phenomenon has remained elusive. This problem can be attributed to the fact that corruption is, on the one hand, a complex word that represents a wide array of illegal and unacceptable behaviours and, on the other, to the fact that it is a concept whose use is largely culturally specific. A careful review of existing scholarly literature, however, shows that there are three basic types or model of definitions on corruption across the world.

The first set of definitions are what one may refer to as the public-office-centred definitions. These definitions linked to the notion of public service and behaviours that regulate its operations are reflected in the writings of...
Bayley (1966), Nye (1967, 2008), Myrdal (1968, 2008) and so on. Generally, they place emphasis on the abuse of trust and power with respect to the exercise of public office, in a manner that is aimed at attracting illegal personal benefits which may not necessarily be material in nature. The second type of definitions are market-centred definitions, which are traceable to the works of scholars like Kluveren (2008) and several others. In brief, they emphasize the conversion of public office or positions into an enterprise for the maximization of income, almost similar to the way in which an entrepreneur will seek to maximize profits from his investments. According to Kluveren (2008), a corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will seek to maximize. The office then becomes a maximizing unit. The size of his income depends upon the market situation and his talents for finding the points of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve. The third type of definition known as the public-interest-centred definitions are stressed in the works of authors like Etzioni-Halevy (1984), Kempe (2000), Friedrich (cited in Heidenheimer and Johnston 2008, p. 15) and so on and link corruption to the concept of public interest. Within this framework, Friedrich (cited in Heidenheimer and Johnston 2008, p. 15) defines corruption as: “a kind of behaviour which deviates from the norm actually prevalent or believed to be prevalent in a given context, such as the political.” Similarly, Kempe (2000, p. 18) views corruption as: “the utilization of official positions or titles for personal or private gain, either on an individual or collective basis, at the expense of the public good, in violation of established rules and ethical considerations, and through the direct or indirect participation of one or more public officials, whether they be politicians or bureaucrats.”

These three types of definitions contain each within them their own shortcomings or limitations. For instance, all three consider corruption as more or less a public sector-based phenomenon, whereas, corruption does also occur in the private sector. Similarly, the second set of definitions, that is, the market-centred definitions, creates the wrong impression that corruption involves purely economic or financial gain. In reality, however, corruption may involve other benefits that are non-material. One can therefore combine and integrate them in order to arrive at a more inclusive, exhaustive and useful definitional framework which gives a clearer picture of the concept we are seeking to define. One of such comprehensive definitions which comes to mind is the one offered by Khan (1996). According to him, corruption may be seen as:
Any act which deviates from the rules of conduct, including normative values, governing the actions of someone in a position of authority or trust, whether in the private or public domain, because of private-regarding motives (that is non-public or general), such as wealth, power, status, etc. (1996, p. 1)

If we adopt this definition, an act or behaviour can only be termed corrupt if it meets all of the three following conditions:

1. The act involves an individual holding a position of authority or trust irrespective of the domain (public or private).
2. The act or behaviour in question violates laws and regulations, including norms and values.
3. The act or behaviour is committed using the office or position and intentionally with the aim of advancing some non-public goals which may or may not be material in nature.

If this definition is adopted, acts such as bribery, extortion, embezzlement of funds and diversion of public property, fraud, nepotism, electoral malpractices, examination malpractices and so on can be termed “corruption.” However, in this chapter, our analysis is limited only to a particular variant of corruption which we term “police corruption,” which is here defined as those corrupt practices that are perpetrated by police officers. These will involve a situation where police personnel use their position of authority for non-public benefit. The term “police corruption” as used here includes such practices as commonly associated with the police, like unauthorized violence and brutality, fabrication and destruction of evidence, favouritism or nepotism, bribery and extortion, embezzlement of funds or diversion of public property and electoral malpractices. The last three are particularly very common in contemporary Nigeria. However, one must note that acts which we label police corruption are not necessarily committed by police officers alone. They are referred to as police corruption insofar as they are carried out by them in a given context, either acting alone or in connivance with outsiders. A number of dimensions have also been mentioned in attempting to determine what constitutes police corruption. Sayed and Bruce note that corrupt behaviour can include the “Blue Glue” dimension—covering up or protecting colleagues—as well as behaviour which is specifically designed not to offend businesses or politicians (1998, p. 4). Kleinig (2002, 288) differentiates between “process corruption” and “noble cause corruption” and argues that “the pragmatics of policing foster situations of genuine moral ambiguity.”
**Internal Security**

Along with food and shelter, security constitutes the most essential of all man’s needs. According to social contract theorists, security need was the basis of the social contract between the people and the state (which gave rise to the state or government), in which people willingly surrendered their rights to an organ (government) who oversees the survival of all. In this light, security embodies the mechanism put in place to avoid, prevent, reduce or resolve violent conflicts and threats that originate from other states, non-state actors, or structural socio-political and economic conditions (Stan 2004). For decades, issues relating to security were on the front burner in the development discourse. Several attempts have been made since the Cold War ended to redefine the concept of security from a state-centric perspective to a broader view that places premium on individuals, in which human security that embodies the elements of national security and human rights and national development remains the major barometer for explaining the concept. At the heart of this debate there have been attempts to deepen and widen the concept of security from the level of the states to societies and individuals and from military to non-military issues (Krahmann 2003; Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013).

Some scholars in conceptualizing security placed emphasis on the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion and political and socio-economic objectives of a country (Oche 2001; Igbuzor 2011; Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013). Thus, there is a general consensus in the contemporary literature that security is vital for national cohesion, peace and sustainable development. It is therefore apparent that national security is a desideratum, sine qua non for economic growth and development of any country (Oladeji and Folorunso 2007). In the intelligence community there is a consensus that security is not the absence of threats or security issues, but the existence of a robust mechanism to respond proactively to the challenges posed by these threats with expediency, expertise and in real time.

The opposite of security is insecurity. The concept of insecurity connotes different meanings such as absence of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, lack of protection and lack of safety. According to Beland (2005), insecurity is a state of fear or anxiety due to absence or lack of protection. Achumba et al. (2013) define insecurity from two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury.
Secondly, insecurity is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune. These definitions of insecurity underscore a major point that those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers when they occur.

Security can be further classified into two categories: internal security and external security. The first relates to threats emanating from within the territory of a state, while the second concerns threat from outside the shores of a country. Generally, the police is charged with the task of assuring internal security, while the military takes charges of issues relating to external security. A field survey conducted by Nwagboso (2016) revealed that Nigeria faces serious internal security problems which impact negatively on the economy of the Nigerian State and statehood. These internal security problems that may have impacted negatively on the statehood include kidnapping, militancy and terrorism mainly linked to Boko Haram. All cases involve armed groups challenging the legal authority of the state with reference to protection of lives and property of the citizens, considering that the primary duty of the state is to protect lives and property of the citizens. The mechanism for achieving this lofty objective by the state is through an effective law enforcement agency, which the police represents. However, available evidence shows that the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) has been incapacitated in tackling the increasing rate of internal security problems in Nigeria, especially in recent years. This has led to a situation where the Nigerian Army, which ordinarily is an institution that is expected to protect the nation from external aggression, has now been increasingly involved in ensuring internal security in the nation.

Several reasons have been given for the incapacity of the police to respond effectively to the security situation. According to the Police Public Relations Department (PPRD), they include challenges relating to recruitment, training and indiscipline. The Force, according to the PPRD, also lacks expertise in specialized fields and, more importantly, is challenged with corruption and dishonesty among its rank and file. These, according to them, engender a low level of public confidence in the institution. Thus, crime prevention, detention and investigation are compounded by failure of the public to report crimes accurately to the police (Nigerian Police Watch 2011). Indeed, the people in any situation of sighting the police brew in their heart the thought of how to escape from the hands of those who are supposed to be the keepers of the society. Today, the popular
perception among many Nigerians is that the police force has failed to fulfill its role as "guardians" of society (Alemika 1988; Hills 2008; HRW 2010; Oluwaniyi 2011; Ladapo 2011). Alemika (1988) submitted that the legacy of the Nigeria Police Force is that of corruption, arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism, incivility, low accountability to the public and corruption (p. 161). But before discussing how corruption among the police contributes to the general atmosphere of internal insecurity in Nigeria, we first highlight the scope and dimensions of police corruption. We do this by resting on a review of existing literature.

**Police Corruption in Nigeria: Review of Literature**

Despite its pervasive and damaging nature, the issue of police corruption has not received sufficient attention of scholars. However, a brief review of what has been written on it so far still gives an illuminating picture of the extent and dimensions of this phenomenon.

On the extent of corruption among Nigerian police officers, Osayande (2001), cited in Adegoke (2014), postulated that, in Nigeria, the police have been maligned, battered and dismembered. The police have been polluted to such an extent that the force requires a complete surgical operation and dialysis. He identified that the police cannot carry out their functions properly due to the shortage of manpower, mobility in the performance of their duties, and communication facilities. Oluyinini (2005), cited in Adegoke (2014), averred that what is even more worrisome is that, rather than evoke confidence and hope in the public, the appearance of policemen often conjures up a depressing picture of fear and mistrust. This is in line with the submission of Kehinde (2005) and Adediran (2009) that in the Nigeria Police Force, corruption is known to have grown from a humble beginning, when the force had little supplies of stationeries which contributed to the posting of some officers to solicit assistance from the public which gradually led to a sustained behaviour of begging within the police force. Aremu considered it a pandemic requiring urgent and innovative methods to wipe out (Aremu 2007). In another study undertaken with two other researchers, he suggested self-efficacy counselling as a bottom-up approach for reducing police attitude to corruption in Nigeria (Aremu et al. 2009).

Othman (2012) on the one hand posits that there is a link between corruption and social diversity, ethnic fractionalization and religious differences. A culture of selfishness and greed breeds corruption, the mani-
manifestation of which negatively impacts the leaders’ and followers’ decisions to engage in corrupt practices. The political system and Nigeria’s many diverse cultures could make the police leaders and their subordinates compromise and be more susceptible to corrupt practices. There is a popular norm within the Nigerian society commonly referred to as chop-I-chop, which has become acceptable in many organizations in the country. This term coined by political leaders, especially during the regime of Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993)—popularly referred to as evil genius—has crept into the police institution. Orole (2013) conducted research on transformational leadership and perception of corruption within the Nigeria Police Force in 2013. According to his findings, two out of five of the respondents (police officers) believe it is wrong to engage in bribery. Yet, almost all of the respondents (four out of five) participate in one kind of corrupt practice or the other. Many of the respondents believe that it is acceptable to use their positions to solicit bribe. So, it has become a dignified and glorified practice among the police force to engage in corruption. Worst still, most of these practices go unchecked by the leaders who themselves, directly or indirectly, engage in gross misconduct.

Still on the same issue, a study conducted by Daniel has shown that police corruption exists on a large scale in Nigeria and tends to greatly undermine national security. To an average Nigerian, the most corrupt organization in the country today is the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). What with the horde of policemen, mostly the rank and file (comprising constables, corporals, sergeants and inspectors), who daily troop to the highways to collect illegal tolls, derisively referred to as egunje or green boy, representing the 20 naira note.

Apart from bribe taking and extortion, electoral malpractices constitute a second-most common dimension of police corruption covered in the literature. The most frequent cited allegations of police electoral misconduct include partisanship and discrimination against the opposition party; functional ineffectiveness to prevent and contain electoral crime; and complicity in fraud through brutality, intimidation and vote snatching, among others. Several researches have documented cases when the police headquarters issued specific instructions to all state commands that its officers and men should ensure the success of a particular party, usually the ruling party, in elections (Ayoala 2004, pp. 1–2). The report of the European Commission Election Observation Mission (2007) also emphasized various dimensions of police electoral misconduct: arbitrary arrest and detention of opposition supporters before and during
elections by the police, without charges; banning of rallies and campaigns mounted by the opposition; and flagrant impunity of violations committed by the members of the ruling party.

The third form or dimension of corrupt practices common among police officers is diversion and embezzlement of public funds or properties. This happens to be the least reported form or dimension of corrupt practices common among policemen. Aside from media reports, relatively few studies have been done on this form of corruption which happens to be the exclusive preserve of senior police officers. Few example reports will suffice.

The first one occurred in early 2005, when the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria’s major anti-graft agency, announced that almost ₦18 billion and several choice properties have been recovered from the former Inspector General of Police, Mr Tafa Balogun. The 18 billion came from cash lodged in different banks within the country. On 4 April 2005, Mr Balogun was arraigned at the Federal High Court, Abuja, on charges involving about ₦13 billion obtained through money laundering, theft and other sources. These offences allegedly took place between 2002 and 2004, when Mr Balogun presided as Inspector General of the Nigeria Police Force. In the end, Mr Balogun entered into a plea bargain with the court which jailed him for six months, in exchange for returning much of the property and money (Enweremadu 2006, p. 329).

The second case occurred in 2012, when a probe by the Nigerian Senate uncovered the mismanagement of the police pension funds involving several billions of naira. The incident revealed how some officials of the Police Pension Board, aided and abated by some corrupt police officers, falsified documents to withdraw ₦24 billion from the budget office for the payment of pension that required only ₦3.5 billion (Eme 2014). According to media reports, some of the accused officials were subsequently arraigned by the EFCC before an Abuja high court on an 18-count charge of conspiracy, breach of trust and embezzlement of ₦32.8 billion police pension funds. One of the accused, a former director in the Police Pension Office, was also sentenced to two years in prison with an option of a fine of ₦250,000 on each of the three counts (http://www.antigraft.org/cc-case/pension-funds-theft-n32bn-police-pension-fund).

The foregoing analysis shows that the issue of corrupt practices involving Nigerian police officers has been extensively covered by the literature, especially its nature, causes and scale. However, the same cannot be said of the link between police corruption and public security. That area has so far
received only very scant scholarly attention. This is in spite of the extensive media reportage of this phenomenon and an overwhelming evidence of deteriorating security situation in the country.

One of the few studies that have tried to demonstrate how police corruption directly contributes to insecurity in Nigeria is Ochoche (1998). According to Ochoche, the police in Nigeria, like in some other African countries, has not been able to maintain internal security, defend the national interest nor uphold the protection of lives and property of the citizens. One of the major reasons why this is so is because they have mainly upheld regime and personal security in the form of corruption and criminality (Ochoche 1998, p. 113). Luckham (1998, pp. 12–13) holds that in a very fundamental sense, national security is a public good and not the private property of the state, nor of particular dominant interests. According to Luckham (1998, p. 13), there can exist a tension or contradiction between the manifest and latent functions of security. This is especially the case where the police are employed as an instrument of state coercion to oppress, exploit, extort and terrorize the citizenry. A study carried out by Nte (2011) also argues that there is some correlation between police corruption and national security. The police appears to show loyalty to the government of the day and forget so quickly it is an institution meant to serve the nation at large. When such an institution as the police becomes a political tool, then the security of the nation is at risk. Nte therefore concludes that insecurity cannot be combated without attention drawn to ensure a responsible and efficient police force. This study was carried out to provide some empirical evidence to substantiate the claims of this group of scholars, whose arguments, although faultless, were largely theoretical.

**Theoretical Basis of Police Corruption in Nigeria**

While this study was mainly carried out to interrogate how police corruption contributes to insecurity in Nigeria, it is still necessary to explain why corruption is such a widespread phenomenon in the police, as many studies have demonstrated. The literature is replete with a number of theoretical views about the origin and reason for persistence of corruption in many public and private institutions in Nigeria. However, the institutional theory of corruption appears, in my view, to be the most relevant as far as the Nigerian Police is concerned.
The theory borrows from the (neo)institutional theory in social sciences, which argues that the structure and character of a country’s institutions are the major determinants of political behaviour. Institutional theory considers the processes by which structures, including schemes, rules, norms and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour (Scott 2004). In other words, the theory is about how institutions predispose individuals to behave in a particular way or refrain from behaving in a given way. The concept of neopatrimonialism has been used to explain how established norms (personalization of power and clientelist distribution of public resources in exchange for political support) have served as authoritative guides for corrupt behaviour in Africa (Médard 2008; Joseph 1987; Lewis 2007). In Nigeria, as is the case in much of Africa, politicians are often expected to use their position to capture public resources and institutions, including the police, for themselves and members of their primary groups, or else they lose their relevance. Accordingly, the major assumption for the institutionalists within anti-corruption studies is that contrary to some scholastic belief, corruption in developing countries is not just a culturally or economically embedded phenomenon but rather an institutional problem (Pillay and Kluvers 2014; Della and Vannucci 2012; Thung-Hong and Han 2008). The implication of this argument is therefore that the widespread corruption observed within the Nigerian Police can only be contained, to a reasonable degree, by institutional re-enforcement or restructuring. As we demonstrate in the rest of this chapter, the Nigerian Police has been bedevilled by several institutional challenges throughout its existence, including insufficient manpower, training, equipment and resources and, most importantly, lack of institutional autonomy, which have helped reduce integrity and morale within the force.

**The Nexus Between Police Corruption and Internal Insecurity in Nigeria**

As already noted, the police are in the forefront of detecting and apprehending criminals, including individuals suspected of engaging in corrupt practices, and arraigning them in the courts if they are convinced of their culpability. However, these same institutions have become widely involved in the same practices. This study seeks to address three principal research questions, namely, what is the nature or extent of corrupt practices among Nigeria policemen and policewomen; what are the main courses of cor-
ruption within the Nigerian Police; and how does police corruption impact the levels of internal insecurity in Nigeria? The first question has been sufficiently addressed in the previous section of this chapter. The second question has been partly addressed by the two theories discussed in the preceding section, while the third question remains unaddressed. This section therefore concerns itself with finding answers to the last two questions.

In order to address those two questions, the study included a survey research method, which allowed us to collect some primary data directly from the members of the public who interact daily with the police. The method of data collection here was through the use of the instrument of questionnaire. The questionnaire sought information on questions that were relevant to the causes of corrupt practices among Nigerian policemen and the challenges such behaviours pose to insecurity in the country. The responses are presented and analysed under two sub-headings below, with the help of tables which contain the summary of the major findings.

The first part of the questionnaire solicited information bordering on the personal bio-data of the sample which closely approximates the target population. This included civil servants, private sector workers and students (see Table 16.1).

**Table 16.1** Respondents’ bio-data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private workers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10–20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31–40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of residency</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–10 yrs.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–20 yrs.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–30 yrs.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 30 yrs.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibitoye O. V. (2016)
The table shows a relative balance in the sex distribution of respondents. The table reveals that 46.4% of the total respondents are male while the remaining 53.6% are female. As for the educational status of the respondents, 69.6% of the respondents are university or polytechnic graduates, 18.8% are college graduates, 9.8% are secondary school certificate holders, while primary school certificate holders and persons without formal education constitute 0.9% each. The respondents’ occupational distribution is divided along the three strata mentioned earlier. As many as 38.2% of the respondents are civil servants, while 32.0% are workers in private enterprises. Amongst the respondents also are students who make up 20.1% of the total respondents. The age distribution of the respondents was also noted. As Table 16.1 shows, 37.5% of the total respondents fall between the ages 20 and 30, 35.7% fall between ages 31 and 40, while 11.6% fall between 41 and 50. A total of 3.6% were people above 50 years of age. Length of residency shows how long respondents have resided in their various local government areas within the state. Of the total respondents, 55.3% have resided in Oyo State for 1–10 years, 19.4% have resided for 10–20 years, 11.7% have resided for 20–30 years, while 13.6% of the total respondents have resided in Oyo State for over 30 years.

As we have argued in the earlier sections of this chapter, the level of corruption in the Nigerian Police is very serious and the causes are attributable to different factors. To find out the most common causes, five affirmative statements were put forward before our respondents and their responses were indeed instructive (Table 16.2).

### Table 16.2  Respondents’ view on causes of police corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Causes of police corruption in Nigeria</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The occurrence of corruption within the police force is very rampant</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(61.6%)</td>
<td>(34.8%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low level of professionalism has led to police corruption</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(42%)</td>
<td>(40.2%)</td>
<td>(15.2%)</td>
<td>(2.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Police corruption has been fuelled by political class interference</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(41.1%)</td>
<td>(46.4%)</td>
<td>(11.6%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Inadequate/irregular salary has increased police corruption</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(31.3%)</td>
<td>(29.5%)</td>
<td>(14.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibitoye O. V. (2016)
Although the key objective was to establish the causes of corruption among Nigerian police officers, the first statement put to the respondents, as shown above, attempted to solicit the views of the respondents as per the level of corruption within the police force as the agency of government saddled with the responsibility of internal security in the country. The responses show that the majority of the respondents (98.2%) believe there is corruption within the police force and these corrupt acts are very rampant. The next three research questions that followed then sought to find out the major causes of corruption within the force, in other words, the respondents’ views on the factors responsible for police corruption. In their responses, the majority of the respondents agree that inadequate or irregular salary (63%), low level of professionalism (84%) and political class interference (87.5%) are responsible for the incidences of corruption within the force. In other words, the most important causes of corruption within the Nigeria Police Force are of political (interference and manipulation of the agency by political elites seeking to advance political and economic goals) and institutional (poor level of professionalism and inadequate remuneration) nature. This validates two arguments advanced by the two theories upon which this study was built, namely the institutional and neopatrimonial theories (Table 16.3).

As already noted, previous researches showed that corruption within the Nigeria Police Force has gotten so deep that its effects have manifested in different forms, including internal insecurity. What was lacking was specific and sufficient empirical data to support that connection. This study provides some of such data. Thus, three areas of the possible effects of police on internal security were interrogated through three specific questions contained in our questionnaire.

**Table 16.3  Respondents’ views on the impact of corruption on internal security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Effects of police corruption on the society</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Police corruption has led to the loss of many lives</td>
<td>67 (59.8%)</td>
<td>42 (37.5%)</td>
<td>3 (2.7%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I feel safe to report cases to the police</td>
<td>13 (11.6%)</td>
<td>19 (17.0%)</td>
<td>55 (49.1%)</td>
<td>25 (22.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The police can ensure maintenance of law and order</td>
<td>16 (14.3%)</td>
<td>48 (42.9%)</td>
<td>33 (29.5%)</td>
<td>15 (13.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibitoye O. V. (2016)
The first one probed the effects of police corruption on their role of maintenance of order in the society (apprehend and punish lawbreakers). From the responses received, only 57% agreed that the Nigerian Police has the capacity to ensure the maintenance of law and order, whereas a sizeable number (43%) felt that the police lacks the capacity to ensure maintenance of law and order. However, it should be noted that corruption is not the only explanation for the limited capacity of the police in this regard. For instance, the study also discovered that the Nigeria Police that is closest to the people is apparently understaffed. In a country of over 170 million people, the police staff strength is about 371,800. This is an average of one policeman to about 457 persons. This number, which is hardly enough to ensure security for a country the size of Nigeria, and is also far below global standards, leaves the citizens vulnerable.

The second question probed the effects of police corruption on public trust or confidence in the police as measured by the willingness of citizens to report suspected cases of crime to the police, which will ultimately enhance their role of maintenance of order and security in the society. On this issue, the result from our data analysis points to a high level of distrust between the people and the police, with 71.4% of the respondents admitting that they don’t feel safe to report any case to the police due to fear of being charged for what they know nothing of or being extorted in the process. Given that the agency responsible for the maintenance of order within the country has lost credibility before those they are expected to safeguard, security of the people becomes a spiritual pursuit where the citizens retire to trusting the invisible to protect them.

Finally, the third question probed the effects of police corruption on the loss of lives of members of the public. Here an overwhelming majority of our respondents (97.3%) affirmed that indeed police corruption has been responsible for the loss of many lives. This occurs, for instance, when many in the police are distracted by corruption or deliberately ignore their role in providing security after receiving gratification, leading to loss of lives and property (Chinwokwu 2013, Olumuyiwa et al. 2014). In some cases, police officers themselves murder members of the public who resist extortion or refuse to offer bribes (Idio 2016) or even shoot in order to rob their victims of their belongings (Hanafi 2016).
CONCLUSION

Despite being dotted by several law enforcement agenesis, Nigeria has witnessed a rising wave of internal security challenges in recent times. This situation has been blamed on many institutional inadequacies found within the security agencies, notably corruption. This study thus attempted to examine the impact of corruption on internal security focusing on the Nigerian Police which is the primary agency for the maintenance of internal security. The study found that, although the police force is the preeminent public institution established to assure the security of lives and property within the country, the institution has ironically functioned more as an enabler of corruption and insecurity.

The study reveals three major ways in which corruption in the police force has undermined internal security. The first is through declining capacity to ensure maintenance of law and order, which occurs because police officers are distracted by corrupt practices or look the other way after receiving inducement by criminally minded individuals. The second is through direct loss of lives or properties of members of the public orchestrated by police officers against citizens who resist extortion. The third is through the unwillingness of citizens to report suspected cases of crime to the police because of their mistrust for the police which will ultimately erodes their role of maintenance of order in the society. The study identifies several factors that are responsible for the manifestation of corruption in Nigerian Police and by extension the high level of internal insecurity in the country. These include the misuse of the police by the political class, poor welfare packages, low level of professionalism and understaffing.

To strengthen the police force and boost security within the nation, the study offers the following recommendations. First, the government should recruit more manpower to ensure a representative police force, while providing adequate logistics, and improve welfare packages that will contribute to the effective and efficient delivery of the Police Service. Secondly, the police should be allowed to act in an independent capacity, as is done in developed countries. This means the police should be shielded from political interference and “politically motivated appointments.” The role of law enforcement in any civilized society is to serve and protect the citizens. Political appointments will end up making the officer subject to the whims and caprices of the government of the day, thereby undermining his duty to the nation. This is a major obstacle to police effectiveness in Nigeria and must be discouraged at all cost if improved police performance
must be achieved. Thirdly, the study also recommends community policing as a way to ensure accountability of police officers. When the policing is reduced to community level, those who misbehave are easily held accountable within the society and forced to discharge their duty. Finally, there should also be an independent body to check the excesses of the police force and assure her prompt responses to security issues.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 17

Dimensions and Manifestations of Spiritual Threats and Insecurity in Contemporary Nigeria

O. B. C. Nwolise

INTRODUCTION

On March 19, 2017, one Dr Allwell Orji jumped into the Lagos lagoon from the Third Mainland Bridge in a suicide plunge that led to his death. He was reported to have ordered his driver to stop on the bridge after receiving a mysterious phone call (Ocholi 2017, p. 4). His associates and other people have put forward explanations for his suicide plunge including frustration, the poor state of affairs of the nation’s health sector, and weight of demands from his numerous dependent relatives. No one has given serious thought to the mysterious phone call, through which he might have been invoked spiritually or given spiritual commands, just as is done in the world of yahoo-plus which is based on spiritual command and control by persons using spiritual powers against victims.

In March 2017, the Oyo State Police Command made public the case of one Gbenga Babalade who in the search for quick money was alleged to
have with the help of other accomplices kidnapped a man, killed him, and cut out his heart as directed by a herbalist for money rituals (monitored on Galaxy Television 2017). In September 2016, Fani-Kayode, a former Aviation Minister, wrote about blood cult in aviation that derived powers from causing plane crashes, in view of the plane crashes in Nigeria, and many people laughed it off. In the write-up, he stated that the five plane crashes that occurred in Nigeria “between 2005 and 2006 were man-made and planned”, for sacrifice. In his words:

Most of our leaders are not human. They are “hybrids” and “reptilians” working for a hidden hand and some very dark and sinister forces. It is in that context that you can understand their exceptional callousness. They are cold-blooded reptiles and certified psychopaths… Between 2005 and 2006, just before I was redeployed as Minister of Aviation, there were five plane crashes in Nigeria in one year. Four hundred and fifty-three innocent souls perished in those crashes in that year alone. All of them were man-made and planned. They were sacrifices. In one case, a bomb was planted on the plane. I know this because I took over as Minister and stopped it. I had access to all the reports, particularly the American NTSB reports. I wrote to the powers that be, and demanded an international investigation, only to find out that they were involved too. I was asked to drop it, in very cold and almost threatening terms… Members of the public know nothing about their political leaders. And it is a worldwide phenomenon. There is a grand conspiracy to establish a new world order and most of these world leaders are just puppets of the illuminati, paving the way for the anti-Christ. All you have to do is to be in the inner circle of power for one hour to know that these creatures are not human. They are cold, unfeeling and callous. They kill, maim and destroy at the drop of a hat.

Fani-Kayode went further to add:

There are many secrets that some of us will carry to the grave. They say knowledge is power and ignorance comes with a very heavy price and devastating consequences. This matter is for developed and enlightened minds and sadly beyond most people. (Fani-Kayode in Daily Sun 2016)

The message is that when political leaders of nations belong to occult organisations, the security of nations, citizens, and their properties become imperilled.

In the same vein, Abati (2016) wrote about spiritual happenings in Aso-Rock Villa, Nigeria’s seat of power, and again many people laughed it
off. Even the presidency (in Saturday Vanguard 2016) reacted by saying that Abati only wrote from his own perspective. Abati wrote of what a colleague told him that there were “persons in the Villa walking upside down, head to the ground”. He also observed that “when Presidents make mistakes, they are probably victims of a force higher than what we can imagine”. In March 2014, the horrible news broke out about an evil forest in the Soka area of Ibadan, Oyo State, where people (including school children) were murdered for ritual purposes and their vital parts harvested (Daily Sun 2015, p. 1). These are all threats to human and national security. Security is the ultimate value that determines all other values, as far as human beings and nations are concerned. This is because without security nothing else meaningful can be done successfully. For the Nigerian citizens in the North-Eastern States of Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno, life had not been meaningful since 2010 as a result of Boko Haram terrorism until December 2016 when the group was degraded. Millions of them were sacked from their homes to become refugees in Cameroon, Chad, or Niger, or internally displaced persons (IDPs) in one of the IDP camps. For the Syrian nation today, it has been destruction since 2010. Millions of the citizens have escaped abroad to safety. The nation’s leaders under President Asad are not talking of national development now. The focus is on national survival. Every Syrian citizen too is praying hard to survive the war. Despite all evidence on spiritual threats today to human and national security, the attention of humanity—scholars, political leaders, students of strategic studies, analysts, and commentators—on matters concerning security is concentrated almost a 100 per cent on physical (including military) (in)security which manifests in various forms such as wars (civil and international), terrorism, insurgency, border clashes, communal conflicts, religious riots, ethnic riots, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, murder, national disasters (earthquakes, tornados, flood, volcanic eruptions, etc.), and man-made disasters (fire, plane crashes, road accidents, train mishaps, etc.). The definition of health given by the World Health Organization (2000) is physically based. In its words: “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely absence of disease or infirmity”. A person may be looking physically, mentally, and socially fine, but spiritually wrecked, and may be on his or her way to the grave.

The spiritual aspects of (in)security have been almost totally neglected especially in researches and other forms of scholarly works especially due to the dogmatic and pompous prescriptions of majestic science. Thus, while the bookshelves and libraries of the world are over-saturated with
materials and data on physical (in)security, humanity is left with a resounding dearth of information, knowledge and data on spiritual (in)security. Yet individuals and nations battle with spiritual threats to their security on a daily basis. The rationale for this discourse at this point of our national history is not far-fetched. One, there is too much anarchy in the spiritual realm to continue to leave out the study of the spiritual dimensions of human and national security, and both individuals and nations continue to suffer spiritual decay that adversely impacts their physical domain. As I have noted elsewhere:

There is so much anarchy and havoc going on in the spiritual realm of human and national security today that there is every urgent need for government and societal attention to be focused on that realm to save lives, protect human rights, and national values and to enhance human and national security. There is nothing happening in the physical world today that is not happening in the spiritual world—rape, bombing, robbery, kidnapping, hostage taking, murder, torture, conspiracy, politics, accidents, maiming and others. (Nwolise 2012, p. 6)

Two, there is urgent need for massive public education and enlightenment to raise consciousness to the various spiritual threats, attacks, and crimes that occur today so that people will take precautionary measures necessary to preserve their lives, rights, health, and property. Three, the government has to make new laws and establish new penalties for various spiritual crimes. Four, the military and paramilitary security personnel especially the police have to be trained in new knowledge and their methods and equipment upgraded to ensure that they are ahead of those who spiritually threaten the security of others. Five, the entire Criminal Justice System has to be tuned to adjust to the new crimes and threats. Judges specially have to be prepared and armed with new punishments, for example, for ritual rape as against ordinary physical rape of the past. Six, the dead no longer have peace in their graveyards that are invaded by human parts and skulls hunters for rituals. The cemeteries now need extra-protection.

Seven, certain diseases, sicknesses, ailments, and even death have spiritual origins. People should be fully aware that the evil they perpetrate against their fellow human beings, especially innocent persons, as well as their sins (murder, robbery, rape, fornication, adultery, etc.), cheating, and curses, are all sources of sicknesses. Reductions in this direction will decongest hospitals and reduce the quantum of resources the government spends on drugs and other health sector requirements.
Eight, spiritual matters now penetrate the political system or domain of the country to the point of even selecting candidates to run for elections and lead local governments, states, and the centre. Godfathers mortgage the conscience of their godsons, for example, by taking them to shrines for ritual oaths of allegiance. This is a deadly blow against democracy and public accountability. In September 2016, as Ondo State prepared for its governorship election, juju was placed at the gate of the Secretariat of the All Progressives Congress (APC). As nobody wanted to suffer the spiritual consequence, the gate was not opened by anybody, and the APC Secretariat did not function for several days.

Nine, spiritual manipulation is now entering the nation’s monetary control domain, and if not addressed, it may make it difficult for the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to effectively control money in circulation. Money rituals and conjured money as being done in Ghana now generate huge money outside CBN calculations.

Ten, people commit atrocities without knowing the full consequences, especially spiritual ones. Thus, escaping the government law is not *uburu* (freedom) for a ritual rapist or ritual killer, for example, people need to know.

Finally, people need to know the difference between physical and spiritual ailments. Often, people keep treating spiritual ailments physically in the hospital until the patient dies. A deputy vice chancellor in one of our universities in Nigeria was spiritually poisoned in a social occasion through a mineral drink. Even when drivers and cleaners were fully aware of what happened and the wife was told that it was not a hospital matter, the professor was left to be treated in the hospital. He died!

What is the probable explanation for these cases of rising spiritual threats, attacks, and crimes? Three major factors, poverty, greed, or jealousy and vengeance, which seek pleasure from the pain of victims are the probable explanations. Those locals who are involved in rituals for wealth are poor. But the big-time smugglers who engage our customs personnel with jujucraft at the borders are greedy elements. Those who use witchcraft, juju craft, and so on, to hold people down, kill them, or ruin their businesses are the wicked and jealous fellows, some in search of vengeance.

**Conceptualisation: On National Security**

Throughout the Cold War era, national security was perceived in terms of state security which was protected by awesome weapons of all types and large military personnel. National security was thus seen as a state good as upheld by scholars like Morgenthau (1960), who wrote about the state...
being able to maintain its territorial integrity and that of its institutions, and Lippman (in Imobighe 1998, p. 4), who asserted that “security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack or defeat it”. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in 1991 without any war despite being a well-armed superpower, and the humiliation of the United States on September 11, 2001, by a handful of unarmed, angry Arab youths, caused a shift in the paradigm of national security perception, con-
ception, and practice.

Thus, the UN began a new campaign on human security which, as the United Nations Commission on Human Security noted in 2003, seeks to “project the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfillment”. Hubert (2001, p. 3) went further to assert:

In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being, characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives … it is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or government.

Following this new thinking, security concepts expanded vertically and horizontally: vertically, it now recognised the individual, group, state, and humanity and horizontally, Buzan (1991, p. 7) identified the five new dimensions of security as military security, political security, societal security, economic security, and environmental security. Nwolise (2009, pp. 263–268), perceiving these five dimensions as narrow and Eurocentric, added ten additional dimensions on spiritual security: physical security, psychological security, technological security, image security, territorial security, legal security, treasury security, people’s power security, global security, and spiritual security. Nwolise (2013, p. 14) asserted that it is not enough for security studies to focus on man and that “the focus on man must be bifurcated into physical and spiritual security because physical security does not give the total picture of man’s security architecture; and also because there are several spiritual threats to the (physical) security of man”. He argues:

It is my contention therefore that human security cannot be fully studied, understood, predicted and controlled without proper grasping of the spiritual factors at work on and around the person. (Nwolise 2012, p. 16)

He asks, how does one explain the case of a physically healthy pregnant woman who after nine months instead of delivering a bouncing baby boy
or girl pushes out a stone, monkey, tortoise, snake, or horse from her womb as has happened several times? (Nwolise 2013, p. 54). What then is spiritual security? As stated elsewhere (Nwolise 2009, p. 264, 2012, pp. 17–18):

In sum, spiritual security is the safety of the human spirit and body from spiritual threats and attacks. In an elaborated form, spiritual security has to do with the safety, peace, development, welfare and happiness of the human spirit … it concerns getting people and nations close to God who is the Supreme Spirit and ultimate Guarantor of real security. The concept of spiritual security has the spirit of people and nations as its point of reference rather than exclusively focusing on physical security, because in the final analysis, nothing happens in the physical realm without first happening in the spiritual.

There are three key lines of action in the maintenance of spiritual security:

1. Taking preventive actions to reduce vulnerability to spiritual threat or attack.
2. Carrying out Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) occasionally to detect the source and nature of a spiritual threat or attack before or when it occurs.
3. Embarking on quick and effective remedial action to neutralise actual spiritual attacks to avoid the attacker’s intended outcome.

The spiritual security approach highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity of a person, group, or nation from the spiritual angle before they manifest physically.

In treating human and national security challenges in Nigeria, therefore, given the above narrative, the following can be identified. The list is in two broad categories: (1) physical and (2) spiritual. The physical has three sub-categories: external, cross-border, and internal.

**Physical Dimension of Security Challenges**

External Security Challenges

1. Aggression by hostile forces (war)—hostile neighbours and imperial nations
2. Deployment of hostile intelligence services (espionage)
3. Massing of enemy troops at the borders (can lead to blockade)
4. Cyber-attacks (hacking of systems and databases)
5. Subversive penetration
6. Influence of information warfare
7. Deployment of dangerous chemical and biological weapons (bio-chem war)
8. International terrorism

Cross-Border Security Challenges

1. Cross-border banditry
2. Rebel raids or infiltrations from neighbours
3. Cyber-crimes across borders
4. Car snatching across borders
5. Piracy and sea robbery
6. Commodity smuggling (food stuff, petrol, poultry products, etc.)
7. Human trafficking for prostitution, slave labour, sexual slavery, or organ harvest for medical transplants in Europe and Asia
8. Hard drug trafficking
9. Arms trafficking
10. International terrorism/insurgency
11. Animal and plant smuggling
12. Toxic waste dumping

Internal Security Challenges

1. Terrorism (North-East)
2. Militancy (South-South)
3. Separatist agitation (South-East)
4. Natural disasters (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, plane crashes, Earth tremors, landslides, mudslides, floods, etc.)
5. Man-made disasters (fires, floods, road accidents, plane crashes, train accidents, building collapses, etc.)
6. Sabotage
7. Subversion of government institutions
8. Ethno-religious conflicts
9. Kidnapping and abduction for rituals, organ harvest, forced marriage, sexual slavery, slave labour, or ransom
10. Armed robbery
11. Pipeline vandalisation
12. Electricity pillar vandalisation
13. Corruption (especially political corruption)
14. Unemployment
15. Herdsmen (armed militia) attacks on farms, and villages
16. Climate change
17. Rape (physical)
18. Election violence (political thuggery)
19. Election rigging
20. Arson
21. Population explosion
22. Proliferation of small and light weapons
23. Assassinations
24. Murder
25. Excessive use of force by defence forces (Odi, Zaki-Biam, Kaduna [El-Zakzaky issue], Afara)
26. Police brutality
27. Hate speeches and hate silence
28. Hate appointments and hate policies
29. Character of the Nigerian state that does not manifest serious care about peace and security and has become in itself a harbinger of insecurity pathogens

**Spiritual Dimension of Security Challenges**

These spiritual threats include:

1. The wrath of God.
2. The wrath of local deities.
3. Aggressive witchcraft.
4. Aggressive juju, charms (or jujucraft) prepared by mercantile and greedy native doctors, pastors, and *mallams*.
5. Curses, including curses of the law (divine curses).
7. Possessed objects-humans, plants, animals, eateries, blood test laboratories, monies (dropped on the road), and so on.
8. Hypnotism—to enable rape, duping, kidnapping, or murder of victims (in vehicles, streets, and homes).
9. Cultism, cult wars, and secret societies.
10. Oath-based human trafficking with risks of madness or death.
11. Controlled prostitution based on deadly oaths.
12. Yahoo-plus based on hypnotism, and spiritual command and control (the spiritual aspect of yahoo).
13. Oath or hypnotism—based on forced religious conversion and forced marriage.
14. Ritual murder—for blood money, political power, self-protection, and so on. This is different from the murder of people for meat production and organ harvest and sale for medical purposes abroad.
15. Ritual rape of minors, old women, mad women, and so on for blood money, life elongation, or power.
16. Aggressive spiritual husbands and wives.
17. Aggressive spiritual or terrestrial groups.
18. Aggressive familiar and ancestral spirits.
19. Aggressive ghosts, especially of people who died violent and sudden death as a result of murder, road accidents, plane crashes, shipwrecks, landslides, armed robbery, or war.
20. Spiritual poisons delivered through dreams or physical food.
22. People who have acquired supernatural powers and use these to kill, maim, dupe, rape, and challenge the state and its security agents and officials.
23. Spiritually induced road accidents.
24. Spiritual manipulation of innocent people to commit crimes against the state and fellowmen.
25. Breaking of spiritually based oaths—where the moral guarantor is a local deity such as Ogwugwuakpu of the Okija shrine fame.
26. Spiritual covenants.
27. Occult-oriented leaders and businessmen.
28. Dream sex—implants sickness or takes away luck or future progressive opportunities.
29. Dream manipulations to incite people, families, or groups against each other (using people’s faces to attack others in dreams).

Thus, my understanding of national security is far away from the traditional or mainstream conception which is solely based on physical security. The chapter now moves on to discussing the dimensions and manifestations of current spiritual threats in Nigeria.
DIMENSIONS AND MANIFESTATIONS OF SPIRITUAL THREATS

The followings are some of the dimensions and manifestations of spiritual threats and insecurity in Nigeria today. In some areas, examples from other nations are given for illustration.

Curses

“A curse is a deep heartfelt strong and bitter invocation of evil, calamity, suffering, loss, destruction or death upon a person or an entity, propelled by anger, anguish, agony or bitterness, and inner cry for divine justice when one is cheated, betrayed, denied or wickedly treated especially with impunity” (Nwolise 2013, pp. 80–81). Curse is a phenomenon many people have not fully understood, yet it is devastating several people and families today. Armed robbers, rapists, kidnappers, thieves, and bosses who wickedly sit on the promotion of their subordinates and murderers of innocent persons come under curses of the law or curses of their victims or victims’ relatives. When a man rapes a girl, he thinks he is enjoying himself, but he does not know he has brought a generational curse upon his present or future daughters. Every innocent person murdered in this country curses not only the murderer but also the nation for not protecting him or her. This worsens the insecurity situation of the nation.

In March 2017, during a meeting of the members of Police and National Union of Road Transport Workers, and Road Transport Employers Association, one of the workers told the Lagos State Commissioner of Police (CP), Fatai Owoseni, that the policemen that extort money from them tell them that the money is given to him (CP) and the inspector general of police. Out of anger probably at the false accusation, Mr Owoseni (in Jimoh et al. 2017, p. 9) cursed such policemen saying:

It will not be well with any policeman who said they are collecting money on my behalf or the Inspector General of Police. Such a person will not die well! Don’t you know that you should not allow policemen to oppress you? As taxpayers, you are the ones paying policemen salaries so you are our masters. Don’t give policemen money, take their numbers or names down and call me. I assure you that I will send policemen to arrest them. The current leadership of the police is doing everything to ensure that we change the ways things are done.
The curse has been taken note of by divine forces and those it is directed at are in soup. They may not know the sources of their problems when it starts work on them, unless they employ Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) early enough.

**Cult Clashes**

Cultism is about the worship of a local deity by some initiates. Thus, it is a spiritual affair. Cult groups abound in our educational institutions especially universities, and from there they have spread into secondary schools, primary schools, towns, and villages. Human lives are lost in two main ways in cult matters. The first is through the occasional sacrifice of human beings (blood) to the local deities that serve as the nucleus and spiritual power base of the cult group. The second is through the clashes between rival cult groups. Hundreds of people have been killed in Nigeria on cult-related matters, and the media are awash daily of these deaths.

One recent case is the clash between two rival cult groups in Amarata area of Yenagoa, capital of Bayelsa State, on March 18, 2017, which claimed the lives of two innocent teenagers that were hit by gun bullets. In the clash, guns, cutlasses, axes, and other dangerous weapons were freely used. The fact that cultism is ruining the country’s future leaders is clear from the fact that one of the dead teenagers named Paul (about 18 years) from Anambra State was the leader of the cult group that came on reprisal attack on another group for an earlier attack. He was shot in the abdomen and died at the Federal Medical Centre, Yenagoa (Ebipade 2017, p. 7).

On May 9, 2013, the Imo State Police Command located the embalmed remains of a 78-year-old woman (Mr Lucy Osigweh) in a big compound in her son’s room. She had been missing for nine years. Her son had told the neighbours that she travelled to America on a visit to one of her children. The then Imo State Commissioner of Police, Mohammed Musa, told newsmen that the remains of the woman were used for ritual purposes by her son and his cult group members who held their nocturnal meetings in the room to enhance their mystical powers (Nigerian Newsworld 2013).

The case of the Badoo cult group in Lagos is a sad and frightening one. The members were specialised in smashing the heads of their victims with a large stone and wiping their blood with white handkerchiefs, each of which was sold to ritualists for N500,000. They were also noted to specialise in wiping out whole family members during their operation.
Forced Marriages and Religious Conversions

Some citizens, especially Christian girls, have been abducted by their so-called lovers and forced into marriages and subsequently converted to other religions. There have been complaints that some of the girls are hypnotised and not in a position to speak their minds. The perverts that abduct these girls no doubt use spiritual means to control them, and they claim that the girls speak their minds, even where the girls are below 18 years; what a crime and impunity! No wonder *The Punch* (2016b, p. 1) in its editorial of March 1, 2016, on Ese Oruru asserted that “The abduction and ferrying of Ese, then 13 from Opolo in Yenagoa local government area of Bayelsa State to Kano by a pervert, ostensibly for marriage and religious conversion, is a heinous crime that should be severely punished”.

When Ese’s brother, Onome Oruru, was asked his view on the claim by some people that his sister at that period who was still under her abductors said she does not want to come back home to Bayelsa and wants to stay in Kano, he said:

> I do not believe them at all. Even if she said that as they claim, then it means they are the ones manipulating her to say such things, because Ese that I know cannot say such a thing. (quoted in Umukoro 2016, p. 7)

The fact that Ese was released soon after this statement, and that she has since 2016 been staying with her parents, puts hollow the earlier claims of her abductors. There are many girls that have been abducted and forced into marriages and religions out of spiritual manipulations. We have long learnt that even Boko Haram elements who forcefully abducted girls and “married” them before they were degraded performed rituals before “raping” their “wives” so that the children that they will produce will continue the terrorist struggle! No wonder some such “wives” who were liberated by the Nigerian Army voted to go back to their Boko Haram captors because spiritually, their souls had been so programmed. But how does the society help such victims of spiritual manipulations? There is no help because the police will scream that they do not want to get involved in spiritual matters, yet, spiritual matters are devastating the citizens they are paid to protect. Only the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) has mastered the terrain, as the Agency takes rescued victims of trafficking for controlled prostitution to where they were made to take ritual oath for neutralisation of such an oath for the girls to be really free.
When a forced marriage or a forced religious conversion occurs, parents of the girl should know that there is a spiritual dimension to it, either in terms of hypnotism or ritual oath or in terms of the spiritual pinning down of the victim. In that situation, the girl is not herself and cannot say or do anything in her favour or favour of her parents. As such there is no need to ask her any questions, involving choice even if she is over 18 years. The best thing to do in the situation is to report to the police for record purposes only and not to engage the police and abductors in altercations. The main work is to break the spiritual force or chains holding her down in the abductor’s house, and she will return home to her parents on her own, no matter how long she has been held and how many children she has delivered—she will take all the children along.

**Human Trafficking Fired by Ritual Oath-Taking**

Human trafficking is a big business all over the world today. It has reached the level at which some people describe it as modern-day slavery. People are trafficked for various reasons: house help, slave labour, sexual slavery, human spare parts (organs) hunting for the organ transplant industry of Europe and Asia, ritual murder, controlled prostitution, and so on. In Nigeria, people are trafficked in and out on a daily basis.

The spiritual aspect of this inhuman business is that the victims are subjected to ritual oath-taking in shrines pledging to keep the process secret, to obey their *ogas or madams* (traffickers), not to attempt running away, not to implicate their traffickers, and to deliver money to their traffickers as agreed. These oaths are usually taken on threats of death or madness if broken by victims. Often the hair, nails and blood of the victims are used for rituals in the shrine. Thus, from day one, the victims are subjected to constant fear and pressure.

Nigeria’s porous borders aid human trafficking, which is said to be second to the smuggling of drugs and vehicles in terms of profit generation. Olabulo (2016, pp. 19–21) informs us from his study that “as soon as a maid is about to be brought into a new home, the middlemen will ensure that they take oaths in shrines, pledging that they would not steal, commit any offence or implicate their madams”. Some victims who broke their oath abroad or in Nigeria have died or run mad. The National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) has on many occasions taken victims of human trafficking to the shrines where they were earlier subjected to ritual oaths for the reversal of such oaths.
**Aggressive Jujucraft**

A juju or charm is an object believed to be imbued with magic powers aimed at pursuing a good or evil purpose. It is often in the form of an amulet, pendant, padlock, or other objects tied together with threads of differing colours. No matter the shape, nature, or how a juju or charm is prepared, one thing common to all is that a spirit is or a number of spirits are invoked into it to be effective.

Juu can be done for or against someone, a group of people, an organisation, or even a whole nation whose name or names must have been mentioned as the target during preparation. Juju or charm can be dispatched when made ready by burying it in the ground, blowing it into the air, nailing it to a tree in the forest, throwing it into a river or ocean, hanging it on a wall, placing it on a table, incising it into the blood, or even swallowing it.

The juju or charm that threatens the security of people is the type that is meant for harming. The wicked, jealous, or greedy go to any lengths to achieve their devilish purpose including effecting what I call jujucraft or preparing a charm against their perceived real or potential enemy. The Juju can be meant to cause death, madness, and protracted illness or to delay or completely block the enemy’s progress or promotion. Juju or charm can also be done for good sales, attracting membership, controlling someone, protection against evil forces or actions, and so on. Few examples are as follows:

1. In December 2015, a clergyman was arrested by the Esigie Police Division personnel in Benin City, Edo State, for burying an unidentified object in front of his church at 2:00 am. Before he buried the object, those who saw him said that he walked around the church building several times in a ritualistic manner. The clergyman however told the police that he wanted to remove a charm buried by some people as the land was in dispute.

2. I was opportuned to observe the removal of a juju used to lock a friend’s car from moving for two years. The car was bought at Cotonou, and on the way to Nigeria, something like stone hit the windscreen cracking it a little. On arrival at Ibadan, the car was packed in the garage. The car did not move again for the next two years despite all the mechanic work in it, which included changing the automatic gearbox twice. It took spiritual action to remove the
juju planted on the engine on that day of return from Cotonou by a wicked and jealous fellow from a faraway South-East town. The juju was opened by the pastor and it contained a padlock which was used to lock the engine, human hair meant for death by accident by anyone riding the car on the day of action by the evil person, periwinkle (sea animal) meant to be fetching ocean salt water into the carburettor, fuel tank, coil, and so on (Nwolise 2013, p. 67). Immediately the juju was removed, the car was serviced by a mechanic, and it started working and works well till date.

3. The police in Anambra State found a padlock juju in the house of one Mr Kenny Voss in Ifie village, Awka, in March 2006. On one face of the padlock was written “Ifeoma Stella Nwolisa must come back to my house or die” (Daily Sun 2006, p. 17). Ostensibly, the girl’s life and progress had been mortgaged and she was programmed to die (if her God approves) if she did not return to Mr Voss’ house. The people had to report the man to the police because they were fed up with his evil ways, only for the police to discover that charm when they entered his house.

4. On July 29, 2011, a leader of one political party (a ward chairman) in Lagos was arrested by the police for using juju to hypnotise three people found unconscious in his car, meant for rituals (Saturday Punch 2011, p. 8).

5. In 2007, a Danfo driver was mysteriously killed with a charmed ring in Alagbado, Ogun State (Spectacular Encounters 2007, p. 39).

6. On September 18, 2011, a Togolese living in Nigeria named Komina Jakou beat his relative Mr Degol to death with a charmed ring during a fight for raping his wife Aminat. The two had come from Togo with their respective rings meant for self-protection. The Nigerian Police had to call in the Togolese Embassy (Sunday Tribune 2011, p. 33).

7. On December 5, 2009, a local vigilante group beat a tailor to death with charmed canes at Ijebu Ife in Ogun State. This led to a mayhem unleashed by youths. In the fracas, three people were killed including an Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mr Omololu Oladokun. Many buildings and petrol stations were set ablaze. The town dwellers fled including the Oba (The Nation on Sunday 2009, p. 1).

8. In August 2015, one Ahmed Azeez, a 25-year-old okada operator, slumped and died at Ifo, Ogun State, after being struck with a charm
by an official of the Articulated Motorcyclists Owners and Riders Association, following an argument and fisticuff over a levy seen as outrageous by Azeez. The police spokesman Olumuyiwa Adejobi who confirmed the incident told newsmen that it was being investigated. The question was “how will the police investigate a spiritual matter?” (Nwokolo 2015, p. 7).

*Aggressive Witchcraft*

Some people maintain that they do not believe in witchcraft or the existence of witches and wizards. They regard it as superstition. However, my duty here as a scholar who has been in the research field for decades is not to try to convince anybody. My duty is to deal with social realities with abundant evidence which I have presented elsewhere in 2012 and 2013 (Nwolise 2012, 2013). My thesis on the matter is that witchcraft not only exists, it exists all over the world, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China, and that witchcraft power just like political power can be used for good or bad. When corrupted, political power is as dangerous as witchcraft power.

The problem in Nigeria and much of Africa where witchcraft seems to be more pronounced is that poverty, greed, and associated jealousy as well as visionless national leadership tend to make witchcraft power to be directed to evil doing. The tendency is for witches to hide as it is seen as a negative force. While a witch (woman) or wizard (man) is perceived as a person with (evil) magical powers, witchcraft is seen as the practical application of the (evil) magical powers in protection and promotion of the self or loved ones or the use of spells, juju, and invocation of evil spirits to punish, harm, delay, or even kill those marked as enemies. Witchcraft power can be used positively to diagnose and heal ailments, x-ray the future, and counter the magical powers of others.

Witchcraft threatens the security of people and a nation in four main ways:

1. There can be aggressive application of witchcraft powers to kill, maim, ambush, rape, inflict sickness, or take away luck through dream food or dream sex.
2. The sickness inflicted on people reduces national productivity as man-hours are wasted in hospitals and or traditional treatments.
Also, the money spent on the ailments could have been useful elsewhere.

3. Those who are killed through different ways (accidents, dream food poison, fired arrows, etc.) due to witchcraft attacks deny the nation a productive workforce that increases national wealth.

4. The stagnation of people’s destiny, business, and progress delays national development.

5. When pregnancies are tied down, it negatively affects national population growth and replenishment.

6. Many people are killed on the accusation of witchcraft, especially children and old women.

A few examples are presented here on how witchcraft negatively affects people’s security:

1. In December 2013, five men confessed being wizards and killing their own children and others and have been visiting their community in Akwa Ibom State with evil in the last 10 years. Their case blew open when one of them bought a goat to be killed for Christmas, and his son began screaming that his father must not be allowed to kill the goat as he (the son) will die. The father confessed it was true. The matter went to the police at Odot, but the police said they don’t want to be involved in spiritual matters. The five men were forced by the community to release six other persons they had marked for death by the end of January 2014 (Saturday Sun 2014, p. 12).

2. There have been confessions by witches (young and old) in the print and electronic media on how they cause accidents on our roads so that they can see human blood to drink.

3. A witch was sent from her coven to Prophet Joshua Iginla’s Champion’s Royal Assembly Church in Biaji, Abuja, in June 2011. When the Prophet noticed her presence and shouted “fire”, the woman charged towards the Prophet at the alter but fell half way. As she released her powers, the generators providing light for the church were dead, the church was in darkness, and the Prophet got temporarily weakened. The woman later confessed that she had used her powers and second position in the coven to kill many people (even in her extended family), including some of her own children. She had also initiated 200 people into witchcraft. At the end, she received Christ and never returned to her coven (Saturday Sun 2011, pp. 30–31).
4. One Mrs Grace Okoh’s pregnancy was tied down from development for six years through witchcraft. For that period, a woman kept appearing to her in the dream, telling her “you will not give birth to this child”. No hospital could help, as the doctors could not see any child during the scan but the woman felt the child, yet her belly did not protrude till church prayers came forward, and the baby was delivered after six years (The Westerner 2007, p. 20).

5. Another woman told her church how her own mother in law allegedly held the delivery of her pregnancy for over eight years through witchcraft (Saturday Sun 2012, p. 7). She was lucky.

6. In Cameroon, a prosperous and generous construction company driver called Konany Abel died a sudden and mysterious death in 1996 in Tarla village of Wumbumland. The chief of Tarla who could not bear the loss sent out three delegations to investigate the cause of his death traditionally (spiritually). The three delegates came back not only confirming witchcraft, but also with the names of those who killed Abel through witchcraft, led by a man called Baka. The culprits confessed and were banished from the village for a period.

7. In 1993, a ward head and four other persons were jailed for misuse of witchcraft power by a Grade A magistrate court in the Bali town of Taraba State. They were attempting to kill a pregnant woman named Hassanatu through witchcraft, just because some members of the family did not approve of her marriage to their son. The four men therefore wanted to destroy the pregnancy, marriage, and the woman. They were found out through what I call Strategic Spiritual Intelligence, gathered by Hassanatu, and after their confession in court, they were jailed (Nwolise 2013, p. 71). So when any policeman or woman today says that the police does not handle spiritual matters like witchcraft, that police personnel is ignorant and does not know his job and our laws.

8. In 2001, a 13-year-old girl, Jummai Hassan, was arrested in Kano over 51 killings, including her own father, with witchcraft power; she personally confessed over Radio Kaduna:

My body is here but my spirit is away. We go by our spirits, but interact as normal human beings. We attend meetings at a church in Lagos at night, where instructions are given to us as to which parts of the human body to take. We always use powder to kill. Once we apply it on a person, he dies and we take his heart. (in Maduagwu 2010, p. 14)
9. Accusations of witchcraft have led to the killing and torture of many in Nigeria, especially women and children. Akwa Ibom State in 2010 was in high tension over the issue of child-witches when several children were either chased out of their parents’ homes, or tortured to death. Of late, the police in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, arrested a man and his wife (Zikeme and Eunice Ideisy) for torturing their seven-year-old son (Joshua) to death on accusation of being a wizard (Folarin 2017b, p. 4). It is time the Nigerian government and society take the spiritual security of citizens and the nation serious, especially as matters concern witchcraft and jujucraft.

**Ritual Murder**

Ritualists today abound in the country, hunting for victims. They hypnotise, kidnap, and kill innocent people on a daily basis. One-chance buses in Lagos, Micra taxis in Ibadan, and Otokoto in Owerri are outstanding nomenclatures of the inhuman practice. Innocent people are killed and their vital body parts taken away to be sold to organ transplant merchants, feeding European and Asian hospitals or for money rituals or political power rituals. The organ transplant merchants are very active in the Sahara desert where they harvest organs from people escaping Africa to Spain, Italy, and so on, even while the victims are alive. A few are lucky to be killed before their bellies are torn open for the harvesting of their organs. Combating these ritualists has on a number of occasions led to further deaths. Recently, in Ibadan on January 15, 2017, to be specific, for example, a vigilante group of youths caught a man (Taheed Musiliu) with a cellophane bag containing a human head. This led to the gathering of a mob that was bent on delivering jungle justice on him. The process of the police trying to rescue the man from a recalcitrant mob led to stray bullet killing of one person (Atoyebi 2017, p. 48).

Also on March 19, 2017, the residents of the Ikoga Zebbe area of Badagry, Lagos State, were shocked with the fresh head and hands of an unknown lady found with a man named Taofik aka Kiekie. The man who has been living in the community for long led the police from the Area K Command from the Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad who arrested him to a location in the bush where a stockpile of fresh and decaying human bodies were dumped. He used to carry dried wood, but when people noticed him carrying sacks stained with blood, he retorted that he
had become a hunter and was carrying bush meat. A policeman who had been observing him decided to stop him on March 19, on the excuse that he wanted to buy bush meat. Sensing danger, Taofik took to his heels, threatening the policeman with a knife. But people pursued him, caught him, and brought him back only to see a young lady’s head and hands when the sack was opened. On interrogation, he said he sold the parts to people who needed them for rituals. He confessed that he had a gang of three persons and that he always cast spells on his victims before taking them to the bush across a river where they were murdered and dismantled. It turned out that the lady whose head was in the bag was Taofik’s girlfriend (Folarin 2017a, p. 4). The three and their witch doctor who escaped the arrest are still out there in the streets of Badagry, killing and dismembering innocent people for rituals.

Another case of ritual murder involved one Ibrahim Mohammed who first poisoned two brothers of the same father (Muhammed Kudu Abubakar and Umar Tanko Abubakar) to weaken them and thereafter killed them by hitting their heads with a pestle in January 2016, at Kugbani village, Kogi local government area of Kogi State. In an attempt to hide his crime, he buried the bodies of the two brothers in his compound after robbing them of their Toyota Carina car. The criminal was sentenced to death by hanging in a Kogi State High Court sitting in Koton Karfi by Justice Alaba Omoley-Ajileye in March 2017 (Oladoyinbo 2017, p. 7).

In January 2012, the Ondo Police Command arrested four suspected ritualists who had kidnapped and murdered a 25-year-old hunchback, Mr Adeoye Dowo, for money rituals, in Ago Alaye village. On killing him, they neatly removed his hunch (Nigerian Tribune 2012, p. 48).

In January 2016, Daily Sun published a screaming headline “Fresh Otokoto lands in Enugu: 3 human bodies buried in building foundation” (Obi 2016, p. 9). The report was that the police in Enugu had exhumed three decomposed human bodies already covered with concrete that were buried in the foundation of a new building site at the Ugwuaji area of Enugu believed to be a church. The bodies could be keke (tricycle) operators, some of whom were reported missing for long. It may be recalled that in 1996, a man was found in Owerri, Imo State, with the head of a young boy by name Ikechukwu Okonkwo. The police traced his buried torso to the premises of Otokoto Hotel, and this led to the uncovering of a syndicate specialised in ritual killing as well as the selling and buying of human parts. The discovery led to violent protests in Owerri during which properties were looted or destroyed.
In the same year, January 2016, a 25-year-old member of a gang of ritual killers was arrested by operatives of the Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad, Osun State Command, for luring a 4-year-old boy with groundnut, killing, and beheading him for money rituals (Malik 2015, p. 49).

In July 2015, a 16-year-old boy named Tajudeen Azeez lured a little boy, Ibrahim, of about 5 years of age to a place, killed him, and cut off his penis, kidney, and intestines, and buried his corpse in the bush. On his arrest, Tajudeen confessed that one man called Uzor gave him ₦100 to get the organs of four- or five-year-old boys for rituals (Daily Sun 2015, p. 16).

In March 2017, four persons were paraded in Ibadan by the police for killing a business associate, Mr Oyeyemi Akintoye, cutting off his head, and removing his heart for money rituals (Malik 2017, p. 3).

A 23-year-old prostitute Miss Uche Agunta narrated to the Imo State Police Command in December 2014 how she and her gang specialised in cutting off the manhood (penis) of their victims with a razor blade at orgasm during sex. The male organs were sold for money rituals at ₦150,000 per manhood. Uche confessed to the police, according to the then Imo State Commissioner of Police, Mr Abdulmajid Ali, that her gang had killed seven men in the hotel through the razor process (Uwujare 2014, p. 12).

In March 2014, a forest of horror was located in Soka area of Ibadan where people were slaughtered for rituals. Human skulls and human parts littered the environment with several decomposed bodies and skeletons. Several pictures, clothes, shoes, and even school bags of victims were recovered by the police (Akpuh 2014, p. 1).

The issue of ritual murder is not only in Nigeria. It is rampant in Africa, especially towards and during elections. In Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda, and Kenya, today, albinos are haunted and killed because witchdoctors believe that potions made from albino body parts generate good luck and wealth (National Mirror 2015, p. 49). This haunt has damaged the international image of these nations, especially Tanzania. The government has clamped down on witchdoctors in the country as part of counter-measures, and offenders suffer severe penalty. For example, two people were sentenced to death in Tanzania in 2015 for murdering an albino woman. Also, in March 2015, over 280 witchdoctors were arrested. The United Nations has estimated that over 80 albino Tanzanians had been killed since 2000. The Red Cross noted that witchdoctors pay as much as US$75,000 (₦30,000,000) for a complete set of albino parts (The
Guardian 2015, p. 9). In Malawi, in April 2016, ten people were arrested for killing a woman with albinism. A mob had earlier burnt to death seven members of a gang hunting for albinos after being found with albino parts. All those who kill for rituals have no knowledge of, or have forgotten, or do not care to know God’s aversion for murder. In the Bible when Cain killed his brother Abel, God cast a spell on Cain as punishment:

What hast thou done, the voice of thy brother’s blood cried unto me from the earth which hath opened her mouth to receive thy hand. When thou tillest the ground it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength, a fugitive and a vagabond shall thou be in the earth. (Genesis 4:10–12)

In the Holy Quran also, we are taught that:

If anyone kills a human being, unless it be (in punishment) for murder or for spreading corruption on earth, it shall be as though he had killed all mankind; whereas if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though he had saved the lives of all mankind. (Holy Quran, 5:32)

Most of these ritualists and their agents are either Christians or Muslims, and only few if any are animists or traditionalists. No wonder Douglas William Jerrold philosophied that “Religion is in the heart not in the knee”.

**Dream Manipulation**

Through witchcraft or jujucraft, people’s dreams are manipulated either to frighten them to succumb to the manipulator’s will or to show them the picture of a wrong person as being a threat to his or her life, well-being, or progress. This form of manipulation has created enmity between several people and families, as wrong persons are spiritually presented to others as enemies. In some cases, such dream manipulation has led to violence and death. For example, on August 30, 2012, a 25-year-old man by name Ifeanyi Okorie of Amatakun, in Ohaozara local government area of Ebonyi State, was arrested for allegedly killing his 65-year-old uncle, Mr Uwajie Obasi, with a machete. The reason for killing him as gathered by the police, and stated by the Police Public Relations Officer, Mr Sylvester Igbo, was that Mr Okorie said that he saw his uncle Mr Obasi in his dream pursuing him to kill him with a machete.
Only Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) can reveal if the person seen in the dream by Okorie is really Mr Obasi or not. The person may be a woman who took on the physical appearance of a man. The person may also be an enemy who wants to plant bitterness and distrust in the family. The point of concern to this author, however, is making people to be aware that dreams can be manipulated, and therefore nobody should take such extreme actions as done by Mr Okorie without fully finding out the truth about what one saw in dreams.

**Bullet-Proof Charms**

From time immemorial, our ancestors used various charms for war: charms for disappearance when in danger and appearance in safe places; charms against snake bites in the bush; charms to turn from human form to animal form (fly, lion, snake, tiger, etc.) when in danger; and charms against bullets, machete cuts, arrows, nails, and so on. The most outstanding of these charms today is the one that protects the body from bullet penetration and wounds from sharp objects like cutlass, daggers, and so on. The problem or threat from this charm is that criminals and violent persons obtain them and use the protection from them (where real) to cause havoc in the society, for example, terrorists, insurgents, kidnappers, and armed robbers.

Another source of threat from this charm or jujucraft is that some obtain fake charms, and die in the process of testing it, or in actions based on the false belief that they are protected. For example, in July 2014, an apprentice bricklayer by name Rasheed Suleiman was shot dead while testing the potency of a bullet-proof charm (in the amulet he wore) which he just procured from a herbalist. His death threw the Asipa community in the Ife North local government area into confusion. It was gathered that the deceased could have been preparing to use the charm for governorship election (Makinde 2014, p. 5) activities such as political thuggery. The elders of the community were rattled and worried as they “believed that some other youths might have similar charms”.

In Liberia’s civil war period (1980–1989), General Butt Naked was a well-known warrior who used bullet-proof charms that enabled him survive the civil war. He was Commander of the naked platoon that fought on the side of President Samuel Doe. The *khamajors* also used bullet-proof charms during the Sierra Leone civil war. Many soldiers, especially child-soldiers, wore “ronko” (a “country cloth”) which is a bullet-proof
material. Mohammed from the Ropet village of Northern Sierra Leone, who is a 12-year-old, told researchers that he used to wear “ronko” when going to warfront to protect him from the white man’s bullet. He confirmed the “ronko” worked well for him as long as he observed all the rules and rites, which included abstinence from sex. The boy said that after they were initiated, they were given “ronko” to wear. They were then lined up and fired at in turn to test the potency. They were assured of invincibility to bullets (Gbla, in Sesay, 2003, p. 178).

In Nigeria’s war against Boko Haram in the North-East, the issue of use of mystical powers by Boko Haram elements was rife especially between 2013 and 2014 when the terror group was on a rampage, sacking army barracks, burning down villages and towns, and sending our soldiers on the run for their dear lives. A New Telegraph reporter, Ibrahim Abdul, stated that the tabloid’s correspondents were told by fleeing soldiers that Boko Haram elements were using mystical powers. In his words:

Sources told our correspondent that testimonies from fleeing soldiers involved in the fight against the insurgents alleged that Boko Haram employed mystical powers, to overwhelm the Nigerian troops. They also alleged that it was one of the factors that made the soldiers to flee from the insurgents. (Abdul 2014, p. 5)

He reported one of the soldiers to have said:

When we fired our guns at the insurgents, they did not die because they had mystical powers (voodoo) and kept advancing towards us. So we had no option but to flee from them. (Abdul 2014, p. 5)

Nigerian soldiers at the beginning of the anti-terror war were handicapped in several areas. First, they were not trained to fight terrorism. Second, they were not supplied adequate and proper weapons. Third, they were not trained for guerrilla warfare, and above all, fourth, they were not trained for spiritual warfare. To overcome these, their training was quickly upgraded to fight terrorism and guerrilla warfare, while the government struggled to get the needed weapons from China, South Africa, open market, and so on. To overcome spiritual warfare deficiency, the idea of recruiting local hunters, local vigilantes, and Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) came up, as they were also “versed in the use of voodoo powers” (Abdul 2014, p. 5). They used SSI and carried magical sticks (gora in
Hausa), local arms (Dane guns, bows and arrows, etc.), and many of them also had mystical powers. I was reliably informed that some of the red cloth or band some members of the CJTF tied round their Dane guns were prepared with menstrual flows and such guns can bring down anybody who had anti-bullet charms.

In December 2016, the Federal government announced a ban on tokunbo vehicle importation through land borders, and both the smugglers and customs officials started getting ready for enforcement showdown. The preparation was more spiritual than physical. As a customs official told a Nigerian Tribune reporter:

Nobody wants to be caught napping. Ali (Customs boss, Colonel Hammed Ali rtd) will make us do it (enforce the ban) and you know these people (smugglers) won’t just disappear from the land borders because of the ban. They are either going to increase bribe offers or get deadlier. They know they can’t beat us to gun fight, so it is these babas (herbalists), alagbas and alfás (Christian prophets and Muslim clerics) that they will want to move closer to. But our people (officers) are not sleeping too (officers are fortifying themselves). (Adewole et al. 2016, p. 19)

One of the herbalists told the reporter:

You know, smugglers constitute a huge percentage of the clients some of us (herbalists) who reside around border towns enjoy. They come to us for fortification against bullets penetration and all sorts of charms. The kind of job they do, which involves confronting customs officers in thick bushes along border towns exposes them to exchange of gunfire sometimes. Some of them come to us for fortification to avoid being killed during this exchange of gunfire. Some smugglers would want fortification against bullets penetration while some would insist that anytime they are approaching, the guns of the customs officials should not work until they leave that area. Some other people come for charms that would make them invisible and others ask for charms that would make their (customs personnel) pursuit unsuccessful. (Adewole et al. 2016, p. 20)

This makes it clear that customs officials face a lot of security threats, both physical and spiritual, in their job, and many have been killed. Smugglers cannot do without magical powers. Some disappear when fired at. At times another person appears and dies when a smuggler is fired at. Customs officers for their own safety also visit native doctors who give
them both bullet-proof charms and white cloth which they tie over the muzzle of their guns to prevent the smugglers escape, especially in Seme (Lagos) and Idiroko Ogun State (Adewole et al. 2016, p. 20). In some situations, a smuggler carrying guns can turn them into stalk fish or walking sticks when they approach the customs post to deceive the personnel.

The problems here are that security personnel of the state are manipulated or killed! In addition, the state loses revenue as a result of spiritual attacks or threats on its security personnel. Yet, the state looks on helpless or careless about the situation.

**Spiritual Poisoning**

There are various types of poisoning that can kill human beings. There is natural food poisoning that can occur when someone mistakenly or unknowingly eats certain food items such as poisonous mushrooms and expired creams. There is the deliberate poisoning of a person by another through the application of cyanide, crocodile bile, acid, or similar chemical or biological liquids or substances in a target person’s food. Concoctions of snake venom, deadly leaves, mushrooms, and other such substances are also used by the wicked in eliminating their fellow human beings. These are all components of physical poisoning.

But there is the spiritual aspect of poisoning which can be administered through dream food or through physical food laced with spiritual agents. For example, a little powder or liquid can be sprinkled on a target person’s food or drink. Once such food or drink enters the stomach, the spiritual agents transform into what they were meant to be to carry out their deadly assignments. They can become needles meant to pierce the heart, vampire bats sucking the victim’s blood, or scorpions.

The former governor of Kogi State, His Excellency Alh Audu, was alleged to have been poisoned. The latest is the first governor of Osun State, His Excellency Adeleke, whom the family members believe was poisoned to death in April 2017. In fact, one angry young man stated that he was killed with juju poison. The problem is that the Nigerian state is not equipped to handle such spiritual challenges. But this incapacity does not stop the existence of the threat! The wicked, greedy, and jealous elements prefer to use spiritual poisons because they are difficult or impossible to trace to the doers, and the state is not equipped to prosecute suspects without SSI, unless where there is confession, which is very rare.
Humanity lost three people in April 2015 in the Ukehe community, Igbo-Etiti local government area of Enugu State, after they ate food with funeral meat. It was believed that the man Mr Eze, his mother, and his wife ate meat poisoned at the funeral given by an unknown person. They started vomiting blood after eating the meat and later died, shattering the family’s joy.

**Spiritual Traps Against Sexual Intruders**

In several African nations such as Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, there are spiritual mechanisms used by men to check infidelity on the side of their wives. There are two current strands of such mechanisms. One is prepared and laced on the woman, after which any man she copulates with will be “gummed” to her body until the antidote is administered. This mechanism has been seen in operation in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria (the Onisha incident).

The second is known among the South-West people of Nigeria and is called “magun” (meaning “don’t climb”), that is, “don’t climb my wife” or “don’t climb this woman”. It is prepared in the form of a string which is placed on the ground usually across a door which the wife will walk through and over the string. Once she walks over the string, the spiritual agents will afflict her, and any man she copulates with will die. Some men usually warn the wife and or her illegal lover before the administration of the “magun”. Any male victim of “magun” dies in one of five ways: he tumbles three times from the woman’s body at orgasm and dies, he crows like a cock three times at orgasm and dies, he keeps calling for and drinking buckets full of water till he dies, he dies the day he eats okro soup, or the day he hits his toe against a stone while walking.

In August 2014, the *Nigerian Tribune* (Olukoya 2014, p. 8) reported the case of one pastor of a church in Ijebu-Ode who died after having sex with a lady friend in a hotel. The lady friend absconded, while the police from the Obalende divisional office took his body to the general hospital for autopsy.

One problem with “magun” is that once the spell is on the woman, even her own husband who administered the “magun” on her is vulnerable. Some husbands who cast the spell and forgot have died after copulating with their possessed wives. In the course of my research over this magun matter in 1978, I was told that a man under the “magun” attack can still be saved if the woman can hold him and urinate into his mouth.
before he tumbles or crows the third time. This information is yet to be tested and is difficult to be tested for confirmation.

In 2013, in Kenya, a woman who had been cheating on her husband despite appeals and warnings was publicly disgraced along with her illegal lover. At orgasm, the bodies of the woman and her illegal lover gummed together inseparably. The news spread like wildfire attracting thousands of anxious people who wanted to witness the mysterious gumming. The Kenyan police ran out of options trying to control the situation and at last decided to invite the woman’s husband. People pleaded with her husband to set the offenders free. He agreed after several hours but insisted that the intruder must pay him 20,000 shillings. It was agreed, they were freed, and the money was paid.

Also, in 2012, Adom Television based in Ghana featured in its Ahomaso programme on May 22 a video footage of a man and a woman who were glued to each other while committing adultery. Hundreds of people assembled to see them, and it took the intervention of security personnel to save them from being lynched. It took serious prayers of men of God to neutralise the spiritual force that bound them together and set them free.

**Sin**

There is too much evil in the country, especially bloodletting, armed robbery, kidnapping, cheating, rape, assassination, stealing, oppression of the poor and weak by the rich and powerful, ritual killing, human trafficking, drug trafficking, aggressive witchcraft and juju, nepotism, corruption and others. All these are sins before God. Sin is a reproach to a nation as the holy books teach us. “Sin puts man under the wrath of God” (Obasanjo n.d., p. 35). In Romans 1:18, it is stated that “The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the ungodliness and wickedness of men”. Sin weakens the spiritual aspect of human beings and elevates the flesh. It sets men against God and His angels.

Those Christians who think that they will go free after committing atrocities against their fellow human beings should read Hebrews 12:29 which reminds us that “God is a consuming fire”. They should also read the history of King David (who won the heart of God but also got punished), King Saul, and Sodom and Gomorrah.

In the Holy Quran, Al-Maida 5:2 provides that Allah (SWT) is severe in punishment:
And do not let hatred or ill-will towards any folk incite you so that you swerve from dealing justly. Help you one another (in virtue, righteousness and piety); but do not help one another in sin and transgression. Be just; that is the nearest to heedfulness. Fear Allah, verily Allah is severe in punishment.

Sin is therefore a spiritual threat to man and the nation. The more sins citizens commit in any nation, the more such citizens and the nation suffer the wrath of God in different forms.

**Violent Ghosts**

Ghosts are spirits of dead persons. Ghosts of persons who were unjustly murdered, as well as some ghosts of persons who died violent deaths such as through war, communal clashes, terrorism, road accidents, and plane crashes tend to be violent, as they seek revenge on their killers or the society that failed to protect them. These spirits can enter the bodies of the living especially children and youths and use them to carry out violent acts. Osman Gbla noted from his study of post-war Liberia and Sierra Leone that:

> It is clear … that majority of the people in Liberia and Sierra Leone like those in many other African countries, believe that war-related psychological trauma is linked to the anger of the spirits of those killed during the war… In Mozambique … these spirits referred to as ‘mpfhukwa’ are generally believed to have the power to harm those who killed or mistreated them in life… In Sierra Leone, they are called ‘mompilas’ (ghosts), and are also believed to have the power to hurt and torment those involved in their death. Consequently, people in both countries, especially those in the rural areas, still believe that the dead have a role to play in the day-to-day affairs of the living. (Gbla 2003, p. 186)

Osman advised that these beliefs and perceptions should be taken into account if the treatment of former child-soldiers for post-trauma stress disorders in Liberia and Sierra Leone will be meaningful and successful.

It may be recalled that the Igbo people of Nigeria in 2015 had to carry out collective burial of men, women, and children who died during the two-and-a-half-year Biafran war to give them and the living peace in Igboland. Chief Rommy Ezeonwuka, who is a member of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) Board of Trustees, said that he was now sure that the spirits of the millions of Igbo people that died in that war will now rest in peace. In his words:
Their restless wondering spirits had taken over the souls of our youths and used them to commit havoc, kidnapping, armed robbery, occultism, rituals, drug trafficking; and other vices have continued to pollute the image of Ndigbo before the outside world. Their spirits are also behind the plight of Igbo youths who have died in Sahara desert in search of greener pastures and those who are languishing in many prisons across European and Asian countries. The problem of disunity between Ndigbo and apparent failure to realise certain political ambition in Nigeria are also traceable to the failure to accord the fallen heroes a befitting burial in line with our tradition as established by our forefathers. (Bobby 2015, p. 12)

The message is that society should take the protection of life more seriously, and any innocent person killed must be appeased and given a decent burial.

In April 2014, a pastor dropped dead in Asaga-Ohafia, Ohafia local government area of Abia State, while conducting the funeral of a renowned herbalist, Pa Oji Okoko “who was not only a notable herbalist, but a leader of some powerful cult groups such as Uke Aboa, Akpan, and Ekpe” (Samson 2014, p. 12). It is said that the man had warned before his death that his corpse should not be kept in any mortuary when he dies, or taken to any church, and there should not be any Christian funeral conducted for him. Two other pastors had declined to officiate at the funeral, but a third pastor, Pastor Odum, agreed to officiate but collapsed and died in the process. Many believe that the man’s spirit was angry that his death wish was not obeyed. Moreover, the pastor was given enough warning signs to back off which he stubbornly ignored.

In 2011, a Lagos-based businessman by name Kazeem Ademoye was brutally murdered by some men hired by his own wife. After his death, the wife so manipulated things that her husband’s brother and their pastor were arrested by the police for her husband’s death. Angered by the impunity and wickedness of his wife in not only killing him, but also arresting innocent people, Kazeem’s ghost faced the woman, tormenting and threatening her to confess or see hell. She had no choice after several days of torment than to confess.

Few days after the DANA plane crashed at Iju Ishaga in Lagos killing all on board, the residents of the crash site started seeing ghosts and hearing footsteps and other frightening noises around their homes. The Obas consult Ifa, who told them to perform cleansing rites to appease the spirits of the crash victims who died violent and horrible death and roving the
area, before they become violent. The Obas did the cleansing rites, killing goats, chicken, and, so on, at the site and since then, peace reigned in the area, as the spirits of the dead went to rest. The *Aare* of Iju Ishaga, Chief Olajide Akinwumi, spoke on the matter thus:

What happened has happened. These people died horrible death. Their spirits are still roving the place. We have to perform the rituals to ensure that the dead leave the people in the area to live in peace. The people living in the area complained that they heard noises of the dead at night and they could not sleep. We know it can happen like that and we have to ensure that the dead allow those living to know peace. (Quoted in Adeseko 2012, p. 5)

The message is that those who murder people will not know peace. They may wrongly believe the white man’s view that “dead men don’t bite”. It is not so in this continent. We should also note that all this blood-letting in Nigeria, through religious and ethnic conflicts, Boko Haram war, herdsmen (armed militia) attacks, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, ritual killings, excessive use of force by soldiers, police brutality, avoidable road accidents, and other violent ways throw hundreds of angry and violent ghosts in the nation, and these worsen the insecurity situation in the country.

*Static and Roving Spirits*

There are static and roving spirits, some of which can do harm to people at certain periods of the day or night. It is believed that such spirits can turn babies in a woman’s womb into stones or snakes. Among the Yoruba of South-West Nigeria, pregnant women rarely leave their homes in the afternoons, especially between 12:00 noon and 2:00 pm. Those who must leave their homes tie stone or safety pins to their wrappers on top of their belly.

*Familiar Spirits*

Thousands of young girls are in churches for prayers in search of husbands. Several girls who are married have no babies. The two problems are at times associated with familiar spirits—spirit husbands and local deities that possess these women. Some boys and men are also possessed by spirit wives and local deities. The delay in pregnancy negatively affects the
repopulation of the society. A lot of productive man-hours are also wasted in the church prayers, hospitals, and herbal homes. These reduce the quantum of national productivity and national wealth.

**Ritual Rape**

Rape in contemporary times is no more for the raw sexual pleasure of a depraved man. There is pecuniary-induced rape as demonstrated by what is called blood minerals in Congo. In Congo, criminals are sponsored to descend on villages where strategic minerals are found and rape girls, boys, and women continuously until the entire village evacuates, giving way to the imperialist sponsors of the rapists to take over the villages for free mining. Also, some old men approaching the end of their lives at 90 years or more rape under-aged children in order to rejuvenate their expiring lives. Such men apply concoctions to their private parts or rub it on the girl before such rape, and this leads to the death of the victim. There is also rape for money rituals. An Abuja-based pastor who wanted to harvest money from a new church he wanted to establish got juju prepared for him. He was told to rape a five-year-old female virgin to activate the juju. He raped the five-year-old child of his landlord and got arrested. The rest is now history. Rape can also be for political power and influence and can cause the death of a victim too.

In September 2015, a 46-year-old man was arrested by the Badarawa/Malali Concerned Forum in Kaduna and handed over to the police for raping an 11-year-old girl. On interrogation, the man confessed that the rape is for a money ritual. In his words:

> I was given charm by an herbalist in Maiduguri in Borno State for wealth purposes and he told me that I need to be sleeping with a minor for it to be effective… He asked me to rub it on any girl of between 10 and 11 years of age and then sleep with her after which I will have a lot of wealth. (Alabi 2015, p. 38)

The point here is that people should know that rape now has several faces or goals, and that the police should always establish the motive for each rape case for proper justice to be done to the victim and ensure her life is secured. In the case of the 11-year-old in Badarawa, the Kaduna State Police Command Spokesman DSP Zubairu Abubakar confirmed the incident, saying that investigation had begun. The point is, in a state where the police is
not equipped or empowered to handle spiritual matters, how can it investigate and prosecute ritual rape? The message is then that the police need to upgrade their knowledge and skills, and the laws of the land also need to be upgraded to be in tune with the times and transmute the crime of rape.

**Spiritual Attacks**

Millions of people are under one form of spiritual attack or the other in the world, with most not being aware of the sources of their problems. The destinies of some people are tampered with, manipulated, or held down by the wicked, jealous, and fetish. Several unmarried or unemployed young men and women suffer from spiritual attacks. The business of many has been collapsed by such evil attacks, and several road accidents have emanated from spiritual attacks.

Hundreds of innocent people have been killed and many others made mad through spiritual attacks. These attacks are effected through magic, witchcraft, or jujucraft. It affects children, men, women, private people, and public officials—presidents, governors, directors, and so on. In September 2015, there was this report by the *Daily Sun* titled “El-Rufai Admits Spiritual Attacks”. In the words of the reporter, Omipidan:

Governor Nasir Ahmed El-Rufai of Kaduna State yesterday disclosed what looked like an admittance that he was indeed attacked spiritually… El-Rufai had shortly after superintending over the Kogi State All Progressive Congress (APC) governorship primary election, “disappeared” for about 10 days. … Though, in a veiled reference, he told some residents, comprising mainly workers: They wanted me dead. But what they don’t know is that even if I am not here today, my deputy will continue. They can go ahead with their fetish activities, I don’t care…

Omipidan went further to report that:

Daily Sun gathered that El-Rufai actually collapsed… Other APC chieftains who spoke in confidence previously about the matter disclosed that El_Rufai was suffering from a “spiritual attack” over the Zaria demolition: “Ask around, the Zaria people who are angry over the demolition he carried out have vowed to see his (El-Rufai) end. And these people are using both marabouts and other African traditional magic to hit at the man. So forget about what some ignorant persons are saying. I can confirm to you that the man is suffering from spiritual attack….” Another APC chieftain said: “We have
always told him that Abuja is not Kaduna. Abuja is no man’s land, but in Kaduna, we have locals who can invoke whatever they believe in, and in no distant time, you start seeing the repercussion.” (Omipidan 2015, p. 5)

Spiritual attacks can take one or more forms. The spirit of a victim can be invoked in a mirror, a spiritual pot of water, to a coven and hit with a juju, stabbed with a knife, or shot with a gun. People whose spirits are weak are easily attacked through this technique. Strong spirits are those people who are serious in prayer and fasting, and do good deeds and so are protected by God. Pictures of people are also used. The name of someone can be invoked into an effigy and attacked by breaking the leg or hand, or piercing the eye or heart with a nail or knife. People’s names can also be mentioned and a curse or spell pronounced against them. Padlocks are also used against victims.

When the governor of a state faces spiritual attacks for performing his duties that the government saw to be in the best interest of the state, then, such spiritual matters should no longer be perceived as mere superstition. This is because events have left the social sphere and registered in the political sphere and therefore call for serious intellectual study and government response. But who will bell the cat? A South African university dedicated a department from 2018 for the study of witchcraft. They hope to reduce fuel importation and traffic jam from the research results that follow. But we here in Nigeria still see witchcraft as superstition! I pity our countrymen and women. O ma se o! O di egwu!

In this case, curses or spells are pronounced into a padlock, evil spirits are invoked into the padlock to execute the mission, and the padlock is locked and buried in the ground, thrown into the bush or river, or nailed to a tree in the thick forest. Powder bearing a person’s name and curse or spell can also be blown into the air, and it can travel to any part of the nation or world. Where witchcraft is the tool, the victim can be attacked in his sleep through stabbing, strangulation, curses, or spells. Any mission can be carried out depending on the state of the spirit of the target victim. Names or pictures of the target can also be deposited in shrines or with mercantile pastors and imams for harm.

**Spiritual Mortgaging of Political Godsons**

Political godfathers today mortgage the conscience and freedom of action of their godsons through spiritual means, and this has grave implications for public accountability, development, and democracy consolidation and
sustenance in the country. Godfathers drag their godsons to shrines of local deities to take ritualised oaths of loyalty, obedience, allegiance, and money supply. In this the godsons are made to undergo rituals. This form of spiritual bondage promotes corruption and constitutes threats to the safety of public treasury and the deepening of a democratic culture. We recall the case of Dr Chris Ngige, who in the process of being given the ticket for governorship of Anambra State was taken to the Ogwugwuakpu shrine at Okija by his godfather, Chief Chris Uba, where he had to take an oath of allegiance. It was the refusal of Dr Ngige to play ball and compromise Anambra State’s money that blew the lid open after a few months of his assumption of office. If he had not taken that patriotic stand, the money meant for the development of Anambra State and the welfare of the people would have gone down the drain. Even though he was later removed through the court for reneging on the oath, as many believe, he had done a great job in Anambra State. Apart from the great transformations in infrastructure, he enabled Anambra people to know that the state was indeed getting money, which was in the past stolen or shared by the greedy in the face of weak leadership.

The point remains however that spiritual powers are being used by political godfathers to mortgage the conscience of their godsons. It is a threat to national peace, national security, and national development. Several people were killed, and several public properties of Anambra State were destroyed as a result of this crisis. Dr Chris Ngige himself, even as governor, was kidnapped and locked up in a toilet. We thank God for His mercies that the man survived to be federal minister today.

**Increasing Use of Hypnosis**

There is increasing use of hypnosis or hypnotism in the society today. People are hypnotised in vehicles (taxis, one-chance buses), on the roads, and even in their homes. Hypnosis or hypnotism involves spiritually taking control of someone’s mind and demobilising the victim’s guards and thinking system in order to make him or her answerable to the command and control of the hypnotist. People are hypnotised to be duped, raped, or kidnapped, or abducted, for rituals, or to be trafficked into prostitution, sexual slavery, or forced labour.

The Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS) announced the case of one Isiaku Adewale who finished school at University of Abuja and was awaiting his National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) programme. He
left Shaki town for Lagos, but stopped at Ojoo (Ibadan) to board the vehicle to Iwo road, where he would join a Lagos vehicle. He was pronounced missing at the BCOS on February 21, 2016. He had sent a text message home when he was in a vehicle between Ojoo and Iwo road that he had entered “one chance” (i.e. the vehicle of fraudulent persons—kidnappers, ritualists, or traffickers). He was later found unconscious on a bridge in Lagos and was unable to recognise anybody or answer any question correctly. Definitely, he was hypnotised for a purpose, yet to be identified. He is lucky to be alive. Hundreds of people have been hypnotised and taken to slaughter areas or trafficked abroad.

The hypnotisation process can take any form—tapping of the victim on the chest, lap, head, or back; giving food or a drink item; posing a question to the victim; and so on. On November 25, 2016, two school pupils on their way to school at Masaka, Nasarawa State, were given a yoghurt drink by a strange woman. After dinking the yoghurt, they “voluntarily” followed the woman away. Their parents believed they were in school, while their teacher thought they were at home. It was at 6 pm that it became clear they were missing (Monitored on Nigerian Television Authority 2016).

**Increasing Theft of Human Parts at Cemeteries**

Cemeteries and graves in homes and villages are under siege by human parts hunters all over Nigeria today. Thus, even the dead is not allowed peace, as their bodies and skeletons are mutilated, separated, and the needed parts stolen away, especially skulls, torsos, arms, genitals, heart, liver, and so on. These human parts are sold to ritualists for money rituals, political power rituals, and so on.

In July 2016, Kwara State experienced an unprecedented invasion of its cemeteries and graves by criminals and practitioners of rituals. The worst hit were the Muslim cemeteries at Osere and public cemeteries at Oke-Oyi. An affected relative told *The Guardian*:

> We took the remains of a brother to the cemetery early this month and laid him to rest according to the Islamic rites. But when we returned to the grave two days after with the aim of putting concrete on the tomb, to our surprise, we met a dismembered body outside the grave. (Fagbemi 2016, p. 1)
This means posting more security men at cemeteries to stem the vice, with the implication of less security men to protect the living. The rituals done with the stolen parts of the dead also worsen insecurity in the country or the world.

**Wrath of Local Deities**

People who take oaths, those who break oaths whose moral guarantors is a local deity, and those who cheat or offend others who, in the search of justice or out of anger, deposit their names in the shrines of local deities suffer the wrath of such deities. In Lagos, the deity called Elegba (the devil), among the Ojuelegba community, is believed to bring peace and tranquillity to the Lagos community.

In fact, the town got its name from the deity that was located there during early times. Elegba was the main deity of the area and was well worshipped. Later people abandoned the worship, and problems began with constant accidents on the Ojuelegba bridge, cult killings, and diseases. These stopped after the deity was appeased due to the concern raised by government functionaries and police officers (Saturday Tribune 2016, p. 19).

The gods (local deities) are not dead as some people think. Thus, young people should stop taking oaths in the name of or before local deities, believing that nothing will happen to them when they break the oath. The shrine of the Ogwugwuakpu deity at Okija in Anambra State is filled with corpses of people who took false oaths in the shrine and died later. Also people who steal from shops, homes, and farms placed under the guard of sango (the Yoruba god of thunder) see the red eye of the deity as they are sooner or later killed by thunderbolt.

In September 2016, a columnist of *The Punch* Abimbola Adelakun told the story of a pastor who invaded a shrine in the Ketu area of Ogun State with the aim of destroying the shrine. He claimed that he was instructed by the “Holy Spirit” to destroy the shrine in the community. But when he got to this shrine, he saw himself transfixed as if under a spell from a supernatural force. It was the early intervention of the traditional ruler of the town that saved the pastor from sudden death (*The Punch* 2016a, p. 48).

People should be careful with local deities. Christian pastors particularly should leave African traditional religion alone. When prayers are said in public places, only Christians and Moslems are called upon to pray. Sundays and Fridays are officially marked out for Christian and Moslem
worship. There is nothing for African traditional religions, as long as it remain in jail in Nigeria, and Africa, so long shall African traditional medi-
cine be in jail because both are linked and all of us, Christians and Moslems, will keep suffering the side effects and huge costs of synthetic oyibo medi-
cines that reduce life expectancy. Where is our national sense of justice, equity, and fairness? We must promote religious tolerance in word and deed and stop all these exclusionisms that divide and radicalise people.

Wrath of God

For those who believe in God, it is said from the holy books that the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom. Because the churches and mosques often preach that God (Allah, SWT) is very merciful and forgiving, many people have been misled into committing sins against God and atrocities against their fellow human beings. They forget that God is not the God of injustice and evil and that the wrath of God will always descend on the wicked and evildoer. Thus, millions of people and several societies are suffering today from the wrath of God due to their sins and man’s inhuman-
ity to man, even without knowing where their problems come from.

The Holy Bible as stated earlier teaches us in Hebrew 12:29 that “God is a consuming fire”, while the Quran (5:2) teaches us that “God is severe in retribution”. People should read holy books and understand God. The wicked will always suffer the wrath of God at the appropriate time, unless they repent and make amends to their victims early enough. If they do not live long enough to suffer for their atrocities in this life, they will suffer it in their next life or the punishment will be visited on their children.

There is no place in any holy book where God has ever forgiven a person who never showed genuine remorsefulness or repentance. Therefore any imam or pastor or prophet preaching forgiveness must first preach repentance or remorsefulness. Psalm 7 verses 8–16 records as follows about God and the fate of the wicked:

8. The Lord shall judge the people.
9. Oh let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end…
11. God is angry with the wicked everyday.
12. If he turn not, He will whet His sword; He hath bent His bow and made it ready.
13. He hath also prepared for him the instruments of death.
16. His mischief shall return upon his own head.
Also in Psalm 11 verses 5–6, these solemn words are written:

5. The lord trieth the righteous; but the wicked and him that loveth violence His soul hateth.
6. Upon the wicked He shall rain snares, fire, and brimstone, and an horrible tempest. This shall be the portion of their cup.

In the same vein, Psalm 110 verses 5–6 states:

The Lord at thy right hand shall strike through kings in the day of his wrath. He shall judge among the heathen, He shall fill the places with the dead bodies, He shall wound the heads over many countries.

People should stop presenting God wrongly as if He is God of confusion and injustice. His relationship with man is well set out in the holy books. The wage of sin is death. It can only be mitigated by prompt remorse, confession, plea for forgiveness with a promise of turning a new leaf, and restitution or compensation for victims.

**Casting Spells**

A spell is a set of projected pronouncements imbued with magical powers. A young man who copulates with the wife of a very jealous man may end up with the spell to “keep having sex with married women until he meets his doom”. Some cases of a man having sex with a goat, or with his own daughter, are products of spells. A pastor’s or imam’s child who is a wayward or a thief may be under an enemy’s spell just to disgrace the father.

In May 1986, a man was charged to court in Kenya for placing a spell on his wife to prevent her from having sex with other men. After the trial, he was ordered to undo the spell and buy a goat for the wife to carry out cleansing rites. We have earlier mentioned “magun” of South-West Nigeria.

In the United Kingdom, a 66-year-old man, William Nicoll, was caught having sex with a horse and was charged to court. In Ibadan, Oyo State, a boy was caught having sex with a goat. His mother confirmed that the boy has been under a spell for years as revealed by pastors (Nwolise 2013, pp. 79–80).
**Controlled Prostitution**

Several girls are deceived into going abroad for ready-found jobs and schools, while some voluntarily accept to go for prostitution. The three categories are usually subjected to ritual oaths in Nigeria in shrines before leaving our shores. At such shrines their pubic hair, fingernails, and blood are used for rituals. They are then told to swear an oath of obedience and secrecy of the entire plan and activities under pain of death or madness. From the moment of oath-taking, they come under the full control of their traffickers. This ritual oath is one of the problems of fully penetrating and dismantling trafficking for prostitution syndicates. The National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons has been doing excellent job from the moment they learnt the secret of taking liberated trafficked girls to the shrines where they earlier took an oath for their freedom.

**Yahoo-Plus Operations**

Yahoo now has two dimensions. One is the usual yahoo everybody hears of which involves the use of wits and ability to convince a target victim and defraud him or her. The second is the aggressive application of supernatural powers online by a criminal practitioner against someone in order to hypnotise him or her or bring his or her spirit, mind, and body under command and control for selfish gains. This second yahoo type is what is called *yahoo-plus*. It involves rituals, jujucraft, witchcraft, and magic. Several people have lost their lives, money, and landed properties as a result of these yahoo-plus activities.

The operators carry a live ritualised tortoise on their chest when communicating with the target victim, some wear ritualised charms or rings, or some place their hands or feet on a juju. Some rub ritualised powder or a potion on their palm while operating the laptop or computer while passing instructions to the target victim. Some purchase nice dresses, rings, wrist-watches, shoes, caps, earrings, and so on, ritualise them, and send them to the target person who on getting into direct contact with the objects get hypnotised. Some submit names of targeted persons to shrines. Some make incisions in their tongues while some lick juju before talking to the target person. Some operators sleep in graveyards with their laptops for rituals.

Many girls have fallen victim of these yahoo-plus practitioners by drinking minerals from them. The girls soon start bleeding from their private
parts and die if spiritual remedy does not come fast. The men will then use the girl’s star. Some operators effect ritual rape or even voluntary but ritualised sex with girls they entice with money, cars, jewellery, or clothes. After the sex, they wipe the girl’s semen for rituals, and such girls become useless in life thereafter (Independent Saturday 2017, pp. B6–B7).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has not only shown that spiritual security threats exist and are increasingly causing havoc among citizens and families in Nigeria, it also went ahead to identify their various dimensions and gave living and verifiable examples of their manifestations. What is next is for the Nigerian state to take up the matter from here and do the needful by making appropriate new laws, prescribing appropriate new punishments, and upgrading the training, methods, and equipment of security personnel. This is to ensure that the security personnel and the Criminal Justice System remain ahead of the new threats, attacks, and crimes.

For now, the people feel abandoned by the state, as its security agents and the courts are still working with old laws, methods, and tools. For example, how does the state investigate and prosecute a man who carried out ritual rape on a five-year-old girl? The time of talking about superstition has passed. The state should charge the universities to commence degree programmes on spiritual security studies. State intelligence agencies have to upgrade to Strategic Spiritual Intelligence. I do not agree with Sun Tzu’s thesis that “foreknowledge can not be gotten from ghosts and spirits”. With due respect to the legendary Chinese general, philosopher, and strategist, that statement is outdated.

When I gave my inaugural lecture at the University of Ibadan on February 20, 2014, I humbly suggested the establishment of a “new Department of Metaphysical Studies, or Department of Spiritual Studies, which will serve as the nucleus for a future Faculty of Spiritual Sciences”. I further suggested that:

There is a need to open up studies in mysticism, Nigerian and African divinities, magic, spiritual sicknesses, spiritual healing, spiritual warfare, death, Strategic Spiritual Intelligence, etc. (Nwolise 2013, p. 110)

But so far in the country nothing has happened. It is rather in faraway South Africa that a new department on witchcraft was established to take off in 2018, as mentioned earlier in this chapter.
There is an urgent need to raise public awareness and consciousness on these identified and other spiritual security threats and crimes so that collective response can be galvanised while awaiting further state actions. There is a need for spiritual security education in schools, via radio, via television, in churches, and in mosques.

New laws are needed to control spiritual power especially by native doctors, and mercantile pastors and imams against misuse. It is being done in Tanzania where native doctors are registered and given orientation. Those who violated the laws have been jailed or executed by the state.

Witches and wizards have to be recognised and registered and given new orientation to direct their knowledge and powers to positive use for the common good. People should depart from evil, trust in God, get close to God, and do good deeds to get His protection. They should monitor their fellowmen from time to time using Strategic Spiritual Intelligence; if not, the evil ones may get them first, attack them, and finish them.

Nigeria majorly and all African nations have to rediscover our social values before the continent completely loses its children and youths to the devil and the foreign cultures of globalising states. We must remain our brothers’ keepers. The sanctity of human blood and sacredness of human life must be restored. Social justice must remain the basis for peace and harmonious living in the society.

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PART III

Formal and Informal Agencies and the Management of Internal Security in Nigeria
CHAPTER 18

The Nigerian Army and Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic

Jude Abdulkareem Momodu

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria’s return to democratic governance on May 29 1999 resulted in the liberalization of the political space that was hitherto occupied by the military dictatorship for almost 33 years (1966–1979 and 1983–1999). The concomitant effect of this political freedom was massive outbursts of sectarian agitations, including the emergence of new forms of violent crimes such as terrorism, insurgency, farmers-herdsmen conflict, armed banditry, militancy, kidnapping, armed robbery, cultism, electoral-related violence, and small arms and light weapons proliferation. These internal security threats are precipitated by the bourgeoning youth population and the threat of an army of unemployed youth, affected by the worsening economic conditions occasioned by decades of maladministration. These internal security threats have continued to undermine peaceful coexistence and national development in the current republic, and the Nigeria Police Force that is constitutionally charged with the responsibility of tackling them is largely ill-equipped and ill-trained to handle them. As a
matter of fact, policing has always been a major challenge in Nigeria due to limited government funding of the police institution, a situation that has often constrained the efficiency of the institution. Alternatively, successive civilian administrations have had to resort to forming various military-dominated Joint Task Forces in many states of the federation facing security challenges, and such outfits are largely controlled by the army, and they are saddled with the responsibility of managing internal security threats (Francis et al. 2011).

Despite the regular engagements of the army in internal security operations (ISOs), domestic security challenges have continued to increase, reinventing themselves in terms of their methods, lethality, scale and intensity, thereby dangerously undermining the fragility of the Nigerian state. Evidently, Nigeria’s internal security has remained very volatile to violent conflicts and criminality, thereby according it negative ranking in the international community. As a result, the country has been ranked by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in its 2018 report as the third most terrorized country in the world, after Iraq and Afghanistan. The GTI measures the impact of terrorism on countries. Nigeria has also been ranked by the 2018 Fragile States Index (FSI) as the 15th least stable country out of 177 nations in the world (Failed States Index 2011). The aim of the FSI list is usually to assess states’ vulnerability to conflict or collapse. Currently, there exists a very sharp fault line along ethnic and religious lines in Nigeria permeating intergroup relations in Nigeria. The proliferation of numerous internal security threats in the extant Nigeria’s democratic republic clearly points to the fact that the country is at war against itself, and this has made the security agencies to be stretched beyond their capacity.

The engagement of the army in ISOs by both the federal and various state governments is mainly to restore public order and maintain national stability. This is with the understanding that security is significant to development and progress of any society. ISOs happen to be Nigeria’s Armed Forces’ third function of “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order” (Omede 2005). This becomes very important as Waltz has warned about the primacy of national security in a country like Nigeria plagued by national security challenges, when he posited that, “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power” (Waltz 1979: 65). The importance of national security as a fundamental responsibility of governments cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, governments devote huge resources towards ensuring watertight national
security architecture. Unarguably, democracy cannot flourish in an atmosphere of anarchy, violence and general insecurity, as it is the case under Nigeria’s current democratic experience.

In Nigeria, ISOs are often regarded as a matter of strategic national interest to the extent that it is enshrined in the constitution of the country, and huge resources are often committed to pursue this objective. The role of the Armed Forces of Nigeria in ISOs is contained in Section 217 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which expressly states that the Armed Forces of the Federation have the responsibilities of (1) defending Nigeria from external aggression; (2) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air; (3) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President and (4) performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended).

But how well is the Nigerian Armed Forces, especially the army which is the focal point of this study, playing this very important constitutional role of managing the internal security challenges of the Nigerian state? This is against the backdrop that its engagements in ISOs in the current republic have increased dramatically, and it appears to be overstretched and overwhelmed by the activities of insurgent groups such as the Boko Haram sect, the Niger Delta militants, the marauding herdsmen and secessionist groups like the indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB) and Arewa Youth organization. As of 2016, the army was deployed on ISOs in 32 out of the 36 states (International Crisis Group 2016), and in 2017, its personnel were deployed in 30 states within the country (Premium Times 2018). From 2018 to date, the army has again been deployed in 32 out of the 36 states. There are simultaneous military operations and Joint Task Forces currently in force in all the 36 states of the Federation, including the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.

The above ISOs are largely meant to assist the ill-equipped Nigeria Police Force and other paramilitary agencies. This is a sign that the personnel of the army are unnecessarily overstretched and unfortunately discharging the traditional responsibility of the Nigeria Police Force, whose main responsibility is to prevent and manage internal security threats. This is a complete usurpation of the constitutional and traditional role of the police by the army and this call for rethinking of the engagement of the army in internal security management. Notwithstanding however, the existing engagements of the army in ISOs need a thorough examination of its capacity to discharge effective ISOs. Under a democratic regime,
there must be civilian control of the military as Feaver argues that “the military must be strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorized them to do” (Feaver 1996: 149). Therefore, it is important that the army as an institution must display high levels of professionalism in the discharge of its duties, and it must also be strong enough to effectively respond to internal and external security threats.

The effectiveness of army’s engagement in ISOs is a function of the degree of its capacity and preparedness in terms of its professionalism, the quantity and quality of its personnel and equipment and the operational strategy it employs in responding to internal security threats. On the one hand, if these factors or inputs are adequate, then the army will be able to effectively discharge its ISOs’ role more effectively and efficiently. On the other hand, if these factors or inputs (professionalism, quantity and quality of its personnel and equipment and the operational strategy to be employed) are not adequate, then their capacity to effectively and efficiently discharge ISOs will be negatively affected. This chapter evaluates the role, challenges and successes of army’s role in ISOs in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The study also examines the limits of the engagement of army in ISOs since it is not trained to be the front-line agency of managing internal security. This study draws on a combination of secondary sources and primary data. Interviews were conducted by the authors with key informants on the internal security operations of the Nigerian Army in the Fourth Republic.

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

Security

The English word “security” originated from the Latin word “securus”, “se” means without and “curus” means “uneasiness” (Mesjasz 2004). Also, the Latin word securitas refers to tranquillity and freedom of care, or what Cicero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends (Liotta 2002). Unarguably, the term security is an “essentially contested concept” (Baldwin 1997: 5) which can be “dangerously ambiguous” (Wolfers 1962). During the Cold War era, security was dominantly conceived as being coterminous with military security as against other states’ military power (Booth 2005). However, since the end of the Cold War, the meaning of security has significantly moved away from its tradi-
tional state-centric character, which primarily conceived security in military sense. This conception focused only on the protection of the state. However, the new concept of security has been broadened to dwell more on human security issues rather than positing a state-centric perception. The expansion of the meaning of security from a state- or military-centric sense to the inclusion of human centred security, perhaps informed the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs’ definition of the concept as a “condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress” (United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs 1986).

Buzan also define the concept of security as “the pursuit of freedom from threats” (Buzan 1991: 18). He maintains that: “Security can be approached both objectively (there is a real threat) and subjectively (there is a perceived threat), and nothing ensures that these two line up” (Buzan 1997). Møller (2001) also refers to the term security, explaining that in an objective sense, “the term security measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”, and Wolfer’s characterization of security as “the absence of threats to acquired values”. Møller and Wolfer’s definition of security explains the value-laden nature of the concept to the extent that it could be implied that individuals, families, groups, communities, states and organizations have values that they care so much about which they want to protect at all cost. The concept of security usually throws up some very fundamental questions which should dictate the rationale for security protection as Baldwin raised some questions such as security for whom, security for which values, how much security, from what threats, by what means, at what cost and in what time period (Baldwin 1997: 12–18).

In defining the concept of security, there is the need to synergize the threat concerns of the state with that of the citizens as this will enable the concept to reflect the threat concerns of both the state and the citizens. A holistic definition of the concept of security should therefore be viewed as the ability to protect values that are critical to the survival of the state and the existential needs of the citizens whether from real or perceived threats. What this translates into is that the concept of security must take into account threats against the state and the human security of the citizens. The state has a greater responsibility to guarantee the protection of these dual (state and citizens) security concerns, bearing in mind that this is what is encapsulated in Thomas Hobbes’ “social contract theory”. Because
there cannot be a condition of absolute freedom from threat(s) in any society, it therefore makes sense to define the term security “as a condition of reasonable freedom from basic existential threats to human life and ensuring the safety of objects and institutions critical to human survival”.

**Meaning of ISOs**

ISOs refer to the constitutional responsibilities of the state security agencies towards tackling domestic threats to the corporate survival of a nation-state. Such responses are primarily carried out by the traditional internal security agencies vested with the constitutional responsibilities. In the case of Nigeria, such agencies include the Nigeria Police Force, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Directorate of State Security, Nigeria Prison Service and Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, and in the event that these agencies cannot suppress or successfully manage internal security threats, the military is usually called upon because of its professionalism and the sophisticated ovation of its coercive capacity to respond to large-scale violence and internal insurrections. Nwolise (2007) defines ISOs as actions carried out by the internal security agencies for the purpose of managing or responding to threats to the security emanating within a sovereign state. Such threats may include riots and demonstrations, armed banditry, secessionist agitations, militancy, kidnapping, communal clashes and terrorism, which normally fall outside the constitutional duty of the military. Most internal security threats usually originate from within a nation-state, and sometimes, some domestic threats may be inspired from outside the country.

In his analysis of the Nigerian military’s (which includes the army, navy and air-force) internal security function, former President Obasanjo once commented that the “military is an instrument of national policy and is constitutionally tasked with the responsibility of aiding civil authorities in maintaining law and order” (The Guardian 2001). According to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 14(2 b), it expressly states that: *the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government*. It therefore means that ISOs are a constitutional responsibility of the state. Generally, ISOs deal with the constitutional responsibility of the state that rests on the civilian authorities but exercised through the state’s coercive institutions of conflict management with the aim of ensuring public order and protection of the citizens and the state.
from domestic threats. It also deals with protection of critical state or national infrastructures and institutions.

ISOs are very complex and strategic requiring well thought-out policy initiatives that can effectively prevent and respond to threats to the domestic security of a nation. Ineffective internal security policies can undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. In making these policies, the state consistently carries out threat analysis to ascertain the degree to which the threat undermines its core national security values and then it can determine the appropriate security agencies that will respond to the threats—whether it is the military or the traditional internal security agencies that is best suited to respond to the threats (Jesse 1972).

Internal security threats to the Nigerian state include armed banditry, human trafficking, drug trafficking, armed robbery, border security, financial/economic crimes, protection of critical infrastructure, electoral violence, farmer-herder conflict, community clashes, ethno-religious conflicts, kidnapping/abduction, assassinations, Boko Haram insurgency, militancy/oil theft and civil unrests. According to The Law of Armed Conflict Internal security operations-Part A (International Committee of the Red Cross Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces 2002), the document highlights the activities carried out by the military while performing ISOs to include the following:

1. Cordon and search operations (sealing off a village to search for offenders, weapons or equipment)
2. Urban and rural patrols, possibly joint patrols with police or paramilitary forces
3. Manning observation posts
4. Guard duties at key points or for very important personalities
5. Road blocks or vehicle checkpoints (VCPs)
6. Identity checks
7. Controlling peaceful demonstrations
8. Controlling or dispersing unlawful assemblies or demonstrations (riot situations)
9. Enforcing curfews
10. Making arrests
11. Detaining persons
12. Acting as a reserve or reinforcement, that is, quick reaction duties on standby for incidents
13. Keeping sides apart (manning a “peace line” or “green line”)

14. Escort duties for the police, civil defence units and the fire brigade
15. Hostage rescue
16. Ambush
17. Securing or picketing routes, for example, to ensure safe passage of supplies through sensitive areas
18. Bomb disposal or dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

Other ISO activities include counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency; cracking of armed bandits; participation in complex humanitarian emergencies or disaster management such as flooding, disease outbreaks and wildfire management; and election duties.

**Defining the Concept of Army**

The army is the land branch of the Armed Forces or the military institution (army, navy and air-force), which is authorized by law to use coercive or lethal force to defend a state from both domestic and external threats. The army profession is a complex, regimented and bureaucratic organization, and it is categorized into two, namely the officer corps and the other ranks who are also called the enlisted or rank and file. While the officer corps are “the modern professional body and the modern military officer a professional man” (Huntington 1957: 7), and the unique, professionalizing skill practised by the army officer is the “management of violence” (Huntington 1957: 11), the enlisted, also referred to as rank and file, are not professional soldiers of the army but they “are specialists in the application of violence and not the management of it. Their vocation, therefore, is a trade and not a profession” (Huntington 1957: 17–18). The enlisted does not have the same responsibility as the army officer corps. The Nigerian Army has the largest army in West Africa. Currently, it has 162,000 active front-line personnel and 32,000 reserve personnel. There are plans by the present army authorities to increase the number to about 200,000.

The army, like the navy and air-force, has both domestic and international responsibilities in protecting the Nigerian state. Section 217(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) highlights the responsibilities of Armed Forces which include the Nigerian Army as follows:
1. Defending Nigeria from external aggression
2. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air
3. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President
4. Performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter is anchored on “social contract theory” propounded by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). The basic tenet of social contract theory is that security and order could only be achieved by a contract in which all citizens would give up all their individual powers to a central power—the sovereign—in return for the protection of life and property (Marshall 1998). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines “social contract” in the context of fragility and state-building, which underline interactions among three elements: (1) expectations that a given society has of a given state; (2) the state’s capacity to provide services, including security, revenue generation and control of territory to provide these services; and (3) the presence of a political elite that manages state resources and has the capacity to fulfil social expectations (OECD 2008). Under the social contract theory, the state is seen as the guarantor of security and the provider of welfare to the citizens (Hobbes 1985).

In pursuant of the objective of providing security and welfare for its citizens, the state formulates national security policies to guarantee law and order as it is only under a peaceful and secured atmosphere that a state can mobilize its human and material resources towards a productive end (Willie 2008). The main objective of national security is therefore to uphold a country’s national values, which include national survival, self-preservation, territorial integrity and economic progress (Abidde 2014). The army is a major instrument for guaranteeing national security, and by law, it is expected to be subordinate to civilian control to the extent that the civilian authorities decide the why, what, when and where the army is to apply coercive force, but how to apply coercive force is exclusively determined by the army authorities, which is often codified in the “Rules of Engagement”. Ball and Fayemi (2008) rightly observe that the quality
and effectiveness of protection for the territorial integrity of a nation-state and its citizens are directly proportionate to the level of subordination of the security organizations to democratically elected leadership structures and civil authorities.

The question is, does it mean that the army must do everything it is directed to do by the civilian authorities, as Feaver asked—if the issue of civilian control of the military revolves around reconciling “… a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do” (Feaver 1996). Nay, the army must at all times rationalize, balance and be sure that it acts responsibly in the interest of the state and the citizens, whenever it is directed by the civilian authorities to act in matters of national security interests. It must be cautious not to carry out any directive from civilian authorities that is unconstitutional and capable of threatening societal peace. It needs to understand that it has a constitutional responsibility to the society by protecting and preventing it from returning to Thomas Hobbes’ state of the nature. It also needs to guarantee the society’s continued existence through the use of its coercive force to guarantee public order and national stability. Therefore, the theory of social contract is relevant to the extent that it explains the primacy of the role of the state in providing security for its citizens through the security agencies, which is clearly stated in the Federal Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Section 14 (2b) “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. And as Marshall (1998) rightly observed that security and order can only be achieved by a contract in which all citizens would give up all their individual powers to a central power, the sovereign in return for the protection of life and property. However, the responsibility of protecting the state and its citizens from violent domestic and external threats is best soothed for the military because it has the “unique, professionalizing skill for the “management of violence” (Huntington 1957: 11).

A BRIEF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIAN
ARMY, 1862–2018

The Nigerian Army is the oldest branch of the Nigerian Armed Forces established in 1862 by a British colonial officer and the Resident Governor of Lagos Captain John Glover with the sole aim of using the troops to defend the Colony of Lagos. This small formation called Hausa
Constabulary, formed a nucleus of the Royal Niger Company Constabulary, which were the troops raised by the Royal Niger Company in 1886 to form the West African Field Force (Ukpabi 1966: 17). The aim of establishing the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was to protect British interests in Northern Nigeria. By 1900, when Nigeria officially became a colony under the British government, the army became the coercive instrument of national security defence of the British colonial government in Nigeria. More elaborately, Ukpabi (1987) outlined the reasons for the founding of an army by the British colonial government to be threefold, namely to protect the British traders, the Christian missionaries and to protect the British Trade routes around Lagos (1987). According to the Library of Congress Webpage (2002: 2):

The Company Constabulary was recruited to serve an internal security role in Northern Nigeria. This constabulary formed the core of the Northern Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The third unit, the Oil Rivers Irregulars, was created predominantly of Igbo’s in 1891. This unit was later designated the Niger Coast Constabulary, and formed the Southern Regiment of the WAFF. The two regiments became the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF on January 1,1914 along with the consolidation of the Nigerian Protectorates. (The Library of Congress Country Studies, Nigeria 1991)

The First Battalion was established on 26 August 1896, while the Second Battalion was formed in 1898 and the Third Battalion was added later in 1898 (Butts and Metz 1996; Ukpabi 1966). The formation of the three battalions was to prepare for the effective takeover of the disparate nations that would be merged under Nigeria as a full colony of the British government in 1900. Eventually, the West African Field Force and the Northern Nigeria Regiment were amalgamated in May 1900 (Killinggray 1986). By 1914, the Southern Nigeria Regiment and the Northern Nigeria Regiment were amalgamated to form the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (Miners, 1971), and this brought about the unification of Nigeria’s Armed Forces. By 1928, WAFF was renamed the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), and during the 1930s, it expanded from four battalions to six battalions which served in two theatres. The Northern and Southern Commands had major installations at Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Yola, Enugu and Calabar (The Organization of African Unity Homepage 2017).
Furthermore, the visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Nigeria in 1956 led to the renaming of the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF to the Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment (QONR). Later that same year, Britain granted military autonomy to her dependencies and the QONR was renamed Nigerian Military Force (NMF) (Luckham 1994 [1971]). At independence in 1960, the name changed again to Royal Nigerian Army. As soon as Nigeria became a Republic in 1963, the name was changed to the Nigerian Army and with the other two forces—navy and air-force—were designated the Nigerian Armed Forces, the name it bears till today (Adekson and Adekanye 1981). The Nigerian Army has come a long way—it is about 154 years old (1862–2018), and its numerical strength is currently 160,000 with a reserve of 132,000, and its responsibilities have grown tremendously under the current democratic dispensation, especially in terms of protecting the Nigerian citizens and the Nigerian state.

The increase in internal security threats in the North-East of Nigeria has led to the establishment of more army formations in the region. The Nigerian Army under the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Lt-Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika (retd.), in August 2013, established the 7 Infantry Division in Maiduguri to boost the military’s counter-terrorism operation in the North-East. Under Lt-Gen. Tukur Buratai COAS, 8 Division was also established in the northern part of Borno State, as part of strategic plan by the army to boost military operations against terrorists, particularly in areas around the Lake Chad Basin. The citing of the Special Forces Training Centre in Buni Yadi in Yobe State is also to enhance the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram. This is an indication of the army’s determination to end insurgency. The expansion of the Nigerian Army’s Order of Battle (ORBAT), 2016, has led to the establishment of three additional divisions (6, 7 and 8 divisions in Port Harcourt, Maiduguri and Sokoto, respectively), thereby introducing an eight-division force structure.

Also, a military barracks was established in 2017 in Southern Kaduna to tackle the activities of Fulani armed bandits. However, the Nigerian Army still has a character which it inherits from its British colonial founder, which is that, it is an army of occupation and suppression with a responsibility to protect the regime of its master. The army has also adopted this same character in the current democratic dispensation as the civilian authorities use them as an army of occupation, subjugation and suppression; they also use the army to rig elections in their bid to capture or consolidate power.
The Nigerian Army remains one of the foremost coercive instruments of stability and conflict management as well as a national security guardian of the Nigerian state. As such, it is constitutionally empowered to perform three major roles in a democratic dispensation which include (1) protection of the democratic government by subjugating itself to the democratically elected government, (2) protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state and (3) protection of the citizens and internal security of the Nigerian state. Section 217 (c) of the 1999 Constitution forms the basis of involvement of the military in ISOs in Nigeria. It provides thus in relation to the functions of the military in Nigeria: “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of National Assembly”.

Similarly, section 8(1) of the Armed Forces Act provides that the President shall determine the operational use of the Armed Forces. Operational use is further defined thus:

“In this section, “operational use of the armed forces” includes the operational use of the armed forces in Nigeria for the purpose of maintaining and securing public safety and public order”. The performance of these roles is directed and funded by the state, as Huntington (1957) rightly observes that national security policy is established by heads of state to protect the nation’s “social, economic, and political institutions”. He went further to describe three dimensions of national security policy which include military security policy (protection against outside threats), internal security policy (prevention of internal threats) and situational security policy (prevention of situations that can hinder governance).

The Nigerian Army’s engagements in ISOs are usually designed by the state to focus on the second and third forms of Huntington’s model of national security (i.e. internal security policy and situational security policy), as Kemp and Hudlin rightly observe: “it is for the civilian leadership to decide where the line between ends and means (and hence between civilian and military responsibility) is to be drawn” (Kemp and Hudlin 1992). ISOs in Nigeria are designed to respond or manage internal conflicts, namely civil war or secessionist violence, riots, military coups, students protests, political/electoral crisis, militancy, armed banditry, protection of the electoral process, communal/ethnic clashes, religious
conflicts, herdsmen and farmers’ crisis, kidnapping, sabotage and acts of terrorism, which have all necessitated the engagement of the Nigerian Army to assist the police and other agencies involved in ISOs. The internal security priority of the Nigerian state can be inferred from the analysis of a former Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshal Paul Dike (in a lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institute, London, 26 March 2010), who affirmed that Nigeria’s security is based on a holistic view which sees the citizens as the primary beneficiaries of every security and developmental deliverable that the state can offer. In a nutshell, Nigeria’s internal security priority focused only on two critical factors, namely the human security—protection of the citizens and the Nigerian state from domestic threats.

The army is the bastion of Nigeria’s national defence, and its personnel have been drafted to perform ISOs since the colonial era, especially quelling civil protests organized by nationalist leaders, labour unrests and so on. In August 1914, as the First World War gathered pace, an Egba revolt was militarily crushed by ten companies of troops from the newly created “Nigeria Regiment”. In 1929–1930, the regiment was called upon for a major internal security operation against Igbo women, mainly at Aba. It also assisted in quelling the Tiv riots induced by the Middle Belt Congress party that was protesting against the exclusion and suppression of the Tiv people by the ruling Hausa-Fulani–dominated Northern Peoples’ Congress of Nigeria from 1962 to 1965 and the dreaded “Operation Wetie” political uprising in the Western Region of Nigeria in 1965 between the supporters of Action Group party and Nigeria National Development Party, both in the same region. Since the country’s independence on 1 October 1960, the army has contributed to several internal security operations, assisting the police and other traditional internal security agencies and the civil authorities to maintain and restore law and public order. The greatest ISOs that the Nigerian Army has been drafted to quell is the secessionist attempt by the Igbo people of the Eastern Region in 1967. The scale of the operations was very huge, including not only the army but also the navy and air-force. Their combined efforts assisted in bringing the 30-month civil war to an end in 1970. Following are the highlights of the ISOs carried out by the Nigerian Army since the colonial era up to 1999:

1. The Epe Expedition of 1863 carried out by the Lagos Constabulary
2. The Brass River Operation of 1895 (conducted by the Niger Coast Constabulary)
3. The Benin Campaign 1897
4. The siege of Yola, Kontagora, Bauchi, Sokoto, Kano and Arochukwu (by the Northern and Southern regiments from 1902 to 1903), under overall direction of WAFF
5. Egba revolt of 1914 crushed by the army
6. Maintenance of public order due to Aba women’s riots of 1929–1930
7. The frontier control operations along Nigeria-Cameroun border in 1959 and 1960
8. Implementation of emergency rule in the Western Region in 1962
9. The Tiv Riots—(1962 and 1965)
10. Western Region Political Crises—1965
11. Maintenance of law and order due to the crisis created by the 15 January 1966 coup d’état
13. Joint military Police anti-robbery patrols immediately after the civil war
14. Quelling of Ali Must Go riots in Universities of Nigeria in 1979
17. 1983 General Elections crisis
18. Quelling the anti-SAP riots of 1989
19. Quelling the Zango-Kataf mini-war of 1992
20. Quelling of 12 June protests of 1993
22. Political crisis following the annulment of 12 June 1993 elections

**Nigerian Army’s Engagement in ISOS in the Fourth Republic and Its Successes**

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been very challenging to the army due to the increasing domestic security challenges. However, the army has prevented the republic from disintegration through its active engagements in
ISOs. Its men and women have responded to threats such as sectarian violence, terrorism and insurgency, armed robbery and banditry, farmers-herdsmen conflicts and recent secessionist agitations. Colonel Sagir Musa, Deputy Director, Army Public Relations, highlights the achievements of the army’s engagements in ISOs as follows:

The Command Post and Field Training Exercises were initiated and executed with the major objective of addressing peculiar security challenges across the various regions of Nigeria. This idea assisted significantly in the huge successes achieved in all the areas where the Exercises were conducted. The Buratai’s Approach—that of putting—realism/pragmatism and subterfuge into training, exercises and/or operations strategically aimed or targeted to solving identified security threats across the nation has so far yielded the desired results. (This Day Newspaper 2016)

Similarly, during the 2017 Nigerian Army Day Celebration, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Tukur Yusuf Buratai, praised the Nigerian Army to have done brilliantly well in internal security management in Nigeria. To cite his words, he maintained that:

Every Nigerian must congratulate the Nigeria Army for stemming Boko Haram, Militancy and other security threats. The Nigeria army reflects the diversity of Nigeria. Those who have left the service will always say ‘I remember when I was a soldier’ because the extra-ordinary thing we enjoy is that when you are in the service, you live a professional life and unite with everyone despite our differences because the main aim is to defend our father land. (Leadership Newspaper 2017)

There is no gainsaying in the fact that the army’s engagements in ISOs in the current dispensation have largely assisted in tackling the several internal security challenges confronting the Nigerian state. In this regard, the army has busted many criminal gangs and has also prevented the escalation of several ethno-religious and community violence such as Tiv-Jukun conflict, Ife-Modakeke, Zango-Kataf riots in Kaduna, Umuleri-Aguleri conflict in Anambra state, post-election crisis in Kano, Kaduna and Niger Delta militancy. Some of the organized criminal groups busted are cattle rustlers in Plateau, Zamfara, Yobe and Kaduna States; armed robbery gangs in Lagos State and cult groups and kidnappers in Edo, Rivers and Delta States; as well as some South-East states, among others. The army in conjunction with other security agencies wiped out the Boko Haram
insurgent group from areas they captured and declared as caliphate in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States in 2014. Generally, the army, under the current republic, has tirelessly struggled to ensure national stability and the continued corporate existence of the Nigerian state. Its men and women have put their lives on the line in discharging their constitutional responsibility of managing the internal security of Nigeria. In fact, the Nigerian Army, together with the other arms of the Armed Forces, remains the bastion of Nigeria’s unity, as they have continued to keep the disparate entities within the country together as a corporate entity.

**Army’s Response to Ethno-religious Conflicts in the Fourth Republic**

Several ethno-religiously motivated conflicts have occurred since the return to democratic governance on 29 May 2017. Some of these conflicts are the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Wukari, Taraba State, 1999–2000; Aguleri-Umuleri conflict in Anambra State, 2000; Ife-Modakeke conflict, 1999–2000; Jos crisis 1999–2000; violent crisis between Muslim Fulani cattle and Kaduna crisis, 2016; and Shiite crisis with the Nigerian Army in Kaduna in 2008. The army has been deployed by the federal government to respond to these conflicts and effectively prevent the escalation of violence in the various conflicts. However, the army was excessive in some cases, committing human rights abuses. A case in point is the Zaki Biam killings by the army in revenge for 19 of its personnel who were gruesomely murdered by Tiv militias. This is reported by Human Rights Watch report:

The military operation began on October 22, 2001, when soldiers from the 23rd Amored Brigade of the 3rd Amored Division rounded up villagers at Gbeji (in Zaki Biam area of Benue State) in what turned out to be a “ployed” meeting. The soldiers made the villagers to sit on the ground, separating thereby men from the rest and opening fire on the men indiscriminately. (*Human Rights Watch*, October 25, 2001)

Another case of army excessiveness in ISOs is the Odi killings in Bayelsa state, which was a reprisal killing for 15 policemen murdered by members of a militia group in Odi community. According to Human Rights Watch report:
In an apparent revenge, the military acting on the directive of the Federal government, invaded Odi village in Bayelsa state and raided it. This attack was characterized by intense and excessive use of force. In effect scores of unarmed civilians, including women and children, were killed. All the buildings in the village, except the bank, the Anglican Church and the Community Health Centre, were destroyed, leaving the village in a woeful state of desolation. (Human Rights Watch, November 1999)

In both cases, several hundreds of innocent Nigerian citizens were extrajudicially killed by the army. Human rights abuses are a regular character of army’s engagement in ISOs in the Fourth Republic. Furthermore, some army personnel on ISOs have been observed to rain insults, intimidate and molest innocent citizens that they ought to protect. For instance, in Odi in Bayelsa State, where the army was drafted on ISOs, some of its personnel littered the walls and buildings in the community with graffiti writings as pointed out by Albert (2003) in its documentation of such expressions:

1. “Bastards, why run, come and fight us now?”
2. “We don come, where are you bloody fool?”
3. “Resource control my foot”.
4. “I Fok you mama; wetin you do?”
5. “I will kill all Ijaws—By Soldier”
6. “Bayelsa will be silent forever”
7. “Odi, where is your pride”
8. “Dem don run”
9. “Where is the Egbesu?”
10. “You are burnt”

The atrocities of Nigerian Army in the Boko Haram insurgency have also been documented by Amnesty International in its recent report, “Our job is to shoot, slaughter and kill”: Boko Haram’s reign of terror in north-east Nigeria. In the report, Amnesty International:

Documented 27 incidents of extrajudicial executions committed by the in 2013 and 2014. At least 1,000 men and boys, almost certainly many more, were killed in these incidents. In 14 of these cases, Nigerian military forces, sometimes in collaboration with Civilian JTF members, executed a large number of people, at times dozens or even hundreds in one day. The precise number of extrajudicial executions is impossible to verify due to the lack of
records, cover-up efforts by the military, and the difficulty of reaching witnesses in the areas where the crimes were committed. Cases presented in this report provide documentation of extrajudicial executions in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. (Amnesty International 2015: 40)

One point that needs to be stressed here is that some of the excesses of the army in ISOs may be state directed like their atrocities at Odi in Bayelsa State, Zaki Biam in Benue State, Gbaramatu town in Delta State, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-East and many others. Such acts may sometimes be justified by the government like President Obasanjo and some other leaders did in some instances; however, R. Jervis has also rightly argued that “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” (1978). Notwithstanding, however, it is very wrong to subject the citizens they are supposed to protect to human rights abuses under the guise of conducting ISOs. This undermines not only Nigeria’s human rights laws but also international laws and customs.

**Nigerian Army’s Response to Boko Haram Insurgency**

The Nigerian Army has been engaged in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram jihadist group in the North-East of Nigeria. The conflict dates back to 2009, when the sect waged a violent campaign against the Nigerian government. The Islamist group is popularly known as Boko Haram, but it prefers to be called *Jama’atu Ablissunnah Lidda’awatiwal Jihad*, meaning “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad”. Like al-Qaida, Islamic states of Iraq and Syria and other many jihadist groups, the core objective of the Boko Haram Islamic group is to replace the secular Nigerian state with a caliphate, which will be strictly governed by the Shari’a Islamic laws.

In July 2009, Boko Haram launched a violent uprising against the Nigerian state taking on Nigerian security forces which led to the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf—the charismatic leader of the group—and several hundreds of the members of the sect. Some of the sect members managed to escape and went underground but only resurfaced in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the second in command to Mohammed Yusuf. According to Joint Investigation Team (JIT) established by the Defence Headquarters, the team acknowledged that between 2009 and 2013, the military operations in the North-East against
the Boko Haram extremist group changed from internal security operations to a “full scale offensive against the BHT [Boko Haram terrorist] insurgents”. Amnesty International also reports that:

In 2013, as attacks by Boko Haram intensified, former President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency, which was subsequently extended repeatedly, in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The state of emergency gave overly broad emergency powers to the security forces. Former President Goodluck Jonathan set up a Joint Task Force to lead the operations against Boko Haram, which included personnel from the Nigerian Army, Police Force and other security forces. The army took full control of operations against Boko Haram in August 2013. (Amnesty International 2015)

It should be noted that the military’s high-handedness and repression of the sect in the July 2009 uprising and the consequent declaration of emergency rule by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in May 2013 in the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, and its renewal after six months, largely contributed to the escalation and intensification of the violence and the sect’s metamorphosis, first into a terrorist group (2010–2013). Later on in 2014, it graduated into an insurgent group capturing territories and declaring them as part of its acclaimed caliphate in the three states. The army’s engagement in countering the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East has been criticized both locally and internationally for its ineffectiveness by the US Department Office, who recently noted that the security forces’ handling of the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram lacks coordination and effectiveness. In a similar manner, the Amnesty International has also alleged the security forces of committing gross human rights abuses against innocent civilians in the North-East. The reports noted:

In the course of security operations against Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria, Nigerian military forces have extra-judicially executed more than 1,000 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of torture. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims of enforced disappearance; and at least 7,000 people have died in military detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding and denial of medical assistance... Data collected suggests that since March 2011, more than 7,000 men and boys have died in detention, their deaths often unrecorded and almost never investigated. Amnesty International gathered the data and the
details of individual cases through visits to mortuaries, internal military reports, statistics recorded by local human rights activists and interviews with witnesses, victims, former detainees, hospital staff, mortuary personnel and military sources. The highest death rates were recorded in Giwa barracks in May, June and July 2013, where up to 180 deaths were recorded on some days. In June alone, more than 1,400 corpses were delivered from the barracks to one of the mortuaries in Maiduguri. (Amnesty International 2015)

So far, about four major counter-terrorism operations have been launched against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military, with the army spearheading the operations. These counter-terrorism operations are identified as follows by Amnesty International report:

Since 2011, there have been four major operations in the north-east to counter Boko Haram. Operation Restore Order I (ORO I), from June 2011 till May 2013, was the first. Some 4,000 troops served in Borno state and, together with the police and members of other security forces, formed the Joint Task Force (JTF). In Yobe state, ORO III was established in ORO I was replaced by Operation BOYONA, which covered Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (the acronym derives from the names of the three states). Operation BOYONA was launched when the state of emergency was announced in May 2013 and had some 10,000 troops. Both ORO I and its successor Operation BOYONA reported to the Chief of Defence Staff. On 19 August 2013, operational command of Operation BOYONA was taken over by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) when the newly established Army Division 7 took over from the JTF and military forces took over fully from the police in actions against Boko Haram. Operation Zaman Lafiya, with 10,000 troops, was launched as the successor to Operation BOYONA. Including ‘Operation Lafiya Dole’ which is currently ongoing in the north east against the Boko Haram terrorism. (Amnesty International 2015: 20)

**CHALLENGES OF ARMY’S ENGAGEMENTS IN ISOs IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL DISPENSATION**

The declining performance of the Nigerian Army in ISOs is a function of the long years of neglect of the institution under the successive military administrations that tactically and strategically weaken the capabilities of a military institution which the army is an integral part of. The International Crisis Group report (2015) identifies the root causes of the inefficiency that is plaguing the Nigerian military, which includes the army as follows:
The decline began during 33 years of military dictatorship that took a severe toll on professionalism, operational effectiveness and accountability. Return to democratic rule in 1999 raised hopes the institution could be restored, but successive civilian governments’ pledges of much-needed reforms proved largely rhetorical. Presidents, defense ministry and parliament lacked the commitment and expertise to implement significant changes. They left the military badly governed, under-resourced and virtually adrift. Administration and accountability deteriorated throughout the sector. Poor, indeed lacking senior leadership has been compounded by equally poor legislative oversight and defense headquarters coordination and planning. (International Crisis Group 2015)

The cumulative negative effects of the neglect of the army resulting in its poor performance became very evident in its inability to contain the militant groups in the Niger Delta, forcing the government to offer the militants an amnesty in 2009. Also, the army and the other Armed Forces lost territories, personnel and equipment to Boko Haram insurgents in 2014 in the North-East. These flaws had on 15 January 2015 made Major General (retd.) Muhammadu Buhari, a former military head of state and then presidential candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC), to lament that the inefficiency of the Nigerian Army and its sister Armed Forces in containing the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria was “a big disgrace”. Under the current administration of General Muhammadu Buhari (retd.), 2015 to date, the army and the other security forces have been able to degrade the capacity of the Boko Haram insurgents, but not without the government still being forced to negotiate the release of kidnapped Chibok girls for huge sums of dollars and release of Boko Haram commanders.

Some of the factors that negatively affect the performance of the personnel of the army on ISOs are discussed as follows:

**Corruption in the Army**

One of the factors that affect the performance of army’s engagement in ISOs in the Fourth Republic is corruption. According to Aljazeera Cable programme titled *Counting the Cost* (2015), it noted as follows:

From 2001 to 2012 the military received $19 billion is only about one percent of GDP, even falling to half a percent in 2006. On average, nations typically spend around two percent of GDP. But in 2014, Nigeria spent $5.8bn on security, a quarter of the total budget. Of the $5.8bn, roughly a
third went to the Defence Ministry that is $830m for the army, $440m for the navy, and $460n for the air force. Another $400m was spent on deployments and missions. However, much of that money has allegedly fuelled corruption or been siphoned off to enrich regional governments. This has led to an under resourced military, short of guns and ammunition. It has allowed Boko Haram to extend its influence, threatening national elections which last month were postponed for six weeks so the army could take on the armed group. (Aljazeera 2015)

In the same manner, ICG (2015) describes the endemic and institutionalized corruption in the Nigerian defence sector as follows:

Corruption is system-wide. Legislators often manipulate the appropriation process at the National Assembly to serve private business interests rather than benefit the armed forces. Dubious procurement practices, fraudulently bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weak auditing systems at the national security adviser’s office, the defence ministry and armed services headquarters often mean funds are diverted to private or non-military purposes; arms, ammunition and other equipment are sometimes substandard and not always delivered. Inadequate funding, corrupt procurement and poor maintenance result in serious equipment and logistics deficits.

The army leadership and the defence ministry have been docked in several corruption cases. A case in point is the Dasuki-gate corruption scandal involving misappropriation of US$2.1 billion meant for the procurement of military hardware by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). Money meant for military procurements to fight the Boko Haram insurgents were converted to fund campaign for President Goodluck Jonathan’s re-election. Even the money allocated for defence procurements to equip the fighting forces in the North-East was embezzled by the Defense and Service Chiefs. According to International Crisis Group report revealed the corruption in defence procurement process as follows:

Defense acquisitions are shrouded in secrecy. Rather than explore government-to-government arrangements, there is an overwhelming preference for dealing with rent-seeking middlemen, so equipment can be bought at grossly inflated prices, with contractors and military/government officials reportedly sharing the huge margins. Allegations of inflation or over-invoicing of contracts, award of phantom contracts through which
funds are diverted to private accounts and fraudulent acquisition of substandard, sometimes useless, equipment are common. There have also been recurrent reports of phantom procurements—contracts awarded to non-existent companies and never seen items recorded as supplied or delivered. (International Crisis Group 2016: 11)

Also, in November 2007, military and media sources reported that a syndicate had, over a long period, allegedly sold arms and ammunitions belonging to the Nigerian Army’s Central Ordnance Depot to Niger Delta insurgents (Sunday Punch, Lagos, 20 January 2008; Nigerian Tribune, 15 January 2008). A significant number of soldiers have been involved in other criminal activities, from armed robbery to ransom kidnappings (Vanguard, 29 December 2015). Corruption within the army has a tremendous direct negative impact on the efforts of equipping the army personnel with the right and up-to-date weapons and equipment to conduct effective ISOs.

**Personnel and Training Deficit**

The military, in which the army is one of its units, is largely understaffed, poorly trained and overstretched. A country of about 170 million people, with an army strength of about 162,000 and a reserve of 32,000, is grossly inadequate. According to a report of International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (2014), Nigeria has the lowest ratio of military and paramilitary personnel to overall population compared to its neighbours except Niger with 0.7:1000. Nigeria currently has 1:1000 ratio of military and paramilitary personnel to overall population. Meanwhile, in Chad, it is 3.4:1000; in Cameroon, 1.2:1000, while in Benin Republic it is 1.1:1000. The capacity of the institution to absorb quality personnel has continued to decline, as its training institutions are short of facilities and instructors, lack training modules, and because they are largely focused on conventional operations, they are somewhat outdated. Personnel are under-motivated due to low pay, poor welfare services and bleak post-service prospects (ICG 2015). In a bid to address the problem of personnel deficit in the army, there is consistent recruitment of personnel currently going on, although more Nigerian Army personnel are lost to Boko Haram onslaught on a daily basis. This still significantly reduces personnel capacity.
Equipment and Logistics Deficit

Another major challenge of the Nigerian Army is equipment deficit. This is so serious to the extent that for many years, the military made no major acquisitions, at best taking delivery of refurbished platforms (Leadership, 21 July 2014). The limited military equipment available is often poorly maintained. For instance, the army’s 35-mm anti-aircraft guns, imported from Switzerland in 1979, became unserviceable in 2002 and were left in that condition until 2013 (This Day, 31 October 2013). International Crisis Group (2014) report observed that many soldiers deployed to fight Boko Haram in 2013–2014 reported their equipment were obsolete and unserviceable and often broke down frequently. This was a major factor for the many desertions in those years. Logistics is also major challenge to the army. The army’s operational vehicles and aircraft are inadequate, old and largely unserviceable, owing to poor funding or capacity challenge to routinely service these operational equipment for easy logistics and movement of personnel and equipment.

Generally, the deficit in equipment and logistics in the Armed Forces became very visible in 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic governance. This was a calculated and deliberate attempt by the successive military administrations starting from the time of President Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1992) spanning to General Sani Abacha (1993–1998). Their aim was to demobilize the military so as to prevent military takeover against their governments. The deficits in equipment and logistics have contributed significantly to the poor performance of the army in ISOs in the current political dispensation.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)

The illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons are mostly responsible for crime commission and armed conflicts. Small arms and light weapons (SALWs) are also the weapons of choice for many non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and those seeking to enhance self and community protection in Nigeria today. Consequently, several seizures of SALWs have been made by the Nigerian security services, including the Nigerian Army. For instance, the Nigerian Customs Service had, on four occasions in 2017, intercepted 2671 pieces of firearms smuggled into the country. Similarly, between 2018 and 2019, more seizures have been made, especially because of the forthcoming general elections in February and March 2019.
The increasing supply of SALWs within and from outside the country has continued to escalate incidences of violent crimes and conflicts, posing huge threat to Nigeria’s national security as Krause asserted that although the availability and use of more sophisticated weapons have contributed to the erosion of state authority, SALWs proliferations in the country have equipped many individuals and groups with weapons potent enough to challenge the state’s coercive power. This is evident from groups like Boko Haram, militants in the Niger Delta, Fulani herdsmen, armed robbers, kidnappers and cult groups. These are groups that are now on the rampage in the theatre of violence in Nigeria and have made the army to be deployed on ISOs in 32 of the 36 states of Nigeria. The problem of proliferation of SALW has become compounded because of the ineffective efforts of the Nigerian government towards curbing the proliferation of illegal arms and ammunition in the country. The consequence of this failure has been the numerous security challenges that the country now grapples with.

### Funding Constraint

The Nigerian Army is suffering from serious funding constraints. The 33 years of military dictatorship left the army and other Armed Forces poorly funded and badly governed. According to International Crisis Group (2015):

Until recently, the military was under-resourced, with comparatively low budgets, disbursed irregularly and unpredictably. From 2000 to 2008, its budget was less than 3 per cent of overall government expenditure. From 2009 to 2014, it increased to an average of 7.2 per cent of government spending ($5–$6 billion); but, as in the past, this was still allocated disproportionately to recurrent expenditures, leaving very little for crucial capital investment. (ICG 2015:i)

The Nigerian Army has continued to expand its personnel strength and facilities, thereby necessitating increased budgetary funding. The Acting Chief of Accounts and Budget, Army, Brigadier General Jehadi Ezra Jakko argued that (Table 18.1):

With the expansion of the Nigerian Army’s Order of Battle (ORBAT) 2016, leading to the establishment of 3 additional divisions (6, 7 and 8 divisions in
Port Harcourt, Maiduguri and Sokoto respectively), thereby introducing an 8 division force structure, there is need for the federal government to initiate new sources of funding to halt the continually dwindling financial allocations to the Nigerian Army. Dwindling resources through the envelop system has also impeded routine exercises required for operational readiness and efficiency. “There is therefore the need to exploit new budgeting windows to include other channels of funding for the Nigerian army as is done in other nations”. “Available options include creating a Defence Support Fund as obtainable in Turkey, establishment of a Military Industrial Base and Investment Holdings as in Egypt or enacting a local Defence Trust Fund Act like existing Tertiary Education Trust Fund in Nigeria”. “The government could also include defence and security sector as beneficiaries from the National Sovereign wealth Fund. These windows will reduce the burden of funding military on government”. (Duniya 2017)

Table 18.1 Nigeria’s military expenditure from 1999 to 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defence budget (₦) 1999–2017</th>
<th>% of defence budget from the annual budget—1999–2017</th>
<th>Nigeria’s annual budget (₦) —1999–2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>45,400,000,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>299 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>37,490,000,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>702 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>63,472,000,000</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>894 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>108,148,000,000</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.05 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>75,913,000,000</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.45 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>85,047,000,000</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.19 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>88,506,000,000</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.6 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>99,853,000,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.88 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>122,200,000,000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.39 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>191,515,000,000</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.74 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>224,021,000,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.05 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>299,108,000,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.4 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>369,045,000,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.7 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>364,843,000,000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.9 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>380,500,000,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.99 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>968,127,000,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.96 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>387,497,000,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.4 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>429,000,000,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.06 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>465,000,000,000</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.4 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total:</td>
<td>4,814,685,000,000</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>59.1 trillion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s field compilation
The above table illustrates Nigeria’s defence budgets from 1999 to 2017, which cumulatively stands at ₦4,814,685,000,000 trillion, which is about 8.1% of the total annual budget which stands at ₦59,100,000,000,000 trillion. This means that defence budget is very low, leaving the military including the army poorly funded, with 8.1% of the country’s 18-year budget.

**Human Rights Abuses**

Available literature on the Nigerian Army’s counter-insurgency operations against the Boko Haram extremist group in the North-East of Nigeria and their engagements in other ISOs within the country have exposed its poor human rights records (see ICG 2015; Amnesty International 2015). The army often grapples with the problem of high-handedness, and insensitiv-
ity to the nature and characteristics of civilian-dominated areas is always pointed out as a flaw. While on ISOs, its personnel have constantly engaged in gross human rights abuses such as rape, arbitrary arrests and detention, extra-judicial killings, brutality, extortion and molestation of civilians. The army and other security agencies in order to restore order have often killed more people than were killed at the initial stage of the conflict (Hill 2012). The Legal Defense and Assistance Project of Nigeria recorded that the army killed in 529 of the 880 incidents in which they intervened between 2003 and 2004. Also, between 2006 and 2014, the security forces killed in 2043 incidents, resulting in 12,078 fatalities. Of these killings, the military killed more than the other security agencies. In May 2009, over 500 people were killed in coordinated attacks by a combined team of the army, navy and air-force personnel in Gbaramatu kingdom of Delta State (Francis et al. 2011). The 2001 Zaki Biam genocidal killings in Benue State is also a quick reminder of the extra-judicial killings carried out by some personnel of the Nigerian Army. Furthermore, Amnesty International publication titled *Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military* chronicles the gross human rights abuses of the personnel of the Nigerian Army in the North-East as follows:

The military engagements in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria, has resulted in the extra-judicial execution of more than 1,000 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of torture. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims of
enforced disappearance; and at least 7,000 people have died in military
detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding and denial of med-
icinal assistance. (Amnesty International 2015: 4)

The poor human rights records of the army have often given the institu-
tion a bad publicity both within and outside Nigeria to the extent that
army authorities are now making frantic efforts to clean itself from within
by sanctioning its personnel that commit human rights abuses. This action
is in line with the argument of Huntington (1957: 16–17) who has argued
that when a military officer has broken the rules of the profession, other
members hold him accountable. The Nigerian Army authority have also
instituted human rights standards in their training schools as well as set up
human rights desks at the theatres of ISOs. Recently, the army spokesman
Col. Sani Usman, in a statement reminding the officers of the Nigerian
Army’s Rules of Engagement (ROE) for internal security operations
( Operation Mesa), warned the personnel of the Nigerian Army on ISOs
about engaging in unprofessional conducts. He warned:

For the avoidance of doubt, the ROE and Code of Conduct set out the
circumstances and limitations, under which armed forces personnel may be
applied to achieve military objectives in furtherance of government policy
within Operation MESA and other IS Operations. Any officer or soldier
found aiding or abetting any act of arson, vandalism or unprofessional con-
duct, would be severely dealt with according to the extant laws... Once
deployed on any internal security (IS) operation it is the duty of an officer
or soldier to ensure the enforcement of law and order in conjunction with
other security agencies. Troops on duty must intervene in any situation to
avoid a breakdown in peace, stability or law and order of any area where they
are deployed. It is inexcusable for troops to stand aside and watch the secu-
ritv situation deteriorate leading to loss of lives or damage to property with-
out intervening. Such intervention should, however, be based strictly on
sound judgement and within the ambit of the code of conduct for IS
Operations while exhibiting good professional ethics. Troops have to use
necessary force to quell crisis resulting in deaths, injury and damages to
properties”, citing section 217 (2) (c) of the 1999 Constitution (as
amended)…. ( This Day Newspaper, September 11, 2016)

It is important to stress at this juncture that contemporary warfare is asym-
metric in nature and character, usually involving the professionally trained
and regimented state army against the ragtag and amorphous non-state
armed groups (NSAGs), which often adopt guerrilla tactics against the state. Therefore, the nature and character of NSAGs makes it very impossible for the state army to engage them in warfare without committing human rights abuses. As a matter of fact, there is no military in the world, whether it is sophisticated or not, that can successfully engage NSAGs in warfare without occasionally violating the rights of innocent citizens or the rebels. The sophisticated military of the United States of America, fighting against the Taliban terrorists/insurgents in Afghanistan, has continued to commit even worse forms of human rights abuses against innocent citizens. It is important therefore that military authorities should mainstream human rights education in military training schools and in their internal security operations (ISOs). This will assist in committing military personnel to their rules of engagement. Setting up of human rights desk at theatres of ISOs will also help to expose and punish military officers that engage in the violation of human rights of the citizens (Tables 18.2 and 18.3).

Table 18.2  Nigerian Army’s ISOs in the Fourth Republic (1999–2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Period of Nigeria Army’s ISOs</th>
<th>Operational areas and dates of ISOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Zaki Biam invasion 2001, Benue State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Onitsha disturbances, 2006, Anambra state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Ikeja Bomb blasts, 2001, Lagos state.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(g) Plateau State (Jos) crisis, Plateau state.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(l) Kano religious crisis.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(m) Plateau state (Jos) crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n) Itshekiri/Urhobo/Ijaw crisis of 2004, Delta state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(o) Danish religious cartoon crisis, 2006, Bauchi, Kano and Borno States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table 18.2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Period of Nigeria Army’s ISOs</th>
<th>Operational areas and dates of ISOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alhaji Umaru Yar’Ad</td>
<td>29 May 2007–5 May 2010</td>
<td>(a) Quelling of Islamic insurgency in Borno (Maiduguri), 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Niger Delta militancy (Operation Restore Hope, Warri—2008; Operation Pulo Shield-2012; and Operation Delta Safe-2016).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Invasion of Gbaramatu Delta state in 2009 by the Nigeria military with the aim of routing out of the militants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Goodluck Jonathan</td>
<td>2010 to 29 May 2015</td>
<td>(d) Jos crisis, Plateau state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Jos crisis (till date), Plateau state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Post-elections crisis (April, 2011) Northern states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Umbasse ethnic killings in Nassrara State 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Army and police in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Muhammadu Buhari</td>
<td>May 29, 2015</td>
<td>(a) Boko Haram insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Niger Delta militancy—from 2016 to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Farmer and Herdsmen conflicts 2015 to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Violent crisis between Muslim Fulani cattle and Kaduna crisis 2016.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Army in Kaduna in 2018.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(f) Agitations of the independent peoples of Biafra (IPOB) in South-Eastern states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(g) Armed banditry in South-Western states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(h) Commercialized Kidnappings in the South-South, South-East and North-West regions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s field data
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/no:</th>
<th>Name of ISOs</th>
<th>Mandate of ISOs</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>(a) Operation Lafiya Dole&lt;br&gt;(b) Operation Deep Punch</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Borno State, Yobe State and Adamawa State.&lt;br&gt;Counter-terrorism and counter-terrorism operations launched to clear the remnants of Boko Haram insurgents from Sambisa Forest.</td>
<td>North-East region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>(a) Operation Safe Haven&lt;br&gt;(b) Clearance Operations&lt;br&gt;(c) Operation Whirle Pinch</td>
<td>– To quell ethno-religious conflicts and other criminal activities within Jos metropolis.&lt;br&gt;– Operations: Created to checkmate the activities of kidnappers, armed robbery and other forms of criminalities within the North-Central, especially Kogi State.&lt;br&gt;– It is an operation established to fight banditry and armed robbery along Abuja-Kaduna road and Birnin Gwari area in Kaduna State.</td>
<td>North-Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Operation Sharan Daji and Operation Harbin Kunama</td>
<td>To combat banditry in Zamfara, Kaduna and fringes of Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina and Kano States.</td>
<td>North-West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>(a) Operation Delta Safe, formerly Operation Pulo Shield.&lt;br&gt;(b) Operation Crocodile Smile I and II,&lt;br&gt;(c) Navy’s Operation Tsera Teku.</td>
<td>These operations are all aimed at crushing the resurgent Niger Delta militancy and other acts of criminality like oil theft, vandalism and bunkering in the region.</td>
<td>South-South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Operation Awase</td>
<td>To contain the criminal operations around Ogun-Lagos axis, particularly in Arepo where illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism are regular occurrences. South-East has Operation Iron Fence to combat armed robbers, hooligans and kidnappers.</td>
<td>South-West</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. **Operation Iron Fence** [(a) Operation Iron Fence,](b) Operations Python Dance I and II  
   (a) Established to combat armed robbers, hooligans and kidnappers.  
   (b) Established to combat armed robbery, cultism, kidnapping and rioting.  
   The operation was carried out in the South-Eastern Region from 27 November–27 December 2016. It was repeated in  
   The peculiar security challenges in the region such as kidnapping,  
   abduction, armed robbery, farmers—herdsmen clashes, communal crisis,  
   traffic gridlock and violent secessionist agitation among others were the targets of this Exercise.  

7. **Operation Mesa**  
   Which is a joint task force (JTF) operation against all forms of criminal activities in all the states of the federation.  

8. **Operation Whirle Stroke**  
   This operation was established to curtail the escalating spate of herdsmen/farmers conflict as well as armed banditry in parts of Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba States.  

9. **Operation Safe Conducts**  
   It is to guide armed forces participation in electoral matters with a view to creating a conducive atmosphere for elections  

10. **Operation Tsare Teku’**  
    To combat piracy  

11. **Operation 777**  
    Designed to consolidate on the achievements of the existing operations.  

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Author’s field data
What Should Be the Limit of the Army’s Engagement in ISOs in Nigeria?

The ISOs’ role of the Nigerian Army is contained in Section 217 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended)—“suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President”. The performance of this role in the present republic has led to a situation where the army is excessively engaged in ISOs. This has been emphasized by the current Chief of Army Staff, General Tukur Buratai, in his words that: “Currently, the Nigeria Army is deployed in about 32 states fighting to eradicate terrorism, cattle rustling, kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, armed banditry and communal clashes among others”.

The challenges have in many instances necessitated the deployment of Quick Response Groups to troubled areas and establishment of new units in some cases (*This Day Newspaper* 2017). Its men and women are overstretched by multiple deployments to assist an ill-equipped and inefficient federal police that is unable to play its role effectively in terms of maintaining law and order in many areas of the country. The Nigeria Police Force (2008) annual report observes that the “police is handicapped because of combination of factors that plague them, among which are; lack of resources, poor government support, poor condition of service, lack of appropriate and adequate training and ill-equipped workforce”. In June 2014, former Army Chief, General (retd.) Abdulrahman Bello Danbazzau alluded to this serious concern when he observed: “the armed forces are the ones doing the duties of the police” (*International Crisis Group* 2014). As of June 2015 military units were deployed in joint operations with the police and other paramilitary organizations in 32 of the 36 states. At present, the army is currently on ISOs in 34 of the 36 states of the federation. Internal security deployments prevent the military from surging to areas like the North-East and distract troops from preparing for real combat (*The Sun*, 5 July 2013; IRIN, 3 June 2015; ICG 2015).

The Director of Defence Information (DDI), Brig-Gen. Rabe Abubakar, has acknowledged the enormous role played by the army in internal security in Nigeria. He maintained accordingly:

There is no military in the world that can claim that it is overstretched when it comes to internal security challenges. This is our primary duty to ensure that our country is united. Even though the military would have loved a situation where other security agencies step up and play their role to complement our
supporting duties. There are certain security operations that could have rightly been carried out by other security agencies to assist the armed forces but in the event this was not done we cannot just fold our arms to allow things to deteriorate. This is our country, it is our duty to protect it and we are able and capable of defending our territorial integrity. (*This Day Newspaper* 2016)

Brig-Gen. Rabe Abubakar’s comments are a direct admission of the fact that the military is unnecessarily overstretched and overburdened by its regular engagements in ISOs which ought to have been the responsibility of the police. It is instructive to argue that the continued excessive engagements of the army in ISOs can fundamentally exhaust and civilianize its men and women from being a professional army to a non-professional army, thereby predisposing them to corrupt practices, which can potentially undermine the professionalism of the institution. This has currently been observed in most of the army checkpoints in the North-East where its personnel extort money from motorists. Its personnel can also be tempted to subvert or overthrow the democratically elected government, as they did in the past. To this extent, therefore, the regular engagements of the army in ISOs should be restricted to only its core constitutional role of defending Nigeria from external aggression; maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land; suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President; and performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. This can only be possible if adequate funding, training, provision of equipment and motivation are given to the police and other traditional agencies of internal security so as to enhance their capacity to effectively deter, respond and manage internal security threats in the current dispensation.

**Current Internal Security Threats and Suggestions on How to Strengthen Nigerian Army’s Engagements in ISOs**

The Nigerian Army has engaged in many ISOs since its creation and even more since the return to the Fourth Republic. Its current ISOs include the protracted war against the Boko Haram extremist group which has lasted for about eight years now (2009–2017), the deadly and recurrent farmers and herdsmen conflicts, cattle rustling, kidnapping, oil bunkery, pipeline vandalism, secessionist agitations in the South-East and armed robbery. The
proliferation of internal security threats in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has made peace elusive in the country, and this has often negatively affected the country in the Global Peace Index ranking as shown in Table 18.4:

Notwithstanding the magnitude of insecurity facing the Nigerian state, the Nigerian Army in collaboration with other security agencies has been recording tremendous gains in their engagements in ISOs in the current republic. However, US Country Report on Terrorism for the year 2016 submitted to the US Congress produced by the US Department of State has expressed worry about Nigeria’s inability to effectively hold on to territories recaptured from Boko Haram terrorists. This report underscores the urgent need for overhauling the ISOs strategies designed to tackle the Boko Haram terrorism and other ISOs in the country. The following suggestions if implemented by the government and army authorities can assist in repositioning the army institution towards better performances:

1. The Nigerian Army should incorporate ISOs’ training in its training schools, and it should also train its members regularly on international best practices on ISOs.
2. The government should increase budgetary funding for ISOs, especially for procurement of modern equipment in order to withstand the challenges of modern threats. This is important because soldiers involved in ISOs are often not properly equipped to carry out their tasks.
3. The army should leverage on the community leaders in information gathering on activities around their jurisdiction when on ISOs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Global Peace Index</th>
<th>Global peace ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2.873</td>
<td>148th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2.849</td>
<td>149th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2.877</td>
<td>151th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2.910</td>
<td>151th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.710</td>
<td>151th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.693</td>
<td>148th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.707</td>
<td>146th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.613</td>
<td>137th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.628</td>
<td>131th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.599</td>
<td>127th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.574</td>
<td>125th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: excerpt from Global Peace Index (2018) documents
They also need to collaborate with the police and other security agencies in the area of intelligence gathering and sharing and training to enhance the efficiency of its personnel on ISOs.

4. The National Assembly should as a matter of urgency design standard rules of engagement for the Nigerian Army and other security agencies which will assist in regulating their conducts in ISOs as well as ensure that they efficiently carry out their duties with precision.

5. There is also an urgent need to improve leadership, oversight, administration and accountability across the entire defence sector.

6. The Nigerian Army should mainstream human rights education in its training curriculum and as part of its regular field instructions in ISOs.

7. The Nigerian Army needs to create a very robust platform for engaging the civil populace at all times and especially during its engagement in ISOs. This is important because civil-military relationship tends to be calm when both civilians and the military understand and accept their appropriate roles.

8. There is also the need for the government to improve funding to the Nigeria Army Defence Industrial Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), with a view to enhancing their capacity for local production of basic military items, particularly arms and ammunitions, combat kits, electronic gadgets and so on.

9. ISOs should also ensure the mopping up of the surplus small arms and light weapons used by militant, religious extremist, armed bandits and ethno-communal groups. The influx and proliferation of small and light weapons are greatly impacting on the internal security of Nigeria in the contemporary times.

10. The Nigerian Army Command should ensure that a high level of professionalism is entrenched in the army institution, and acts that fall short of this standard should be sanctioned.


12. Recruitment of more personnel to meet up the numerical personnel strength to respond to the ever-increasing internal security challenges to the Nigerian state.
The army is an indispensable institution of national security defence in any nation including Nigeria. As part of the core constitutional mandate of the army in securing the Nigerian state, its men and women have carried out many ISOs since the country’s independence to date. Since the return to democratic governance on 29 May 1999 to date, the army has been engaged in more ISOs than any other time in the history of the Nigerian state. However, it is in the same political dispensation that its weaknesses have been exposed in terms of its inefficiency and unprofessional conducts in the theatres of ISOs. In particular, some personnel of the army on ISOs have often committed human rights abuses such as human rights abuses, extra-judicial killings, rape, extortions, torture and acts of insurrection. These misconducts have often negatively affected the public trust in the institution. The authorities of the army need to make concerted efforts to try to re-invent and reposition itself in its constitutional efforts of promptly responding to and managing internal security challenges within the Nigerian state.

The numerous internal security threats within the Nigerian state are the consequences of the structural problems plaguing the country, coupled with the prolong years of bad governance and social and economic injustice. Therefore, it will be improper to believe that only deploying the army’s coercive power can adequately tackle the country’s internal security challenges without addressing the economic and social injustices prevalent in the country as well as strengthening the weak public institutions of justice through responsible and efficient good governance as McNamara (1999) maintained that “any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortages, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capital income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment has a false sense of security”.

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Mathias Daji Yake

CHAPTER 19

INTRODUCTION

On a daily basis, Nigeria is faced with numerous security challenges. In recent years, especially since the year 2000 to date, Nigeria from its North-Eastern part is confronted with insurgency. South-South (Niger Delta) is confronted with militancy, while cattle rustling and herdsmen and farmers’ conflicts ravage the North-Central and North-Western parts. South-East and South-West are plagued with kidnapping, trafficking and other violent crimes. Due to the rise and persistence of conflicts in most states in Nigeria and the worrisome lack of capacity to curb conflicts by the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the military has been actively involved in maintaining internal security in most states, especially those that are facing more worrisome security challenges. In situations like these, the military is required to perform one of its constitutional roles/duties in maintaining, and if need be restoring, law and order.

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To this end, men and officers of the Armed Forces are seen on streets and in communities of different parts of Nigeria supporting and assisting the Police in maintaining law and order, which has led to the formation and establishment of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in various states and regions of the country with different code names and mandates, such as Operation Restore Order (Yobe), Operation Sweep, Operation Harmony, Operation Restore Hope (Borno), Operation Gbale, Operation Rainbow (Plateau State), Operation Yaki (Kaduna), Operation Safe Haven (Plateau) (Essien 2012). In recent years, Operation Pulo Shield, Operation Crocodile Smile, Operation Delta Safe, Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Zaman Lafiya were established in South-South states and North-East states and Operation Harbin Kunama in North-West states recently.

Nigeria seems to utilize the multitrack diplomacy in its management of conflict. Specifically, the role of security agents in the management of conflict in Nigeria ranges from prevention to total control of the situation at the spot of violence, which is mitigation. In many cases, the adoption of the military in the management of conflicts is usually occasioned by indiscriminate use of illegitimate firearms and ammunition by the belligerent groups, which result in higher number of casualties in terms of loss of lives and properties during the conflict (Karim 2013). The primary responsibility of the Nigerian Military (Army, Air force and Navy) is to protect the territorial integrity of the Nigerian state from external threats, provocation and aggression; the military on many occasions are invited to support and assist other civil authorities (whose primary responsibilities are to maintain internal security) to address other forms of violence and tensions that pose as threats to the internal peace and security of the country. As such, the military could be asked to assist the Police in restoring law and order in the country or as stated earlier (Azinge 2013).

Despite efforts put in place by the government to curtail or resolve tensions as reflected earlier, the continuing conflicts and security challenges witnessed in the country raise serious questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the state machineries or mechanisms in managing conflicts in the country. Albert (2012) notes that inter-agency collaboration is important in problem-solving. To this end, Joint Task Forces are usually set up for specific purposes and assignments to resolve different security concerns. For example, the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta is set up to checkmate militancy in the region, the Special Task Force (STF) in Plateau State is set up to curb ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State and some parts of Bauchi State, and the Joint Task Force in Borno, Yobe and
Adamawa is set up to curtail insurgency. In other states like Kaduna State, the JTF is there to address the cattle rustling and ethno-religious conflicts in Southern Kaduna and other North-West states. Joint Task Forces are usually set up based on the principle of inter-agency collaboration, meaning that all the security groups would formally work together to attain specific integrated mandates (Albert 2012). But despite the heavy presence of the military and its joint operations, conflicts seem to persist, and capacity of the military to curtail them seems to be threatened or questioned. Therefore, this chapter examines the challenges of Joint Task Force Operations but with particular focus on its internal security operations in Plateau State.

The actor network collaboration theory provides the theoretical orientation for this chapter. The theory is drawn from different social theories, such as actor network theory and collaboration theory. Here the actor network collaboration theory postulates that every group is an actor (actor group), and every actor group is made up of different individual actors which form the actor group; it goes further to say that when different actor groups come together to form a network, there is a need for collaboration among them to work effectively. Therefore, the Joint Task Forces can be likened to be a network of actors in which there must be collaboration among them and other stakeholders for them to succeed in their assignment.

The next section of this chapter undertakes a conceptual analysis so as to provide a detailed understanding of joint task force. The third section is an overview of military and internal security operations in Nigeria. It provides a snapshot of internal security operations through the years. The fourth section examines joint task force operations in Plateau State, Nigeria. In the fifth section, the challenges of internal security operations in Nigeria are investigated and discussed.

**Conceptual Analysis of Joint Task Force**

**Joint Task Force**

The *American Heritage Dictionary* of English language (cited in Mejabi 2012) defines a ‘task force’ (TF) as a temporary formation of military units under one commander for specific assignment or operations. It is also a grouping of different actors and resources for the achievement of specific task or goal. Furthermore, the *Collins English Dictionary* defines task force
as a temporary grouping of military units formed to undertake a specific mission. It could also be a semi-permanent organization set up to carry out a continuing task (Mejabi 2012).

According to a US publication on Joint Task Forces (2012), joint forces are composed of key different departments under a commander (who is responsible for joint force). The commander of the joint forces or formation may create other units or heads to command other operations under it at specific places and jurisdictions or areas of responsibilities, while receiving orders from its established authority that is headed by the commander. Looking closely at the dictionary definitions of task force given in the preceding paragraph suggests that a Task Force is created for a specific assignment over a certain period of time. From these definitions, there is a time frame that would be allowed for a ‘Task Force’ and would mean an ad hoc force mandated to achieve specific objectives. On the accomplishment of the task(s), the force is dissolved to pave way for an established formation in the area of operation to continue with the mission.

Given the roles and responsibilities, context and areas of operation, a Joint Task Force is established under the authority of a single commander (known as the Joint Forces Commander). It is the responsibility of the establishing authority to designate or assign the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF), assign the mission, designate the forces and provide other necessary command and control guidance and assistance that are necessary for the commander and the joint forces to commence operations. The establishing authority may establish a JTF for a specific geographical area or functional basis as the case may be. As previously stated, the establishing authority is responsible for assigning the areas of operation or responsibility for the Joint Task Force, and the task (mission) of each JTF might differ depending on the context in which the JTF would be operating in (Joint Publication 2012).

Joint Task Forces can be organized, staffed and equipped for operations across the full range of military operations. Commanders of joint task forces mainly serve at the operational level while deploying and assigning responsibilities to other areas of assignments in the field (tactical level). For instance, the missions of JTFs in the Niger Delta are different from the ones in South-Western Nigeria and also different from those in Northern Nigeria. While a mission of one may be to secure the economic activity of an area, the other JTF team may be tasked with maintaining/restoring law and order and, like in the case of some parts of northern Nigeria, to fight insurgency. This shows that joint operations are specific,
time bound and are dissolved when the purpose for which it was established are achieved. Occasionally, the factors that necessitated the formation of the task force might be prolonged and as such might call for the need to re-examine the assignment which should inform best options for either continuing the operation, ending it or a redesign of its terms of reference. For example, the Multinational Joint Task Force in Baga, Borno State, was established in 1998 with the mandate of curbing armed banditry in the Lake Chad Basin, but the operation has lasted for more than 20 years. With the insurgency ravaging the Lake Chad region, it calls for the need to re-examine the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task in the region. However, like the Multinational Joint Task Force, there are many types of task forces which include Combined Task Force, Combined Joint Task Force and Joint Task Force.

**Overview of Military and Internal Security Operations in Nigeria**

Internal Security has to do with the activities and services of the Police and other security agencies in ensuring the maintenance of peace, law and order, as well as security of lives and properties. From the military perspective, it is defined as the roles the military play in maintaining and restoring law and order, as well as providing key services which may involve primarily the maintenance, restoration of law and order as well as essential services in the face of civil disturbances while using the least level of force. It includes revolt and even the early stages of rebellions (cited in Mejabi 2012). Mejabi, in buttressing the concept of internal security operations as discussed by Nwolise (2006), is of the view that the activities and services of the Police and other security agencies suggest that internal security is a venture that calls for the integration of the Police and other security agencies to achieve a common goal, which is the security of lives and property and the maintenance of law and order. In other words, internal security operations are activities which are collectively undertaken by all security agencies, toward the restoration of peace and stability in Nigeria.

Ihejirika (2012) noted, over time, massive deployment and engagement of military in internal security operations during peacetime in Nigeria. He added that by December 2010, the army had deployed 17,000 men in internal security operations across the country. Furthermore, Ihejirika noted that the security challenges in the country and other exter-
nal demands have stretched the military to a great extent and even its limited resources. There has never been a democratic dispensation in Nigeria that has been confronted with enormous security challenges other than the present and immediate past dispensations. Hence, internal military operations are imperative to maintain law and order and sustain democracy. In buttressing this point, Fayeye (2012) noted that preservation of social order and democratic consolidation are also dependent on its formidable security agencies.

Internal security operations are carried out in fulfillment of the constitutional provision of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so. This is provided in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Section 217 Subsection 2c as “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authority to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly”. It is also in line with Nigeria’s Defence Policy of strengthening our national character by eliminating social vices. Operations concluded in this regard ranged from anti-crime to suppressing insurrections like the quelling of Maitatsine religious uprising in Kano and some cities in the north, and other vices in other parts of the country. Military task forces were involved in various anti-crime operations such as Operation Burst, Operation SWEEP and Operation GBALE in Lagos and Oyo States, respectively, Operation YAKI in Kaduna State as well as Operation HARMONY and Operation RESTORE HOPE to contain ethnic militancy. To fight against indiscipline among its own personnel, the Nigerian Army also launched Operation CHECKMATE (Albert 2012). Operation Crocodile Smile, Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Pulo Shield.

The participation of the military, especially as Joint Task Forces in internal security operations in Nigeria, has undoubtedly had challenges, but according to Omede (2012), the most perceived controversial and possibly most challenging experience for the military in internal security operation was the March 2010 Jos crisis. He noted that issues involved were an eye-opener on how the military ought to understand and adapt to the context and ensuring law and order that fosters peace, while nipping in the bud emerging threats to the nation’s national security in a dynamic world. He further added that the March incident revealed necessities and imperatives of civil institutions to take the lead in maintaining security and curbing violent conflicts in Nigeria. Omede further observed that though the military had been applauded for quick intervention and dousing tensions,
many had critiqued and condemned some of the military’s conflict management styles, citing the March 2010 Jos ethno-religious crisis as the one which was not handled well (Omede 2012).

The military were alleged to have delayed responses to early warning signs and inappropriate responses to stop attackers from reaching villages on smaller roads, despite being on duty along major roads in and around Jos. That they (the military) compromised the security of the state by showing bias in their handling of the crisis and finally were also accused of slow reaction by other security forces (such as the Police) and being part of the (sectarian) problem in Jos. However, in a similar pattern taken by other scholars, Omede did not explain what could have been the challenges encountered by the military in maintaining internal security in Jos. Hence this chapter is a response to that vacuum of scholarship.

On a broader spectrum, Fayeye (2012) observes that military in internal security operations have helped to consolidate democracy in the country, especially since the return to democracy in 1999. He added that if not for military internal operations, there would have been a breakdown of law and order. He further asserted that the plurality of the country’s ethno-religious groups has been a challenge for the military (which is part of the security sector of the country) and hence the need for continuous impartiality and neutrality in all its operations in the country (Houngnikpo 2012).

**JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS IN PLATEAU STATE**

Since the outbreak of conflicts in Plateau State in 1991, governments (both state and federal) have responded to the conflicts in three major forms: setting up of judicial inquiry, peace initiative committees and deployment of security agencies (Krause 2011; Crisis Report 2012). The state has witnessed several commissions of inquiries, yet the conflict has persisted—some of these commissions of inquiry include Justice J. Arbitration Fiberesima Commission (1994), Justice Niki Tobi Commission (2001), Plateau Peace Conference (2004), Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry (2009) and Solomon Lar Presidential Advisory Commission (2010), though Osareti and Akov (2013) notes that there have been at least 16 commissions so far. Despite the recommendations and communiqués written by various committees, publication of the reports is slow, especially of the 2010 Presidential Advisory Commission for wider circulation.
Also lack of political will in implementing or acting on the recommendations made by the commissions has posed serious challenges. Crisis Report (2012) reveals that in many cases, governments (state and federal) get selective in acting on some of the recommendations being made. Also some security agencies were accused of lacking the capacity to pin down instigators of the conflicts in the state and also hardly inquire about the authors of inflammatory, inciting and provocative speeches. As a result, there was little or no deterrence against recklessness and impunity (Crisis Report 2012). Due to the overall lack of political will, the protracted conflict which was getting worse or the increase in violent conflicts in the state, despite the several commissions of inquiries and peace conferences and deterioration of law and order in the state, the Special Task Force was established (Emelonye 2011; Krause 2011).

The Special Task Force (STF) was established in September 2010, when President Jonathan directed the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) to assume full responsibility of Plateau State. The Chief of Defense Staff’s main assignments included overseeing the work of the STF. The STF comprises the Nigerian Army, Air force, Navy, Mobile Police Force, the State Security Service (SSS) and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). In buttressing the above points, the commander of the Special Task Force in the State concurred that the security challenges in the State led to the establishment of the Special Task Force, and the situations on the ground had escalated beyond what the statutory agencies in the state can handle.

**Roles and Rules of Engagement**

The role of security agencies in the management of conflict ranges from prevention to total control of the situation on the spot of violence. In order to appreciate the role of the Armed Forces in the management of conflicts, the consequences of insecurity must be recognized. Without security, no other activities can be effectively carried out. Life itself would be in jeopardy, economic activities would come to a standstill or would go down. Daily religious activities and political processes would not be feasible because of insecurity (Karim 2013). Like in the case of the Plateau State, either on Fridays or on Sundays, the roads are usually blocked or closed for at least three hours because of fear of attacks.
Security agencies, under the Constitution, are responsible for the containment of conflicts. In doing so, they are expected to comply with the provisions of the nation’s Constitution. Though the Nigerian Police and State Security Service have the primary responsibility for internal security, however, the Armed Forces may be deployed to complement or take over the operations. The guidelines for the involvement of the Armed Forces in internal security are clear in the Nigerian Constitution. Primarily, for internal security operations, the situation on ground determines the rules of engagement in that area. Hence, while the STF troops in Plateau State are tasked with the protection of lives and deterring the enemy from attack, the rule differs from one area of operation to another.

The Mission or Mandate of the STF

The Special Task Force, with an operation code name known as Operation Save Haven at inception was mandated primarily to restore law and order, aid civil authority, and protect lives and property. The overall objective is to achieve long-term peace settlement in the state and also ensure socio-economic stability in the environment, especially among herdsmen and farmers. Normally, Joint Task Forces’ Operations are usually short termed with a time frame of 90 days, but in the case of the STF, there is no specific time frame given for its assignment. Rather the state of peace and stability in the state is a determinant of achieving or not achieving its mission in the state. Hence, the STF could remain in the state as long as possible. That is why the task force is called a Special Task Force and not just a Joint Task Force. So far, the operation has lasted four years and is still ongoing without achieving the desirable result (peace and stability) in the state.

Achievements of the Special Task Force

According to the key respondent, Major General Henry Ayoola, Commander STF noted that the task force has recorded some substantial levels of success in the state, especially in the areas of protection of lives and properties and outright inter-communal conflicts. He added that economic activities once again have begun to flourish in the state. These achievements are further discussed later.
Breaking Barriers Among Conflicting Parties

As a result of the conflicts in Jos (Plateau State capital), places like Tudun Wada, Anguwan Rogo and Nassarawa Gwom were no go areas to non-residents of those places. Usually, when non-residents of these areas were passing by, they were attacked by residents of the area and as such had created fear among the people. Also until the banning of commercial motorbikes in the state, they were used for silent attacks and other criminal activities, especially after sunset. The ban on commercial motorcycles led to a reduction in criminal activities and silent killings that occurred on a daily basis.

In the so-called no go areas, the presence and formations (such as check points) of the STF helped to reduce attacks on non-residents moving through those areas and also to reduce interpersonal/inter-communal conflicts. Personnel of the STF also engaged in mediating small-scale disputes in communities that could lead to large-scale violent conflicts; their interventions in helping to mitigate the problem led to such issues being quietly resolved. This led to confidence building among residents in the communities and helped to strengthen inter-group relations. Though it can be observed that in some of these communities, the peace recorded was negative peace arising from the fear of the uniformed men (soldiers).

Civil-Military Relations

In order to strengthen civil-military relations and inter-group relations, the Special Task Force embarked on a number of outreaches in the state. Some of these outreaches included free medical outreach, drilling of boreholes in communities and organizing peace soccer tournaments in communities, especially those torn apart by violent conflicts. These outreaches helped to bring conflicting parties together, to reconcile and tolerate each other.

Inter-agency Collaboration

In many cases, especially when different agencies are brought together to work on a common cause, there is usually the problem of lack of proper synergy among these agencies for effective service or pursuance of the assignment. Thus, in looking at inter-agency collaboration, General Henry Ayoola commented that the STF in the State is an epitome of formidable
synergy among security agencies in the country. The commander of the STF noted that strong leadership base of the outfit is what makes the synergy easy among the personnel of the task force. This synergy helped the STF to carry out its assignments effectively and successfully without many hitches from personnel. Therefore, Intelligence gathering and information sharing among the STF flowed with little or no barrier. As postulated in the actor network collaboration theory, the base of effective delivery is collaboration among the different networks of actors and actor groups that are brought together. Without collaboration, the collective goal to be achieved by a network of actor groups is likely to be futile.

CHALLENGES OF INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS IN PLATEAU STATE

Internal security operations have been on for over five years in Plateau State and yet constant attacks on communities remain the norm. This signifies that the presence of the Military Special Task Force (MSTF) in the state is not a guarantee for sustainable peace. It is therefore noted that the right political will of the government (from local up to federal level) to tackle the insecurity challenges in the state is key to achieving sustainable peace. Over the years, government inability to decisively take actions to resolve some of the conflicts in the state has kept the state in a vicious cycle of violence. For example, the conflicts between the herdsmen and farmers in the state can be decisively settled, as Henry Ayoola puts it in these words:

There are vast and abundant lands in the state, which is big enough for every farmer to farm as far as he wants and large enough for every herdsman to feed his flock as far as he can go. It is only trouble. As far as I am concerned for some fellows to deliberately go and graze on someone else’s farmland. (cited in Yake 2014)

Religion has been used as an instrument to escalate the conflict in Plateau State; hence religion is being used as a tool for political gain. This in turn frustrates the efforts of the STF in doing its best to maintain the peace in the state. Many times, politicians have tried to drag the STF into the conflict, trying to make them partisan. In buttressing this point, it should be noted that the conflict in Plateau State is a political one that would need political solutions to resolve it. This points out that the MSTF is caught in a political web that may have grave consequences for it. This
confirms what Mejabi noted in 2012, that the military is a profession which in the modern complex and dynamic world cannot bear the stresses of Nigeria’s precarious political practices, in which either the nation is unduly militarized or the military is dangerously politicized. Therefore, no matter the high level of military preparedness, either combat readiness or equipment readiness and enough manpower, the conflict in Plateau will remain in an unending cycle. This is because the conflict in the state is multifaceted that needs a multifaceted approach with the needed political will (Yake 2014).

The above points out the need to settle root causes of the Jos conflict on the table and not just involving the military to change conflict behavior; because of the presence of the military, the use of arms could be reduced, but other forms of violence may increase which in turn may lead back to the use of arms. This would only create a situation of recycling those who hold arms and not an end to the conflict. The state of peace in the plateau which is the determining factor for the withdrawal of the STF in the State can only be fully achieved if all the previous recommendations made by the different commissions of inquiry are implemented. However, the major issue which is indigene/citizenship (indigene-settler dichotomy) in the state can only be settled when ambiguities around it in the Constitution of the country are also settled. This is to say that it seems that the Special Task Force has come to stay in the State. While the presence of the MSTF doesn’t resolve the conflict in the State, the presence and activities of the operation can only change the conflict behavior among conflicting parties and to some extent secure lives and properties in the state.

Maintenance of security in Plateau State is also beyond the presence of the MSTF alone but also includes the need for collective responsibility and sincerity of purpose by politicians in the State. Hence, the need for good governance can only be made possible with the right and positive leadership. Just as positive leadership is key to good governance, multitrack diplomacy has also become imperative in the Plateau if peace must be sustained. Despite the successes recorded by the STF so far, some challenges still persist that frustrate their efforts, which is actually the crux of this research. Respondent had noted that if not for recurring challenges, the successes would have been more. The challenges therefore are recorded below.
**Lack of Manpower**

At the inception of the STF in the State, there were about 3200 personnel deployed to carry out its task. The present manpower of the STF is grossly inadequate to address the security challenges in the state. The STF is made up of nine sectors and each of these sectors has its area of responsibilities (AOR), some of areas of responsibility could be two local governments to a sector or a local government to a sector, depending on the responsibility given. But in places where attacks have been severe, especially in communities of Jos South, Riyom and Barkin Ladi local governments, the number of men for the task there is grossly inadequate. Most of the rural communities are far from each other, and in some cases, there isn’t any telecommunication network to facilitate communication among residents of the community and members of the STF. This in many cases has enabled assailants launch attacks on such unfortunate communities.

**Lack of Equipment and Logistics**

Lack of equipment such as binoculars, arms/ammunitions, communication gadgets, night vision goggles and other military equipment has continued to frustrate the efforts of the STF in carrying out their responsibilities in the state. Personnel of the STF in rural communities lack equipment and facilities that can facilitate their assignments there. In a country where power supply is a problem, rural communities suffer most of this power shortage, and as such, STF personnel working in these areas would need equipment such as solar power to carry out their responsibilities effectively. Without adequate logistics, success would be difficult on any given assignment for the security personnel. Other logistics such as operational patrol vehicles are grossly inadequate for patrolling in rural communities, especially communities with difficult road terrains. Also in many cases, respondent noted that inefficient communication gadgets among the personnel have resulted in the use of their personal mobile phones for communication, which constitutes a security risk. On the other hand, availability of global system mobile (GSM) communication has added another challenge to internal security operations. Just as security operatives enjoy the benefits of the mobile phones, hoodlums and terrorist seem to also have a better use for it. Due to how hoodlums and terrorist use the GSM to successfully plan and execute their operations, the network of the telecommunications had to be shut down in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa for some months.
Respondents also noted that the major cause of the conflict in Plateau State is control of the political economy of the state. This concurs with the view of Alozieuwa (2010), who noted that the political economy of the state is at the center of the Plateau conflicts. Some other respondents noted that since the bombing of the terminus market in 2001, many businesses are yet to fully recover. They also added that even as the rebuilding of shops and other commercial centers are built, they are now allotted to indigenes only. Other challenges include the welfare of the personnel, which includes their feeding and accommodation. STF have been faced with harsh weather conditions, and they don’t even have a conducive accommodation to keep them warm during the cold seasons. In terms of feeding, the troops are to fend for themselves, as there is no provision for constant supply of food for them, especially those in the interior communities.

Sometimes troops have to rely on the goodwill of host communities to assist them with food, which isn’t good for the kind of assignments being carried out as it affects their mandate to be neutral. These have posed serious challenges for the troops, as sometimes when they are needed to quickly respond to attacks or security threats in some places and one or two personnel isn’t anywhere to be found, as such one might have gone to look for what to eat. The above challenges are a result of national demand in the country. The country is presently in a state of high demand of its resources on different competing needs, especially because of the state of insecurity in the country, especially in Northern Nigeria. Hence, these challenges may not be limited only to Special Task Force in Plateau State but also to other Military Joint Task Forces across the country at large.

Management of Diversity Among Troops

Members of the Special Task Force come from the various ethnic and religious groups in the country and, as such, at both tactical and operational levels, management of diversity matters. A commander of every troop must at all times keep abreast with the rules of engagement and with universal rules of neutrality and impartiality. Troops of the STF have been accused several times of taking sides in the conflict. The peak of these accusations came when women first protested against them and demanded their removal from their localities in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. In 2013, the caretaker chairmen of Riyom and Barkin Ladi local govern-
ments also called for their withdrawal from their local governments. They further accused the STF of escalating the conflict in order to justify their stay in the localities and yet they are doing nothing.

Respondents noted that such accusations from the people, especially that of the local government chairmen, were not only baseless but also lacked merit and were made out of ignorance. He further added that community leaders and politicians needed perception management and needed to ensure that they were more informed before making public comments. Other respondents also noted that because of the instrumentalism of ethnicity and religion in the conflicts, the STF troops had faced very serious criticisms to the point that whatever actions they carried out, the public looked at it through the lens of religion and ethnicity. And whatever the troops do that do not favor any of the conflicting parties was seen as biased.

Communication and Language Barrier

Communication and language barrier has been a major challenge for troops in various communities in Plateau State. In many cases, troops have found it difficult to communicate with residents of the communities because of the language barrier. For example, Yoruba-speaking troops would find it difficult to communicate with the residents who primarily spoke Berom and not English as a language. Communication for some troops becomes easier when they are deployed to areas in Jos metropolis, while the ones in the interior communities continue to battle with the language barrier. Sometimes, this language barrier creates an unknown fear in troops and makes them unnecessarily suspicious of some communication which may not be directed at them.

Lack of Training

Troops of the Special Task Force in Plateau State are drawn from the Armed Forces, Police, State Security Service and Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), and as such, their individual unit training differs. While those of the military (Army, Air force and Navy) may not have problems on the laws governing armed conflicts, those of the other paramilitary agencies may have. Also, their individual training and orientation are not the same. Hence, it is a challenge to properly train the personnel and to handle internal operations in the country. This challenge sometimes determines the roles of each participating agency in the operation.
Lack of Political Will

As far as one of the respondents is concerned, there is a lack of political will by the government (from local up to federal level) to tackle the insecurity challenges in the state. He noted that the government was unable to decisively take action in resolving some of the conflicts in the state. For example, he noted that the conflicts between the herdsmen and farmers in the state can be decisively settled, as he puts it in these words:

there are vast and abundant lands in the state, which is big enough for every farmer to farm as far as he wants and large enough for every herdsman to feed his flock as far as he can go. Its only trouble as far as i’m concerned for some fellows to deliberately go and graze on someone’s else farmland.

The respondent also noted that religion is being used as an instrument to escalate the conflict in the state; hence religion is being used as a tool for political gain. This, he says frustrates the efforts of the STF, as many times politicians have tried to drag the STF into the conflict, trying to make them partisan. In buttressing this point, he stated that the conflict in Plateau State is a political one that would need political solutions to solve it. This suggests that the STF is caught in a political web that may have grave consequences on it. Which also confirms what Mejabi noted in 2012, that the military is a profession which in the modern complex and dynamic world cannot bear the stresses of Nigeria’s precarious political practices, in which either the nation is unduly militarized or the military is dangerously politicized. Therefore, no matter the high level of military preparedness, either combat readiness or equipment readiness and enough manpower, the conflict in Plateau State will remain in an unending cycle. This is because the conflict in the state is multifaceted that needs a multi-faceted approach with the right political will.

The availability of these parameters to the extent of efficient performance of the internal security tasks indicates good operational readiness. The insufficiencies of the needed resources pose real challenges to the STF and as such stretch their capabilities. The spillover effect of insurgency in other neighboring states could result in the proliferation of arms and ammunitions in the State. The above points out the need to settle root causes of the Jos conflict on the table and not just involving the military to change conflict behavior.
Media Reports and Public Perception

Media reports, especially hostile media reports as noted by respondent, could stir up public dissent against the STF, thus making the operations uneasy and winning the hearts of the people difficult. This in turn makes the operational environment for the security personnel unfavorable. This is why the STF Public Relations Officer briefs the general public from time to time on the activities of the STF and sometimes responds to false media reports on its activities. The challenges mentioned earlier also confirm the works of Mejabi (2012), Karim (2013), who noted that corruption, poor equipment, inadequate infrastructure, poor intelligence gathering, lack of adequate knowledge of the areas of operation and operational order, proliferation of illegal weapons and lack of adequate training are issues that affect security agencies in the management of conflict.

Conclusion

This work has attempted to examine Joint Task Force and internal security operations in Nigeria with particular reference to Plateau State. It has also examined the factors militating the achievement of Joint Task Forces in internal security operations. The chapter concludes that the challenges faced by the Joint Task Force in Plateau State are not peculiar to the state alone but reveal a national problem that cuts across other states of the federation. It is crucial to emphasize the need for effective collaboration among agencies participating in joint operations in the country; as such, there is a need for a holistic security sector reform to accommodate and provide robust mandates for Joint Task Force operations to be more effective in the country, which would include robust policy framework in order to address overlapping responsibilities. Even though the Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended) backs the role of the military in internal security operations, a robust policy framework for joint operations would help strengthen the operations, especially in providing the needed funds to procure and efficiently carry out its mandates.

References


**Online Newspapers**


CHAPTER 20

The Nigeria Police and Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Adebola Rafiu Bakare and Gabriel Temitope Aderinola

INTRODUCTION

Provision of security to guarantee the protection of lives, properties, welfare and rights of the citizenry has been the primary responsibility of a responsible government. This is in view of the fact that individuals under social contract have surrendered their sovereignty to government (through electoral legitimacy), while government undertakes the protection of their lives and property. Thus, protection of lives and properties of the people remains the major objective of the government. Until recently, the relative peace that Nigeria enjoys among the comity of nations in West Africa has been overridden by high level of insecurity. The country now witnesses incessant kidnapping, insurgency, armed robbery, political violence and ethno-religious conflicts, among others, mainly as a result of the political and religious differences in the country (Odeh and Umoh 2015). Nigeria now witnesses a high rate of insecurity which permeates all geopolitical zones, especially the North-East that is riddled with insurgent attacks. These posed a great threat to national security, which consequently led to increase in budgetary allocation to the security sector (Achumba et al. 2019).
Despite the increased funding to the sector, the spate of violent crimes is not reducing; rather, it is fast becoming one of the major occurrences in the nation (Adegoke 2014).

Section 14(2b) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended) mandates the government to give primacy to the security of the people. In view of this, the Nigerian government delegates the management of internal security of the country to the Nigeria Police and other sister security agencies. By this, the police is required to detect and prevent crime, maintain peace and orderliness, as well as enforce the laws and other regulations of the government. However, the continuous increase in the rate of insecurity in the country raises concerns on the effectiveness and efficiency of the police. Premised on this, it becomes significant to look into the activities of the police to identify its achievement, challenges and prospects in light of world’s best practices in security management.

It is against this backdrop that Odekunle (2004) opined that identifying the challenges militating against the effectiveness and efficiency of the police should be of concern to scholars and policymakers rather than trading blames. While one may agree with this notion, it is not out of place to do a comprehensive tripartite assessment of the situation on the basis of the achievement, challenges and prospects. The essence of this is to make a case for the reformation of the Nigeria Police to come up with a formidable security agency that can perform its basic constitutional duty of securing the lives and property of all Nigerians. The discourse also contributes to the ongoing debate among security experts, politicians and other stakeholders on whether or not to unbundle the Nigeria Police to allow for more inclusiveness of other actors (especially the state governments) in supporting the federal government to secure the lives and properties of the people.

With regard to the ongoing debate, there are basically three arguments to the reformation of the security sector. While some call for the incorporation of non-state policing (vigilantism) into the mainstream of formal policing project bringing about community policing (see Bakare 2014; Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi 2010; Inyang and Abraham 2013; Brogden 2004; Alemika and Chukwuma 2004), others led by Babatunde Fashola (a former Governor of Lagos State) and his Edo State counterpart, Adams Oshiomole, and most of the sitting Nigerian Governors believe that the only solution is to unbundle the Nigeria Police by amending section 214(1) of the constitution to allow the establishment of state police. The third category, prominent among whom are Goodluck Jonathan (a former
Nigerian President), M. D. Abubakar (former IG of Police) and Abubakar Tsav (retired Senior Police officer), argues for the maintenance of status quo with the call for strengthening the force with regard to acquisition of modern technology, weaponry and recruitment of more personnel, among others (see also Soyinka et al. 2011; Nimbe and Bayo 2011).

It is on this note that this chapter attempts a discussion of the performance level of the Nigeria Police in managing internal security in the wake of the contesting contemplations of the struggle for sustainable peace and safety of lives and properties in the country. To do this, the chapter is divided into sections. Following this introduction is the review of literature on policing heterogeneous societies and a theoretical exposition. The third section traces the historical development of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the argument for the reformation of the police. Section “The Institutional and Constitutional Framework of the Nigeria Police” dwells on the institutional and constitutional framework of the Nigeria Police. Section “Assessing the Nigeria Police in the Management of Internal Security” assesses the role of the Nigeria Police in the management of internal security. This is followed by section “The Nigeria Police and the Dynamics of Nigerian Politics and Governance: Issues, Challenges and Prospects”, which examines the Nigeria Police and the dynamics of Nigerian politics and governance, looking at the contending issues and challenges hindering the effectiveness of policing the nation as well as the prospect of a virile policing in Nigeria. The chapter ends with recommendations and conclusion.

**Policing Heterogeneous Societies**

The concept of policing has become a contested issue among scholars, especially with respect to the meaning ascribed to concept. The concept of police connotes an institution primarily charged with the responsibility of enforcing law and order. In a general term, the major role of the police is to secure compliance to the laws of the land and ensure compliance to government’s regulations. Put simply, while ‘police’ is an institution, ‘policing’ is the art and act of the institution. There is no significant difference in the organization and roles expected of the police in all political and administrative systems (Jones and Maguire n.d.). However, what differentiates the political systems is how the police are put into use, whether as a civil organization or an agent of oppression. Each ruler may tend to use the police based on his interest, for instance, for overall good or sectional...
good. This is why Reiner (1993, p. 1) argued that the police is an institution that shows how powerful a state is, especially on the use of force.

In a contextual meaning, police refers to any institution backed by law (constitutional or traditional) to enforce law and maintain order in a given society. This means that there are other police institutions aside from the normal police that could provide security. Such institutions could be categorized into two. The first are the paramilitary agencies such as the immigration and custom services charged with policing the territorial borders to regulate inflow and outflow of people and goods to avoid breakdown of order. The second category is those non-state security outfits set up by the people to complement the state security in regulating social and customary relations in the community. The two categories usually coexist to provide policing functions though with varying degrees of power to sanction and use force. This is why Reiner (2000) argued that policing is a subset of control processes that ensure the establishment of surveillance systems to detect crime and deviant behavior. To this end, policing is an act that transcends the state provision of security; rather, it involves the cooperation of both state and non-state agencies. This is referred to as community policing.

It should be noted that the non-state security agencies usually derive their legality based on the approval and license by the state security agencies. This is as a result of the fact that state enjoys monopoly of the use of force which is evident in the control of the police and other security agencies. The government manifests its power and authority to enforce law and maintain orderliness through the policing institution (World Encyclopedia 2006; Sullivan 2005; Das and Palmiotto 2004; Ascoli 1979; Robinson et al. 1994; Suleiman 1996). Aside from enforcing law, the police also perform other functions as deemed fit by the policymakers (Bittner 1970; Potholm 1969). This accounted for the reason why defining the police in terms of provision of security seems problematic (World Encyclopedia 2006; Klockars 1985). Therefore, any definition of the ‘police’ must take cognizance of other social functions of the institution outside crime control. These functions include traffic management, road safety maintenance, firefighting and crowd control. Perhaps, this is why Sullivan (2005) and Tamuno (1985) argued that the duty of the police covers crime control and any other activities that require intervention to avoid chaos and anarchy. However, providing other social services does not remove the fact that the police is an institution primarily charged with the responsibility of crime prevention (Suleiman 1996) making other functions to be
regarded as secondary. To this end, one will expect that the police need wide discretionary powers to perform these multitude of duties. However, this does not connote that the police can resort to use of force at all times, as world’s best practices show that contemporary policing entails the craft of handling crime and other social vices without the use of force (Das and Palmiotto 2004; The African Guardian 1986).

Aside from the function and techniques of policing, there is the issue of variation in the institutional organization of policing system, especially between homogeneous and heterogeneous societies. This variation is mostly as a result of the cultural diversity and the pattern of ethnic politics. Ben-Porat (2007) contends that while it is easier for homogeneous societies to organize their policing structure given their homogeneity, the reverse is the case for heterogeneous societies because of the complications attached to multicultural diversity. The multicultural diversity usually affects the organization of government and all agencies of government, as different sections of the society will want to get a share of the government structure to show their membership of the union. This poses a great challenge to policing as the interests of the diverse groups must be considered first before looking at the primary role of the police institution (Stenning 2003). The tendencies for conflicts between majority and minority groups over the claim of domination and marginalization not only affect the organization of the policing system but also portend a threat to the effectiveness of the police. It becomes difficult for the police to battle inter-ethnic violent crises given the interests and forces at play. The outcomes usually show that the police is not prepared and capable of battling the scourge (Stenning 2003), sometimes leading to the invitation of the military. In some cases, the reactions of the police, to prove its effectiveness, escalate the crisis on the argument that the police is taking sides with one particular ethnic group.

Over the years, policing is one of the major sources of concern for heterogeneous societies. No government will allow any section of the country to negotiate its authority, especially through secession. While the government has the power to draft the police to maintain peace and order in every region of the country, the agitating minority groups see it as purpo- sive clampdown using the police as an instrument of terror and subjugation by the government. This contradictory tendency usually leads to the public’s negative perception of the police as being brutal and not civil as expected. From another perspective, the police in heterogeneous societies is also questioned on the basis of its mode of operation and organization
structure. For instance, the Nigeria Police is structured under a single command attached to the presidency. This often creates the atmosphere for people to agitate for reform. The argument is premised on the fact that the unified structure of the policing system is too rigid and encourages bureaucratic bottleneck in decision making and slow rapid response and alienates the local community from policing their communities. This is why Fleras (1992) describes policing systems in heterogeneous societies, especially those under a unified command like Nigeria as an institution with military overtones characterized by central command and hierarchy which make flexible enforcement of rules difficult, if not impossible. While there is no end in sight for the blame trade associated with policing heterogeneous societies, Manning (2006) contends that it has become an important aspect that the police will have to live with and continue to defy the effectiveness of the police except if decentralization of the policing system is considered. This is because the police is operating in a society that is conscious of political contest with the aim of protecting different conflicting interests.

**HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIA POLICE AND THE ARGUMENT FOR ITS REFORM**

The history of the Nigeria Police can be divided into three periods in line with the historical development of the Nigerian state itself. The first period being the pre-colonial era, followed by the period of colonial rule and, lastly, the era of self-government (post-colonial era). In the period before the advent of colonialism, indigenous institutions such as the traditional rulers were charged with the responsibility of crime prevention and management. Though laws were not codified, they existed with almost everybody knowing the punitive measure placed on each crime or offense. These ranged from imprisonment, forced community service, banishment from the community and capital punishment. Aside from the traditional rulers, there were other institutions that complemented the enforcement of laws and regulated behaviors based on the customs and traditions prevailing in each community. These institutions include the secret societies (ogboni confraternity), kings’ messengers, youth leaders, family heads and palace guards (Marenin 1985; Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi 2010; Inyang and Abraham 2013). During this period, the laws enforced by these security institutions were not documented but were known to all and sundry. The
policing structure was directly under the control of the political or administrative leader as the case may be.

The policing system changed during the colonial period as the institution was operated in line with the provisions of the British colonial laws. This period witnessed a paradigm shift from the tradition-based policing to modern-based police system. The first implication was the change in orientation and objective of the police where it no longer protected the people’s general interests, rather protected the colonial and commercial interests of the Britons at the expense of the people. Officials of the old order and the control chain were discarded, with new recruits manning the structure under the direct control of the colonial officials, a situation which Rotimi (2001) described as ‘strangers policing strangers’. The consequence of this new order is seen from the incessant clash between the police and the people. This situation made scholars and criminologists such as Alemika (1988), Ahire (1991), Ikime (1977), Tamuno (1970) and Crowder (1978) to opine that the activities and rules of engagement of the police during this period were tailored toward the protection of British occupation in Nigeria. This prompted Onyeozili (2005) to argue that early recruitment and deployment of police and security resources were done to achieve the colonial economic and political objectives which consequently shaped the current posture of policing in the contemporary period given its oppressive tendencies.

The third period (post-colonial era) in the history of policing in Nigeria is heavily influenced by the second period (colonial period). During independence, the departing British colonial authority handed over power to the natives, forcing the apparatus and methods of political administrative system on the newly independent Nigeria. One of such apparatus was the police. Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi (2010) observed that the police of the independent Nigeria was not in any way different in orientation and objectives from that of the colonial period as the security institution is still enmeshed in the sectional interest protection, especially that of the political elites. Since the departure of the colonial power, the Nigeria Police is still faced with the challenges which the colonial police faced. The contemporary police despite its human and material resources still fall short in providing adequate security for the people.

Despite several efforts at reforming the police by succeeding authorities, the implementation of the reform exercise has always been problematic. This has led to continuous agitations and scholarship proposition of various models of policing that best suit the specificity of the Nigerian
heterogeneous structure. Options such as devolution of police structure from federally controlled police structure to allow state participation in policing; community-based policing; and the incorporation of non-state policing institutions to mainstream policing, have been proffered for effective and efficiency policing system in the country. None of the proffered options is without problems.

Critics of the establishment of state police opposed it on the ground that Nigeria may witness the repeat of the 1960 experience where the local police was used as an instrument of political oppression against the opposition politicians and the people who held dissident views against the government (Nimbe and Bayo 2011 cited in Inyang and Abraham 2013, pp. 54–55). The implication of this according to Soyinka et al. (2011) is that most state governors will have undue advantage over their political opponents and may use the state police to victimize the people, especially those who oppose their interest; all in the name of policing the state and fighting crime. One may question the basis of the critics’ argument on the ground of whether the federal government is also not using the federal police in this direction.

Aside from the argument for the establishment of state police, there is also the argument for reforming the existing police structure to make way for community policing which requires a partnership arrangement between the police and the host community to prevent and manage crime (Bakare 2014). This position gains the support of the police hierarchy as shown in the research conducted by the Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation) in partnership with the NPF in 14 states selected from the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria between March 2001 and December 2003. The study found and established the fact that community policing if well implemented is capable of eradicating security challenges and criminal tendencies in Nigeria (Pam Sha 2005). However, this position seems to have low publicity and acceptance as the argument for state policing is the most widely reported by the media.

THE INSTITUTIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE NIGERIA POLICE

The institutional and constitutional framework of the Nigeria Police is provided for in Section 214 (2)(a) and 215(2) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended). The constitution recognizing its inexhaustiveness makes provisions for the enactment of other laws to guide the structure and functions of
the police. For instance, Section 214(2)(a) states that: ‘Subject to the provisions of this constitution (a) the Nigeria Police shall be organized and administered in accordance with such provisions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly’. Section 215(2) provides that ‘The Nigeria Police shall be under the Command of the Inspector-General of Police and any contingents of the Nigeria Police stationed in a state shall; subject to the authority of the Inspector-General of Police, be under the command of Commissioner of Police of that state’. Premised on these constitutional provisions, three structures of the Nigeria Police are identified. These are: the command (authority) structure, administration structure, and organization structure, all designed to achieve the objectives stated in the constitution.

The first structure (command), also seen as the authority structure of the police, is predicted on the regimental nature of the police and configured along the badges of ranks. This is premised on the provisions of Section 215(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 6 of the Police Act, 1990, which provides that the police should be under the overall command of the Inspector-General of Police, who is expected to dish out directives to other officers for the purpose of effective and efficient policing. The law also empowers the Inspector-General to sanction any officer found wanting in implementing the directives (see http://www.npf.gov.ng/).

Aside from the rank of the Inspector-General, Section 5 of the Police Act also provides for other ranks in the following order as captured in the Regulation 273 of the Police Regulation, Cap 359 laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1990:

1. Inspector-General of Police
2. Deputy Inspector-General of Police
3. Assistant Inspector-General of Police
4. Commissioner of Police (in-charge of contingents in a state)
5. Deputy Commissioner of Police
6. Assistant Commissioner of Police
7. Chief Superintendent of Police
8. Superintendent of Police
9. Deputy Superintendent of Police
10. Assistant Superintendent of Police
11. Inspector of Police
12. Sergeant Major
13. Sergeant
14. Corporal
15. Constable
The Nigeria Police is administratively structured and divided into nine departments: (1) Finance and Administration, (2) Operations, (3) Logistics and Supply, (4) Investigation, (5) Training, (6) Research and Planning, (7) Information & Communication, (8) Force Secretary and (9) Force Intelligence Bureau. Each department is headed by a Deputy Inspector-General (DIG) and sometimes Assistant Inspector-General of Police (AIG). All heads of departments assist the Inspector-General of Police for effective policing and administrative conduct of policing business in the country. The IG is directly under the executive control of the president and his delegated personalities such as ministers and national security adviser as the president deems fit. Each department is expected to perform peculiar duties as allocated to it, but such duties must be complemented and mutually inclusive with other departments. In designing the structure of the police, consideration is also given to the geopolitical structure of the country. There are 37 commands comprising the 36 states commands with Federal Capital Territory (FCT) commands which are organized into 12 zonal commands. Each zonal command is headed by an Assistant Inspector-General of Police (AIG) who oversees the activities of state commands under his/her sphere of jurisdiction. At the state level, the State Command is put under the control of a Commissioner of Police (CP) who is responsible for the operation and activities of the police in the management of security in the state. While the CP is responsible to the AIG, he/she is also expected to take orders from the state governor who is constitutionally the chief security officer of the state without prejudice to police structure and chain of command.

In order to ensure adequate grassroots coverage, each state command is further divided into Area Commands and Divisional Police Headquarters usually manned by a Superintendent of Police (SP) or Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) as the case may be, who serves as the Divisional Police Officer (DPO). Each Divisional Police Headquarters also has a number of Police Posts for administrative and security management convenience, especially in the rural areas where population is minimal and geographically scattered. The structure formation enables effective and efficient policing operations in the heterogeneous and vast geographical cleavage of Nigeria. The structure of the Police Force in terms of organization and hierarchy is represented thus: Force Headquarters (with nine departments), Zonal Headquarters, State Commands Headquarters, Area Commands Headquarters, Divisional Police Headquarters (generally
called Police Station) and Police Posts, all which is diagrammatically depicted in Fig. 20.1:

As stated earlier, all the 36 states and the FCT commands are distributed into the 12 zones as depicted in Table 20.1:
By this structural arrangement, the operational crime-fighting duty of the police is enhanced and distributed to cover the nooks and crannies of the country. This is better appreciated from the fact that no part of the country whether urban or rural is left out of the direct command of the police chief, which enables total coverage of the entire country with a clear chain of command for two-way flow of information on policing and internal security management.

**Assessing the Nigeria Police in the Management of Internal Security**

From the foregoing analysis, it is noted that the establishment and organization of the control and command structure of the management of the Nigeria Police is predicated on an Act legislated by the colonial regime and subsequently domesticated in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the Police Act (CAP 359 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990). For instance, Section 4 of the Police Act provides that:

The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged, and shall perform such *military duties within or without Nigeria* as may be required…. (emphasis added)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Geographical location</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone 1</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>Jigawa, Kano and Katsina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 2</td>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>Lagos and Ogun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 3</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>Adamawa, Gombe and Taraba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 4</td>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 5</td>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>Bayelsa, Edo and Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 6</td>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>Akwa-Ibom, Cross-River, Rivers and Ebonyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 7</td>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>FCT, Niger and Kaduna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 8</td>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>Kogi, Kwara and Ekiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 9</td>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>Enugu, Anambra, Imo and Abia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 10</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 11</td>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>Ondo, Osun and Oyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 12</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>Bauchi, Borno and Yobe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the provision, officers of the police have statutory powers not only to investigate crimes, but to also apprehend offenders, interrogate them and prosecute such as suspects before a court of law of competent jurisdiction. The police is also empowered to grant bail to suspects provided such person(s) meet the requirements, pending completion of investigation or prior to court arraignment. The law empowers the police to serve summons and regulate or disperse processions and assemblies, especially when this is perceived to threaten peace and orderliness in the society. Having known the constitutional duties and power of the Nigeria Police, the question to be asked is, to what extent is the force successful in the performance of its statutory duties of maintaining internal security?

According to Owen (2014, p. 10), Nigerians seem to have some sort of confidence in the police despite some reported challenges facing the institution. Perhaps, this is because the police enjoy monopoly of the use of force as civil security service providers. The people report criminal concerns to the police with the expectation that such concerns will be handled professionally by the police. However, the negative public perception against the institution beclouds its effectiveness in this regard. Many people never see anything good that the police is doing; they are rather quick in pointing out the bad side of the security agency. In this regard, Owen (2014) contends that the media is not interested in reporting the crime preventive efforts of the police but have passion for reporting criminal activities that the police were unable to avert.

On the contrary, Owen’s assertion is contradicted by the survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation in 2009 which found that 52 percent of Nigerians prefer to report crimes to members of their family, while only 20.2 percent of the people report crime incidences to the police. On the other hand, the report shows that 3 percent of the people consult the traditional leaders and 2.3 percent have preference for their religious leaders, with 2.4 percent to non-state security provider (vigilante). This shows that the people did not have confidence in the police as one would expect. This could be attributed to the structural and institutional challenges hindering the police from performing at the optimal level. These challenges include inadequate manpower, underfunding, inadequate training, poor welfare package for personnel and negative public perception. The consequence of these challenges is the poor, inefficient and ineffective policing system which paves way for manipulation by the rich and powerful in the society. As noted by Marenin (1985), the rich people use the police as their personal bodyguards and often turn them into some sorts of errand boys.
Aside from this, he observed that a substantial number of the police personnel are concentrated in the urban areas, leaving the rural areas to be under-policed. This observation is corroborated by a former police boss, Ibrahim Coomassie, who based on his experience as an Inspector-General of Police claimed that:

… any time a citizen becomes a public figure, his first official correspondence on assuming duty is to write the Inspector-General of Police to ask for an orderly and policemen to guard his house … Everybody wants to use the Police as status symbol, yet the members of the organization remain without accommodation, adequate remuneration, tools to work with, transport to patrol, effective communication and appropriate intelligence outfit to support their operations. (Coomassie 1998, p. 10)

In view of this, the Nigeria Police can best be described as elite-policing system which according to Alemika (2003) is greatly influenced by the colonial manipulation of the agency to protect the interests of the colonial officials and some accomplice natives who worked for the colonial government. At independence, the new political class maintained the inherited policing orientation which consequently shaped the policing structure of the country to date. Premised on the foregoing analysis, one can deduce that the effectiveness of the Nigeria Police is questionable given the myriad of challenges confronting it. However, it may not be out of place to argue that the police have the potential to be effective, but the challenges will have to be tackled. It should also be noted that aside from the institutional challenges, there are also behavioral challenges which on the part of the officers influence their performance level. For instance, the poor remuneration and lack of motivation have lured most of the officers to engage in sharp practices which made them lose respect of the public (Ibidapo-Obe 1995).

The alleged widespread corruption and incidences of police brutality have made scholars, analysts and security practitioners to question the integrity of the Nigeria Police. Alemika (1993) noted that extortion, brutality, extra-judicial killing among other uncivil acts characterized the behaviors of most officers. These according to Ibidapo-Obe (1995) are consequences of poor training, lack of motivation, infrastructural and equipment deficit and administrative nepotism in personnel deployment and promotion, among others. Despite the modern techniques of policing that come with the waves of modernization and globalization, the Nigerian
Police still use archaic methods of crime investigation, prevention and management such as extreme torture which include beating, sticking of pins and other sharp objects into suspects’ penis, shooting of suspects’ legs to elicit confessional statements from the accused (Nwankwo et al. 1993). All these contributed to the alleged abuse of human rights by the police which consequently lower the rating of the institution locally and internationally.

**THE NIGERIA POLICE AND THE DYNAMICS OF NIGERIAN POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

A lot of issues bordering around governance and political dynamics within Nigeria’s political and social terrain appear to affect the operational capacity of the police force. Some of these issues and challenges include the following.

*Manpower Shortage and Elite Policing*

The first and most prominent challenge hindering the effectiveness of the Nigeria Police in internal security management is shortage of manpower. According to global best practices, the United Nations recommend 222 police officers per 100,000 persons (Nkem-Abonta 2015). This means that a police officer is expected to secure about 450 people. However, the current manpower strength of the Nigeria Police is around 370,000 (Daily Post 2015) expected to police about 180 million people. This amounts to a ratio of 1:487, that is, one policeman to 487 people, which is far below the standard. Sad enough, the few police officers mostly engage in elite policing—a situation where the president, governors, ministers, commissioners, senior special advisers (both federal and state levels), local government chairmen and their deputies, 109 Senators, 360 members of the house of representatives, director generals of government agencies, other government appointees and even ruling political party officials have police officers attached to them. Expatriates who are mostly commoners in their home countries are also treated like kings in Nigeria, with police officers serving as personal guards and errand boys to them. These elites not only use the officers and men for security purposes but also have them do menial jobs such as buying groceries in the supermarkets, carrying bags of
wives of public officials, washing cars and sweeping the floor and sometimes drive their children to school, all at the expense of the average people being terrorized by kidnappers, armed robbers, ritualists and hired assassins. This drastically reduces the manpower capacity of the Nigeria Police to combat crime in the country.

The Challenges of Ineffectiveness and Inefficiency

Studies have shown that some of the allegations leveled against the Nigeria Police and the unsatisfactory comments passed on its personnel about its low level of performance have proven to be true. There is increasing trajectory of police ineffectiveness and inefficiency through arbitrariness in exercising its power, corruption, extra-judicial killings, lack of strong will to combat crime, needless confrontation with other security agencies, and disregard for the respect of human rights in policing procedure, perversion and delays in justice administration, inadequate funding, manpower shortage, obsolete information and communications technology (ICT) equipment, among others (see Ali 2008; Karimu 2015; Guttschuss 2010; Alechenu 2013; Alemika 2005; Bakare 2014; Inyang and Abraham 2013 among others). This perception of the police officers and the citizens they serve is not helping the cause of security provision. It has led to the problem of mutual suspicion, mutual distrust and mistrust among the formal police and the informal police which was established by the people out of the loss of confidence in the former (Bakare 2014). In view of these, the questions as to what is responsible for the continuous decline in police effectiveness and how to salvage the situation become pertinent. Addressing these questions, it is hoped, would enable the building of an effective policing system that will be dynamic to new trends of criminalities, especially in the wake of the advent of new technology and globalization.

Poor Public Perception

The Nigeria Police suffers from poor public perception which often leads to loss of confidence in the policing system. Most people never expect anything good from the police and see all police officers as indispensable bad eggs. The institution is rated as one of the topmost (if not the topmost) institutions that abuse human rights (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000; Ali 2008; Coomassie 1990, 1996; Nwankwo et al. 1993; Okeshola 2013). There are cases of human rights violation pending in courts all over
the country, some of which have been decided against the police. According to Arase (2015), the Nigeria Police has paid over ₦1 billion to Nigerians whose rights were abused by police officers between 2012 and 2015. Many police officers who perpetuate this act of torture hide under the Order 237 which allows the police to use force. Despite the fact that local and international groups and individuals are criticizing this law, the police hierarchy is not doing enough to repeal it or caution its officers. The police cell has become a den of torture where implicating statements are retrieved from suspects under duress, just for the suspects to argue that they confessed to have committed the alleged offenses to escape the unbearable inhuman torture meted out to them. In most cases, the presiding judges dismiss such cases, as confessions made under duress cannot stand in the law courts. The Nigeria Police also engage in double standard in the arrest and treatment of suspects. While the underprivileged are disgracefully arrested in handcuffs even without arrest warrants, the privileged are mostly invited with courtesy despite alleged to have committed heinous acts.

The Issue of Politicization

The Nigeria Police is also perceived to be politicized. Recruitment, promotion, posting, appointment and training in the police force are highly based on ethno-religious affiliation. The religious and tribal background of majority new intakes at a point in time usually reflects that of the top hierarchy in the force. Those appointed to specific juicy leadership roles are majorly ethno-religiously inclined. Cronies are posted to juicy states while others are posted to less economical and crises-ridden states. Top officers’ appointments are usually influenced by political and ethnic affiliations, with experience and capabilities relegated to the background. This affects the performance output as the officers who benefited from impunity and nepotism will be loyal to their benefactors rather than the country’s interest. This fuels patron-clientelism in the police at the expense of meritocracy.

Public Alienation and Corruption

The Nigeria Police is alleged to be enmeshed in corruption to the extent that it perverts and beclouds the moral consideration of most officers. As argued earlier, this is unconnected with the influence and legacy of
The use of the police during the colonial period to protect sectional interests erodes the culture of accountability to the people. There is wide disconnection between the police and the people to the extent that the people perceive police stations as dens of corruption. To average Nigerians, the word ‘police’ is synonymous to ‘corruption’. Events and experiences of the people make them believe that it is practically impossible to eradicate corruption in the police force. Some even consciously joined the force despite the meager salary and welfare package with the notion that they will make it through ‘bribe and runs’. The situation worsens as a result of the alienation of the people from the activities of the police. The people of the communities that host police formations have no input on how they are policed, thereby widening the gap between the two parties and making intelligence gathering more difficult for the police.

**Commercialization of the Police**

The Nigeria Police Force has become commercialized and has become a money-making enterprise. This disturbing trajectory is acknowledged by the police authority. According to Abubakar (2016), the former Nigeria’s Inspector-General of Police noted that the police has become a subject of ridicule as a result of the perceived commercial activities of the institution. He further noted that:

> Police duties have become commercialized… Our men are deployed to rich individuals and corporate entities such that we lack manpower to provide security for the common man. Our investigations departments cannot equitably handle matters unless those involved have money to part with. Complainants suddenly become suspects at different investigation levels following spurious petitions filed with the connivance of police officers. Our police stations, State CID and operations offices have become business centres and collection points for rendering returns from all kinds of Squads and Teams set up for the benefit of superior officers. Our Special Anti Robbery Squads (SARS) have become killer teams, engaging in deals for land speculators and debt collection. Toll stations in the name of check-points adorn our highways with policemen shamelessly collecting money from motorists in the full glare of the public.

The consequence of this on policing is a state security system that is tailored along patron-client system. This brought about a police force that is nothing but an instrument of oppression in the hands of hegemonic
capitalists. The police as an institution now enjoy little independence from the ruling elites and have since immersed in the struggle of the class, especially between federal ruling and opposition political parties. It is against this backdrop that advocates of effective policing are calling for a break from business as usual toward evolving an efficient policing system characterized by world standard with its own outstanding character suitable for its effectiveness and efficiency.

**Centralized Command Structure and Nepotism in Leadership Appointment**

The highly centralized command structure of the Nigeria Police seems antithetical to the diverse nature of the country. It disallows states’ participation in police decision making. The states’ commands only take orders from above but cannot take decisions on their own. This slows down efficiency of service delivery and creates bottlenecks during periods of emergencies. On the other hand, there is high handedness in the appointment of police leadership where nepotism is the order of the day at the expense of meritocracy. There were reported cases of undeserved promotion and appointment of officers to leadership positions where those who deserved were jettisoned for nepotism. For instance, it was alleged that 7 DIGs and 13 AIGs were unduly promoted in 2012 without considering qualification and experience, whereas those who are genuinely qualified were neglected (Okenyodo 2016).

**Conclusion and Recommendation**

From the foregoing study, it is established that the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nigeria Police in the management of internal security are questionable. This disturbing conclusion is attributed to the heap of challenges hindering the performance of the police. These range from underfunding, inadequate training, lack of motivation, politicization of the police, influence of political elites, effect of colonial legacy and negative public perception, among others. The study argues that the Nigeria Police have the potential to be effective and can manage the security concerns of the country based on world’s best practices, but the identified challenges are hindering the optimal performance.

Based on this assertion, the study recommends among others that the presidency should consider increasing the funding of the police so as to
enable the institution to purchase modern equipment and embark on massive training of personnel. It is also recommended that the police authority should depoliticize the institution by giving priority to merit and jettison nepotism in the appointment and promotion of officers. This will improve the morale of the men and spur them to put in their best in serving the country. It is also recommended that adequate provisions be made to put an enticing reward system in place to motivate and reward hard work. Finally, the gap between the police and the community should be bridged to make way for community policing which will enhance intelligence-gathering capacity of the police toward successful management of internal security in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER 21

The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps and Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Idowu Johnson

INTRODUCTION

The relevance of security in relation to human survival, national stability and sustainable development cannot be overemphasised. In modern times, placing premium on the safety of citizens has become the hallmark of any leader or society that wishes to be perceived as democratic, civilised and advanced in the progressive sense. Furthermore, ensuring the protection of the lives, property and resources of citizens from the encumbrances of threat and danger has become the major pre-occupation of governments that wish to be adjudged or evaluated as successful (Omah 2013, p. 5).

In recent years, Nigeria has been experiencing serious incidents of security threats. In the same vein, Nigeria has continued to be affected directly or indirectly by the dynamics of the global environment with attendant national security concerns that border on virtually all aspects of our national life. These concerns often translate to matters that require the
employment of security agencies (especially the armed forces and the police). While some of these threats may be considered minor, others may pose serious danger to the unity and stability of the nation. The internal security threats to Nigeria include terrorism, kidnapping, indigene-settler conflict, ethno-religious conflict, pipeline vandalism and armed robbery. Others are corruption, transnational crimes, political thuggery and assassination, cross-border banditry, sea robbery, cattle rustling, herdsmen and farmers’ clashes and proliferation of small arms. These internal security challenges necessitated the Nigerian government to deploy the military in managing them. However, the military cannot do it alone. Hence, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) has been mandated to assist the military in managing threats to internal security in the country.

This chapter examines the role of NSCDC in internal security management. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first is the introductory part, followed by an overview of internal security challenges in Nigeria, the historical background of NSCDC and the constitutional role of NSCDC. The third section examines the NSCDC and internal security management. The fourth section examines the challenges of NSCDC in internal security management. The final section is the conclusion. This chapter adopts the qualitative research methodology. Data were sourced from secondary data via relevant books, journals, conference papers, newspaper publications, government documentations and online materials. The secondary data were supplemented with personal interviews of some NSCDC personnel, which served as tangible sources of insight into the role of NSCDC in internal security management. Data from these sources were qualitatively analysed in a descriptive format.

OVERVIEW OF INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is currently experiencing some form of insecurity which threatens the country’s democracy, with great potential of impacting its national development negatively. The spate of insecurity and threats to lives and properties in Nigeria has reached alarming proportions despite the increasing viability of the Nigerian Police and the military in the management of internal conflicts (The US Department of State 2008; Omede 2011; Minimah 2015; Johnson 2016). The following are some of the internal security challenges confronting Nigeria today.
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

The manifestations of upsurge in ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria could be captured in the various violent conflicts that erupted in different parts of the country immediately after the inauguration of a new democratic government in May 1999. Cases of violent religious crisis were recorded in some parts of the country with ethnic dimensions. These crises which were mostly recorded in northern Nigeria have been between Christians and Muslims, thus making that part of the country notorious for ethno-religious crises (Odoma 2014). For instance, the February 21, 2009, ethno-religious conflict at Makama New Extension in Bauchi State claimed over ten lives, more than 400 houses burnt and several properties destroyed (Ugwueze 2016, p. 263).

TERRORISM/RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

Since the end of the Civil War in 1970, no other internal security threat has dominated national discourse like the current Boko Haram terrorism. The activities of this sect and others with similar extremist ideologies/narratives have been a great concern to the government and ordinary Nigerians. The sect seeks to impose what it terms as an absolute Islamic ideology on the country, starting with Borno State. Their methods have mimicked those of other extremist groups across the globe and involved the sophisticated use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, beheadings, mass abductions and the sensational use of the media (Minimah 2015, p. 13).

INDIGENE-SETTLER CONFLICT

The indigene-settler dichotomy is one problem that has made many Nigerians ask whether or not their citizenship is anything they can be proud of (Odoma 2014). Although crises relating to indigene-settler questions have reared their ugly head in many parts of Nigeria over the years, the worst cases were recorded in Plateau State in recent years. The Hausa-Fulani, who have lived for years in Jos, see reason to lay claim to Jos North Local Government, while three other tribes—Anaguta, Berom and Afizere—also lay claim to the same on the condition that the Hausa-Fulani met them there as indigenes (Odoma 2014). This indigene-settler conflict has claimed hundreds of lives and unquantifiable resources in the series of violent clashes and reprisal attacks.
Kidnapping/Hostage-Taking

Kidnapping and hostage-taking is still prevalent, especially in the South-East and South-South Zones. These started as political actions in the South-South meant to attract external and governmental attention to the plight of the long neglected region, but it has ended up as commercial actions in the South-East for criminal enrichment of the self (Nwolise 2014). These nefarious activities, no doubt, have a negative impact on the level of socio-economic development in the affected areas.

Illegal Arms Proliferation

The alarming rate of small arms trafficking and proliferation nationwide has contributed to changing the face of conflicts in Nigeria. Thus, the internal proliferation of arms has threatened Nigeria’s security. Security reports on various conflicts have implicated both Nigerians and foreign mercenaries from across the borders in the trade in arms and use of the same. In the same vein, the capacity of local arms manufacturers and dealers to produce and sell arms within Nigeria is increasing by the day. These arms are mostly used to perpetrate political violence, kidnapping, armed robbery and other criminal acts within the country.

The Niger Delta Crisis

The security challenge posed by the emergence of Niger Delta militants is enormous. The militant groups include Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV). Their modus operandi has defied national security mechanisms, and the strategic dexterity with which they operate, coupled with the sophisticated nature of their weapons, has raised such questions as to the source of their military training and experience. As a result of the conflict in the region, lives and resources have been wasted; hostage-taking, shoot-outs between soldiers and armed militant groups, petroleum pipeline sabotage and so on have led to production shut-in and deferment (Omeje 2006; Johnson 2016).

Other manifestations of insecurity in contemporary Nigeria include armed robbery, political thuggery and assassinations, cult clashes, urban crimes, vandalisation of electricity equipment, cross-border banditry, oil theft and pipeline vandalism, herdsmen and farmer’s clashes and transnational crimes.
Historical Background and Constitutional Role of NSCDC

The NSCDC was established on May 23, 1967, during the Nigerian Civil War. Then, it was initially referred to as the Lagos Civil Defence Committee charged with the fundamental responsibility of precaution during the Civil War. However, the Charter of April 6, 1968, made it possible for states that wished to establish the Corps within their jurisdiction to do so (Abolurin 2010, p. 132). However, the promulgation of the Act known as NSCDC Act No. 2 of 2003 and amended by Act 6 of June 4, 2007, makes the Corps a full-fledged paramilitary outfit of the government under the then Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, now Ministry of Interior, and by this enactment the Corps now has some statutory responsibilities to perform. Some of the constitutional roles of NSCDC as contained in the establishing Act (as amended) are to:

1. Assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the protection and rescuing of the civil population during periods of emergency.
2. Recommend to the minister the registration of private guard companies.
3. From time to time, inspect the premises of private guard companies, their training facilities and approve the same if it is up to standard.
4. Supervise and monitor the activities of all private guard companies and keep a register for that purpose:
   (a) Periodically organise workshops and training courses for private guard companies.
   (b) Seal up any private guard company which operates without a valid licence.
5. Maintain 24-hour surveillance over infrastructures, site and projects for the federal, state and local governments:
   (a) Enter and search any premises and seize any material suspected to have been used in vandalisation or the suspected process of vandalisation.
   (b) Enter and search premises of any suspected illegal dealer in petroleum products or material used by the Power Holding Company of Nigeria, postal services, Nigeria telecommunications or for any other public utility or infrastructure.
6. Have power to arrest with or without a warrant, detain, investigate and institute legal proceedings by or in the name of the attorney general of the Federal Republic of Nigeria against any person who is reasonably suspected to have committed an offence under the Act or is involved in any:
   (a) Criminal activity.
   (b) Chemical poison or oil spillage, nuclear waste and poisoning.
   (c) Industry espionage or fraud
   (d) Activity aimed at frustrating any government programme or policy.
   (e) Riot, civil disorder, revolt, strike or religious unrest.
   (f) Power transmission line, or oil pipelines, Nigerian Postal Service (NIPOST) cables, equipment, water board pipes or equipment vandalism.

7. Monitor the activities of religious bodies and trade associations.

8. Monitor, investigate and take every necessary step to forestall any planned act of terrorism, particularly:
   (a) Cult and ethnic militia activities.
   (b) Criminal activities aimed at depriving citizens of their properties or lives.
   (c) Syndicate activity aimed at defrauding the federal state or local governments.

9. Monitor, investigate and take every necessary step to forestall any act of terrorism and report the same to the appropriate federal security agency.

10. Provide necessary warning for the civilian population in times of danger.

11. Evacuate the civilian population from danger areas.

12. Provide and manage shelters for civilians during period of emergency.

13. Assist in the decontamination and in the taking of precautionary measures during any period of emergency.

14. Carry out rescue operations and control volatile situations.

15. Assist in the provision of emergency medical services, including first aid, during any period of emergency.


17. Assist the federal and state fire services in fire-fighting operations.

18. Assist in the distribution of emergency supplies.
19. Provide assistance to restore and maintain order in distressed areas in any period of emergency.

20. Assist in repairing indispensable public utilities during any period of emergency.

21. Provide intelligence information to the military on any matter relating to:
   (a) Crime control generally.
   (b) Riot, disorder, revolt, strike or religious unrest.
   (c) Subversive activity by members of the public aimed at frustrating any government programme or policy.
   (d) Industrial action and strike aimed at paralysing government activities.
   (e) Any other matter as may be directed by the minister.
   (f) Have power to arrange and mediate in the settlement of disputes among willing members of the public (Abolurin 2010).

Having examined the constitutional role of the NSCDC, what then is the role of the Corps in internal security management?

**NSCDC and Internal Security Management**

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) since its inception has evolved from an insignificant status to an enviable height and has become an organisation to be reckoned with in the area of internal security management. The worsening security situation in the country where acts like vandalisation, oil bunkering, kidnapping, cult clashes, violence and bombing are now the order of the day posits that Nigeria’s internal security is being threatened by organised criminals who have devised modern techniques of carrying out their nefarious acts and by other cases of insecurity that are being perpetrated by ordinary citizens. Thus, the task of securing the nation cannot be left only to the Armed Forces and the Nigeria Police.

The Corps on many occasions has performed creditably well to actualise the mandate given to it in the area of checking of vandalism, in maintaining peace and conflict resolutions, in resource management and in being proactive in countering terrorism. The Corps has worked assiduously to reduce to the minimum acts of vandalism in the oil industry as
well as the telecommunication sectors. With regard to the oil industry, the former Commandant-General, Dr Abolurin, in his interview with Leadership News, confirmed the prosecution of not less than 30 culprits in the first two months of 2012, which has proven that the Corps is not leaving any stone unturned in that direction (Leadership News 2012). Also worthy of commendation in this regard is the contribution of NSCDC in the containment of riots and protests that greeted the 2012 oil subsidy removal in Nigeria.

Crime has been identified as a social problem and constitutes a threat to Nigeria’s national security (Aderinto 2002). The responsibility of prosecuting criminal offenders was solely that of the Nigeria Police Force. Prior to the constitutional approval of the NSCDC as an agency with legal rights to prosecute criminal offenders, offenders were arrested, investigated and handed over to the police for prosecution. Pursuant to the promulgation of the NSCDC Act of 2007, the agency is empowered to prosecute criminal offenders at the constitutional law courts. To be sure, the NSCDC has always been co-opted into a different Joint Task Force in preventing criminal activities.

More importantly, criminals do not live in isolation; they live among other citizens within the same community. For security agencies to be effective in crime control, they need information, and this information may not come voluntarily. In view of this, there is the need to interact with the public to extract information from them. The NSCDC in this regard did this within the context of grass-roots intelligence information gathering. In the same vein, one of the methods of NSCDC in crime control during conflicts or violence is education. The civil populace is often given orientation on what should be their reactions or responses to various developments that may occur during conflict in order to accelerate the peace process and resettlement of affected people.

In the area of humanitarian assistance and managing of relief materials, the NSCDC has been very active. In cases where humanitarian relief materials are allocated to people who suffer losses during conflicts, the NSCDC is one of the prominent government agencies usually directed to protect and oversee the judicious distribution of these materials. For example, the Corps has assisted in providing humanitarian services in the following cases:

2. ADC air crash in Abuja Airport in 2006.
3. Dutse River flooding in Jalingo, Taraba State.
4. Prophet Muhammed cartoon riots in Maiduguri, Borno State, and its fallouts in Onitsha, Anambra State, Enugu State and in Aba, Abia State.
7. The Sosoliso air crash in Port-Harcourt.
10. Collaborated with other security agencies for the rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North-East, 2016.
11. The Borno command deployed about 600 Corps to various worship centres in Maiduguri to assure worshippers of their safety during the month of Ramadan, June 2017 (Daily Post.ng).

In addition, the NSCDC has contributed immensely in preventing and mitigating disaster and emergency throughout the country. It has established a Disaster Management Department whose sole responsibility is to raise alarm on disaster and emergency areas. NSCDC has been very active in medical relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as health care of the people during national functions like sports fiestas, religious crusades and events organised by the government and NGOs. The Corps has defined four areas/issues in disaster management, namely: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Preventive measures are undertaken through early warning conducted through aggressive and massive public enlightenment and education in disaster-prone areas. Preparedness is about the machinery put by the Corps to counter the occurrence or mitigate the impact of disaster, whereas response takes the form of search and rescue operations designed to salvage lives, properties and environment. Recovery entails reliefs, rehabilitation and reconstruction aimed at restoring normalcy (Alao 2017). For instance, the Corps participated in the management of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Boko Haram terrorist attacks. The Corps not only safeguards their lives and properties from looting but also guards against further attacks.

Terrorism and violence are the major security threats to Nigeria’s internal security. These include violent riots, kidnapping, explosive bombing, assassination, incendiary attacks, herdsmen-farmers’ clashes and cultism. There is an upsurge of terrorism occasioned by the Boko Haram insur-
gency which has led to loss of lives and property. The NSCDC has discharged its mandate on terrorism through public enlightenment, education and intelligence gathering. The Corps has collected intelligence on the activities of different terrorist groups and passed the same to the appropriate authorities such as the Army, Navy, Police and the Air Force. Also relevant to this discussion is the training of the Anti-Bomb and Counter-Terrorism units. The Corps, in line with its mandate, has sent its officers on counter-insurgence training overseas and in order to competently forestall all subversive activities, the agency has set up a unit to coordinate all its anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. Since the return of the Corps personnel from overseas training, they have assisted in reducing kidnapping, cultism and, to some extent, foiled several terrorist attacks and helped in assisting victims of bomb blasts. The Corps cooperated with other security agencies to free a Lagos Monarch Oniba of Iba Land, Oba Yushau Oseni, from abductors in 2016. In the same vein, the Corps, in collaboration with the Kwara State Police Command, arrested about 40 suspects in connection with a clash among the Aiye and Eiye cult groups at the Kwara State Polytechnic, Ilorin, in 2015 (Daily Trust 2015). Of late, the Borno Command of the NSCDC said it has discovered “Count Down Timers” used by Boko Haram terrorists to detonate explosives. The Commandant of the Corps, Mr Ibrahim Abdullahi, said that the instruments were discovered by men of the Disaster Management Unit of the Command at the scene of bomb blasts in Kalari area of the state capital (www.garanews.com/2017).

The protection of vital key infrastructures is one of the constitutional responsibilities of the NSCDC. It is imperative to note that the security and safety of Nigerians have been undermined by the activities of vandals motivated by a variety of reasons, namely: political, economic, vengeance, sabotage, conspiracy and the rest. Vandals have destroyed petroleum pipelines, Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) high-tension cables, rail lines and railings on bridges, public vehicles, properties and utilities, among others. For instance, the Corps revealed plans by some persons to attack investments of Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN) in Bayelsa State as a reprisal following the xenophobia attack on Nigerians in South Africa. The anti-vandalism role of the NSCDC is a key mandate which the Corps has carried out with competence and result. The Corps has carried out their role through media campaigns, public enlightenment and orientation, rating vandals’ activities, vulnerability analysis, threat analysis, planning and preparedness (Alao 2017). The success recorded by
the Corps is immeasurable. For instance, the National Mirror of July 28, 2008, reported that the Corps arrested over 300 pipelines’ vandals in riverine areas like Ebonyi, Abia, Warri, Ondo and other axes. The paper also reported that in Abia State, over 200 arrests were made and 53 cases are in the law court (National Mirror 2008, p. 24). Also, the Corps resorts to the use of force where clear evidence of pipeline vandalisation is detected and the culprits can be identified. In this regard, arrests are made and the vandals are taken to court for prosecution.

In the area of private guard companies, the NSCDC has contributed to safety and security through the registration, monitoring and supervision of these companies. It is a known fact that state security agencies cannot cope with the volume, nature and dynamics of common crimes, hence the emergence of private guards to provide security to clients for a fee. The private guard companies have been established in every part of the country providing services for clients. However, the issue of private guard companies fizzling out or being unable to arrest culprits when crimes are traced to their doorsteps has become a thing of the past. This is because the NSCDC makes sure that no private guard company is floated without prior registration, training, inspections and renewal of registration licence. Thus, the NSCDC in this area has enhanced the security service delivery of these companies, enthroned professionalism and created a congenial environment for private guard companies and their clients. The Corps has also sensitised the private guard companies to make meaningful contribution to Nigeria’s national security. The Corps within a year licensed 285 private guards companies, sealed 96 and renewed 600, while 210 are still waiting to be licensed (aljazirah news.com/appraising-giant stride). It has also reduced to a minimal level crimes and other social vices in Nigerian urban and rural settings. For instance, the Corps arrested a tanker load of suspected adulterated fuel in the Odukpani Local Government Area of Cross River State in May 2017. The Corps in collaboration with the Police, Army and Air Force recovered over 200 cows and sheep from suspected rustlers in the Birnin Gwari Local Government Area of Kaduna State. The animals were recovered during a raid at a forest in Buruku village, following intelligence reports from patriotic residents concerning the activities of suspected rustlers in the area in May 2017 (www.channelstv.com).

Finally, the NSCDC has participated immensely in elections for the purpose of enhancing its smooth conduct. The Corps encourages voters and politicians to conform to the rules and norms of Independent National Electoral Commission’s guidelines. This is aimed at ensuring a peaceful
polity even after the conduct of elections. It should be noted that the role of NSCDC is not only during elections but also before and after elections. In the 2011 general elections, a sizeable number of NSCDC personnel were noticed in all the 36 states of the federation and the federal capital territory (Abuja), making sure peace and tranquillity existed among spectators and actors. The Corps helped in the transfer of equipment and materials (sensitive and non-sensitive) needed for the purpose of the elections. In addition, the Corps recorded a significant achievement during the 2015 general elections. The NSCDC deployed its officers for effective monitoring before, during and after the elections. The deployment of Corps personnel was to identify black spots with the collaborative efforts of all security apparatuses in order to ensure hitch-free polls. In short, the deployment of the Corps personnel was to ensure effective protection of residents and government installations against attack during the polls. About 60,000 of the Corps personnel were deployed for this task. In the same vein, the Corps deployed dogs which were used to detect improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The agency also put in place the use of forensic psychologists and the deployment of modern surveillance vehicles to ensure a peaceful atmosphere for the conduct of the 2015 general elections (http://www.airmaxfreedom.com/nikeairmaxgriffey).

**Challenges of NSCDC in Internal Security Management**

The challenges confronting the NSCDC within the context of internal security management are enormous. These challenges must be seen as problems that must be attended to urgently in order to restore the reputation of the country that has been dragged in the mud before the comity of nations owing to the present internal security predicament in Nigeria.

First, the NSCDC is ill equipped to meet the present internal security challenges in the country. The most common weapons available to the agency according to a personal interview with an officer of NSCDC are G3 and AK 47. It was observed that the Nigerian Army trained the NSCDC personnel on the stripling and assembling of G3 and AK 47 rifles, description of the G3 rifle, arms maintenance and shooting positions. However, the criminals that the Corps daily confront come up with more sophisticated weapons, making it difficult for the Corps to overcome them in some cases.
Second, the Corps has serious challenges in the area of logistics. Not only that vehicles are in short supply, the ones that are available cannot match the terrain on which they operate mostly. The vehicles are either old or by design not good for paramilitary operations. For instance, the oil pipeline vandals operate inside the bush, sometimes mostly rough terrain that only vehicles with high-ground clearance and four-wheel drive could effectively be used for operations. In view of this situation, the Corps should be equipped with enough vehicles of paramilitary design.

Third, the state governments have not been fully supporting the NSCDC as a law-enforcement agency. The federal government cannot do it alone. This is why the state governments have been assisting the Nigeria Police Force with patrol vehicles, armoured personnel carrier, bullet-proof vests and helicopters. Thus, for effective performance, state governments should extend the same to the NSCDC.

Fourth, some law-enforcement agencies which have been regularised before NSCDC do act as if they are superior to the NSCDC. The NSCDC is now in rivalry with the police. The police authorities have been protesting the establishment of the NSCDC, stressing that the Corps is performing their duties. While the police have had more clashes with the Army, Navy and the Air Force, they also engage in a serious superiority contest with the NSCDC (Abolurin 2010: 334).

Other areas calling for urgent attention are:

- The need for the NSCDC to focus on long-term strategy on grassroots intelligence security and civil defence operations
- The need to diligently assess new and emerging threats to national security
- The need to develop the ability to initiate measures in terms of intelligence networking and information gathering both as short- and long-term projections
- The need to monitor and upgrade existing security mechanisms to commensurate with the level of identified threat, especially in this state of heightened insecurity in Nigeria (http://www.nscdc.gov.ng)

**Conclusion**

This chapter has been able to identify internal security challenges in Nigeria. The present state of insecurity in Nigeria makes it crucial that the capacity of security agencies be built to prevent and respond to them. The
NSCDC within its constitutional responsibilities has been responding to the issue of internal security threats. It is evident that the NSCDC has discharged its mandate to a satisfactory level of providing safety and security to Nigerians. The Corps has demonstrated civility in handling security and safety assignments. Through dialogue, negotiation, debate, public enlightenment and civic education, the agency has contributed positively to the management of internal security in Nigeria. In spite of some of its challenges, the Corps has demonstrated a high level of professionalism in security matters. In conclusion, there is a great need for the government to improve the recruitment and training process of NSCDC. This will enhance their skills in combating crimes and managing internal security threats.

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CHAPTER 22

Nigerian Prisons Service and Internal Security Management in Nigeria

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INTRODUCTION

One of the characteristics of a state is the existence of laws and norms. They are enacted for the purpose of peace, security and stability of the state. Unfortunately too, persons are bound to violate societal norms, laws and values. These kinds of persons can be sanctioned in several ways depending on the kind of society they belong to and the severity of the offence committed. Punishments for offences are guided by different principles and theories. One of the principles of punishment is the principle of retribution or desert theory. This says that punishment is a morally appropriate response to crime. It adds that those who commit crimes should be punished in proportion to the gravity of the offence committed or the
extent to which others have been made to suffer. Deterrence principle is another. This says that for the offender to be deterred from further committing crime in the future, she/he should be punished. Another principle is the principle of rehabilitation which aimed at the restoration and reformation of the offender with the rationale of preventing further offence through the strategy of rehabilitation. This stems from the belief that criminal behaviour is treatable. The last is the principle of incapacitation. This principle is based on the assumption that by removing the offenders from the community, either by putting them to death or by hiding them for a specified period of time, the capacity to commit crime is removed. This last principle is the philosophy behind establishment and management of prisons by the state. There are various forms of punishment that can be meted out to offenders. However, imprisonment is the most widely used form of punishment for criminal offences (Bamgbose 2010). It involves placing the offender in a secluded environment away from the society. This secluded place is called prison, correctional facility, detention centre, gaol or jail, among others, depending on the country. The use of prisons began after the emergence of state and the development of formalized legal codes for regulating social conduct in society. It specifically arose from the evolution of punishment (Bamgbose 2003). For instance, among the Babylonians where the Code of Hammurabi existed, a place of incarceration called bit kili existed where debtors and petty criminals, slaves or foreigners were kept. Among the classical Greeks and Romans, private prisons or carcer privates existed.

The principle behind the operation of prisons by the state is that there are some people that constitute threats to the national security of a state. Those people must be taken out of the society into a secluded area. As Duff (2007) observed, sentencing a criminal to prison sends a message to the prisoner that she/he is unfit to continue living in that society. Keeping such persons away from the public does not only incapacitate him/her from further committing crimes, it also allows for the opportunity to rehabilitate such persons to live a better life after they are released. Apart from this, there are so many advantages of imprisonment of criminals for peace and national security of the state. First and foremost, keeping a criminal in prison send messages to would-be offenders that committing crimes does not pay. In this respect therefore, it helps to serve as deterrence to other people who may want to commit similar or related crimes. The fact that
anybody can be kept in custody for crimes committed has deterred many people from committing crimes with impunity. Second, keeping a criminal in prison helps assuage the feeling of the affected parties—individuals, groups or society. Many people who have been affected by the criminal actions of other people have been consoled by simply sending the offenders into prisons. This does not only prevent self-help from the injured people but also help repose their confidence in the state and security agencies. Thus, it prevents them from taking laws into their hands, which, most times, would result in a circle of violence. Third, criminals are influenced into committing crimes by peer groups. Therefore, taking them into prison custody protects the convict from the destructive influence of peer groups on them. Many offenders who have come into prison custody have suddenly realized through reflection that they become criminals because of bad company. The essence of imprisonment in the contemporary penal system is however not just to punish the offender as a form of retributive justice but also to rehabilitate the offender from criminal behaviour and reintegrate him or her into the society for the security of the state.

Imprisonment is one of the available punishments under the Nigerian criminal justice system. In fact, it is the most common sentence administered by the court in Nigeria because for some offences, there are no alternative options. Even where there are options, the structures for the use of the options are not put in place (Bamgbose 2010). The essence of imprisonment in the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Act is not only to use prisons as a form of punishment for the offenders but to serve as a reformatory home for the offenders such that when they leave prison, they become better citizens of the Nigerian state. Olusola Ogundipe, former Comptroller-General of the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS), corroborated this point when he observed that:

... except for prisoners on death row, every person sent to prison to serve terms, must one day rejoin the society again at the expiration of his/her terms. Even those on death row, if their sentences are commuted, also have a date with destiny because they too will one day rejoin society. It behoves on the prisons to make sure that when these people leave the prison they leave as reformed persons—law abiding, productive, and better citizens. It follows then that apart from taking and keeping the prisoners in secure custody, the prison is expected to work on (i.e treat) them so that on discharge they will no longer pose further threat to the society. (2010, 370–371)
It is to ensure this value that the Nigerian Prisons Service was created. The mission/vision statement of the agency buttressed this fact very fervently when it said:

Our intention is to establish a credible Prisons Service which through excellent penal practice seek lasting change in offender’s attitudes, values and behaviour and ensure successful reintegration into the society. To promote public protection by providing assistance for offenders in their reformation and rehabilitation under safe, secure and humane conditions in accordance with universally accepted standard and to facilitate their social reintegration into society. (http://www.prisons.gov.ng/mission_vision)

The import of this is that the Nigerian Prisons Service has a role to play in the internal security management of the Nigerian State. Beyond keeping criminals that can constitute security threats to the state in custody away from the public, they have the duty to rehabilitate them to become better citizens after release. Unfortunately however, persons sent to prisons in Nigeria come out to become more hardened and constitute security threats to the state. Nwolise (2010, 240) observed correctly that:

Corrections/prison service are meant to keep inmates reform, reoriented, and rehabilitate them to avoid recidivism, and empower them to be law abiding and productive members of society on release from prison. But the situation on ground today in much of Africa (Nigeria) is the opposite. In several African nations, not only is there no rehabilitation and empowerment, several inmates go back to crime soon after discharge from prison to terrorise the society, and return to prison to worsen the overcrowding and financial crisis of the prisons.

This chapter interrogates the role that the Nigerian Prisons Service is playing in the management of internal security in Nigeria. Data and information for this study were gathered from primary and secondary sources. Primary information was sourced from a senior prison official in Yola, Adamawa State and an ex-inmate in one of the prisons in the state. Furthermore, secondary data were collected from Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and other relevant textual materials like books, journal articles, online reports, especially those of the Nigerian Prisons Service, and newspapers. The thesis of the chapter is that Nigerian prisons have a significant role to play in the management of internal security of the Nigerian state. However, the institution is yet to perform this role effectively due to challenges such as inadequate funds,
poor rehabilitation programmes, the mixture of minor offenders with hardened criminals, problems of awaiting trial persons and philosophy of the operating Nigerian prisons as punitive rather than reformative systems. As a result, Nigerian prisons have become avenues for criminalization of inmates rather than reformation centres, thus complicating Nigeria’s national security. The chapter is written in sections. Section “Introduction” is the introduction that gives background to the chapter. Section “Evolution of Nigerian Prisons Service” chronicles the evolution of the Nigerian Prisons Service. Section “NPS, Prison Management and Internal Security in Nigeria: An Assessment” is the assessment of the contributions of the NPS to internal security management of the Nigerian state. The fourth section examines the challenges militating against the NPS while the fifth section concludes and makes recommendations.

**Evolution of Nigerian Prisons Service**

The use of prisons in Nigeria can be traced to the period before the country was colonized by Britain (Awe 1968; Asuni in Adewale 1982; Ogunleye 2007). People who deviated from acceptable societal norms were kept in places of detention for trial or punishment. For instance, among the Nasarawa people in the present-day North Central region, persons who stole were usually locked up in the compound of their victims (Gunn 1960). Among the Hausa-Fulani people, offenders were kept in prison custody where he or she would be visibly seen by passers-by and be jeered at. Among the Yoruba, prisons (known as *tubu*) existed where grave offenders were kept. Among the Tiv, a building was set aside in the chief’s compound where offenders were kept. Even among the Benin people there existed the *Ewedo* where offenders were detained till they were either sold into slavery or released (Bradbury 1957). However, according to Meek (1970), cited in Adewale (1982), the operation of places of detention was not popular among the Igbo people. There, habitual criminals were killed or sold into slavery. The foundation of a modern prison system in Nigeria was laid with the British colonization of Nigeria and the establishment of the British colonial administration in Lagos in 1861.

The British colonial government headed by I.I.S. Freeman was authorised to set up courts and also appoint judges. With these powers, four special courts were established in Lagos in 1863. These courts were the court for resolving petty disputes, the court for trying serious criminal cases, the court for addressing cases arising from abolition of slave trade and the court for resolving disputes relating to trade and commercial activities. To complement the establishment of these courts, there was a need to establish prisons. Thus, the establishment of courts necessitated the
establishment of prisons in colonial Nigeria. The first prison in Nigeria was established in colonial Nigeria in 1872 at Broad Street, Lagos, with the capacity to accommodate 300 inmates (Adewale 1982; Alemika and Chukwuma 2001; Orakwe n.d.). After the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914, the establishment of prisons outside Lagos started. Three types of prisons basically developed during this period. These were maximum security prisons, the provincial prisons and the divisional or native authority prisons. The maximum security prisons were large prisons in towns like Enugu and Calabar and some parts of Western Nigeria. They had high walls around them and accommodated convicts who had long sentences to serve. The provincial prisons were located at Owerri, Ogoja, Makurdi and Onitsha to custody inmates whose sentences were not more than two years. The divisional prisons were located at Nsukka, Uyo, Itu, Okitipupa, Umuahia and Kano, to take care of inmates whose sentences were less than two years (Dambazau 1999; Moses 2011). It is important to note that the colonial prison system was not designed to reform anybody in prison custody. As Orakwe (n.d.) noted:

Instead prisoners were in the main used for public works and other jobs for the colonial administration. For this reason there was no need for the recruitment of trained officers of the prisons. Hence colonial prisons had no trained and developed staff of their own and instead the police also performed prison duties. As time went on ex-servicemen were recruited to do the job.

They were also very poorly run and the local prison conditions varied from one place to another in their disorganization, callousness and exploitation. But so long as they served the colonial interests of ensuring law and order, collecting taxes and providing labour for public works, they were generally left alone. The result was that the prisons served the purpose of punishing those who had the guts to oppose the colonial administration in one form or the other, while at the same time cowing those who might want to stir up trouble for the colonial set up.

The first important step in the unification, modernization and upgrading of prison services in Nigeria was executed in 1917, when Prison Regulation Act was published, to ensure the regulation. This took care of admission prescription, staffing, treatment, feeding and clothing of inmates, among others. It must further be noted that the new prison regulation then also clearly differentiated between awaiting trial persons
and convicted inmates and even specified the categories of convicts in each of the prisons. Though this was a step in the right direction, it was essentially a tokenistic intervention. This is because these provisions could not be described as the national prison policy, owing to the fact that inmates of native authority prisons were excluded from these provisions (Orakwe n.d.).

Be that as it may, the beginning of the modernization of prisons services in Nigeria on the national scale could be traced to the time Mr R.H. Dolan served as the Director of Prisons (1946–1955). He began his service as an experienced prison officer. Prior to his appointment by the colonial administration in Nigeria, he had acquired considerable training in prison management and administration from Britain, Trinidad, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) (Adewale 1982). It was also at this time that vocational training which was earlier introduced in 1917 but with a limited success rate was re-introduced by him. He also introduced mandatory prison classification and began allowing prison visitation by inmates’ relatives. In addition, earning schemes for long-term first offenders, moral and adult education while in custody, establishment of a body to pay attention to care and reformation of freed inmates were introduced under his leadership. With these, many other developments followed in Nigerian prisons which enhanced the effective rehabilitation of inmates. For instance, with the introduction of custodial education, libraries were established in prisons and there was a sporadic increase in literacy among prisoners (Awe 1968).

Basically, Mr Dolan can be regarded as the father of modern prison services in Nigeria. This is because during his term in office, he did not only focus on the welfare of the prisoners, but also worked to ensure that prison members of staff were adequately trained with the establishment of the Warders’ Training School. In addition, educated wardresses were recruited into the prison service especially to administer female wings of the Nigerian prisons. He also improved the service conditions of prison staff. By 1948, he had opened four reformatory homes in Lagos and converted part of the Port-Harcourt prisons for the housing and treatment of juveniles. Dolan left behind indelible legacies in the annals of prison service in Nigeria. No wonder Orakwe (n.d.) states that: “Dolan’s tenure represented a very high point in the evolution of Nigeria Prisons Service.”

However, by 1958, Prison Ordinance (cap. 159, 1958) was promulgated. This commenced the beginning of the “Nigerianization” of prison management and administration in Nigeria with the appointment of a Nigerian—Chief Giwa Osagie—as the Director of Prisons for the country. After independence in 1960, the Nigerian prison system underwent sig-
significant change. The change was occasioned by certain realities in the prison system left behind by the British colonial masters. The native authority/divisional prisons were filthy, overcrowded and understaffed while those in control of the regions were becoming instruments of political victimization. Furthermore, there was irregularity in the standards and conditions of prisons throughout the country (Dambazau 1999). As a result, the native authority prison was abolished and the federal and provincial prisons were unified in 1968. This marked the beginning of Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS).

NPS came into full force after the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) ended. It was established in 1972 after government white paper on the reorganization of the Nigeria prison was issued and a decree (Decree No. 9) stating the establishment of NPS was released (Orakwe n.d.). The Nigerian Prisons Service is under the direct control of the Ministry of Interior. However, it is headed by a comptroller-general (CG) assisted by six deputy comptrollers for zonal commands. At the state level, it is headed by the comptroller who oversees prison facilities in the state. The Nigerian Prisons Service is charged with the following duties:

1. Take into lawful custody all those certified to be so kept by courts of competent jurisdiction.
2. Produce suspects in courts as and when due.
3. Identify the causes of their anti-social dispositions.
4. Set in motion mechanisms for their treatment and training for eventual reintegration into society as normal law-abiding citizens on discharge.
5. Administer prison farms and industries for this purpose and in the process generate revenue for the government (http://www.prisons.gov.ng/).

NPS, Prison Management and Internal Security in Nigeria: An Assessment

Generally, prisons have basic functions that are significant to the internal security of the state. These functions are to secure and control, to punish and to rehabilitate and reform offenders. The Nigerian Prisons Service has a significant role to play in internal security management in Nigeria. From
the constitutional roles of the Service highlighted above, it has a duty that extends beyond keeping in custody persons convicted by courts of competent jurisdiction to be imprisoned. It is also statutorily obligated to identify the causes of inmates’ anti-social dispositions and put in place machineries to reform their behaviours. This also includes training them in the skills that will enhance their speedy reintegration into the society after release. This function is particularly important to ensure internal security of the Nigerian state. This is so because a criminal whose cause of anti-social disposition is known can easily be reformed. Effective reformation of such a person will ensure that she/he does not come back to the prison. This task of the prison is necessary to ensure adequate internal security because most people who offend the state and are certified to be kept in prison custody are people who find it extremely difficult to conform to societal norms. Ogundipe buttressed this point more fervently when he observed:

It is assumed that those who have committed crimes need help so that rather than be punished for their offences should be assisted to lead a good life on discharge from prison. This view is predicated upon the understanding that those who have fallen foul of the collective norms and law of their societies, as expressed in their criminal law, are those who have had problems of adaptation and conformity with the general value system of their societies. And this is largely due to the fact that they were unable to some extent in their socialisation cope with the internalisation of the values and norms of their society and therefore express this shortcoming by breaking the laws. When therefore they commit crimes, they are sent to Prison more for reform and rehabilitation than punishment so that on discharge they would be free to rejoin the society as normal law abiding citizens. (2010, 372–373)

These functions, if well performed by NPS, will contribute to internal security of the Nigerian state. Effective custody of persons considered to be of significant threat to the state will ensure public safety but curing and reforming them while in prison will ensure better public safety. This is because identifying their anti-social behaviours and rehabilitating them while in custody will make them better citizens such that whenever they are discharged, they become law-abiding citizens and it becomes impossible for them to reoffend and go back to prison. Unfortunately, the extent to which the NPS has been able to perform these functions may be doubtful.
The most common internal security threat that Nigeria is currently experiencing is increasing crime rate. As a result of this, there is a significant rise in prison population.

As Table 22.1 shows, the population of inmates in all Nigerian prisons in 1969 was 9203. It increased to 11,508 in 1970. It was 16,848 in 1971, 20,705 in 1972 and 26,243 in 1973. In 1974 and 1975, it was 24,161 and 23,001. In 1980 the inmate population was put at 36,000. By 2013, the total number of inmates in Nigerian prisons increased to 52,769. As on December 2016, the population of prison inmates in Nigeria was 65,000. Between December 2016 and February 2017, the number of prison inmates in Nigeria increased from 65,000 to 72,000 (Olawuyi 2017; Daily Trust, 9 February 2017a). As the crime rate continues to lead to the swelling inmate population, other associated problems such as the rate of jailbreak and rate of recidivism (the rate of reconviction) also continue to increase. Between 1971 and 1972, 12,526 or 74.3% of the population of inmates in Nigerian prisons had previously been to the prison. Of these, 43.5% had one previous conviction, while 30.5% had two previous convictions. The remaining percentage had three or more prior convictions and imprisonment (Adewale 1982). Between 1973 and 1974, 17,401 inmates had one or more previous convictions, while between 1986 and 2009, the rate of recidivism increased sporadically as shown in Table 22.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers of prisoners in the country</th>
<th>Number of prisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>9203</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11,508</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>16,848</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>20,705</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>26,243</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>24,161</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>23,001</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39,006</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>40,953</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>39,691</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>41,143</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>41,786</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>52,769</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22.2  Recidivism rate in Nigerian prisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First offender</td>
<td>14,918</td>
<td>11,010</td>
<td>17,642</td>
<td>10,417</td>
<td>6283</td>
<td>33,275</td>
<td>26,810</td>
<td>83,176</td>
<td>47,697</td>
<td>56,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted once</td>
<td>9170</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td>7882</td>
<td>5696</td>
<td>11,089</td>
<td>10,791</td>
<td>27,891</td>
<td>23,381</td>
<td>30,386</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted twice</td>
<td>3092</td>
<td>2689</td>
<td>3325</td>
<td>2610</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>3644</td>
<td>5909</td>
<td>22,192</td>
<td>21,557</td>
<td>25,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted thrice</td>
<td>1749</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1553</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>19,655</td>
<td>16,896</td>
<td>20,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted four times</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>1017</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>2473</td>
<td>13,131</td>
<td>15,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted five times</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>3064</td>
<td>5368</td>
<td>6457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted six times and more</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>1159</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>1159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A major point from the statistics above is that the prisons in Nigeria do not rehabilitate or reform inmates to be good citizens after serving prison terms. Rather, what happens is that they become further hardened. This is why most of the notorious criminals in Nigeria today have been imprisoned previously. They were released after completing their jail term only to become hardened. This obvious fact was better captured by the report of *The Punch* on Nigerian prisons:

Our prisons are no longer correcting people. Our prisons have become a training ground to make a detainee graduate from a misdemeanor to real crime. Our prisons have become a training ground for a man who was imprisoned for wandering to come out and become a hired killer and an armed robber who will carry gun and bullets around his neck like necklace and shoots sporadically and our policemen will go for cover. (*The Punch* 2009, March 14, p. 68)

The question an inquisitive mind would want to ask is why Nigerian prisons are unable to effectively perform their core functions of rehabilitating and reforming inmates to be better citizens. Some of these challenges are discussed below.

**Inadequate funds:** One of the major challenges to the effective administration of Nigerian prisons by Nigerian Prisons Service is inadequate funds. In rehabilitating inmates to become better citizens, many reformatory programmes have to be implemented. Similarly, prison officials have to be involved in day-to-day training to be abreast of new trends in inmate management. Other activities such as prison administration, salaries and allowances and structure and equipment maintenance need to be carried out on a daily basis. These need adequate finance. Unfortunately, prisons are poorly financed in Nigeria. Less than 1% of the Nigerian budget is allocated to corrections annually whereas in developed countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, more than 6% of their annual budget goes into corrections. Nigeria is among those countries in the world where correction is less funded (Nwolise 2006, 2010; Ogundipe 2010). This has serious effect on the correction of inmates as majority of them are poorly treated in custody. For instance, until recently an inmate in a Nigerian prison was entitled to only ₦150 daily for feeding. This was
recently upgraded to ₦400, which is still low (Interview with Prison Official, Adamawa State, June 12, 2017). These prisons are seriously lacking in health-care facilities. Other programmes that prisoners are entitled to en-route reformation and rehabilitation are abruptly stopped due to the inadequate finance of the prison system. As a result, the reformation activities are weak. Similarly, prisons officials are denied frequent personnel training which could have enhanced their performance in rehabilitating inmates. This significantly contributes to producing detainees that will graduate from misdemeanour to real crime and will also return to prison shortly after release.

**Poor rehabilitation programmes**: Another major challenge of NPS in the management of prisons in Nigeria is poor rehabilitation programmes provided by prisons. Carefully conceived and well-implemented rehabilitation programmes are key to rehabilitating a criminal into becoming a good citizen. This is because those who commit crimes in society are usually people who could not cope with the developmental process of the society. As a result, they are school drop-outs, lumpens, homeless, the unemployed, the unskilled and the poor, among others. Therefore, training them on skills, vocation or education while in custody is key to reintegrating them into the society and not by presenting them with sermons and *dawah* on the need to lead a decent life after custody (Ogundipe 2010). This is necessary so that when they leave custody, they will be able to engage themselves in economic activities that will continue to sustain them. While describing programmes embarked upon by NPS to reform, rehabilitate and reintegrate inmates into the larger society, Ogundipe (2010) observed that the agency embarked on a series of human development programme on inmates. These programmes involved schools, vocational workshops, the operation of mechanized farm centres and prison cottage industries. However, the extent to which these programmes are actually implemented is in serious doubt. This is because many of the freed detainees still find it difficult to reintegrate into the society as a result of lack of training in educational or vocational skills that could have sustained them after custody. In line with this thought, Igbodipe cited in Feyisetan (n.d., p. 69) observed that:

> The prison system is not merely to punish but to correct, to redeem, rehabilitate, regenerate and restore the offender to the status of a respectable or respectful law abiding citizens. The conditions in our prisons have made such aims useless and unattainable because of lack of reformative and rehabilitative programmes....
This problem is linked to poor funding. A senior prison official observed that “most of these programmes only exist in paper but NPS cannot implement them due to poor fund” (interview with Prison Official, Adamawa State, June 12, 2017). However, another significant factor is that the programmes are not carefully conceived and implemented. Most inmates are “forced” to acquire skills in which they do not have interest (interview with an ex-inmate in Yola town, May 2017). Thus they fail to practise the skill after custody. This easily encourages recidivism.

**Mixture of minor offenders with hardened criminals:** There are different kinds of people in prisons. One category is convicted people, those found guilty of a criminal offence by the verdict of a jury or the decision of a judge in a court of law. These kinds of prisoners may be condemned (sentenced to death), sentenced to certain years in prison or a lifer (sentenced to life imprisonment). Another category is awaiting trial persons. These are persons who are still undergoing court trial to determine whether they are guilty or not. These various kinds of prisoners are locked together in the same confinement with no classification. In the process, minor crime offenders are locked up with hardened criminals. In the process, the minor offenders undergo steady but a consistent process of criminalization. This results in a situation whereby the minor/first-time offenders are hardened by learning sophisticated crimes from the hardened criminals who may have been condemned or subjected to life imprisonment. This surely promotes recidivism. One major reason for lumping minor offenders with hardened criminals is due to the challenge of space in Nigerian prisons.

**Over-congestion of prisons:** Prison congestion is a serious concern in the Nigerian Prison system. The Nigerian government over the years has grappled with the challenge of decongesting prisons. The current Nigerian Minister of Interior Abdulrahman Dambazau listed the option of setting free those who have served ten years and above in prison without trial as a way to decongest Nigerian prisons (Daily Trust, 25 May 2017b). In the same vein, the government has commuted prison sentences of other categories of prisoners to fines; this implies that upon payment of imposed fines this category of prisoners will be released. However, the clog in the wheel of this policy is that some inmates who have been released based on this arrangement could not meet the condition for release which is payment of the imposed fine. The Senate Committee on Interior once offered and indeed rescued some inmates in Kuje and Suleja prisons who were unable to pay the fines imposed on them by the courts as part of their intervention in the decongestion of prison facilities (Table 22.3).
### Table 22.3  Prison statistics in Nigeria, 2014–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Prison capacity</th>
<th>Unsentenced</th>
<th>Prison inmate population</th>
<th>% of unsentenced of prison population</th>
<th>Prison overcrowding: Ratio of prisoner to prison capacity (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>1406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>786</td>
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<td>2580</td>
<td>616</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1568</td>
<td>1568</td>
<td>1338</td>
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<td>Anambra</td>
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<td>804</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
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<td>1468</td>
<td>1468</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3422</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1228</td>
<td>1228</td>
<td>1228</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
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<td>588</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekiti</td>
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<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>137</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enugu</td>
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<td>1394</td>
<td>1733</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>1950</td>
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<td>Jigawa</td>
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<td>344</td>
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<td>2702</td>
<td>2702</td>
<td>2832</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1840</td>
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<tr>
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(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Prison capacity</th>
<th>Unsentenced</th>
<th>Prison inmate population</th>
<th>% of unsentenced of prison population</th>
<th>Prison overcrowding: Ratio of prisoner to prison capacity (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>66.34</td>
<td>77 101 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>47.08</td>
<td>NA 110 127 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>3897</td>
<td>4538</td>
<td>5286</td>
<td>85.85</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasarrawa</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1321</td>
<td>64.57</td>
<td>NA 173 174 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>55.55</td>
<td>NA 91 99 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>79.23</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>74.92</td>
<td>NA 78 72 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osun</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>596</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>1368</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
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<td>Sokoto</td>
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<td>961</td>
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</tr>
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<td>664</td>
<td>1249</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
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<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td>1178</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>80.57</td>
<td>NA 81 94 85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The committee visited these prisons and facilitated the release of these inmates by making available to them money for the payment of fines. One major outcome of the over-congestedness of Nigerian prisons is lack of effective management. It is also a strong factor in the frequency of prisons breaks in Nigeria as the demographic pressure sometimes serves as impetus for prison breaks. However, some prison breaks might have been instigated by other factors like inadequate physical activities in prison, inadequate quantity and quality of food and other unavailable welfare packages.

**Problem of awaiting trial persons (ATPs):** Another major challenge of the NPS in the management of prisons for internal security of the Nigerian state is the problem of ATPs. Statistics shows that there are 65,944 prison inmates across the country, more than 70% of which constitute ATPs (Punch Newspaper, February 5, 2017). This was also confirmed by the Nigerian Minister of Interior, Abdulrahman Dambazau, recently. The minister, on a Salah visit to the Kano prisons, buttressed this fact when he said:

The high number of awaiting trial inmates is worrisome because the prisons are meant for convicts, but you find out at the end of the day that more than 70 per cent of the people there are awaiting trial inmates. (Daniel 2017)

Many factors have been adduced for the growing population of the ATPs in Nigeria. One major factor resulting in the problem of ATPs is judicial congestion which results in a long period of litigation on cases. Cases are unjustifiably adjourned for a long period of time, while the accused is kept in prison custody unnecessarily.

The above assertion is corroborated by a report compiled by the National Human Right Commission (NHRC). An excerpt from that report states that:

… More than 70 per cent of inmates are awaiting trial because their cases are not going on in court or are not moving as fast as possible. A situation where somebody is supposed to stay two years in prison if convicted, and he has stayed five years awaiting trial, what kind of compensation will you give to him, if at the end, he is not guilty? Our constitution says that you are
innocent until proven guilty, so what happens if this person who has been awaiting trial for five years is innocent? That means he has stayed in detention for five years for nothing, for an offence he did not commit, so we think that the criminal justice administration should be improved. (cited in the Guardian Newspaper, November 20, 2015)

This prolonged trial leading to the congestion of prisons with ATPs has caused a lot of havoc on prisoners and their possibility of been corrected. Continuous co-existence with hardened criminal enables them to learn to become hardened while in the prisons as ATPs. As Ogundipe observed:

The lumping together of awaiting and pre-trial detainees in congested cells for these long periods produce damaged personalities who are no longer in tune with what we can call normative laws and customs governing social existence. Years of staying in congested cells make even those on the periphery of crime become so schooled that they idolize crimes, banish fear and make up their minds that if they can suffer this much for doing nothing, then there is nothing more to fear. (Ogundipe 2010, p. 375)

The implication above is that ATPs are likely to return to the society as hardened criminals after staying for long in the prison with career criminals as a result of judicial congestion. Meanwhile as they are awaiting trials, they are not subjected to any form of correction programme as correction programmes are for convicted prisoners and often come as part of the sentence of the jury (interview with prison official in Yola, June 2017), but while in prison, they are consistently criminalized by hardened criminals. This also explains the high rate of recidivism among Nigerian inmates.

**Punitive rather than reformative correction systems:** Offenders are supposed to be sent to prisons as punishment and not for punishment (Bamgbose 2010). Unfortunately, in Nigeria offenders are sent to prisons as punishment and for punishment. Freed prisoners left prison custodies without any hope of a better life or means for starting life afresh. This factor also pushed some of them back into criminality. For instance, there is no statutory provision for freed inmates to be reintegrated back into society. Oftentimes they leave the prison custody without any means of survival, and the drive to search for survival by all means possible usually leads them to new forms of criminality, which may lead them back to prison.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Prisons play a significant role in the security of people within the state. The recognition of this fact is the reason developed countries of the world concentrate on prison management. It is not only where persons who constitute serious security threats to the state are kept, it is also an avenue to rehabilitate social deviants and criminals. While prisons in Nigeria serve as spaces where people who constitute risk to the state are kept, it is not yet a place of rehabilitation and reformation. It is rather a place where hardened criminals are produced. Some of the factors responsible for this have been extensively discussed in this chapter. There is a need for prison reform in Nigeria. The following are recommended:

1. Imprisonment as a form of punishment should be de-emphasized. Except where custodization is absolutely necessary such as in cases of serious offenders/criminals and for the sake of public safety, other forms of punishments for minor offenders should be adopted. Alternative punishments that can be administered especially on minor offenders are community service, probation, compensation, plea bargaining, binding over and restoration, and fine, among others (see Bamgbose 2010, pp. 60–72).

2. The deteriorating conditions of Nigerian prisons must be addressed. Inmates too must be adequately catered for and be made to undergo programmes that will enhance their effective reformation and integration into the society. Fundamentally, the successful rehabilitation of prisoners has three components. These are healing, treatment and education/training. This may be part of the rehabilitation agenda of the NPS but it is hardly implemented. Most times, they depend only on spiritual healing and counselling of clergymen while aspects of training and education are less pursued. Therefore, these reformative programmes especially vocational training and education of inmates should be improved upon. Earning an education in prison opens up opportunities for employment and a career that ex-prisoners feel is out of their reach. This is why the tendency to come back to prison is high. Apart from this, education helps to build self-esteem of convicts. It is recommended that prison education and training in Nigeria should be strengthened.
3. The government must effectively fund prisons in Nigeria. This is necessary as the effective reformation of offenders is a function of funding.

4. The problem of ATPs must be addressed through judicial reforms that speedily and effectively dispense justice. This can help decongest the congested prisons in Nigeria. The following approaches may be applied to the problem of lengthy pre-trial detention that ultimately contributes to the swollen number of ATPs:
   (a) Increasing legal aid and assistance to the less privileged.
   (b) Enforcing time limits in criminal proceedings.
   (c) Offering bail and other alternatives to pre-trial detention.
   (d) Reforming criminal procedures so that cases are reviewed regularly and brought to a conclusion more speedily.

5. Minor offenders must be separated from major offenders. A situation where a misdemeanour offender is placed in the same gaol with a terrorist or hardened criminal is not the best.

6. There should be a national review and reformation of the criminal justice system in Nigeria. There should be huge government investment in crime prevention and reduction. Imprisonment comes at the end of a long chain of decisions involving legislators and policymakers, the police, prosecutors and courts.

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CHAPTER 23

Non State Actors and Internal Security Management in Nigeria: The Case of Vigilante Groups

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INTRODUCTION

Security of lives and property is the most important role of the state. In fact, one of the indicators of a failed state is its inability to properly secure the lives and properties of its citizens. In the social contract theory, this is the main reason people had to give up some of their natural rights to the state in order for the state to provide them protection. Thus, the state is the result of an agreement entered into by men who originally had no governmental organization, and as such, everybody was living at the mercy of nature. In such an unorganized environment, life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Appadorai 1974, p. 22). People, therefore, decided to set up a government to which they parted with their natural liberty and agreed to obey the laws prescribed by this government. On its part, and to fulfil its own part of the contract, this government or the state was to provide them and their properties with security.
In the context of Nigeria, this role was clearly articulated in section 14, subsection 2(b), of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which emphasizes the pre-eminence of security and welfare of the people as the raison d’être of government. Consequently, by surrendering some of their natural rights to the state, it is expected that the security of the lives of the citizens and those of their property shall be guaranteed by the Nigerian state using the instrumentality of the military and diverse security agencies such as the police, the Directorate of State Security, and other para-military agencies.

However, this has not always been the case. Presently, Nigeria is confronted with a series of security challenges ranging from the less serious crimes such as pick-pocketing, home breaking, and burglary to the more heinous and sophisticated crimes such as armed robbery, car snatching, kidnapping, political assassinations and other related killings, trans-border crimes, ethno-religious conflicts, the Fulani herdsmen menace, and insurgency. In fact, insurgency has become so intractable that the military, whose traditional security role is external—safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country—has had to be drafted to contain it. Despite all the resources and personnel that have been deployed in combating the Boko Haram insurgency, it has continued to wreak havoc on the citizens of the country, especially in the northeastern part of the country where it has been fighting to create an Islamic caliphate.

Containing these security challenges has proven to be a herculean task for the state security agencies for a number of reasons. One, these security agencies are already overstretched by the enormity of work they have had to do given the sophistication of the criminals they are contending with and the number of Nigerians there are to protect. Available evidence indicates that Nigeria is highly under-policed, compared with some other countries. Bodunde et al. (2014) have noted that the minimum benchmark for police strength as recommended by the United Nations is 222 per 10,000 persons. This means that the ideal is one policeman to about 45 persons. Nigeria is far from achieving this, as the ratio in the country presently is 1 to about 500, since the Nigerian Police presently has a strength of about 370,000 officers and men (Bodunde et al. 2014). Two, and as a consequence of the above, security agencies cannot be everywhere at the same time. Many of the crimes are committed in localities where the presence of the police and other security agencies is hardly felt. Three, most of these security agencies are concentrated in urban areas, where crime rates tend to be higher. This has left a security gap in most communities, neighbourhoods, and localities.
In order to address this lacuna, therefore, communities have resorted to self-help initiatives to protect themselves and their property in their communities, and these self-help initiatives, in the form of non-state security actors, have, to a large extent, closed the gap created by the failure of security agencies to guarantee the safety of the citizens and their property (Ogbozor 2016). According to Nyiayaana (2015), this has called into question the purpose of the state as the sole legitimate security provider. These self-help initiatives or non-state policing measures are in the form of vigilante groups or, in some parlance, referred to as neighbourhood watch.

This contribution, therefore, adds to the gamut of literature on internal security management by examining the role of vigilante groups in internal security management in Nigeria. It attempts a conceptualization of the term ‘vigilantism,’ traces the origin of vigilante groups in Nigeria, and also examines the rationale for the introduction of vigilantism in the country, that is, its role in internal security management. The chapter also assesses the nature of the relationship existing among these vigilante groups and state security agencies, especially the police. It further discusses the factors mitigating against effective operation of vigilante groups and finally proffers solutions to these problems, in the form of recommendations. The study basically adopted desk research, relying mainly on the documentary method of generating data. As such, secondary data/information were essentially utilized. Also, authors’ personal observations of the workings of these groups in communities where they operate were also a veritable source of data. Content analysis, based on systematic logical deductions, was used to analyse data.

**Conceptual Discourse**

**Vigilantism**

Buur and Jenson (2004) have noted that the conceptualization of the term ‘vigilantism’ is important for two related reasons. First, the concept is very much embedded in the fashion and encompassment that need to be unravelled to provide the academic space needed to address the phenomenon on a daily basis. Second, there is a need to show that the concept has been unstable. Thus, the word ‘vigilante’ is used in Nigeria vaguely in reference to diverse groups which have different aims. The appellation has been used to describe formations such as the Bakassi Boys, whose initial assignment was to fight crime but who eventually became a tool in the
hands of politicians. The term has also been used to describe the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), a militia group native to the Yoruba race and very active in the southwestern part of the country, whose original aim was to champion for self-determination for the Yoruba people, but it widened its operational scope to include crime fighting. It has also been applied to the Hisba in the north, introduced by 12 northern states in 2000, whose mandate was to ensure compliance with sharia law. The term has also been used to describe several other groups in the villages and communities who perform either the role of security guards or some other functions in different parts of the country. Even hunters’ associations and the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) in the northeast are also described as vigilantes.

Thus, Johnson (1996) conceptualized vigilantism as acts that are focused on crime and societal regulation in the form of enhanced security for partakers and constituents of the group. More so, they are viewed as groups that are established outside the legal structures administered by the state. This view seems to be a re-echo of Nina (1995), who had earlier argued that vigilante groups are constituted outside the law. In other words, they are extra-state, and as such, their operations are extra-judicial. Some have also ascribed mob or spontaneous action to vigilantism (see Sundar 2010). This involves ordinary people lynching or beating up suspected thieves, rapists, and other social deviants. This is usually in preference to the criminal justice system which takes ages to give justice. Therefore, by this definition, any act by which suspected criminals are brought to instant (jungle or extra-judicial) justice is termed ‘vigilantism.’ It is little wonder that Ogbozor (2016) noted that researchers have tended to focus on the negative aspects of these vigilante groups, including abuse of human rights, instead of the critical roles they play in the security of a community.

As Alemika and Chukwuma (2004) have noted, vigilantism is of four different types. These include:

- Neighbourhood or community based: These are neighbourhood organizations formed by communities or neighbourhoods.
- Ethnic: These are groups organized along ethnic lines for the purpose of defending the interests of the ethnic group.
- Religious: These are groups that are faith based.
- State-sponsored: Vigilante organizations which have the mandate of the government to operate.
These typologies are, however, not mutually exclusive, as one group can combine the characteristics of more or all of the above types.

What could be deduced from this gamut of definitions and conceptualizations is that there is no scholarly consensus yet on the exact meaning of vigilantism. However, for the purpose of this chapter, vigilantism is conceptualized as groups of citizens who volunteer themselves in local communities to assist the regular security agents by arresting criminals or suspected criminals and handing them over to the police for further investigation and possible prosecution. It is an admission that the state has not lived up to its expectation in this regard. As Jones (2008) has rightly argued, they were created in response to the inability of the state to guarantee the security of lives and property of its citizens. In most cases, the volunteers who make up the membership of vigilante groups are youths who have regular employment and who are highly recommended by the community leaders; otherwise, they would not be accepted as members of the vigilante group. The idea behind this is to ensure that criminals are not recruited as members as well as to prevent members from engaging in unwholesome practices such as extorting money from innocent citizens. This is important because their services are to a large extent voluntary since members do not receive salary either from the government or from the community, though stipends could be paid from time to time by the community.

Non-state Security Actors

Onuoha (2017) defined non-state security actors as a group of actors who are outside the formal security apparatus of the Nigerian state, saddled with the responsibility of performing security and law enforcement functions on behalf of their communities. At times, they are referred to as the informal police force or voluntary police force. In the case of Nigeria, they operate in the form of vigilantes, neighbourhood guards, community or village guards, or traditional policemen (Ogbozor 2016). They emerged to complement government efforts at addressing challenges arising from the inadequacies of state institutions in security provisioning. In other words, they emerged in response to gaps or deficits in security provisioning by formal state institutions (Onuoha 2017).

Mohammed, 2013 (cited in Onuoha 2017), has identified three categories of non-state security actors in Nigeria. The first one consists of a group of able-bodied young men in the village who organize themselves
to patrol their areas mostly at night in order to protect the community against armed robbers. The second category is largely a product of community decisions whereby the community contributes money and hires people, which they pay on a weekly or monthly basis to guard the community. The third group is mostly hired and equipped by the local government areas to prevent crimes and arrest criminals.

These informal (or non-state) security actors play diverse and important roles in African communities. However, researchers have always focused on the negative aspects of their work, especially as regards abuse of human rights, while neglecting the important roles they play in providing security and safety in communities. Among the different non-state security actors in Nigeria, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria stands out as the oldest and most recognized actor (Ogbozor 2016). The group plays important roles in providing essential policing services to Nigerians, especially in rural areas. They have increasingly filled the void created by the failure of official or state security actors to provide security for the citizens.

**Internal Security Management**

Malik (2010) has noted that in *Arthashastra*, Kautilya had written that a state can be exposed to four different types of threats. These are internal threats, external threats, externally aided internal threats, and internally aided external threats. According to him, among these four types of threats, domestic threats should be addressed without delay. This is because just like the fear of a snake hidden around the corner, they are much more damaging than threats from outside. The most dangerous enemy is the internal enemy. Kautilya (c.350–275 BC), an ancient Indian statesman and philosopher, had written the treatise, *Arthashastra*, as a handbook for running an empire (Violatti 2014). Kautilya’s thesis underscores not only the seriousness of internal security threats, but also the importance of internal security management in containing security threats within a state.

Internal security management, therefore, has to do with those policy actions introduced by the government, and implemented or carried out by government officials and security agencies, especially the police, for the purpose of containing internal security threats to the state. Such security threats include violent demonstrations; riots; communal, ethnic and religious clashes; and terrorism. These threats could be sponsored by external forces but certainly need internal collaboration to materialize. Containing these threats connotes all those activities that are geared towards maintaining peace and security internally in a state.
**Vigilante Groups**

Vigilante groups are groups of people who take up armaments to protect themselves and their communities when they feel that the government has failed to do so. The agenda of these groups is to deter the ever-increasing crime cases in their surroundings (Oyagi 2016). In this case, it is assumed that it is the failure of state security agencies to ensure adequate security to the citizens that gave rise to vigilante groups. In line with this, Jones (2008) has argued that vigilante groups arose as a result of the inability and failure of the state to provide and ensure adequate security for its citizens. Thus, they were established to fill the security void created by the state and its security agencies. Ojebode et al. (n.d.) referred to them as Community-Based Crime Prevention (CBCP) strategies.

According to Okeke (2013), a vigilante is an individual who lawfully or unlawfully metes out punishments to a suspected offender or gets involved with a group that imposes extra-legal penalties on a suspected offender. Arising from this conceptualization, vigilant groups are perceived as meting out extra-legal or extra-judicial penalties to suspected offenders. The definition also presupposes that some vigilante groups carry out illegal activities. However, most vigilant groups operate legally, as they are a creation of legally constituted authorities, most times by local government authorities, traditional authorities, and town union authorities. Since they are registered with formal security institutions such as the police, their activities are also monitored, to avoid taking laws into their hands. As such, they apprehend suspected criminals or offenders and hand them over to the police for further investigation and possible prosecution.

The above therefore conforms to Fourchard’s (2008) view of vigilantes as a number of individuals coming together at the community or local level with the aim of gathering intelligence on people with questionable character in their area and using it to help the police to detect and prevent crime. Their major objective is to monitor their area, collect information on people with questionable character, and pass them on to the police. Thus, vigilante groups could be considered to be a formal institutionalization of the erstwhile night guard that patrolled communities in the past. As was the case with the night guards that existed in the colonial era, vigilante groups do keep watch over the local communities and hand over arrested suspected criminals to the police for further actions (Fourchard 2008).
Though the tasks and roles assigned to vigilante groups range from ensuring adequate security, detecting early warning alerts, control of traffic, intelligence and information gathering, and settlement of disputes to helping in organizing communal development initiatives and exercises (Ogbozor 2016), the primary reason for setting them up is to protect the people from incessant raids by armed robbers in their neighbourhoods (Adigwe 2013).

**Origin of Vigilante Groups in Nigeria**

In the precolonial era, vigilantism found explanation in the activities of secret societies, warrior groups, and night guards who performed various law enforcement duties, external defence and peace-making (Nyiayaana 2015). During this period, vigilante groups were few, known for uncoordinated and loose leadership and activities, and operated autonomously in the various areas of the federation (Ogbozor 2016, pp. 3–4). Thus, before the advent of colonialism, all societies in what later became Nigeria had their respective ways of policing their communities and, in so doing, protecting the lives and property of the people (Okeke 2013). For instance, in the Igbo precolonial societies, this role was performed by the system of Age Grades and that of masquerade societies. Whenever there was any breach of law in the community, a youthful age grade was usually mandated to deal with the situation on behalf of the entire community. Beyond law enforcement, they also provided security for their respective communities, ensuring that criminals were kept at bay, and those that were apprehended were dealt with according to the rules prescribed by the community. When very serious crimes were involved, masquerades, who were generally revered, feared, and regarded as agents of the gods, were used to enforce laws and maintain security.

In the Yoruba communities, hunters were usually used as night guards in several of the cities even before the nineteenth century, when the country was colonized. However, with the advent of colonialism, this practice was proscribed by the colonial government. In fact, the district officer had to put an end to the system in Ibadan in 1903, because it was seen as dangerous, and changed it with a formal police force (Fourchard 2008). In the north, security functions were predominantly performed by palace guards in their respective emirates. They ensured that security was maintained and laws were enforced. In fact, because most settlements and emirates were walled, it was usually difficult for criminals—particularly
thieves—to succeed without being noticed by watchful emirate guards. During the colonial period, the Emir’s Native Authority police were ubiquitous and the chain of daily intelligence ran from the ward head up to the Emir (Last 2008). In other localities, there were also different forms of vigilante services which maintained law and order and ensured there was safety and security of life and property in their different communities.

However, as time went by, they took on a more formal structure, got more organized, and their operations spread across local government areas, states and regions of the country. The origin of state-created vigilante services in Nigeria could be traced to the era of General Babangida’s administration when military governors in that regime officially created vigilante groups (Fourchard 2008). In March 1986, the Military Governor of Oyo State, Adetunji Olurin, and his Niger State counterpart, David Mark, declared that their governments would encourage vigilante groups in different states to help in fishing out criminally minded people in their communities (Fourchard 2008). Soon after these announcements, the then Inspector General of Police, Etim Inyang, made a more general announcement in August 1986, at the time of the raging battle between the police and the dreaded notorious armed robber, Lawrence Anini’s gang. He formally legitimized the formation of vigilante groups by communities in partnership with divisional police officers in their areas (Fourchard 2008).

In the mid-1990s, the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) emerged in the southwestern part of the country. It doubled as both an ethnic militia group contending for self-determination of the Yoruba people and a vigilante group involved in crime fighting, more importantly in Lagos State (Nyiayaana 2015). Indeed, in June 2001, Ahmed Bola Tinubu, the then governor of Lagos State, made a public announcement about his intentions to engage the OPC to help in combating criminals in the state, especially as the police seemed overwhelmed by their nefarious activities (Fourchard 2008). It was later to be officially recognized by the State House of Assembly and subsequently was backed by the state government (Reno 2002). Eventually, Oyo and some other state governments in the southwest publicly requested for their assistance in fighting crime.

In the southeast, towards the dawn of civilian rule, the Bakassi Boys sprang up in Abia State. Initially, it was a case of cooperation between the Abia State government and security agencies to combat crime, especially armed robbery menace in the state, particularly in Aba, where armed robbers were attacking and harassing market traders and residents, thereby endangering their safety and sources of livelihood (Jones 2008; Nyiayaana
Though it was hugely criticized because of its style of jungle justice on presumed criminals, their activities to a large extent reduced the menace of armed robbery in the state. Its success story led to its adoption in the neighbouring Anambra State, where criminals were having a field day, particularly in the commercial city of Onitsha. It got total support from the state government and before long, was able to tackle the spate of armed robberies in the state. But it soon degenerated into a tool in the hands of politicians to fight their political enemies in both states. This, coupled with its barbaric style of dispensing justice, led to its banning by the federal government in 2002.

In 2000, after the return to democratic rule, the Hisba vigilante groups were created by 12 northern states to enforce the implementation of sharia law. Though this group also maintained security in communities in those states, their creation was a reflection of ethnic, identity and religious politics being played in Nigeria (Nyiayaana 2015). These 12 states are Zamfara, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Borno, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, Kano, Niger, and Sokoto States. According to Olaniyi (2005), the creation of the Hisba was not only meant to help these government implement sharia law but was also meant to curtail the pervasive insecurity and increasingly growing anomie among the youth.

However, the need to have some form of operational uniformity and streamlined leadership resulted in the formation of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN). The VGN serves as the umbrella body of all vigilante groups in the country and was formally registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission on February 18, 1999. Operationally, it has four structures: national level, regional level, state level, and local government levels. Its headquarters was moved from Kaduna to Abuja in 2011 in order to give it a national outlook. In early 2017, a bill seeking official recognition for the VGN by the federal government was introduced in the House of Representatives. The Speaker, Hon. Yakubu Dogara, apparently uncomfortable with the whole concept, argued that since vigilante services are part of social activities by various towns and communities, it is a residual matter and falls within the authority of state governments. Moreover, since there is already the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) assisting the police, and even the Peace Corps of Nigeria being proposed, he posited that there is no need for another security outfit at the national level. Be that as it may, vigilantism has become part of the lives of several communities in Nigeria because of the important security functions they perform in such communities. Recognition or non-recognition by the federal government will do very little to change this.
Rationale for Vigilante Groups: Their Roles in Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Nigeria’s security architecture is made up of several security agencies: the military (army, navy, and airforce), the police (mobile force and regular), the para-military (Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the customs, the prisons, etc.), and the intelligence (Department of State Security, National Intelligence Agency). Beyond these, there are other agencies and commissions established by law to help in fighting different types of crimes. Inyang and Abraham (2013) have articulated some of these agencies. They are the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), charged with the responsibility of fighting economic crimes; the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), empowered to fight corrupt practices in government circles; the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), established to tackle drug-related crimes; and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, otherwise known as NAPTIP, established to combat human trafficking. With all these array of state security outfits all geared towards one goal—security of the lives and properties of Nigerians—the questions that arise are the following: do Nigerians still need non-state security outfits like vigilante groups? If the proliferation of armed vigilantes is the result of state failure as Nyiayaana (2015) has argued, would these vigilante groups be able to tackle security challenges where the regular state security outfits, with all the sophisticated weapons at their disposal, have failed? What exactly are the roles of vigilante groups in internal security management in Nigeria?

The answers to these questions are provided from three mutually reinforcing standpoints. First, there are some who hold the view that vigilante groups emerged as a result of the state’s inability to police the society properly and secure the lives and property of its citizens (Neild 1999; Jones 2008; Ajayi and Adefolaju 2013). Following this view, it is believed that the Nigerian state has failed to keep to its side of the social contract. Thus, it has failed to provide security to its citizens as they constantly live in fear of armed robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, assassinations, car snatching, Fulani herdsmen attacks, Boko Haram bombings, ethno-religious conflicts, and so on. As a result, communities have resorted to self-help as they can no longer rely or wait for the ineffectual state. This also explains why wealthy individuals sometimes move around with their private security guards, portraying a deep-seated mistrust of the security agencies, especially the police by some communities and persons. They would rather
entrust their security into the hands of people they know very well rather than security officials that do not even speak their language. This school of thought, therefore, believes that the emergence of vigilante groups casts doubts on the capability of state security agencies to protect and secure the lives and properties of citizens.

Extending this argument further, some scholars have argued that vigilante groups emerged as a result of the surge in criminal activities in recent years and the incapacity of the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies to contain the rising wave of criminality (see Umar and Bappi 2014; Inyang and Abraham 2013). As a result, registered private security outfits emerged. However, only those who can afford their services do hire them because they are profit oriented. As such, only organizations such as banks, multinationals, government parastatals and few private businesses could afford them, thereby leaving the poor masses to their fate. Wealthy individuals and senior government officials have regular policemen attached to them for their security. The result is that communities who were left at the mercy of the hoodlums had to organize themselves and provide alternative security measures for their safety and security. That effort resulted in the formation of vigilante groups.

Second, there are also those who hold the view that vigilante groups emerged to complement the work of state security agencies (see Fourchard 2008; Umar and Bappi 2014). They disagree that the emergence of vigilante groups amounts to a vote of no confidence on the police or an admission that the security agencies have failed in their constitutional responsibilities. In line with this view, Fourchard (2008) has argued that instead of seeing the emergence of vigilante groups as an attempt to fill the vacuum created by the failure of state security services to combat crime, we should rather see it as an attempt at establishing some form of communal policing or an attempt at complementing the work of the regular police force. For this school of thought, the security agencies are not only overstretched but also cannot be everywhere at the same time. Moreover, most crimes are localized and are best detected by local security outfits like vigilante groups before the police can wade in.

Third, another school of thought believes that modern vigilante groups in present-day Nigeria emerged out of frustrations of some state governors with the command structures of state security agencies, especially the Nigeria Police Force. According to Fourchard (2008), because the law disallows state governors to establish state police, some of them have resorted to creating state vigilante groups, which are under their control.
Although these governors by constitutional ascription are designated as their states’ chief security officers, they do not have control over the security agencies in their states, especially the police. To worsen an already bad situation, agitations for the creation of state police have been met with resistance from the federal government. Therefore, some state governments decided to establish vigilante services to fill that vacuum the non-existence of state police has created.

In Abia State, for example, the Bakassi Boys which was established by traders in Aba was later formalized under the Abia State Vigilante Services Act. In August 2000, Anambra State followed suit by introducing a bill in the State House of Assembly aimed at formally instituting a vigilante group. After being passed into law and signed by the state governor in December of the same year, it became known as the Anambra State Vigilante Service (AVS) Act No. 9 of 2000 (Okeke 2013). In Imo State, there was also the Imo State Vigilante Services. In Lagos State, as earlier stated, the then governor, Bola Tinubu, made an announcement that he would invite the Oodua People’s Congress to help the state in combating criminality. In August 2001, a bill creating the Edo State Vigilante Service was tabled before the Edo State House of Assembly. In 2012, the governor of Gombe State, Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo, introduced the Youth Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme (YREP), which recruited almost 1200 youths as marshals to assist in security, traffic and environmental management in the state (Umar and Bappi 2014).

This chapter does not intend to contest any of the positions above, as all are justified in their own rights. However, the fact remains that policing a heterogeneous society like Nigeria is not an easy task. Coupled with this problem is the fact that the regular Nigeria Police Force is grossly inadequate for the country. According to Ogbozor (2016, pp. 2–3):

There are about 377,000 policemen in Nigeria for 170 million people. Sadly, half of the entire Nigeria Police Force is serving the politicians… Some senior government personnel have about fifty policemen attached to him and his family. Rather than patrol local communities, police officers prefer to take on jobs where they can earn additional income, such as working for politicians, guarding security checkpoints, or working as guards at commercial banks. In Nigeria, the ratio of police to the population is low—about 1 police officer for every 500 Nigerians. Compare these numbers with South Africa, where the ratio of police to the population is about 1 police officer per 250 people.
As such, the importance of vigilante groups cannot be overemphasized. They have contributed immensely in internal security management in Nigeria. Some of the areas in which they have been useful in security-related matters include:

(a) Information to security agencies/intelligence gathering: Many vigilante groups work as informants to the police. Since they know the local communities much more than the police, they are in a better position to have meaningful information about criminal activities in their areas of operation.

(b) Providing security/arrest of criminals: Vigilante groups also help the police in securing the communities where they operate. Usually, they patrol the communities at night to ensure that night marauders and armed robbers are kept at bay. During the day also, they ensure that home breakers and such other criminals are apprehended and handed over to the police.

(c) Fighting insurgency: The case of the civilian JTF in the northeast is a case in point. There have been several success stories of the contributions of the civilian JTF in assisting the Nigerian military in fighting Boko Haram insurgents.

(d) Securing public property: In most communities, vigilante groups also secure public properties such as electrical installations and government buildings.

(e) Early warning alerts: This is part of the intelligence gathering function of vigilante groups. Issues that could easily degenerate to chaotic situations are quickly relayed to the security agencies for prompt action.

(f) Settling disputes: Vigilante groups also contribute to the security of their communities by intervening and settling disputes that might escalate to the breakdown of law and order.

(g) Prevent crime and the opportunities for crime and anti-social behaviour: The mere fact of the presence of vigilante groups in local communities deters crimes. Criminally minded individuals often jettison the idea of criminality because of the high possibility of being apprehended by vigilante groups.

The roles of vigilante groups in internal security management in Nigeria could also be classified according to their responsibilities to the different strata of the society. Thus, they are responsible to the communities that
established them, the police that they complement their jobs, and the community members that they provide security for. These roles, however, do overlap. They include the following.

**Responsibility to the Local Authorities/Communities**

(a) Organizing and carrying out activities aimed at preventing crime and ensuring the safety of the community as regards conflicts that pose threats to life.
(b) Defining how the community can respond to issues that threaten the peace and safety of the community.
(c) Setting the rules and regulations that guide security as well as suggesting other measures that can prevent crime and assisting members in protecting themselves from the threat of crime.
(d) Generating information about security and public safety issues affecting the community (Justice for All Programme n.d., p. 4).

**Responsibility to the Police**

(a) Timely reporting of ongoing suspicious criminal activities.
(b) Improving the synergy existing between communities and the police concerning enforcement of law.
(c) Joining the police in patrolling the communities and supporting efforts aimed at preventing crime.
(d) Contributing in the maintenance of peace in communities.
(e) Providing the police with relevant information that will enhance their understanding of how to effectively police the community.
(f) Assisting the police to carry out any other lawful activities in maintaining law and order (Justice for All Programme n.d., pp. 4–5).

**Responsibility to the Community Members**

(a) Protecting lives and property through the prevention of occurrence of crime and violence.
(b) Contributing to the maintenance of peace in communities.
(c) Encouraging peaceful and harmonious coexistence in communities.
(d) Alerting and educating members of possible criminal threats and behaviours that stimulate crime.
(e) Raising the interest of community members to participate in preventing crime.
(f) Sharing information that enables governments to provide support and improvements that help in addressing community security concerns.
(g) Providing information that will enable the victims of crime to get justice in matters being determined by the police (Justice for All Programme n.d., p. 5).

As a result of these varieties of security-related functions they perform, in most communities, the vigilante groups are preferred to formal security agencies. According to Ogbozor (2016, p. 13), “in most communities, the informal security sector is preferred to the formal agencies. Perceptions of the informal security sector are based on three factors: availability, trust, and effectiveness.” First, the vigilante groups are always available and prompt when their services are needed, unlike the police. Second, residents repose more trust on them than the regular police, especially given the alleged penchant of police officers to collect bribes and subvert the cause of justice. Third, vigilante groups are more effective in dealing with security issues decisively unlike the police that is always slowed down with civil or public service red-tapism or bureaucratic bottlenecks. Ogbozor further noted that a respondent he interviewed told him that members of the regular police force are usually not available when there is a need for them in rural areas. In other words, a centralized police force that is detached from the communities they are policing cannot provide adequate security and protection to the members of the public.

**Relationship with State Security Agencies**

The relationship of vigilante groups with regular or state security agencies, especially the police, varies among the states of the federation. In states where vigilante groups are established by an act of parliament of the state, the relationship tends to be more cordial. For example, the relationship between the police and the youth marshals in Gombe State seems to be smooth principally because the group is recognized by the state government. The Gombe State government attached most of the marshals under the watch of the police. The ward/security marshals are attached to the
police while traffic marshals are attached to the motor traffic division unit of the police (Umar and Bappi 2014). With this strategy, the possibility of having any clash between the group and the police in the course of discharging their functions is very remote. Nevertheless, there are cases where even after being recognized by law, there is still a very frosty relationship between the police and vigilante groups. Chikwendu et al. (2016) have noted that in Anambra State, the vigilante group established by the state did not enjoy a warm relationship with the police force because the police felt that the establishment of the vigilante groups was not backed by law but most importantly that they were usurping the powers legally vested on the police by the constitution. This frosty relationship occurs despite the fact that the vigilante groups were established by an act of the parliament.

In other states where the vigilante groups have no legal backing, frictions normally occur in their relationship with state security forces. This is because their operation and constitution are deemed illegal by the police, and as such, the police see them as part of the criminals they are to hunt down. In such cases, frequent clashes always occur between the two groups. Also, the crude means of crime detection used by these groups and the instant judgement meted out to their victims also pitch them against the police.

Sometimes, there have been instances of where the police and vigilante groups struggled for which group should take the glory regarding the arrest or apprehension of some criminals. Such cases usually surface when the police parades criminals and claim the glory of apprehending them when in fact, such criminals were arrested by the vigilante groups before handing them over to the police for investigation. The vigilante group that did the job, most times, is not even mentioned, appreciated or recognized. There have been several cases of the bravado of the civilian JTF in the fight against Boko Haram in the northeast, where they have arrested members of the dreaded Islamist group but the soldiers entrusted with the duty of annihilating the insurgents would claim the honour. In such a situation, there is bound to be some clashes between the vigilante groups and state security agencies.
Factors Militating Against Effective Operations of Vigilante Groups

Several factors have hindered the smooth operation of vigilante groups in the communities where they operate. Some of these factors include:

1. Funding: Finance is a major constraint to the operations of vigilante groups. Ogbozor (2016), for instance, has noted that the federal government does not fund any vigilante group, so do most state governments. Thus, they are largely funded through communal contributions and these are not enough considering the nature of their service and the materials they need for the job. For these groups to function effectively, they need to be mobile (at least with motorcycles), to make patrolling the communities possible. Even if they do not carry arms, they need communication gadgets to enhance their intelligence gathering function. Most importantly, though it is in most cases a voluntary service, members need to be paid stipends once in a while as a form of encouragement. Only very few communities can provide their vigilante groups with all these incentives without government support.

2. Non-recognition by the federal government: As noted earlier, the federal government has not accorded vigilante groups any form of recognition even though their activities are felt all over the country. The civilian JTF in particular has assisted the security forces tremendously in the fight against Boko Haram in the northeast, yet it has not been accorded any official recognition. This creates a sort of demoralizing effect on the members of these groups. Conversely, recognition will serve as a morale booster.

3. Perception: A major fall-out of the non-recognition of vigilante services by the federal government is their perception by state security agencies and even some members of the public. The police in particular perceive them as illegal institutions and this partly explains the constant clashes they have.

4. Mode of operation: There is no gainsaying the fact that some members of vigilante groups, especially those that carry arms, use their positions to intimidate innocent citizens. This is why Nyiayaana (2015) has argued that the manner in which vigilante groups use weapons determines the extent to which the society accepts or rejects them. Some other scholars have also written on the tendency
of vigilante groups to infringe on the rights of citizens as well as their penchant to take laws into their hands (see Ojebode et al., n.d.). In fact, on the Bakassi Boys, Inyang and Abraham noted that:

Despite the seemingly (sic) success, the pattern of administering justice by the Bakassi Boys was an issue of major concern to various human right groups who quickly called for the abolishment of the group. It was clear that the Bakassi Boys in their attempt to salvage the system from the hands of hoodlums, arrested suspected criminals arbitrarily, with little or no evidence, torture and summarily executed most of them in public. (Inyang and Abraham 2013, p. 56)

**Summary and Conclusion**

This chapter examined the role of vigilante groups in internal security management in Nigeria. It attempted a conceptualization of the term ‘vigilantism’ and discovered that there is yet no consensus among scholars on the meaning of vigilantism. While some scholars believe that vigilantism entails any mob or spontaneous illegal action taken to enforce jungle justice, others believe that they are a group of volunteers that have taken upon themselves the task of securing their communities, especially in the face of state failure to do so. The chapter also traced the origin of vigilante groups in Nigeria. It noted that it dates back to the precolonial times when hunters, age grades, and masquerades were used to enforce law and order as well as safeguard lives and property in their communities. Though some of them were banned by the British colonial administration, the practice of vigilantism has been continuing till the present day with notable ones being the Bakassi Boys, which operated in the southeastern part of the country; the Oodua People’s Congress, which still operates in the southwest; and the Hisba in the north. Several communities in almost all the states of the federation also have theirs.

The chapter also highlighted the roles of vigilante groups in internal security management. Some of this includes intelligence gathering and giving information to the police; prevention of crimes in their communities; dispute settlement; early warning alerts; securing public property; and helping to fight insurgency, especially the Civilian JTF in the northeast. The chapter also discussed the nature of the relationship existing between and among vigilante groups and state security agencies and noted that where the state government recognizes the vigilante group, especially if it
was established by an act of parliament, there seems to be a cordial relationship between the two agencies. But where there is no law backing the operations of vigilante groups, the relationship with state security agencies, especially the police, is mostly hostile and confrontational. The chapter also discussed the factors militating against the smooth operations of vigilante groups. These factors include lack of adequate funding, non-recognition by the federal government, perception by the state security agencies and some members of the public, as well as their mode of operation which has earned them severe criticisms particularly from human rights groups.

In conclusion, therefore, it is the position of this chapter that despite the fact that some members of vigilante groups abuse their positions by using them to intimidate innocent citizens, their services are very vital in internal security management in Nigeria. This is particularly so given the fact that the inability of the Nigerian state and its security agencies to provide adequate security for its citizens, especially in local communities, has created a serious security gap in the society. Therefore, the services of vigilante groups are not only necessary but imperative.

**Recommendations**

As a result of the foregoing analysis, and considering the positive roles vigilante groups have been playing in the internal security of the communities where they operate, there is a need to strengthen their capacity to achieve more. In line with this, this chapter therefore recommends the following.

1. Given that many of these vigilante groups operate outside the scope of existing regulatory frameworks and laws which deal with security in Nigeria, relevant policies should be reviewed, and specific frameworks developed in order to give their operations legal backing. Though some state and local governments have done this, others and the federal government should equally do the same.

2. Since there have been complaints regarding the penchant of these groups to infringe on the rights of citizens, there should be elaborate training for them by experts on security matters in order for their members to imbibe the tenets of civil security. This should be done after they have registered with the relevant ministries and agencies.
3. Though it has been recommended in the literature that these vigilante groups should not carry arms in order to stop or minimize their abuses (see, for instance, Inyang and Abraham 2013), it is obvious that Nigerians fear, respect and obey security agencies with instruments of coercion more than those that do not have them. Therefore, this chapter still recommends that they be allowed to bear arms but as minimal as possible to help them enforce laws and apprehend criminals. However, this should be regulated and monitored by the appropriate authorities to minimize abuse.

4. Funding has been identified as a major impediment to the effective operations of vigilante groups. Though they basically serve the communities where they operate, their funding should not be left only to communities since this does not come regularly. Governments at all levels should, therefore, help in funding these groups since their services complement those of the police and other state security agencies.

5. Finally, as Nwaubani, Anyikwa, and Azuh (2014) have noted, public security is better achieved through properly sensitized individuals. Therefore, governments at all levels should help both the regular state security agencies and the vigilante groups by raising the security consciousness of citizens. This could be done through mass media enlightenment and informal civic literacy programmes.

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Challenges of Internal Security Management in Nigeria
CHAPTER 24

The Nigerian Project and the Quest for Sustainable National Security

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**INTRODUCTION**

The provision of security—the freedom from danger, fear, deprivations and depredations—is key to a state’s existence. States like Nigeria endowed with enormous human and natural resources are expected to be capable of providing security within their territory and acting as bulwarks for sub-regional, regional and international security. Since independence, however, Nigeria has struggled to suppress internal contradictions within its territory in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.

In the last two decades, the manifestation of diverse threats has raised serious concerns over the capacity of the Nigerian state to promote national security. Nigeria has been battling a raft of violent conflicts and crimes—ethno-religious conflicts, herdsman-farmers clashes, militancy, kidnapping, serial bombings, assassination, cross-border banditry, piracy, armed robbery and domestic terrorism, among others. Their scale, intensity and frequency have called to question the ability of the Nigerian state...
to effectively respond to these threats to enhance the safety and wellbeing of individuals, groups, communities and assets within its territory. More importantly, it has accentuated concern over the prospect of realising the Nigerian project.

It is against this backdrop that this chapter addresses four key questions. How is national security interpreted in national guidance documents in Nigeria, and how does it relate to the Nigerian project? What are the major national security threats that hinder the realisation of the Nigerian project? Why is the attainment of sustainable national security proving elusive in Nigeria? What is to be done to improve national security towards realising the Nigerian project? To address these concerns, this chapter relies on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis to elicit and interpret data from documentary evidence of secondary sources.

This chapter consists of six sections. The second section, following this introduction, provides a clarification of the concept of national security as used in this discourse. The third section provides an epistemic interrogation of the idea of the national project in relation to national security. In the fourth section, some of the threats to national security vis-à-vis their impact on the Nigerian project were discussed. The fifth section focuses on how the character of the Nigerian state inhibits the realisation of the Nigerian project. The last section provides some concluding remarks.

### Conceptual Discourse

The concept of national security is central to this chapter, making it pertinent that we clarify its usage in the discourse. The notion of national security has long been conceptualised from a narrow, state-centric perspective, especially during the Cold War era. For Hartmann (1983, p. 13) national security is “the sum total of the vital national interest of the state, and because a vital national interest is one for which a nation is willing to resort to force or war either immediately or ultimately, concepts of national security will vary from state to state in direct proportion to their individual willingness to risk either conflict or war at any given time”. From this perspective, the amassing of arms and weapons that increases a state’s military might was seen as critical to achieving national security. As a result, the nation-state dominated the thinking and framing of discourse on national security.

Although the state-centric or militaristic perspective was dominant during the Cold War era, scholars have long canvassed for its reformulation to focus on people rather than the state. Hence, traditional state-centric
interpretation of national security was criticised by various scholars for failure to explain the emerging non-military sources of threat to security at the individual, societal, state, regional and international levels. In the aftermath of the Cold War, threats such as disease, natural disasters, poverty and terrorism gained tremendous attention and consequently altered the way security is defined. The state-centric conceptualisation of security was gradually being replaced with a more comprehensive definition that captures the multi-dimensional nature of security, taking into consideration political, economic, environmental, cultural, technological and military variables.

In this way, Omotola (2006, p. 3) defines national security as “the freedom from danger or absence of threats to the multidimensional elements that may affect the nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and national interests, as much as promote and boost the well-being of its peoples”. Similarly, Onuoha (2008, p. 105) contends that national security is the “capacity of a state to promote the pursuit and realisation of the fundamental needs and vital interests of man and society, and to protect them from threats which may be economic, social, environmental, political, military or epidemiological in nature”.

Increasingly, security is now conceptualised from the human-centric perspective. The term human security was popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report. The report highlighted two main aspects of human security: safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden disruptions in the pattern of daily life, whether in homes, jobs or communities. Threats to human security were categorised under seven key dimensions of security: community, economic, environmental, food, health, personal and political (United Nations Development Programme – UNDP, 1994).

Thus, the understanding of security from the human security angle represents a fundamental shift from orthodox security thinking which gives priority attention to the protection of state power to one that emphasises the safety and welfare of human beings as the primary referents. This is anchored on the premise that “the security of all persons ought to be a moral goal of all governments and their citizens, not a narrowly conceived or poorly justified national security that protects state power or personal interests of privileged elite” (Nelles 2003, p. 1). This informed Hubert’s (2001, p. 162) contention that the security of the state should not be construed as an end in itself but essentially as a means of ensuring security of the people. Thus, state security and human security should be seen as
mutually reinforcing and supportive. The idea of state security suggests the protection and preservation of the integrity of the territory, assets and values of a state, which are central to people’s entitlement to, and realisation of, their right to self-preservation, self-extension and self-fulfilment.

Understood this way, national security has both qualitative and dynamic elements. The qualitative dimension reflects the unending quest by the state for improvement in the safety and wellbeing of citizens as well as the protection of lives, property and resources within its territory. The dynamic posture suggests that concern over security and wellbeing changes with the emergence of new threats or the transformation of old threats. Such threats may emerge from within or outside a state’s borders (Onuoha 2008). Thus, the national security posture of a country changes as the economic, political, environmental, military, epidemiological and social causes of threats evolve (Okodolor 2004). A state is therefore secure to the extent that its rulers are able to recognise and effectively respond to the diverse threats, leveraging available national resources to promote the safety of life and property of the citizens, and ensure the integrity of its vital assets and values, both within and outside its territory. This is why national security is the first and most important obligation of the government. In this way, the concern that arises is whether this broad understanding of national security is appreciated from a policy-guidance prism in Nigeria.

**National Security and the Nigerian Project: An Epistemic Interrogation**

The question of national security as a desideratum for the realisation of the Nigerian project has assumed greater saliency in contemporary discourses on nation building and national development. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended), stated in section 14, sub-section 2(b), that: “the security and welfare of the people shall be a primary purpose of government” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p. 26). This provision is expected to guide every administration in Nigeria. Consequently, the Grand Strategy for National Security adopted by President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration provides that “Nigeria’s national security is meant to be the aggregate of the security interests of all the entities, individuals, communities, and ethnic groups that inhabit Nigeria” (Obasanjo 2001, p. 2). This is to be achieved by strengthening “the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, to advance her interest and objectives, to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, progress and growth, and improve the welfare and well-being and quality of life of every citizen” (Obasanjo 2001, pp. 2–3). Likewise, the National Defence Policy views national security as “the preservation of the welfare and safety of Nigerians at home and abroad and the protection of the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of its assets” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2006, p. 2).

These overarching documents clearly suggest that the safety and well-being of the people, including protection from violence, crime and other threats, are central to national security. It does suggest that national security in Nigeria focuses on the protection of the interests and values upon which the survival of the Nigerian state and its citizens depends. It covers the security of territory and assets and promotion of the well-being of citizens to guarantee advancement in the quality of life of the people.

The quest to attain a stable environment that advances the quality of life of every Nigerian irrespective of religion, ethnicity, gender and class is critical to the idea of the Nigerian project. Thus, the “Nigerian project” is an idea that has figured in most national discourses since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Yet, it can mean different things to different people. From an epistemic point of view, the Nigerian project is about the vision of making Nigeria a united, stable, strong, prosperous and influential state in the comity of nations, achieved through a robust process of socio-political and economic engineering that attenuates the disruptive, divisive and disintegrative forces engendered by ethnic, religious, communal, tribal, cultural and linguistic diversities. In a sense, therefore, it is the struggle of resolving the nagging crisis of nationhood confronting Nigeria since independence.

The Nigerian project is about the national effort to resolve contradictions and contentions by social forces underpinned by the multi-ethnic nature of the post-colonial Nigerian state in order to forge a peaceful, united and prosperous Nigeria out of the divergent nationalities that were wielded into one political entity by accident of a common colonial experience. As captured in the Concept Note of a book project, the idea of the Nigerian project encapsulates an attempt to:

Initiate a sustainable journey toward the building and consolidation of a nation-state, where the priorities would be the deepening of democracy, sustainable economic growth, promotion of national integration, poverty reduction, and the advancement of security for its citizens. (Bankole and Omotola 2013, p. 1)
The Nigerian project is the perennial demand for a holistic effort at addressing the dysfunction of a divided nation, whose greatness is stalled by centrifugal conflicts and the failure of imagination in organising consensus on the national question (Olukotun 2016). Therefore, the Nigerian project is intricately linked to, and underpinned by, the so-called national question. Concisely, the national question borders on to how to order the relations between the different ethnic, religious, communal, tribal, linguistic and cultural groupings in Nigeria so that they have the rights, privileges and access to power and equitable share of national resources in ways that promote justice, legitimacy, stability and development.

The Nigerian project is thus the inclusive political entity that is expected to emerge once the foundation of the national question is addressed. It has both internal and external dimensions. The internal aspect captures the quest to achieve a secure, stable and prosperous society where Nigerians can live and conduct lawful business in any part of the country without fear of deprivation, intimidation, harm or death inflicted on the basis of the person’s religion, ethnicity, language, tribe, sex, creed or state of origin. The external dimension entails the emergence of a strong, stable and vibrant Nigerian state that could leverage its unique human and natural resource endowments to engage in external relations that promote peace, stability and security at the regional, continental and international arena.

The irreducible minimum of the Nigerian project therefore is the emergence of a secure and stable Nigeria. To this end, Nigeria’s first-ever National Security Strategy (2014, p. 1) captures as its overarching vision the desire to make “Nigeria a violence-free, safe, peaceful, self-reliant, prosperous and strong nation”. However, the desire to have a stable and secure Nigeria has remained elusive due to the emergence, intensification or transformation of several threats to national security.

Some Major National Security Threats and the Prospect of the Nigeria Project

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has been confronted with diverse security challenges differing in intensity, geographic scope and magnitude. Such challenges include, among others, endemic corruption, violent crimes, worsening poverty, high unemployment, infrastructural decay and conflicts. The country’s return to democracy in May 1999, however, rekindled new hopes and expectations among the citizen that the new
political arrangement would provide the framework for the resolution of many challenges that have impinged on national security and indeed the Nigerian project.

After more than a decade of uninterrupted democratic rule, these challenges have remained or even assumed worrisome dimensions, further frustrating efforts at achieving a peaceful, stable and harmonious environment critical to the realisation of the Nigerian project. A brief overview of the trend and manifestation of both physical and structural violence in recent times would reveal the level of decline in peace and stability in the country. Suffice it to say that a few of these recent threats are discussed under the following thematic focus.

**Threat of Violent Conflicts**

Diversities in ethnic, culture, identity and religious values have been major sources of conflicts and violence in Nigeria since independence. The ability to manage conflicts underpinned by such diversity is crucial to the realisation of the Nigerian project. However, the outbreak of violent conflicts in Nigeria has taken diverse forms and nature, and the frequency and intensity of such conflicts have increased in recent times. Nigeria is reported to have recorded “over 300 violent ethno-religious, communal and political conflicts of varying intensity and magnitude” (Osuji 2013, p. 49).

Conflicts that have afflicted Nigeria in recent times are diverse in terms of actors, spread and nature. Beginning from the Maitatsine revolt in the 1980s, Nigeria has been riven by cascading incidents of religious violence, including but not limited to those over the introduction of Sharia law in most northern states beginning in 2000. Others include the infamous “Miss World” riot in November 2002 and the February 2006 violence over the uncharitable representation of Prophet Mohammed in the Danish cartoon of *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper. Between 1999 and 2003, for instance, over 10,000 people were reportedly killed in religious violence in Nigeria (Isaac 2003). The level of deep animosity between different groups generated by religious crisis in the country has hindered the attainment of the Nigerian project. If anything, the outbreak of religious crisis has been a major eraser of social capital and harmony between adherents of the two dominant religions in Nigeria.

Besides religious conflicts, the outbreak of communal conflicts further strains the viability of the Nigerian project. Such conflicts have often resulted from dispute over land, water formations, traditional stool and
location of amenities, among others. In Taraba State, for instance, about 93 persons lost their lives in various communal clashes in 2013 (Akpeji and Ibrahim 2014). In January 2012, over 50 people were killed as a result of violent communal conflicts between Ezillo and Ezza, in Ebonyi State, over a land dispute. Communal conflicts over land and natural resources are common in Nigeria because the majority of rural residents are subsistence farmers living in communities with very weak traditional institutions for arbitrating disputes.

Furthermore, the frequency, intensity and geographic scope of violent confrontations between herdsmen and farmers or herdsmen and their host communities add to the problem of insecurity. There have been 389 clashes involving herdsmen and farming communities between 1997 and 2015 in Nigeria, with an estimated loss of about US$14 billion annually to these clashes (Amaza 2016). This form of conflict had been recurring in northern Nigeria but has over time spread to southern communities. Underpinning the escalation in frequency of herdsmen-farmer conflict in Nigeria is the confluence of demographic and environmental forces. A geometric increase in Nigeria’s population over the years has meant that farmers increasingly seek for more farmlands to engage in farming activities in order to generate more income. The quest for farmlands by local farmers creates situations propitious to conflicts, as many cattle routes which were established and demarcated many decades ago by the federal government for the usage of herdsmen are increasingly being encroached upon by farmers who plant crops on cattle routes (Aminu 2012).

The situation is further compounded by environmental factors such as urbanisation, climate change and desertification which have resulted in a significant reduction in the space available for agriculture. The effects of climate change are evidenced by the diminution of water formations (lakes), loss of arable land and drying up of grazing lands. For example, the drying up of Lake Chad and increasing desertification in northern Nigeria have made the seasonal movement of the Fulani cattle herdsmen to the southern part of the country relatively more frequent. Before, these pastoralists migrate to the southern part during the dry season and move back to the north during the rainy season. Because of the deteriorating situation in northern Nigeria, many of them are now settling down in some communities in the South such as, for example, Ubakala, Uzo-Uwani, Umuahia, Ogbomoso, Ilorin, Shaki and Oyo.

Underlying the escalation in intensity is the small arms and light weapons (SALWs) proliferation in Nigeria. These long-distance migrants in the
past carried crude weapons such as daggers for personal protection and to assure their grazing, but they have increasingly turned to the use of more sophisticated weapons such as AK 47 for protection. Given that host communities also have access to weapons, minor disagreements often degenerate into violent deadly clashes. While the Fulani herdsmen complain that their cattle are often harmed or stolen or are denied grazing rights by hostile communities, many host communities allege that grazing cattle not only devour their plants and harvested produce, they also defecate in their streams, thereby polluting their source of drinking water. This development underpins the rising incident of violent clashes between herdsmen and their host communities, with the potential to assume an ethno-religious nature at times or trigger reprisal attacks.

Sometimes, such conflicts are further exacerbated by the “indigene-settler” phenomenon. The issue of indigene-settler dichotomy is a longstanding challenge, often generating violent conflicts in different parts of Nigeria. Contest over access and exclusion to critical resources and the entitlement that being an indigene confers in this binary have often led to such conflicts (Adibe 2013). The indigene-settler problem is common across Nigeria, but it is particularly acute in some areas because of the confluence of this dichotomy with other identity markers such as ethnicity and religion. Nowhere has this manifested more violently than in Jos, Plateau State. Frequent outbreaks of conflicts along this line have compounded the problem of disunity in Nigeria, thereby retarding the prospects of the Nigerian project.

**Threat of Militancy and Secessionist Agitations**

The activities of ethnic militias constitute another threat to national security that significantly inhibits the realisation of the Nigerian project. With the return to democracy, Nigeria contended with the problem of upsurge in ethnic militias, which included groups such as the Arewa People’s Congress (APC), the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Egbesu Boys. Sometimes, violent confrontation is between these groups and people of other ethnic identities. At other times, it is mostly between the militia groups and the state forces. These militias whose goals are to protect the identities and interests of their ethnic groups in the Nigerian federation have unleashed varying degrees of violence against persons and state structures.
Of particular concern is the resurgence of militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta and separatist or secessionist agitations in the South-East. Since January 2016, several new militant groups have emerged in the region. These include the Adaka Boro Avengers (ABA), Asawana Deadly Force of Niger Delta, (ADFND), Concerned Militant Leaders (CML), Ekpeye Liberation Group (ELG), Joint Niger Delta Liberation Front (JNDLF), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Niger Delta Red Squad (NDRS), Red Egbesu Water Lions (REWL), Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate (NDJM) and Ultimate Warriors of Niger Delta (UWND).

These groups have been attacking oil facilities in the region and threatening to cripple the oil industry unless the federal government meets their demands. Renewed attacks on critical oil facilities caused a major reduction in Nigeria’s oil production volume, from 2.2 million bpd to about 1.1 million bpd in May 2016 (Alohan 2016). President Buhari’s administration initially adopted an aggressive military crackdown on the militants, which failed to stem the tide of explosive attacks on oil and gas facilities. In June 2016, his administration began engaging the militants in talks to halt the spate of attacks on crude oil infrastructure in the region. His combination of the carrot and stick approach failed to resolve the problem.

Similarly, the South-East zone has witnessed the resurgence of secessionist and secessionist agitations spearheaded by groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), later renamed as the Biafran Zionist Front (BZF), and MASSOB. These groups have been canvassing for the emergence of an independent state of Biafra. The agitation in the South-East is expected to persist, given the widespread support it has gained from many disenchanted youths from the region. The agitation is a product of long-standing and recent political and economic grievances. The region, like many other parts of Nigeria, is bedevilled by insecurity and youth unemployment. This situation is compounded by official neglect in responding to collapsing infrastructure such as roads as well as worsening environmental challenges like soil erosion.

**Political and Electoral Violence**

Added to this is the problem of politically motivated violence, especially over elections. From “the first federal election of 1964 to the 2015 general elections, the conduct of elections in Nigeria have been characterised by brigandage and violence” (Luqman 2008, p. 96). The 2011 general elections was a deadly expression of the known ugly trend and political
culture in Nigeria. Before the 2011 general elections, violence was recorded in most of the states but the post-presidential election violence was the climax of the violence during the 2011 general elections. Violent protests broke out in northern states, the day after the presidential election, with supporters of General Mohammadu Buhari accusing the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of rigging the election in favour of President Goodluck Jonathan.

The post-election violence claimed the lives of over 1000 people, including an unspecified number of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members, who the electoral body—Independent Electoral Commission (INEC)—had recruited as ad hoc staff to help in the conduct of the elections. About 75 civilians were injured, and 165 churches and 53 mosques, 444 vehicles and 1442 houses were either burnt or destroyed. In addition, 45 police properties, 16 government properties and 987 shops were burnt in Adamawa, Bauchi, Nasarawa, Niger, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Zamfara States (Awowole-Browne 2011). About 74,000 people were displaced. Perpetrators of electoral violence in Nigeria are mostly youths who are very susceptible to manipulation by overzealous politicians. In most of the states, the post-election violence took an ethno-religious nature. The 2011 election crisis brought to the fore the damage the violent struggle for political power could do to the Nigerian project, as evidenced by the deep animosity it generated along ethno-religious lines.

*Threat of Organised Crimes*

The emergence of new forms of organised crimes and the escalation in frequency and spread of old forms add another dimension to the issue of deterioration of national security in Nigeria. Organised crimes such as illegal oil bunkering, sea banditry (piracy and sea robbery), kidnapping and human (including baby) trafficking, among others, have all assumed frightening dimensions.

Reliable data on the quantity or true financial value of oil lost to theft in Nigeria are difficult to ascertain. As a result, estimates by government or oil company officials often vary. On 16 June 2013, the then Minister of Finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, “estimated that 400,000 barrels of crude oil are being lost daily to oil theft, vandalism of infrastructure and halt in production” (Ameh 2013, p. 29). How the proceeds from oil theft are laundered and where they are invested should be a subject of serious concern for all patriotic Nigerians, because of the obvious implications of
such illicit wealth for security, stability and genuine democratic development in the country. More importantly, it robs the nation of the sorely needed revenue to build and sustain a prosperous Nigeria. The inability of the government to aggressively combat the theft has raised questions over the complicity of state and transnational actors.

Oil theft is not the only security threat in Nigeria’s maritime domain; piracy and sea robbery constitute critical national security challenges. A recent study has shown that Nigeria recorded a total of 367 pirate attacks between 2000 and 2015, with the highest incident reported in 2007 (Onuoha and Olufolahan, forthcoming). It is widely believed that over 70 per cent of all piracy-related incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are directly related to attacks mostly originating from the Niger Delta region. Nigerian pirate gangs had successfully ventured as far as into the waters off Gabon, Ivory Coast and Togo, leading to the debasing conclusion that the piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea is “overwhelmingly, a Nigerian problem” (Doyle 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-22956865). This is fascinating in two main senses. First, Nigeria records a majority of the incidents, and second, Nigerian pirates account for much of the attacks in the entire region. The impact on the Nigerian project is not difficult to fathom. It has created a situation where Nigeria is increasingly being viewed as the vector of insecurity in the region.

Related to the problem of sea banditry is the menace of kidnapping for ransom in Nigeria. Kidnapping is a long-standing problem but is now one of the fastest-growing criminal activities offshore and onshore in Nigeria. Kidnapping for ransom refers to “an unlawful act of seizing and transporting a person or persons to an undisclosed place against the victim’s wish and threatened with harm in order that money or object of value can be extorted from either the victim or those associated with the victim—for example, friends, relatives, employers or government—in exchange for the safe release of the victim” (Onuoha 2011a, p. 158).

Although the growth of kidnapping for ransom has been traced to the upsurge in militancy in the Niger Delta beginning from 2006, it has spread to virtually all parts of the country. By 2012, Nigeria accounted for one-quarter of kidnap for ransom cases reported worldwide that year (Popoola 2013). Kidnapping serves not only as a means of personal enrichment for members of criminal gangs but also as a veritable strategy of terrorism financing. For instance, the Jama’atu Ahlisunnah lidda’awati wal Jihad (aka Boko Haram) kidnapped seven members of a French community in Cameroon on 19 February 2013 and later freed them on 18 April 2013.
after allegedly collecting US$3.15 million as ransom (Cocks 2013). One of such high-profile incidents in the Boko Haram insurgency was the 14 April 2014 kidnapping of more than 250 schoolgirls from Chibok. Many girls have managed to escape or been freed since then, but more than 100 are still missing. More than 20 of the kidnapped Chibok girls were released in October 2016 in a deal brokered by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and in May 2017, the Nigerian government again exchanged 82 of the girls for an undisclosed number of high-profile Boko Haram commanders (Onuah and Kingimi 2017).

**Threat of Terrorism**

The threat of domestic terrorism evident in the activities of groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) constitutes the greatest national security challenge afflicting Nigeria. Since July 2009, when Boko Haram waged an anti-government uprising in northern Nigeria, the insurgency claimed more than 20,000 lives, displaced more than 2.6 million people and created over 75,000 orphans. Violent attacks by the group have also caused about US$9 billion worth of damage since 2009 (Onuoha 2016). Its tactics include use of improvised explosive devices, targeted assassinations, ambush, drive-by shootings, arson, night raids and suicide bombings.

In 2014, Boko Haram expanded its regional reach, following the conduct of increasing cross-border attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Later that year, it started seizing towns and communities in Nigeria’s northeast and declared a caliphate in August 2014. Given its growing murderous attacks, the group was ranked as the world’s deadliest terrorist organisation in 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). In March 2015, its leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh. The ISIS leader endorsed the alliance calling Boko Haram “our jihadi brothers” (ADF Staff 2015). Boko Haram thus emerged with the new name Wilāyat al-Islāmiyya Gharb Afriqiyyah or the ISWAP. A crack in the leadership of ISWAP emerged in August 2016, when the ISIS named Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new wali or leader of ISWAP.

As with Boko Haram, the emergence of the Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) further complicates the terrorism landscape in Nigeria. Since its emergence in June 2013, the Ansaru has claimed responsibility for various high-profile attacks such as the November
2012 raid on a detention facility in Abuja; the December 2012 abduction of Francis Colump, a Frenchman working for Vergnet in Katsina State; the January 2013 attack on a convoy of Nigeria soldiers at Kogi State; and the February 2013 kidnapping of seven foreign expatriates in Bauchi State.

Various kinetic and non-kinetic measures by the Nigerian government have failed to defeat the scourge of terrorism. The fact that there are Nigerians who are able and willing to be recruited and radicalised into taking their own lives as suicide bombers alongside that of others has raised concerns on the future of the Nigerian project. The emergence and audacity of terrorist groups in Nigeria are clear indicators of how dangerously the Nigerian project has retrogressed.

**Outbreak of Transnational Arms Trafficking Flows**

The intensity of these diverse forms of physical violence has been compounded by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). SALWs proliferation has become both a contributing factor and a consequence of violent conflicts and criminality in the country. Nigeria is alleged to host over 350 million SALWs, which translate to about 70 per cent of an estimated 500 million weapons circulating in West Africa (Premium Times 2016). The high rate of SALWs proliferation in Nigeria is evident in the constant seizure of various caches of arms by security agents, the frequency of their use in violent conflicts and crimes and the level of human casualty and material devastation recorded in the aftermath of their use (Onuoha 2011b).

Weapons in circulation in Nigeria have been traced to local fabrication; thefts from government armouries; organised cross-border smuggling by criminal networks, ethnic militias and insurgents; illicit importation by dishonest government-accredited importers; and some multi-national oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta. SALWs proliferation in Nigeria is further exacerbated by Nigeria’s porous land, sea and air borders. It was reported that there exist over 1499 irregular (illegal) and 84 regular (legal) entry routes into Nigeria (Ojeme and Odiniya 2013). Criminal groups take advantage of these largely porous land and sea borders to smuggle SALWs into Nigeria. Cross-border trafficking has therefore increased in the wake of the Arab uprising or *Arabellion*. With the outbreak of the Libyan revolt, traffickers, mercenaries and terrorist groups acquired heavy weapons and transported them back to the Sahel region. Libyan arms first obtained by Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been transferred
to non-state armed groups such as Boko Haram, which they have used to carry out audacious and devastating attacks. This has severely hampered the emergence of a safe, stable and prosperous society, and by extension stifled the Nigerian project.

**Threat of Structural Disempowerment**

The fact that Nigerians are now able and willing tools to be used to kill fellow Nigerians and undermine the Nigerian project is certainly not unconnected to the persistence of structural disempowerment in Nigeria. This manifests clearly in the increasing rate of poverty amidst enormous wealth, massive unemployment despite economic growth and widespread official malfeasances amidst a plethora of anti-corruption agencies. Such structural disempowerment basically underpinned by corruption accounts for afflictions in the face of affluence in Nigeria. The twin problems of unemployment and poverty are chiefly responsible for the disempowerment of most Nigerians, especially the youth. Nigeria’s unemployment rate in 2006 averaged 14.60 per cent until 2011, when it increased to an all-time high of 23.90 per cent in December 2011. In spite of favourable economic growth and performance recorded in Nigeria between 2003 and 2010, poverty rate in Nigeria jumped from 54.7 per cent in 2004 to 60.9 per cent in 2010 (Cited in Ojo 2013; Vanguard 2013). As a result, Nigeria witnessed what many described as “jobless” or “paper” growth.

The worst hit by these afflictions is the youth. In Nigeria, about 65 per cent of the population is under 25 years. As of 2013, youth unemployment was around 37 per cent. These high rates of unemployment and poverty often create a feeling of hopelessness and desperation, thereby making such persons very susceptible to manipulation by ambitious politicians, extremist ideologues and crime barons. They are mostly the ones available to be used for perpetrating ethnic, communal, religious, electoral and political violence. Their inability to secure employment or job opportunities for a decent living is not so much about their non-possession of the skills needed to obtain a job (although some lack the requisite skills), but more as a result of dwindling opportunities for jobs occasioned by mismanagement of national wealth. According to the former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, “Nigerian leaders have stolen about $500 billion (₦85 trillion) within the past forty years” (Cited in Sheyin 2007, p. 22). Rampant corruption and misappropriation of public funds in Nigeria have resulted in the collapse of industries, abandonment of critical projects and unjustifiable expenditure on frivolous engagements.
Although Nigeria has earned huge amount of money from the sale of crude oil, it has suffered one of the worst levels of inequality in the world. About 80 per cent of Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues is known to accrue to just 1 per cent of the country’s population, leaving the other 99 per cent of the population to survive on the remaining 20 per cent (Akwuole 2006, p. 15). The consequence has been the paradox of concentration of wealth among the very few privileged elite and concentration of poverty on the rest of the population. For instance, the Gini coefficient index, which is a measure of inequality in income distribution among individuals, reveals that the level of inequality has worsened over the last decade in Nigeria. The “coefficient increased from 42.9 in 2004 to 48.8 in 2010—where 100 implies perfect inequality” (Okonjo-Iweala 2013, p. 123). Growing inequality has created a vicious circle in Nigeria, where wealth and power are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a very few privileged elite and their children, leaving a great majority of the population to struggle for survival.

Consequently, the pervasiveness of disempowerment has created (psychological) ungoverned spaces in the hearts and minds of disillusioned or marginalised citizens. The lives of such citizens are characterised by poverty, destitution and deprivation, leading them to harbour deep hatred against the Nigerian state. The inability of the Nigerian state to provide for these people means that many of them have been either recruited into criminal groups or manipulated into engaging in extremist violence.

As with the outbreak of violent conflicts and crime that has killed many people and displaced several thousands, the prevalence of structural disempowerment resulting from pervasive poverty, unemployment and corruption has made Nigeria increasingly insecure than ever before. Huge disparity or inequality both in terms of income and in terms of access to opportunities engenders structural disempowerment that contributes to social tensions and violence in contemporary Nigerian society. The pertinent question then is why has the Nigerian state failed to address or mitigate these diverse and evolving security challenges that have hindered the Nigerian project.

THE NIGERIAN STATE AND GROWING INSECURITY

Nigeria was the creation of the (British) colonial state. Through its coercive apparatus, the colonial state defined Nigeria territorially and forcefully integrated the various political forms and pre-capitalist modes at different
stages of development into the global capitalist system (Obi 2003). In this way, “the Nigerian colonial state served the interests of global accumulation at the periphery through the local extraction and transfer of resources to the metropolis” (Obi 2003, p. 263).

In the post-independence era the emergent ruling class was interested neither in the restructuring of the Nigerian state nor in addressing the issue of the national question. Instead, it was “more interested in reproducing the neo-colonial character of the state and the conditions for their domination, and continued the use of state power for primitive capital accumulation” (Ifesinachi 2006, p. 2). Since then the continued existence of the nation as a sovereign entity has proved to be a precarious balance between the dominant elements of the social structure, namely, institutions, ethnicity, religion and class. This condition has consistently had unmitigated consequences for the promotion of security and pursuit of the general wellbeing of the people of Nigeria following the lack of adequate capacity and political will by the inheritors of state powers after independence to restructure the colonial state that was alien, illegitimate and hostile to the people (Egharevba 2011).

Since the post-colonial period, the nature of social relationships among the people of Nigeria has been characterised by conflict arising from contradictions in the process of social production and reward systems, where the various multi-ethnic groups have expressed their hue and cry about being marginalised in the pattern of resource or wealth distribution. This has underpinned stringent separatist agitations, resource control or ownership and the incessant demand for equitable share of the nation’s resources by various ethnic groups (Egharevba 2011).

As a result of this colonial experience, the privatisation of the state for primitive accumulation became a defining character of the Nigerian state. Those with access to the Nigerian state have leveraged it to promote and preserve their physical security and material wellbeing, while some others denied of access to the state have resorted to various illicit acts to pursue physical security and material wellbeing. As a result, the nature of the Nigerian state has equally created structural disempowerment that feeds into the cycle and outbreak of violent conflicts and criminality in the society.

Politics in particular became a means of accumulating wealth, and because the state is the object of political competition and medium for the allocation of resources, it has been effectively used to achieve the goal of primitive accumulation (Ake 2001). This has led to the privatisation of the Nigerian state by powerful individuals at all levels of governance (federal,
state and local). The consequence is that the state is used for the pursuit and realisation of individual, sectional and ethno-regional interests rather than for the pursuit and promotion of common interests or the public good (Oyovbaire 1980). Thus, instead of the Nigerian state appearing as the centre for the promotion, representation and repository of the general interests and welfare of the people, the state has become “privatised” to advance prebendal and rent-seeking interests of a vested few elite, thereby turning the state into a predatory or factional state that serves regional, ethnic, class and other interests rather than being a developmental state (Egharevba 2011).

Consequently, the Nigerian state never enjoyed legitimacy or trust from the various indigenous groups and nationalities. As a result, the Nigerian state suffers from capacity deficits in terms of setting generative frameworks for effective resolution of social contradictions. The “effect is that its policies are enforced with difficulties where they are enacted at all, with deep-rooted legitimacy crisis to the bargain” (see Osaghae 1989, p. 33). Its institutions such as the security agencies became more of the protectors of the ruling class and their interests rather than guarantors of security of citizens and their welfare.

The consequence of these is that individual and social groups have lost confidence on most of the institutions, agencies and policies of the state, preferring to address differences and challenges through “self-help” approaches. Herein lies the basis of frequent eruption of violent conflicts in Nigeria. More so, the failure of the state to promote general wellbeing has underpinned some citizens’ pursuit of their individual wellbeing through criminal activities. As Ibrahim (1999, p. 94) has rightly noted:

> The legitimacy of the modern state is linked to its capacity to present itself as a provider of public goods and, more important, a neutral arbiter that guarantees the security of all sections of the society. When the state is generally perceived as serving the particularistic interest of one group, it starts losing its legitimacy and indeed, its authority. As state capacity declines, fear of the other rises and people resort to other levels of solidarity—religious, ethnic and regional—in search of security.

Insecurity in the form of ethno-religious crises, farmer-herder conflict, indigene-settler crisis, youth restiveness, communal clashes and kidnaping, among others, derives from the failure of the Nigerian state and the associated legitimacy crisis. More importantly is that the inability of the Nigerian
state and its agencies to guarantee the safety of lives and property renders the credibility of the state questionable, thus “encouraging the flourishing of centres of competing loyalty in the polity which exacerbates fissiparous tendencies and retards the march toward nationhood” (Tyoden 2005, p. 184).

Consequently, it is this legitimacy deficit or crisis that has created instability and insecurity in the nation’s political economy despite the enormous natural and mineral resources in the land. This subsequently engenders a sense of division amongst the Nigerian people that continually threatens the viability of the Nigerian project (Odukoya 2006). In a sense, therefore, the character of the Nigerian state itself undermines not only the quest for national security but also the very basis of the Nigerian project.

**Conclusion and Policy Option**

The ability of a state to promote and preserve national security is a true test of its legitimacy and strength. Measured on this scale, the Nigerian state is overwhelmingly a very poor performer. The outbreak, persistence and indeed increasing eruption of threats to national security continue to undermine the whole idea and ideal of the Nigerian project. Several factors contribute to this unhealthy situation but at the heart of the problem is the failure of the Nigerian state. For the ideals of the Nigerian project to be realised, there is the need to overhaul the basis of the Nigerian state through a process of inclusive national dialogue that will restructure its character and posture. To this end, the restructuring of the nation in line with the recommendation of the 2014 National Conference offers a starting point. However, a more durable solution will emerge from the convening of a sovereign national conference (SNC). The convocation of an SNC is a categorical imperative that Nigeria cannot afford to continue procrastinating. Such will offer the people the opportunity to extensively debate and resolve nagging issues that border on the national question. It is through this means that a responsive Nigerian state could be recreated, capable of providing sustainable peace and security for the people. Failure to do this will only ensure a future where the Nigerian project will continue to falter and fail, and the attainment of sustainable national security very elusive.
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CHAPTER 25

Nigeria’s Changing Security Matrix and Management of Insecurity

Agaptus Nwozor

INTRODUCTION

One of the most pressing challenges currently facing Nigeria is insecurity. In recent times, the configuration of insecurity has expanded from such traditional sources as armed robbery attacks, the indigene-settler crisis, inter- and intra-ethnic violence, kidnapping, political violence and ethno-nationalist agitations for self-rule or independence to include vicious terrorist attacks and pastoralist violence against farmers and their communities. The security challenges in Nigeria appear to be rooted in two interrelated factors: the high payoff of violence in the face of weak national security system and unresolved national questions, especially the aspects thereof that sustain the disconnect between the expectations of the citizens and government’s incapacity to bring them to realisation (Fayemi 2012; Channels Television 2013).

Nigeria has not been able to evolve a holistic strategy to tackle insecurity. Mainly, its strategy is always reactive and consists of deploying a correspondingly superior force to contain security threats, without paying
attention to early warning signals. The ineffectiveness of this strategy has spawned the ground for the efflorescence of insecurity and its spread across the length and breadth of Nigeria, the expansion in the budgetary allocation to the security sector and the breeding of corruption through the auspices of security vote. In 2012, out of the ₦4.75 trillion budgeted by the federal government for the fiscal year, the security sector gulped ₦921.91 or 19.4% (Leadership 2011), prompting Horsfall (2013) to describe it as the largest amount to be deployed to the security sector by any government in Nigerian history.

With the use of secondary data evaluated in the tradition of the content analysis technique, this chapter examines Nigeria’s security architecture and links the seeming longitudinal ubiquity of insecurity to structural contradictions and superior economic payoffs arising from the institutional incapacity of its security apparatuses. This chapter draws from the gamut of previously published works, especially government gazettes, interview reports of key government officials and security personnel, journals, books and other relevant internet-based documents, in evaluating the Nigerian security environment within the context of competing pressures on national security. It contends that the realist preoccupation of Nigeria’s security governance that tends to reify counter-aggression is patently ineffective in unknotting and resolving the security impasse. It emphasises the imperative of reorganising extant strategies by deemphasising counter-aggression and moving towards addressing the national question and reducing the army of unemployed that are veritable tools in deepening insecurity in the polity.

NIGERIA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTO-THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Since its emergence as a state, Nigeria has contended with a myriad of security challenges with diverse sources. It is important not to confuse the sources of insecurity in Nigeria, that is, the causative factors of insecurity, with the manifestations or indicators of insecurity. Thus, the various threats to national security which manifested at different points in the evolution of the Nigerian state were indicators of insecurity. And these indicators of insecurity owed their causation to a combination of factors.

A pertinent task at this juncture will be to delineate the boundaries of security in order to properly situate it within the national environment. The
The relevance of this task is to shear off the “intellectual uncertainty, analytical confusion, paradigmatic disorder and theoretical impotence” that characterise security, especially national security (Nnoli 2006, p. 5). Thus, the proper contextualisation of security will achieve three goals, namely eliminate fragmented reality and judgemental relativism which will contest existing notions of security and improve the policy and practice of security; provide some sort of guidance to the policies made by the government as well as guide public opinion about policies related to security; and underscore the bases for expenditure on security and spawn a rethink that could influence the distribution of money and power (Nnoli 2006; Rothschild 1995).

An attempt to define security is often characterised with certain complexities. The first definitional complexity of the concept of security lies in its applicability to diverse spectra of fields, each with varied nuances that tend to diverge rather than converge to yield a unified meaning. The second aspect of this complexity is the seemingly elastic applicability of security within the ambit of threats to human existence which, in recent times, are posed by such factors as state fragility and failure, environmental pollution resulting in climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ecological disasters, deepening global disparities exemplified by food crisis and poverty, and population explosion (Nnoli 2006; Rice 2003; UNDP 1994). However, Nnoli (2006, p. 16) has pointed out that while security connotes “freedom from threats, anxiety or danger”, it has objective and subjective components. The difference between the objective and subjective components of security is that while the former is anchored on the measurability of the indicators of security, the latter denotes the perception of individuals based on their values and expectations of the absence of threat, anxiety or danger (Nnoli 2006).

The third characteristic of the complexity of security is its broadness. Within the scope of this broadness, Spear and Harborne (2010) have identified security as encompassing physical and national security. While physical security encapsulates the protection of the individual from violence and abuse, national security is concerned with the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the state and the people. The preoccupation of the state with its own safety, over and above its other components, especially the people, underpinned the massive development and acquisition of nuclear capability with the unwitting evolvement of arms race and its potential threat to the entire international system. The state-centric, militaristic and strategic conceptualisation of security holds that the survival of the state is inexorably linked to the survival of the
people. In other words, the security of the people could only be guaranteed if the state itself is safe. And here, the security of the state is synonymous with the security of the elite within the state as well as the regime in power (Nnoli 2006; Onuoha and Ezirim 2010).

A rethinking of security was advanced by the United Nations Development Programme in its Human Development Report of 1994. As the Report acknowledges:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. The superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle—fighting a cold war all over the world. The developing nations, having won their independence only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile national identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. (UNDP 1994, p. 22)

The import of the Report was the imperativeness of a paradigmatic shift in the recognition of the citizens as part of the major preoccupations of security. Thus, instead of national security being preoccupied with the safety of the state and its institutions, its purview expanded to include human security. The whole essence of human security rests on a tripod: one, the improvement of the existential conditions of the people by guaranteeing them safety and providing them with opportunities for meaningful and value-added existence; two, freedom to exercise choices; and lastly, an inbuilt confidence about continuity in the availability of opportunities (UNDP 1994; Onuoha and Ezirim 2010).

The nature of Nigeria’s security framework depicts inflexibility with the old order. While Nigeria has democratised, its security apparatus is still fixated in the state-centric, militaristic mode. It has not imbibed or, more appropriately, incorporated the human security aspect into its security architecture. UNDP (1994, pp. 23–24) delineates three tripods of human security, namely “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression”, sustainable human development and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life”.

Nigeria’s security challenges are diverse and varied. As has already been noted, a distinction between manifestation of insecurity and causal factors must be made. Thus, such vices as armed robberies, kidnapping, terrorist
and herders’ attacks, political violence and other such sundry aspects are manifestations of insecurity, the causes of which are outside these acts of insecurity. We now turn our attention to these sources of insecurity in Nigeria.

At the inception of Nigerian statehood, the first set of security challenges consisted of safeguarding its independence and preventing its reversal into what Nkrumah called neo-colonialism (Nkrumah 1968). But the preoccupation of the emergent political elite for power to satisfy personal and group interests undermined any concerted efforts to contain neo-colonial pressures.

The second source of security challenge was the structural injustice that Nigeria’s skewed federalism represents. The fear of marginalisation which started during the colonial era and which led to the setting up of the Willink Commission on September 25, 1957, is still unresolved as many ethnic groups, including the major ones, allege marginalisation. A significant proportion of contemporary insecurity is rooted in ethnic disconnect with the Nigerian dream.

The third source is ethnicity and problem of indigeneity. Historically, ethnicity as a social construct has been routinely deployed by politicians to achieve political ascendancy. Babawale (2007) has argued that ethnicity as a social construct is not intrinsically negative. Its negativity inheres from its manipulation and attendant negative outcomes which spawn divisiveness and tension in the polity. The nature of Nigerian amalgamation, the tendency of early Nigerian nationalists to see Nigeria as a “geographical expression”, or “the mistake of 1914”, and the dominance of the political space by three ethnic groups created disenchantment in the country, thus giving rise to allegations of marginalisation (Coleman 1986; Obianyo 2003).

Indeed, the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election deepened ethnic disenchantment as it was interpreted as a demonstration of political intolerance driven by ethnic considerations (Adams 2007). This act singularly spawned insecurity as calls for a sovereign national conference to renegotiate Nigeria’s statehood became a mantra amidst all manners of self-help strategies. Adjunct to ethnicity is the citizenship crisis which is driven by discrimination and exclusion of citizens from state patronage based on the dichotomisation of citizens into natives and settlers (Egwu 2005). This aboriginal argument has serious implications on access, or lack of it, to vital state resources and has remained a perennial source of insecurity in Nigeria. The effect of this dichotomisation and compartmentalisation is that:
... millions of Nigerians who find themselves in “effective” residency in places other than where they can claim “indigeneity” or where they can be accepted as “indigenes” are labelled as “strangers and settlers”, and, therefore, excluded from access to citizenship which is the domain of social and political rights enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. (Egwu 2005, p. 102)

The fourth is the boundless ambition of politicians to remain in power even outside the precinct of popular mandate. The significance of political power in the accumulation process not only ensures the ubiquity of tension but also makes political competition vicious. Tension emanates from intra- and inter-elite rivalry resulting in the dichotomy of the polity into the out-group and in-group and attendant mutuality in the deployment of hostilities. With the personalisation of the state and appropriation of its power by successive regimes, their political survival was projected as, and elevated to, national interest. As Nnoli (2006) points out, the confusion of personal interest with national interest underpinned the arbitrariness in governance and the determination of leaders to survive at all costs regardless of the feelings of the people or their preferences.

Other sources of threats to national security include the Islamist challenge and sundry religious violence (Onuoha 2010; Lyman and Morrison 2004). Violence emanating from religion has been a fixed causality of insecurity in Nigeria; economic crises, ranging from structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to recession, have had the effect of eroding people’s means of livelihood and deepening their pauperisation (Nwozor 2006); the political struggle among the elites resulting in the arming of youths for political ascendancy; the contemporary fashionability and romanticisation of violence as exemplified by the emergence of cultist and other rogue groups, often along ethnic lines (Agbaje 2007).

The theoretical basis of security governance in Nigeria is essentially the deployment of a superior force as a countermeasure to insecurity. This strategy has been described as force theory (Nwozor 2013). The Nigerian state responds to uprisings or situations it considers threatening by deploying paramilitary and military expeditions to contain them and setting up joint task forces, which are patently ad hoc in nature. The force theory exposes the underbelly of the disconnect between the state and the civil society.
The multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious nature of Nigeria motorises the centrifugal forces that give impetus to insecurity in its polity. Despite constitutional efforts at integration, through the federalist principle, Nigeria is not yet united. Within the framework of afrocentric scholarship, there is the reductionist tradition of ascribing the malformation of Nigerian statehood to the nature of its emergence as a state, thus exonerating the mindless brigandage of its elite (Alozieuwa 2012). The contemporary security challenges are squarely a product of the failure of leadership. The observation of Achebe (1983) to the effect that there is no problem with the Nigerian entity apart from the question of competent leadership is still relevant and captures the reality about the Nigerian state and its security challenges.

Notwithstanding the seeming arbitrariness surrounding the emergence of Nigerian statehood, the passage of time ought to have transformed it into a united state, but so far, that does not seem to be the case. Thus, the argument linking the artificiality of the Nigerian state to its myriad of crises, especially insecurity, is banally unsustainable and analytically unhelpful. Apart from the rhetoric of unity bandied by the political elite, Nigeria appears to be more divided than united. There are fundamental questions, often framed as the “national question”, which must be accorded corresponding national answers to fast-track national integration. The concept of the national question is ubiquitous in most multi-cultural settings and is pre-eminently concerned with “the problems of evolving a just arrangement for the peaceful coexistence and integrated development of peoples of different, even if otherwise hostile nationalities within the same polity” (Igwe 2002, p. 284).

Within the context of Nigeria, its national question encompasses the persistent neglect by the state to resolve such feelings as exclusion, marginalisation, an unjust revenue-sharing formula and the general perception of injustice among the various ethnic groups. It also includes questions relating to national integration and citizenship rights as well as justice associated with the distribution of national wealth (Fayemi 2012). The security challenges plaguing Nigeria are located in the unsatisfactory resolution of the subcategories of the national question. For instance, the continued currency of ethnicity as a rallying mantra among the elite is because the federalist principle which was adopted as a unifying mechanism to
smooth away the tensions of multi-ethnicity was distorted. And so far, it has failed to roll back the deluge of separatist agitations.

Akinyemi (2007, p. 37) characterises the Nigerian model of federalism as “pseudo-federal system” and contends that plural states with credible and functioning federal systems often have no security challenges. Added to this is structural imbalance arising from the creation of states and local government areas. Out of the present 36 states in Nigeria, 19 states are located in the North while 17 states are in the South. These constituent parts are the basis for revenue distribution from the federation account. Thus, the North extracts two portions more than the South from the Federation Account. In addition, the North has more local governments and through the Danjuma Revenue Allocation Commission, which introduced land mass and terrain as the basis for revenue allocation, its portion from the Federation Account also expanded (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 2003; Moveh 2012). It is important to note that the last factor is singularly advantageous to the North because of its enormous land mass but disadvantageous to the South which produces the bulk of national wealth through oil and value-added tax (VAT) contributions to the national treasury.

There are various aspects of marginalisation in the Nigerian context. The first is political exclusion and marginalisation, especially those of the minorities. Even some major ethnic groups, notably the Igbo, have also alleged marginalisation. A major part of the issue was Northern dominance of the presidency during both the military and democratic eras. The annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election, which the late M.K.O. Abiola was presumed to have won, heightened ethnic tensions as it created the impression that the presidency was reserved for a certain ethnic group and forbidden to others. This impression subsequently fuelled ethnic-based agitations for the restructuring of Nigeria with deeper implications for national security.

The second aspect of marginalisation is the skewed revenue allocation formula. Nigeria’s revenue allocation formula has been continuously juggled, like the magician’s ball, such that the allocation formula that operated when cash crops from agriculture were the country’s economic mainstay radically changed when crude oil replaced it. The armed insurrection by Niger Delta youths was a fallout of the disconnect between oil wealth and the prevalent poverty in that region interpreted as national conspiracy and injustice (Ibeanu 2008).
Apart from marginalisation, there is also the question of citizenship discrimination on account of ethnic affiliation. The perennial conflicts in Plateau State mirror the crisis of citizenship. Underlining the connection between insecurity and ethnicisation of citizenship, Egwu (2005, p. 104) argues:

... [the] existing system of ethnic citizenship and the bifurcation of Nigerians into “settlers” and “indigenes” reifies ethnicity, increases its obscurantist role in the political process, strengthens the political stratagem of the ruling elites which frees them from norms of accountability, and deepens the poverty and vulnerability of the poor and marginalised Nigerians in whose name ethnic justice is allegedly sought and promoted.

The national question essentially encapsulates the fundamentals of the state system as well as the relationships within it. The feeling of being short changed within a state system that is presumably built on the platform of equality, justice and fair play has been part of the underlying causes of insecurity in Nigeria. And the challenge that confronts Nigeria is how to create the platform to synthesise or harmonise the competing demands of various ethnic groups.

**The Maze of Insecurity in Nigeria and State Responses**

Insecurity denotes the absence or near absence of security. Insecurity is not necessarily, and may not be, an absolute state but a process that is calibrated in its degree of manifestation. The ordinary connotation of insecurity has three strands, namely insecure conditions (the state of being unsafe or insecure), unsafe feelings (a state of mind characterised by self-doubt and vulnerability) and insecure phenomena (an instance or cause of being insecure) (Encarta Encyclopedic Dictionary 2009). A common thread in the various strands of the ordinary meaning of insecurity is vulnerability, that is, the absence of safety. It is in line with this that Nnoli (2006, p.16) renders national security as “a cherished value associated with the physical safety of individuals, groups or nation-states, together with a similar safety of their other most cherished values”.

Having conceived security in this manner, insecurity, therefore, ought to mean the presence of threats, anxiety or danger and lack of confidence in physical safety and other most cherished values. The dominant meaning
of insecurity among Nigerian leaders does not cover this ordinary meaning of the concept. Rather, insecurity is seen from the prism of threats to the cherished values of the state and the dominant class within it. Threats to the values of the masses are not factored into the permutation. The cores of these state-cherished values include the maintenance of the political status quo of the state, the continued docility of the people and unfettered access to state resources.

The approximation of national security to “cherished values of the state” as defined by the ruling elite underpins why insecurity has suddenly been elevated to the front burner of national concern and discourse in recent times. Prior to now, the victims of insecurity had been the masses with the elite being tangentially unaffected and therefore aloof and apathetic (Nwozor 2013). This parochial, state-centric conceptualisation of security poses two serious problems to security governance: one, the narrow and restricted view of security by stakeholders, with the likelihood of ignoring the canons of early warning signals, and two, the likely confusion of the manifestations of insecurity and the adoption of ineffective security strategies.

As already noted, state response to insecurity in Nigeria has been patently reactive. Two paths of the reactive nature of state response to insecurity are discernible: the deployment of force and the purchase of peace. This is so because of the absence of a coherent blueprint on security craftsmanship. Essentially, the security apparatuses react variously to security threats, often based on how directly they affect the state and the ruling elite. Thus, the determination of whether an extreme, medium or minor force will be applied to any given security scenario is dependent on the interpretation of the ruling elite. In other words, there is no standardised bouquet of security measures that could be routinely applied across given security threats.

The pattern of state response is that when counter-aggression does not seem to be productive enough to justify its continued employment, the state engages in negotiation with a view to purchasing peace. In recent times, the purchase of peace has been through the amnesty programme. It was first granted to Biafrans through the three Rs of reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation (Ukaogo 2010), and later to the Niger Delta militants. It was suggested for the Boko Haram sect but its rejection prompted the intensification of counter-terrorism attacks by the Nigerian state.
The major tool at the disposal of the Nigerian state in resolving security threats is the deployment of force or what Nwozor (2013, p. 23) calls “counter-aggression”. For instance, when armed robbery, drug trafficking and coup plotting became part of the major security threats to the country, the military regimes imposed the death penalty as a punishment for them. In the aftermath of the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential elections, various groups that antagonised the military regime of the late General Sani Abacha were hunted and hounded and many of them were either thrown into prison or assassinated. Again, the military expeditions that levelled both Odi, a town in Bayelsa State, and Zaki Ibiam, a town in Benue State, symbolised the strategy of counter-aggression by the Nigerian state. These military expeditions, which separately recorded the death toll of more than 300 apiece, were in retaliation to the killing of security operatives sent there to restore law and order (Nwozor 2013).

The change in the nature and composition of insecurity in Nigeria could be traced to the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential elections. Before then, security threats were at the micro-level and not targeted at the state or the then ruling military oligarchy despite the incapacity of the state to meet the basic needs of the people. All such manifestations of insecurity including armed robbery, kidnapping and ethno-religious violence targeted, to a large extent, the masses. The only internal security threat which the ruling class faced was military coup d’état. The annulment of the presidential election changed the security topography: it provided the needed grounds for the emergence of various organisations. While some principally emerged in reaction to the annulment of the presidential election, others used the opportunity to launch a campaign for public sympathy on the alleged marginalisation of their ethnic groups.

The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) were in the forefront of the agitation for the revalidation of the annulled presidential election. In reaction to these groups, such groups as the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) emerged to canvass for narrow interests designed to confer advantages on their ethnic constituencies (Anyanwu 2005). The hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the continued negative effects of oil exploration and exploitation activities in the Niger Delta led to the formation of several militant groups that engaged in armed rebellion against the state in the region.
Consistent with the force theory of the Nigerian state, the Niger Delta armed rebellion was met with counter-aggression through the instrumentality of task forces comprising the anti-riot elite squad of the Nigeria Police, the army and the navy. The ineffectiveness of counter-aggression against the Niger Delta militants was evident in the gradual incapacity of Nigeria to meet its daily OPEC quota in oil production as a result of targeted terror attacks on oil installations and personnel of oil companies. Thus, the then Nigerian president late Umaru Musa Yar’Adua initiated the amnesty programme for the Niger Delta militants. As CBN (2009, p. 130) acknowledges, “the Federal Government’s amnesty programme brought relative peace to the Niger-Delta area in the second half of 2009. Consequently, production level rose from 1.75 mbd [million barrels per day] in January [2009] to 1.94 mbd in September [2009] and closed at the end of the year at 2.02mbd”. Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former president (1999–2007), considered these groups enough security threats that he reportedly sent a bill to the National Assembly to outlaw them (Douglas and Ola 2007).

The two most violent groups that constitute serious threats to national security in contemporary Nigeria are the Boko Haram sect and the Fulani herdsmen, both of which have been categorised as terrorist groups. Although there are conflicting accounts in literature about the origin of the Boko Haram sect, there is a consensus that the sect transformed into a terrorist group in 2009 in reaction to the state-sponsored extra-judicial killing of its then leader Muhammed Yusuf (Alozieuwa 2012; Connell 2012; Onuoha 2012; Uhrmacher and Sheridan 2016). In the pursuit of its terrorist agenda, the Boko Haram sect has carried out thousands of direct and indirect shootings and bombings, including suicide bombings, with fatalities among civilians running into tens of thousands. Current estimates of the total number of casualties in the eight years that Boko Haram had terrorised Nigeria (2009–2017) are quite intimidating. According to Kashim Shettima, the Governor of Borno State, Boko Haram terrorist attacks have not only led to the death of over 100,000 persons based on the estimates by community leaders but also to the displacement of over two million people. In the same vein, the cost of destruction perpetrated by Boko Haram in the North-East region of Nigeria, where it had its major operational base, was put at US$9 billion (Tukur 2017).

The transformation of Fulani herdsmen into militants complicated Nigeria’s security milieu. Several deadly attacks linked to Fulani herdsmen led to thousands of fatalities. The viciousness of their attacks and resultant
fatalities led to their inclusion in the Global Terrorist Index as well as comparison with such core terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Shabaab and the Taliban. Owing to the lethality of their attacks and the casualties therefrom, Fulani herdsmen were ranked fourth in the hierarchy of the most deadly terror groups in the world by the 2015 Global Terrorist Index. In the year under reference, Fulani herdsmen were directly responsible for 2000 deaths.

In contemporary Nigeria, the maze of insecurity is complex, comprising the dramatis personae (individuals and ethnic groups pursuing security-threatening agendas), the motive (what they envisage to achieve and for who), the strategies adopted in the pursuit of the motive, the weapons used to convert strategies into concrete actions and the support base (internal and external as well as obvious and surreptitious assistance). Paradoxically, while the maze of insecurity is complex, the response of the state is not correspondingly so and this underscores the disconnect in Nigeria’s security governance.

The future of Nigeria lies in the evolvement of an effective strategy or set of strategies to tackle insecurity. There is an urgent need for a paradigmatic shift in the mainstream thinking of government. The Nigerian government is still thinking in military terms in relation to insecurity even with the enormous material resources expended so far and very little success recorded in the deployment of military options. In an address at the graduation ceremony of the Nigeria Defence College (NDC) Course 21, the then President Jonathan tasked the Nigerian military to develop new techniques to tackle the country’s security challenges (Tsokar 2013). The implication of insecurity is that it could erode the corporate sanctity of the country, particularly with the ethnicisation of insecurity.

**CONCLUSION**

Nigeria’s security challenges have become complex and intractable. The seeming intractability is a product of three factors, namely the expansion in the dimension of national insecurity with the entry of terrorism in the matrix, the arsenal of weapons in circulation in the polity and the misapplication of strategies arising from the misdiagnosis of causalities of insecurity. The strategy of choice deployed by the Nigerian government to tackle insecurity, which is counter-aggression, has been ineffective.

There is a need for a paradigmatic shift in the re-evaluation of insecurity in Nigeria. The shift should devolve from increased penchant of the
Nigerian state to militarise the polity as demonstrated by the then President Jonathan’s charge to the military to be “agile and proactive, by enhancing their capacities to identify and disrupt, before execution, the plans and machinations of these faceless enemies, including their sources of fund, arsenal, training bases and recruitment efforts”, to thinking beyond the reactive military option by contextualising the national question and economic injustice in the matrix of insecurity.

**Note**


**References**


Security Funding, Accountability and Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Saheed Babajide Owonikoko

INTRODUCTION

This chapter critically examines the twin issues of transparency and accountability in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds for security management in Nigeria. It basically has seven sections. Section one is the introduction. The second section conceptualises terms that are embedded in the topic. The third section interrogates the necessity for security funding in the contemporary world. The fourth section examines if enormous security funding in contemporary Nigeria has metamorphosed into efficient security within the Nigeria state. The fifth section examines transparency and accountability in the allocation and utilisation of security funds in Nigeria. The sixth section, stemming from the position of the fifth section, examines the implications of lack of transparency and accountability in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds for internal security management in Nigeria. The seventh section concludes and makes recommendations. The chapter theorises that although more resources have been allocated for security in Nigeria, the country has not attained security commensurate to funds disbursed.

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This is due largely to lack of transparency and accountability which is promoting fraud and corruption in the process of disbursement and utilisation of security funds in Nigeria.

**Clarification of Concepts**

Three concepts are essentially important for this chapter. These are security funding, accountability and internal security management. These concepts and the framework of the relationship among them as far as this chapter is concerned are established in this section.

**Security Funding**

The term of “security funding” cannot be adequately conceptualised without first understanding what security itself means and what funding stands for. Unfortunately, the concept of security is an essentially contested concept (Dillon 1996). International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Fifth Edition defines security as the “ability of a nation to protect its national values from external threats” (p. 210). It adds that “security of the state meant the protection of the state, its boundaries, people, institutions and values from external attack” (ibid., p. 210). The explanation of this definition is that security threats can only come from enemies outside the country. The valid question that stems from the definition is: do threats to values, assets, people and institutions of a state only come from outside? The answer is no. Threats can come from within the territory of a state. This is why scholars warned that military security that procures military hardware to safeguard the sovereign integrity of a state is no security. McNamara (1968) and Nwolise (1985) have sounded this note of warning frontally. McNamara had warned as far back as 1968 that:

Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is not military force, though it may involve it. Security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shield its human nature... that is what we do not always understand and what governments of modernizing nations do not always understand. Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion,
low level of productivity and per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities, and chronic problem of unemployment, has a false sense of security. (McNamara 1968, p. 149)

Nwolise (1985, p. 68) adds:

A country may have the best of armed forces in terms of training and equipment, the most efficient police force; the most efficient customs men, the most active secret service agents, and the best quality prisons, and yet be the most insecure nation in the world, as a result of defence and security problems from within—bad government, alienated and suffering masses, ignorance, hunger, unemployment, or even activities of foreign residents or companies.

The pattern of threats to security of states in the contemporary period has shown that threats to security come mostly from within rather than outside. The 2014 armed conflict report of Uppsala University shows that 40 armed conflicts were active in 27 locations worldwide. Out of these conflicts, only one involves a confrontation between two countries.1 The remaining 39 were fought within states although 13 of them were internationalised domestic conflicts, meaning that one or more states contributed troops to one or both sides in the conflict.2 These armed conflicts were responsible for over 100,000 fatalities in 2014 alone, the worst since 1994 (Petterson and Wallesteen 2015). This points to the fact that threats to states come mostly from elements within the state rather than outside. Therefore, this definition linking security threats to external sources alone is grossly inadequate.

According to Manunta (1999), Security (S) is a function of the presence and interaction of Asset (A), Protector (P) and Threat (T) in a given Situation (Si). This, he expressed mathematically as $S = f(A, P, T) \cdot Si$. Asset here means something or someone of value. Protector on the other hand is someone or something that protects or guards. Threat is an imminent danger that can cause serious injury or death. What Manunta says here is that these three elements in a particular situation make up security. According to him:

…the absence of one of these core elements (A, P, or T) voids the concept of security of its significance: without an asset, there is nothing to protect; without a threat, there is no reason to protect; without a protector, there is no one striving for security…These three elements are seen as the components of an open system interacting with the environment. (Manunta 1999, p. 58)
Nwolise (2012) observed that the discourse of security centres on safety and protection which are important for the survival and development of human communities. Without it, human beings cannot attain their full potentials. To quote him:

Security in its natural habitat connotes freedom from fear, danger, turmoil, hostility, war and violence, all of which generate uneasiness for humans. Out of all derivatives of security in its original habitat, the most outstanding is safety. In other words, whoever talks security talks safety, and whoever talks safety talks survival. (Nwolise 2012, p. 12)

For the purpose of this chapter security is defined as safety from violence, crimes, wars, armed conflict and any other threats from within or outside that can cause uneasiness for people within a country.

Funding on the other hand relates to the allocation and utilisation of resources defined essentially in monetary terms basically to attain a specific goal. Having conceptualised “security” and “funding”, security funding is defined within the framework of this study to mean allocation and utilisation of specific funds for the maintenance of defence and security of the state from violence, crimes, war, armed conflicts and any other threats from within or outside the country that may cause uneasiness for the people within the country. Security funding is related to defence/military funding but is different. For instance, while defence or military funding is the allocation of financial resources to raise, maintain and run the services of armed forces for both internal and external security of the state, security funding is any resource (finance) budgeted for the safety of lives and property within the state. Therefore, while defence/military funding is different from security funding, it is an integral part of it. In this case, security funding is not only limited to resources earmarked for the police and other internal security agencies alone. It also includes resource allocated to the military for upkeep and maintenance and votes for members of the executive at the federal, state and local levels to maintain security of their domain.

Accountability

The concept of accountability is “a notoriously difficult concept to define” as Wright (n.d.) has pointed out. Attempt to conceptualise this concept begins from its etymology. The word “accountability” is derived from the Latin words *accomptare* (to account) or *computare* (to calculate).
late) (Mahmoud 1997; Plescia 2001). The concept therefore literally means to give account of or explain one’s action. However, contemporary understanding of the concept of accountability has gone beyond mere account-taking or explanation for one’s action. This is why it is argued that accountability is “an ever-expanding concept” (Mulgan 2000). The core essence of accountability is to promote transparency and trust and curb corruption. Accountability is antithetical to secrecy which has always shrouded the national security of states because secrecy promotes corruption and abuse (Egbo et al. 2010).

Accountability is desirable within a political system for several reasons (Robert 1982; Seidman 2005; Reyes 2006). Firstly, accountability, when entrenched in a political system, usually promotes a sense of responsibility and concern for public good and interests from political office holders and public/civil servants. This is because they know that they will have to explain their actions and inactions to a superior authority. Secondly, it is also a way by which the public controls political office holders. This is more noticeable in a democracy and it depends largely on the conduct of elections within such a democracy (Adsera et al. 2003). Where elections are free, fair, credible and regular, the threat of losing office in the next election often compels policymakers in government to be responsive to voters’ interests. Alternatively, the legislative body also has the power under their oversight functions to impeach, suspend or pass a vote of no confidence on any public office holder or civil servant found wanting. This does not only ensure effective control, it also promotes good governance and good governance is not only about the elected but also the public/civil servants. Lastly, another advantage of accountability is that it promotes dialogue and communication between public office holders and the people.

**Internal Security Management**

Internal security has to do with the safety of lives and property within the territory of the state. Imobighe (1990) sees it as freedom or the absence of dangerous tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and corporate existence. To Osumah and Aghedo (2010), internal security includes peace of the mind, freedom from threats to life and property and core values as well as maintenance of public order for the people within a state. It is the ability of the state to maintain its institutions to further its core values and objectives and preserve the legitimate aspirations of its citizenry and other residents within the state. Internal security management on the other hand is the organisation and administration of security
apparatuses of a country for the purpose of ensuring protection and safety within the territory of a country. There are several agencies in charge of internal security of a state but the lead agency usually saddled with the responsibility of internal security management is the police.

Security agencies need funds to be able to perform their duties effectively. However, they must not only demonstrate precision, professionalism, competence, excellence, diplomacy, skills, comradeship, leadership, teamwork, courage, respect, loyalty and dutifulness in the performance of their duties, they must also adhere to basic principles of security management. Such principles include trust, incorruptibility, honesty, patriotism, reputation, efficiency and transparency in the use of security funds allocated to them (Pyman 2008). It is noteworthy that where these are not promoted, the security sector and the entire security management of such a state are in jeopardy, even when a huge amount is dedicated to financing them to perform effectively. In extreme cases, lack of transparency and accountability in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds may, in fact, result in insecurity. The point that is emphasised here is that in most situations security funds not accounted for or allocated and utilised in an opaque way may be a veritable source of internal insecurity rather than security. Therefore, transparency is not only desirable in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds, but it is also important for the promotion of internal security for which it is meant.

**IS SECURITY FUNDING STILL NECESSARY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD?**

The newest thinking in security studies is that expenditure on defence and security of a state should be slashed and significant amount of it be diverted to sectors that will address the developmental needs which have a direct impact on citizens. These developmental needs of the people are what is today conceptualised as human security. The tenet of this concept is that until people within a country are protected from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, among others, such a country will continue to experience violent crime and insecurity. Although the concept manifested in the United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report, the origin of the thought can be traced to the period shortly after the Cold War when intra-state conflicts engulfed the world. These conflicts were occasioned by human rights abuses, chronic hunger and disease, high rates of unemployment, poverty and
economic hardship as against inter-state wars that were caused by ideological opposition. Addressing the roots of these “new” threats meant addressing critical human development issues. Therefore, it was advocated that a greater chunk of funds for security and defence of the state should be cut and diverted to core human development needs that will help address the root of violence, crime and general insecurity in the state.

Furthermore, it has also been argued that too much of defence and security funds in a state often lead to over-securitisation and militarisation of the country and this, most times, usually promotes insecurity rather than security. The case of the United States’ increase of defence funding since the 9/11 attack has been used to justify this assertion. Since this attack, the United States has increased her defence funding by multiple folds to pursue the popular Global War Against Terrorism. This has rather promoted insecurity, especially in the Middle East. The corollary, therefore, is that more security funding brings more insecurity. However, in spite of the plausibility of arguments against (increasing) security funding, the security sector still remains an important part of the state and must be appropriately funded to perform effectively. Making it perform effectively means that all the necessary human and material resources needed to provide security must be made available because potential security threats may become reality. In fact, in some cases, the level of preparedness, weapons and availability of security personnel always help to prevent violence and crime from being committed. Another missing link in the argument against (increasing) security funding is that, in most cases, the level of security funding of a state is usually determined by the nature and extent of threat to security within the state. The more peaceful and secure a state is, the more likely that less funds will be allocated to security and vice versa. In fact, what often happens is that once threats to security increase within the territorial boundaries of a state, the state is bound to divert its resources to security to ensure that lives and properties are secured. This is because security is very significant to the attainment of the aspirations of people within the country and it is the duty of the state to provide it. The eminent professor of security and defence studies, Thomas Imobighe, buttressed this point more emphatically when he said:

While factors of resource constraint may from time to time influence the allocation of funds for [security], what ultimately determines the allocation of funds is the nature and severity of the threat the country faces. If the nation is faced with an overwhelming imminent threat in which its survival...
is at stake, it would do all it can to find the resources to respond to the threat, even if it means mortgaging future resources to do so. (Imobighe 2014, p. 149)

Therefore, security fund is still very necessary given the increase in violence and criminality globally.

Nigeria has often increased her security funds in line with the severity and nature of threat to her security (Muraina 2014a, b). In one of his visits to the North-East as President of Nigeria, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan justified why more funds were allocated to security in his regime when he said:

“…No responsible government will spend his taxpayers’ money on JTF (Joint Task Force), but when the situation warrants, like in this case of Boko Haram, then we as government will not hesitate to spend our last kobo in order to bring peace and security.” (Agence France Presse 2013 cited in Owonikoko 2013: 9)

What the former president was saying here is that the enormity of the threat to security of lives and property posed by Boko Haram terrorism necessitated increased security funding. His action was justified by a section of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended), Section 14 (2b), under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy which provides that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. This therefore means that whenever the security of lives and properties of the people are threatened, the Nigerian state has the duty to do all it can to ensure security, including increasing funding to the security sector.

SECURITY FUNDING AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

Security in Nigeria has been funded in three basic ways. First is the allocation for the security agencies within the country that are saddled with the responsibility of maintaining internal security of the state. There are many security agencies involved in the management of internal security in Nigeria. However, the Nigeria Police Force is saddled with the lead role. Funding allocation to these institutions is necessary to make them function at the optimal level. Unfortunately inadequate funding always preoccupies the complaints of these security agencies. During the defence of the budget of the Ministry of Police Affairs in 2014, the then supervising
Minister of the Ministry, Mrs Olajumoke Akinjide, lamented that poor budgetary allocation to the Nigeria Police was responsible for the poor performance of the force (Agbakwuru and Erunke 2014). There are at least two basic reasons for poor funding of the Nigeria Police Force. One of the reasons is that many other security agencies have been created either from within the force or outside it and are also competing for funding from the state. Secondly, the Nigeria Army is now more involved in internal security management than the police because the nature of violent conflicts that Nigeria is witnessing is far more than what the Nigeria Police Force can deal with. As a result, more funding for security goes to the army than the police.

Another way by which security is funded in Nigeria is through the allocation of security votes. Security votes are the fund deliberately set aside for the executive at various levels of government, either president, governors or even local government chairmen, for the purpose of ensuring better security of lives and properties within their jurisdiction. This is different from other resources (in monetary terms) allocated to security outfits for their effective functioning. Because of the high premium placed on the national security of the Nigerian state, security votes are usually not accounted for and are usually without legislative approval. As Robert Clarke observed, “…it is being spent by Governors based on their whims and caprices without the authority of the Assembly whether in the states or at the federal level and without the knowledge of the people” (Vanguard News, December 29, 2016). Therefore, the spender is not obligated to be questioned on how, why and when the money is spent (Daniel 2010).

The third way through which security has been funded in Nigeria is through military/defence expenditure. Military/defence expenditure is money specially devoted for the maintenance of the military outfit of the state. A huge chunk of the national resources of the Nigerian state has been expended on the Nigeria Armed Forces, especially since the 1960s when Nigeria attained independence. Nwolise (1987) observed that between 1967 and 1977, Nigeria was ranked the second highest military spender in Africa after Egypt. Two factors were responsible for military expenditure of Nigeria during this period. The first was the Nigerian Civil War which the country was prosecuting against the then Eastern Nigeria which wanted secession as Biafra Republic and second was that the government of the day then was military and was interested in promoting military interests especially the modernisation of all aspects of military life including training, acquisition of equipment and weapons. However,
Nigeria transited to democracy in 1979 and this affected military expenditure as spending started declining (Omitoogun 2003), except that in 1983, military expenditure increased a bit due to the general elections of the year and the widespread Maitatsine sectarian violence which the country needed to deal with using a military approach. The major reasons for the downward trend in military expenditure during this time were decline in oil revenue accruable to the Nigerian economy and general economic devastation that ravaged the country after the military takeover. By 1990 however, Nigeria again witnessed increased military expenditure. This was so because of the leader-motivator role that Nigeria played in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group military operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Simbine 1997).

The transition of Nigeria to democracy in 1999 marked a significant watershed moment in military expenditure in Nigeria. The new civilian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo made several commitments to re-professionalise the armed forces and redirect their attention from politics to their professional role of defending the country. As a result, more financial provisions were made for training, retraining and modernising their equipment (Muraina 2014b). Apart from this, the country also witnessed a series of violent conflicts which military personnel were deployed to quell. A typical example and the most protracted during this period was militancy in the Niger Delta region. Even when the amnesty programme commenced in the region in 2009, the government continued to expend money on acquisition of military weapons to engage the unrepentant militants in psychological warfare (Volman 2009; Albert 2015). However, as the challenge of militancy in the Niger Delta region began to dwindle, the problem of Boko Haram kickstarted in the North-East region which warranted the government to spend more on military to be able to confront the challenge. As the terrorism of Boko Haram becomes more intense, the government also continues to fortify the armed forces with more funding to be able to meet up with the task of decimating the group.

According to Olufemi and Akinwumi’s (2015) review of security spending in Nigeria between 2011 and 2014, the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) and Ministries of Defence, Interior and Police Affairs received a total budgetary allocation of ₦3.69 trillion within four years. This constituted over 20% of Nigeria’s entire budget within the period. Table 26.1 shows the distribution of security spending between 2011 and 2014.
Table 26.1  Distribution of security/defence spending in Nigeria between 2011 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security units</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>348,037,047,378</td>
<td>326,354,184,382</td>
<td>364,415,146,885</td>
<td>340,332,339,871</td>
<td>1,379,138,718,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>158,157,297,012</td>
<td>157,332,986,944</td>
<td>154,731,693,977</td>
<td>151,970,539,830</td>
<td>622,192,517,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Affairs</td>
<td>3,234,011,615</td>
<td>6,109,283,677</td>
<td>9,668,953,320</td>
<td>7,918,883,088</td>
<td>26,931,131,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Service Commission</td>
<td>849,818,435</td>
<td>2,470,077,782</td>
<td>2,221,296,278</td>
<td>1,795,844,001</td>
<td>7,337,036,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Formation</td>
<td>304,737,303,692</td>
<td>307,857,718,425</td>
<td>311,151,366,221</td>
<td>302,901,812,085</td>
<td>1,226,648,200,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>920,256,126,399</td>
<td>924,388,013,122</td>
<td>923,497,868,701</td>
<td>922,644,491,782</td>
<td>3,690,786,500,004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Olufemi and Akinwumi (2015)
Forty per cent of the ₦3.69 trillion which amounts to ₦1.488 trillion was spent on arms purchase within the period. Unfortunately, the increased security funding did not translate to security of lives and property as more people died from crimes, violence and insecurity within the years. Data from Nigeria Watch show that 94,670 people died in the country between 2006 and 2015. Out of this number, 66,625 died between 2011 and 2015. Major causes of these deaths are related to Boko Haram activities, ethno-religious clashes, farmer-herders conflict, militancy in the Niger Delta and extra-judicial killings by security personnel among others. The summary of this is that increasing security funding in Nigeria does not translate to solid national security for the country (Fig. 26.1).

![Absolute number of deaths](image)

**Fig. 26.1** Total number of violent deaths in Nigeria, 2006–2015. Source: Nigeria Watch Report, 2015
Transparency and Accountability in Allocation and Utilisation of Security Funds in Nigeria

Transparency and accountability are very important values in the allocation, management and utilisation of security funding in order to prevent the diversion of security funds to other areas or even private pockets. Unfortunately, transparency and accountability is lacking in the disbursement of security funds in most African states. Ball (2002, p. 6) observes with regard to military spending in Africa that:

Fiscal discipline is weak in many African countries. While the military is by no means the only body responsible for the expansion of the resources envelope in the course of the fiscal year, it frequently enjoys a privileged position. Government officials, military officers and head of state and government intervened in the resource allocation process with flagrant disregard for established procedures and predetermined spending priorities. Military officers have presented the treasury with invoices for expenses incurred outside the budget framework. Defence ministries have refused to share the details of defence spending with finance ministers and parliament.

Here, Ball was raising the issue of transparency and accountability with regard to military spending in African states. However, the problem of accountability and transparency does not only affect the military sector but the entire security and defence sector of African states.

In the analysis of Olufemi and Akinwumi (2015), the total amount spent on arms acquisition for security agencies between 2011 and 2014, if diverted to the developmental needs of the Nigerian state, would contribute significantly to economic and infrastructural development of the country. Yet heads of the country’s security agencies continue to complain of inadequate funding to their security outfits. Former Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshall Alex Sabundu Badeh, lamented while he was retiring that he headed a military that lacked equipment and motivation to fight (Vanguard Newspaper, July 30, 2015). Here, Badeh was referring to inadequate funding of the military in spite of the fact that security sector enjoyed the highest funding during this period far beyond education and health sectors combined. The 36 state governors in Nigeria have also complained of inadequate security votes allocated to them to maintain security in their state. Speaking through their forum—Nigeria Governors’ Forum—they complained that “…state governments are currently overstretched in funding security and called for a special intervention
fund from the Federal Government, especially to the States that are most affected” (Premium Times 2015). The main problem however is that the whole process of budgeting, allocation and utilisation of security funds is shrouded in secrecy in the name of national security. Thus, the leadership of security agencies and members of the executive that receive these funds often hide behind national security not to disclose the details of how security funds allocated to them are utilised.

This is not a new phenomenon in the world as nations in the past have had to disguise their security expenditure. Ball (1984) pointed out that states have adopted basically four significant strategies to disguise their security expenditure from public knowledge. This may come in the form of keeping two sets of government budget accounts in which one is used as the basis of a published account and the other designed purely for internal government consumption. Another way is the creation of sources of funding within the country which do not appear in the national budget. This he called an extra-budgetary account. Others that he identified are disaggregate expenses in a way that it is not useful or understandable to the general public and finally incomplete disclosure and repatriation of foreign exchange earnings. Some of these strategies are no doubt being used actively in Nigeria, and their prevalence explains why it is difficult for the public to decipher the nature and amount allocated to security. This makes the whole process of allocation and utilisation of security funds a secret and gives the users the opportunity to divert the money into unintended areas and even into private pockets. The point, therefore, is that secrecy in allocation and utilisation of security funds deprive it of transparency and accountability. Lack of transparency and accountability makes it easy for security funds to be easily diverted for other uses that are private or simply shared. This accounts for why security funds do not amount to the effectiveness of security personnel and safety of lives and property. Several cases of diversion of security funds to private pockets have been reported while so many are yet to be unravelled. For instance, Mr Tafa Balogun, former Inspector General of Police, was sacked and subsequently convicted for corrupt enrichment. Kenny Martins, former coordinator of police equipment funds, who was also said to be the in-law of former President of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, was indicted for allegedly misappropriating over ₦13 billion meant to equip the police (Sahara Reporter 2009).
The diversion of the US$2.2 billion arms deal is the most recent quintessential example of how secrecy and lack of transparency and accountability in the process of allocation and utilisation of security funds in Nigeria are encouraging abuse and diversion of security funds within the country. An interim report from the presidential investigation committee on arms procurement revealed an extra-budgetary security spending to the tune of ₦643.8 billion and another inexplicable security expenditure to the tune of US$2.2 billion (Vanguard News, December 13, 2015a: 4). The US$2.2 billion, according to the preliminary report, was disbursed for the procurement of arms to fight Boko Haram terrorism in Northern Nigeria but was not spent for the purpose. It was rather diverted to sponsor re-election in 2015 (Thisday News, December 13, 2015: 7). The investigation also revealed that several ghost contracts were awarded between March 2012 and March 2015 and that funds disbursed for the purchase of 12 helicopters, 4 alpha jets, bombs and other ammunitions were not utilised for those purposes. The sum of ₦600 million meant for the procurement of military boats for use in the fight against militancy was also diverted (Sahara Reporter May 16, 2016).

**Implications for Internal Security Management**

The argument of this chapter from the preceding sections is that Nigeria has expended on security through three basic means: funding police and other security agencies in charge of internal/homeland security, distribution of security votes to executives at the federal, state and local government levels, and upkeep of the armed forces. However, the allocation of these funds is usually shrouded in secrecy and this often hinders accountability and transparency in the utilisation of security funds. As a result, it is usually very easy to abuse the fund by either diverting it for other uses apart from security or simply embezzling it. There are basically three implications of lack of transparency in the disbursement and allocation of security funds for internal security management in the Nigerian state. Firstly, it promotes diversion which denies the security personnel the weapons and gadgets needed to ensure effective security of lives and property in the country. A typical example again is the fight against Boko Haram in the North-East. As the security funds meant for arms procurement were diverted, the soldiers in the war front were left with obsolete weapons to fight highly motivated and well-equipped insurgents.
This led to the overrunning of the soldiers and taking over of several local governments in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa States by the insurgents. The continuous occurrence of overrunning soldiers by the insurgents as a result of lack of weapons led to killing of soldiers by Boko Haram insurgents. This later snowballed into military mutiny in which several junior military officers and soldiers protested against their leaders. Senator Femi Ojudu, a member of the Senate Committee on Defence, narrated what led to the mutiny of soldiers and officers of the Nigerian Army in which Brigadier General Enitan Ransome-Kuti was involved:

I first met Enitan many years ago in his dad’s house at 8, Imaria Street, Anthony Village. He was a 2nd Lieutenant in the army then. He came visiting his dad who is my mentor. Enitan was introduced to me by Beko as, ‘meet my son in the army’. Beko’s son in the Army? I asked myself in surprise. It was at a time when Beko and his elder brother, Fela, were engaged in a battle with the military that made them come in and out of prison. ‘Are you surprised?’ Beko asked me… We both left the residential section of the twin duplex for his office which also doubled as a clinic where we talked more about Enitan, his relationship with him and his military career. I will not see Enitan again until the death of his dad and I think then he had become a full Colonel in the army… Sometime in 2013, my committee of defence and army in the Senate was on oversight function to the Army Headquarters in Abuja. One of the officers introduced to the committee was Enitan who had risen to the rank of a Brigadier-General. I shook hands with him and introduced myself as Babafemi Ojudu, a friend and follower of his dad and Uncle Fela Anikulapo Kuti. We got talking and the General promised to call me afterwards. But no call came to me until early this year when I got a distress call from Lande his younger sister…that Enitan has been arrested. (CKN Nigeria 2015)

He explained further:

“What is the problem?” I asked. “It is over the Boko Haram saga,” she said. This was the reason I promptly called Femi Falana, a close associate of Enitan’s dad. Falana opened his high-wire contacts in the army and soon enough…we later got to know that he was sent to fight Boko Haram insurgents in Baga and things went bad for lack of requisite equipment and supplies. The army, in its wisdom, still expected him to perform wonders. For failing to rout Boko Haram insurgents on that assignment he was recalled to the headquarters, arrested and facing trials with others. We know that even President Jonathan himself had come out to say that the army is not well-
equipped. They’re just looking for where to put their blame, you cannot tell people to go and fight and expect them to use their bare hands when they’re not equipped. (CKN Nigeria 2015)

Here, the effect of diversion of security funds as a result of lack of transparency and accountability in the allocation and utilisation is obvious. In spite of the huge amount of money voted for defence, Nigeria still lacked in resources to fight terrorism. Much of the money spent on security fuelled corruption in the military and this led to an under-resourced military, short of guns and ammunition. A CNN reporter, Robertson Nic, who interviewed Nigerian soldiers involved in the fight against Boko Haram in North-East, buttressed this fact. His interviews reveal:

The major problem the soldiers have is they don’t have the equipment to fight. Boko Haram has anti-aircraft guns which are accurate up to three-quarters of a mile. All the Nigerian military has are AK47 small machine guns, accurate up to a few hundred meters. Often the Nigerian soldiers are given only 60 bullets each, so they quickly run out. Boko Haram has large supplies of ammunition and more fighters. Although the Nigerian soldiers do win some fights, they are regularly forced to turn tail and run for their lives by the sheer volume of gunfire from Boko Haram fighters. (Robertson 2015)

He concluded that corruption is the root of the Nigerian military’s problem which brings down the morale of the troops. Similarly, the report of Vanguard on December 9, 2015b chronicled how the diversion of funds meant for the procurement of arms for Nigerian military to fight Boko Haram insurgents led to the overrunning of the Nigerian soldiers which eventually led to the taking over of some parts of Nigerian territory in the North East thus:

There have been some interesting revelations since the EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission) first commenced its investigations. The crux of all these is that the majority of the accused person are suspected to have simply taken their share of the NSA’s (National Security Adviser) largesse and walked away without delivering what they were paid to deliver. No wonder our military most times performed no better than a platoon of boys scouts in their many encounters with the Boko Haram. They were randomly and comprehensively sacked from their bases and from one town to another by a group such as Boko Haram that in the main lacks the discipline of a professional force. (Vanguard News, December 9, 2015b)
Secondly, lack of transparency in the allocation and utilisation of security funds for national security management promotes corruption which often leads to distrust in the relationship between security agencies and the public, the end result of which is public engagement with self-help organisations. For instance, police corruption has caused distrust in the public image of security agencies (Agbigboa 2015); therefore, instead of people taking their cases to the police or any security agency, they simply engage in self-help or consult militia or vigilante groups who simply carry out jungle justice which further promotes insecurity (Owonikoko and Ifukor 2016). This has been attested to by Nigeria’s former Inspector General of Police, Ogbonna Onovo, when he said:

It is apparent that indiscipline, lack of professionalism and widespread corruption have been the bane of the Nigeria police over the years, a situation that has greatly hampered the quality of service delivery. Our image has been battered time and again leading to loss of confidence by members of the public. (Kingsley 2009)

Furthermore, the security funds go to the executive at various levels, either at the federal, state or local government levels, as security votes are usually used to foment violence and insecurity. While in some cases it is used to prosecute rigging of elections, in other cases, it is used to maintain an army of thugs that can easily be commandeered to unleash violence. The former Commissioner for Police in Lagos State, Alhaji Abubakar Tsav, during his interview with Nigeria Today, shared his experience on how politicians used security votes that are supposed to be used to complement the security provided by the Nigeria Police and other agencies to further worsen security. He explained thus:

The original intention of these funds (referring to security votes) which run into hundreds of millions of naira monthly is to be used by the governors to put in place, effective security system in their respective states, to complement the work of the police and other security outfits. But today, most state governors divert security votes into personal use. They use security votes to breed political thugs and hooligans. They use security votes to feed and train thugs to attack and harass their political opponents. This is one of the reasons behind worsening state of insecurity in the country. (Nigeria Today 2016)

Even the development of militancy in Niger Delta and Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria can be traced to the use of security votes by politicians
to keep the army of hooligans they could easily commandeer (see Albert and Danjibo 2004; Sofiri 2007; Owonikoko 2016; 2019).

**CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Security fund is supposed to contribute to and enhance national security of a state. However, in Nigeria, the opposite is the case. Security funding has proven to be antithetical to the national security of the state for the simple reason that allocation and utilisation of security funds are shrouded in secrecy which does not promote accountability and transparency in disbursement and utilisation. Nigeria must review how security funds are channelled in the country. Similarly, the system of accountability that promotes transparency in the use of security funding must also be instituted in Nigeria. A situation where receivers of security funds/votes are not obliged to explain how such funds are spent in the name of national security is itself a grave security threat to the Nigerian state.

**NOTES**

1. This kind of conflict is called inter-state conflict. The recorded inter-state conflict for this year was the India-Pakistan conflict.
2. The internationalised intra-state conflicts were in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Ukraine (Donetsk), Ukraine (Lugansk), Ukraine (Novorossiya), the United States (the conflict with Al-Qaida) and Yemen.
3. For instance, a documentary on the state of security in the Middle East since the United States commenced its Global War Against Terrorism in 2001 showed on CNN revealed that between 2002 and 2014, death from terrorism increased by 5000%.

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CHAPTER 27

Social (In)security and Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Adediran Daniel Ikuomola

INTRODUCTION

Internal security has begun to attract a wide range of attention from academicians to security practitioners and beyond world over as a result of factors such as the incessant loss of lives and properties and the number of delinquent and criminal activities within and outside the Nigerian borders. It must be stated that internal security is one of the yardsticks to measure a nation’s welfare, for which emphasis must be placed on both external factors and national security/defence. Thus, most strategic literature debates dwell more on national defence and give peripheral treatment to internal security discourse in most cases.

Historically the security of a nation has always been towards preparation and readiness for defence from neighbouring countries. And as it is most developing countries still spend more of their budget on armed forces rather than on their internal security agencies to combat anomalies within their borders. Nigeria, for instance, still follows the traditional ideal of empowering the military than the police even before the insurgencies
that bedevilled it in recent times. The long-time neglect of internal security since 1960 when the country got her independence can no doubt be attributed to the current security challenges therein. Thus it becomes pertinent to highlight the need to focus on internal (in)security in Nigeria.

This chapter examines some salient issues surrounding the concept of social (in)security and its impact on internal security management in Nigeria. Specifically emphasis is placed on the broader conceptualisation of social (in)security and necessary developmental implications in Nigeria. The chapter draws conclusion from the experiences of Nordic countries which have marshalled adequate social security and protection policies towards their development and internal security.

**THE CONCEPT OF INTERNAL SECURITY**

The concept of internal security emphasises the fundamental policies and principles fostering the peaceful coexistence and management of the activities of people and institutions within the boundaries of the country. It is in this regard that scholars emphasised that internal security should be defined in terms of goals and philosophy (Amujiri and Agu 2012; Imobighe 1990, 2002; Nweke 1985). For Imobighe (2002), the doctrine of internal security should seek to answer not only the why and how of internal security management, but also the question of the basic nature of the internal security goals desired. Like most African countries, Nigeria has been found wanting when it comes to a clearly defined national security policy over time (Amujiri and Agu 2012; Imobighe 1990, 2002; Nweke 1985). From the periodic reviews of Nigerian foreign policy, scholars and practitioners have agreed that the neglect of internal security by successive regimes (from the period of military dictatorship to the current democratic dispensation) has done more harm than good. And that what are generally available by way of doctrines of internal security are more or less principles meant for handling particular internal emergencies (Omoyibo and Akpomera 2013). Thus the state is overwhelmed at any point in time when there are new forms of security threats within. And that governments are left with no other option but to exercise their military might forcefully which in the long run are not only expensive but counterproductive with loss of lives and properties and increasing resistance to state (re)actions (Omoyibo and Akpomera 2013). Inasmuch as the security challenges in Nigeria are on the increase, it is not out of place that the country is faced with a number of economical and developmental issues ranging from corruption, inflation...
and poverty to illiteracy, unemployment and political instability; thus so many component states are heavily indebted (Omoyibo and Akpomera 2013; Ewetan and Urhie 2014). These events have contributed to the rising rate of criminality among youths, the rise in criminal networks within and across West African communities, drug abuse among unemployed youths, poor standards of living, poor health outcomes of which Nigeria is ranked among the leading nations in maternal and infant mortality index and a booming informal and underground economy which often overwhelms security officials that are often ill-equipped. Similarly these realities have also become evident in the rural communities which hitherto were relatively peaceful; thus, insecurity in the rural enclaves has increased the rate of rural-urban migration of youth, for the purpose of employment and perceived safety in the cities. Understanding these developments, Alemika and Chukwuma (2005) and Ikuomola et al. (2016) noted that insecurity challenges will continue until the Nigerian government recognises these dynamics and trajectories between the rural and urban communities.

The Need for Social Security in Nigeria

After independence in 1960, it was expected that Nigeria would be among the countries that got it right economically and socially, in terms of policies and developmental indices, as is the case in Malaysia, India and China, among others. However, the reverse is the case amidst its abundant natural and human resources. To move out of these quagmires, Nigeria needs to surmount the security challenges to enable speedy economic and social development; it is achievable if first the nation seeks policies that are internally friendly to ensure the peaceful coexistence of its citizenry and institutions. This will ensure that citizens’ sense of belongingness and pride to be members of the state called Nigeria become paramount. There is a need for adequate social security measures which must be well defined to upturn the high levels of underdevelopment, malnutrition, unemployment, illiteracy and unsatisfactory access to the basic services and infrastructure needed to sustain basic human capacities (Onyeonoru 2003; Church 2000; Ngubane 2004; Human Right Watch 2015).

Social security needs to be simplified from the wider concept of security as embedded in social protection. Arguably, social protection emphasises on social support systems which presuppose that the society/state should cater to its weak(er) members (the poor) to become a welfare state (Von Maydell 1997; Stan 2004). Instances abound where social protection has
been used interchangeably as economic protection or safety net or programmes to alleviate poverty, unemployment, disease and squalor. Nevertheless, irrespective of the definition or analysis, the International Labour Organization (1984) propagates the inclusion of preventative, reparative and compensatory measures in the concept of social security. For Norton et al. (2001), the aim of social security should be on how best a state can comprehensively and sophisticatedly insure and provide assistance to its citizenry, continuously in times of need, as evident in the developed clime but elusive in the developing countries, with poor financial and institutional strength. Thus Nigeria like most developing economies tends to focus on temporary and at best short-term measures of giving assistance to its citizens whenever the need arises, most especially when there is an emergency or outbreak of a catastrophe. This is well captured in the more recent terminology ‘safety net’, which is simply the giving of assistance (a limited range of assistance, often now administered through social funds). Irrespective of the various crises in Nigeria, the welfare of people is still very much held in high esteem, at least as specified in the constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Nevertheless, it is quite clear that among a number of insecurity challenges which have crisscrossed the north and southern states of the country, the issue of insurgency has become paramount as well as capturing the attention of international communities.

The rate of insecurity in the northern part of the country is worrisome as shown by the incessant attacks by Fulani herdsmen and Islamic militants as well as the activities of separatist movements in the south-south and southeast. These events have further worsened the social security indices of Nigeria, but also the inability of the Nigerian government to provide adequately for its subjects. As security budgets are often beyond what the state can handle, it becomes glaring as to why most times international support is needed.

Igbuzor (2011) clearly linked government failure over the years to provide basic social and economic needs to its subject as a major catalyst to the current situation that has piled up. The reality is that in the northern states, there are a number of children roaming the streets, begging, as well as a pool of frustrated youth, who either ought to be in school or gainfully employed; as they are not economically active, they seek cover under various religious sects for their daily bread and safety, from which many get indoctrinated and become violent. Thus the popular saying that an idle mind will readily be available to embrace delinquents’ opportunities for survival takes meaning in Nigeria (Cloward 1959). Going by the
numerous challenges therein, alongside the economic downturn since 2015 when the country went into recession, poverty and economic fluctuations have been the order of the day. The gap between the rich and the poor keeps widening. The poverty rate is placed at 43.8 (Gini coefficient), which has doubled since 2005, of which about 75 million people (54 per cent of the population) live within the poverty threshold (Holmes et al. 2011; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2014; UNICEF 2016).

Currently, the government has realised the need to engage with development partners within and out the country to develop social protection policy instruments to mitigate the economic and social crises (Holmes et al. 2011; UNICEF 2016). However, as an innovative idea and welcome development, the UNICEF (2016) report revealed that it is only a temporary measure which is not sustainable, as no nation survives by continuously giving handouts to the poor rather than economically engaging them.

**AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA**

The amount of money budgeted and spent by the Nigerian government has often been at variance with books, and it is eventually regarded as minimal to alleviate the insecurity challenges and poverty compared with other countries in the developed climes. For instance, Nigeria spends only 12 per cent on education and 7 per cent on health (Hagen-Zanker and Tavakoli 2011). In the agricultural sector, which is the domain of most peasants and masses, what are meant for farmers often fail to get to them as a result of the corrupt practices within the three tiers of government (federal, state and local authorities) and the various channels of distribution, through which incentives and aids are meant to get to the grassroots. The federal government is expected to design and implement policies, but they are often circumvented by the state and local authorities, and the masses are left at their mercies. Thus, budget regimes differ from real expenditure patterns as a result of bureaucracy and corruption. Depending on the level of corruption and bureaucratic bottlenecks in every state and local community, the size and resources, poverty and inequality vary.

A number of socio-demographic factors such as age and gender have greatly affected and influenced the level of poverty, and the instability of economic opportunities continuously breeds inequality, of which ethnicity, nepotism and corruption become a tool for survival to the detriment of the poor. These are evident in the spate of crises in the country, when the poor become more vulnerable in times of financial, food and fuel crises, for the
The simple reason that they constitute the majority of the workforce in the agricultural sector (over 60 per cent of the population) and demographically speaking the age of the population is skewed disproportionately towards poor households (Ojowu et al. 2007). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development gender equality index ranked Nigeria low in the rate at which men and women participate equally in economic, political and human capital development programmes and activities. Specifically, the effect is reflected in the rate of mortality (both maternal and infant), where Nigeria is ranked 18 out of the 193 countries surveyed (87 deaths per 1000 children). These are significant obstacles accounting for the lack of participation in economic transformation by women in the country. Similarly women and child trafficking are negative issues, affecting the contribution of women to societal transformation. These have also been linked to the high rate of mortality and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Nigeria, with over 3.3 million affected.

The statistics and indicators of insecurity problems are overwhelming, and hence the Nigerian government has taken steps to prioritise pro-poor agendas through several negotiations with the Paris Club and other international financial institutions for economic assistance to alleviate poverty in the short and long term. These negotiations and developments have brought about conditionalities to the Nigerian state to ensure that financing of the social sector must incorporate first and foremost the poor to tackle the issue of poverty as hitherto stated in both the Millennium Development Goals and the current Sustainable Development Goals. Resources cum policy suggestions to the state include cash transfer programmes that are capable of enhancing health, water and sanitation, education and economic productivity. Since 2005, research has however shown the ineptitude of the Nigerian government to either politicise or relatively neglect these conditionalities at best. For instance 14 per cent of the annual budget instead of the recommended 26 per cent is still being consistently expended on education, representing only 5 per cent of the internationally agreed fund meant to contribute to the social protection agenda (Hagen-Zanker and Tavakoli 2011), in turn representing only 5 per cent of the debt relief gain (DRG) from the World Bank, a largess meant for poverty alleviation and developmental purposes (Dijkstra et al. 2011).

The politicking of the social protection policy of 2004 brought about a national planning commission which was supported by the international community, and a new social protection strategy was introduced. One was the National Social Insurance Trust Fund and the National Policy Implementation Plan—‘the Vision 20: 2020’. These new ideas were
meant to approach social protection without discriminatory practices that seclude women as well as discourage traditional harmful practices affecting the life cycle of women in the poverty matrix. The focal concern of this new programme was to ensure that four main assistances were rendered, that is, labour market security, child protection, social assistance and social insurance. As with past development plans, only limited assistance was provided, most notably the expansion of national health insurance to the informal sector and the setting up of labour-intensive programmes. The lack of political will by the federal government was a major constraint for state and local governments to implement and benefit from the implementation plan of social protection for the poor. In reality ad hoc committees were set up and saddled with the responsibility of implementing conditional cash transfer programmes with little or less inter-sectoral coordination between the state and the federal government.

The general idea of the present social protection scenario in the country reveals that there are noteworthy individuals and agencies acting or willing to act towards implementing governmental action plans and those from international organisations in the forms of aids and donations. Specifically, the Nigerian government has three broad categories of social protection programmes which include the following.

1. Cash transfer: The cash transfer programme targets mostly children of school age and female-headed households and people who are generally vulnerable such as the sick, (persons with HIV/AIDS), the aged and the physically challenged.
2. Health fee waivers for women: This programme is targeted at pregnant women and mothers with babies under the age of five.
3. Community-based health-care insurance: This scheme works in conjunction with the basic primary health-care facilities in rural communities. It is an improvement on the existing primary health-care service in the country to tackle common illnesses such as malaria and typhoid.

Support programmes are generally funded by international agencies to complement the meagre amount set aside by the state and federal government. At the level of implementation it is usually on an ad hoc basis and via subtypes. These subtypes come in the form of conditional cash transfer programmes for the girl child (in some selected states), disability grants, health waivers and educational support (free meals and uniforms, exercise
and textbooks). These are nevertheless subcomponents of general nutrition, health and educational support programmes. Similarly there are labour market programmes to empower youths through skills’ acquisition programmes and capacity-building strategies and seminars at all tiers of the government. There is particular emphasis on agricultural training which invariably targets the bulk of the rural populace (Ojowu et al. 2007). Despite the fact that Nigeria has ratified a number of key social equity legislation acts which propagate transformative social protection agendas with international communities, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant and Civil and Political Rights Covenant, implementation is still very weak due to the insincerity of successive governments.

**SOCIAL (IN)SECURITY: DEVELOPMENTAL IMPLICATIONS IN NIGERIA**

The rising wave of terrorism or terrorist activities has compounded the insecurity problems in Nigeria (Ali 2013). The snowballing effect on the socio-economic environment through business and investment from within and outside the country continues to be negative, hindering other spheres of life. It is in this regard that Omoyibo and Akpomera (2013) noted that the government has failed in ensuring the security and welfare of the people, which has further threatened the coexistence of the diverse ethnic groups living together as a nation, a situation they narrated as contradictory to what is stipulated in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Similarly, regarding the level of criminal activities, the government has not fared well; lives and properties are no longer safe. A confirmation of this is evident in Ewetan and Urhie’s (2014) submission that criminal activities have also contributed to the low ranking of Nigeria in the Global Peace Index in 2012 and onwards.

This is not to say that the Nigerian government has not attempted security in the territory. The problem is that several attempts seem unsuccessful. The international community and multinational organisations have often wielded in on request or as a result of the observable lapses. More often than not countries such as the United States and those in Europe, as well as security intelligence from Israel, are consulted (Ewetan and Urhie 2014) to confront the daunting insecurity challenges which
have seriously affected the nation’s development. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the wave of terrorist activities has not only affected investments but also contributed to the 23.9 per cent increase in unemployment rate since 2011—with a youthful population of over 80 million (over 60 per cent of the total population), with a growth rate of 2.6 per cent every year. The youths have been described as willing to work amidst the lack of employment opportunities due to low investments in an insecure environment. Thus, the nation has also failed in channelling its abundant human resources productively.

In a situation such as this where able-bodied men and women are willing to work, but are not gainfully or meaningfully employed, the question thus arises—how will they survive? How will their needs be met? Answers to these pertinent questions no doubt will reveal that a high number of persons will likely be forced into taking delinquent opportunities and criminal careers for survival, and thus this will swell not only the number of deviants and criminality in country, but also government expenditures in combating criminality (Ikuomola 2017). The implications on the survival of children and youths and family security and social amenities are obvious in statistics. Losses resulting from these insecurity challenges have also been linked with poor health management in the country, due to which women and children are greatly affected. The United Nations Children’s Fund (2016) report shows that Nigeria is the second largest contributor to the death of children/infants (2300 under five years old) and women of child-bearing age (145 deaths per 1000) annually in the world. Poor health outcomes are noticeable also in the way public healthcare centres are managed, access to potable drinking water has become elusive in many communities, electricity supply is either not available or expensive to avail and quality education has become a mirage. Put together realising the key components of Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria becomes impossible, just like the case of the successive set targets in the hitherto Millennium Development Goals (Ewetan and Urhie 2014; Ikuomola et al. 2016; National Bureau of Statistics 2017).

**Unemployment Menace in Nigeria**

The inability to gain employment opportunities in Nigeria has led to economic waste, and the corollary effect on insecurity is worrisome. Apart from the fact that it brings about human suffering, Adebayo and Ogunrinola (2006) also attribute it to the low level of development, as the
country has failed to harness the abundant human resources available for development. Similarly Isamah and Okunola (1997) opined that unemployment is a correlate of several mishaps in the country, some of which are poverty, frustration, gang formation and deviant survival strategies and youth involvement in criminal activities. While Akintoye (2006), identified the nation’s educational system and the over-reliance of modern industries on technology, failure of the government to diversify from an economy that is solely dependent on crude oil over agriculture is another reason. Agriculture he described as having the highest potential of engaging majority of the unemployed (literate and illiterate, skilled and unskilled population) at ago; as well as having the capacity to make the country self-reliant and less dependent on foreign countries for its subsistence. For Ademun (2006), unemployment has brought about low productivity and poor standard of living. Odusola (2001) has earlier noted that most African countries are trapped with unemployment problems which continuously hinder development and foster socio-economic challenges. Transparency International (2005, 2008) has recognised that with the discovery of oil in Nigeria and the accentuation of corruption by successive governments, unemployment problems have become endemic. Similarly the country has not only failed to recover from it lost glory of economic boom but has gradually grown into an economic and politically weak state, which is at its peak of weakness with the emergence of insurgencies and agitations by several separatist movements; thus, there are weakened institutions across states to fight the menace that has ravaged the country (Fund for Peace 2005, 2009; Global Peace Index 2012).

Some Efforts Made at Combating Unemployment in Nigeria

Nigeria, like all developing countries, has been mired by substantial unemployment figures. In the last quarter of 2016, the country’s unemployment rate increased to 14.2 per cent from 10.4 per cent a year earlier. This is a figure regarded as the highest since 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). Research, opinion polls as well as policy speeches indicate that unemployment is considered to be a major problem (Oshiomole 2009; Ikuomola et al. 2016; National Bureau of Statistics 2017). The issue has always been important in different administrations’ economic development efforts and policies. This is one of the ways of stemming the
tide of restiveness and insecurity in the nation. Realising this, the government has been trying to establish structures and programmes to ensure that the country is conducive for youths (most especially for job seekers) to be gainfully engaged by creating jobs as well as doling out other poverty-alleviating measures for citizens. Some of these notable efforts are explained below.

**The Establishment of National Directorate of Employment**

As far back as November 22, 1986, the Nigerian government foresaw the need to establish the National Directorate of Employment, to wedge the envisaged problem of future unemployment problems with the growing population. This was a novel and welcoming idea, meant to intensify developmental programmes for youth employment; capacity-building in the agricultural and agro-allied industries; and vocational skill development programmes for skilled and semi-skilled youths; emphasis was also placed on training opportunities for graduate farmers and small-scale entrepreneurs.

The focal concern on agricultural was to promote youth employment and industrialise the country as quickly as possible, with the help of agricultural professionals in the various state ministries of agriculture, basically to enforce and equip university degree holders and artisans as well as secondary school certificate holders and able-bodied adults to be self-employed and relevant in the economy, be it for production at the farm or agro-allied industries or for the marketing of farm produce. These initiatives as well as implementation and monitoring were well appraised and documented in several gazettes (see Akintoye 2008; National Bureau of Statistics 2017), showing that at a point in time the Nigerian state was on the right track towards development and security of its citizens. However the tale of inadequate funding and neglect in favour of petrochemical industries impaired the capacity and ability of the National Directorate of Employment to function effectively and became moribund. Thus, for about two decades, from 1986, the country struggled and a new initiative was developed called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (NEEDS) to make amends to the lapses observed in the National Directorate of Employment scheme as well as to complement its efforts.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

In March 2004, the Nigerian government established another programme called the National Economic Employment and Development Strategy as one of the several macroeconomic adjustment strategies to alleviate poverty and specifically ameliorate the suffering of the teeming unemployed youths in the country. Adebayo and Ogunrinola, (2006) noted that the target was to generate employment for women and youths and enhance growth and development. Thus, the NEEDS strategic plan was to incorporate the private sector alongside governmental agencies to engineer speedy employment generation and maximise the potential of every citizen in order to be reckoned with in the international community as one of the strongest economic forces in Africa. However, like past schemes and programmes, the NEEDS initiative had no long-term plan; at best it was described as a medium-term scheme which also was not well funded and politicised like others before it. Still the level of unemployment soared like its counterparts in other developing climes (Akintoye 2008; Patterson et al. 2006).

Unlike in the United States, India, Israel and China, where such schemes have been found to be effective, where about 70 per cent of the total population are found in one employment programme or the other, 22.3 per cent in China, 80 per cent in India and 50 per cent in Israel, Eroke (2011) submitted that the failure arose from the neglect of the informal sector, where the bulk of the population is concentrated as a result of the low capacity of the formal sector to accommodate the pool of the unemployed. The foregoing thus means that if the informal sector was well involved and engaged the scheme would have achieved some level of successes in combating the unemployment rate facing the country since the 1990s (Ademu 2006; Khandker 1998). In addition, the informal sector, as a key sector to improving the unemployment problems in Nigeria, is faced with lack of capital, as many individuals are unable to avail loans and financial incentives to kickstart their business plan (Ademu 2006). Microfinance institutions are also faced with the problem of inadequate finance in reaching out to people, as many are faced with the problem of having to bring collateral before financial aid or loans can be given; the issue of needing a guarantor is also another setback for an individual (Akintoye 2008).
Thus, microfinance institutions were saddled with the tasks of ensuring the following.

1. Credit facilities are readily available and easily obtained via softer lending for repayments of loans.
2. There are less bureaucratic bottlenecks in accessing loans in the long and short term.
3. More youths are given credit facilities to venture into farming and agro-allied enterprises.
4. There exist transparency and competitiveness in the recruitment of beneficiaries as well as staff of the institutions.
5. There are viable educative and instructive training programmes and proper monitoring of beneficiaries.

**Pension Schemes as a Social Security Initiative**

The introduction of the pension scheme in Nigeria is dated as far back as the regime of the colonial masters (the British), drawing a clue from events that incapacitated a number of military personnel during the First and the Second World War, due to injuries that were permanent and benefits that had to be paid to their dependents. After independence in 1960, Nigeria kickstarted its own pension scheme with a limited number of workforce and by implication a limited number of programmes. With time there arose the need to reform the public sector to adequately provide a viable pension scheme through the public welfare system (Oluwo 2001).

The first attempt was made to ensure that employees were protected against contingencies that may create a vacuum that will hinder them from being productive after disengagement from the service; thus the Civil Service Pension Scheme and Employers’ Liability Scheme were first, amongst others, established (Onyeonoru 2002; Oluwo 2001). It all began as a non-contributory scheme by both the federal and state government ministries where the pension and benefits were paid by the Civil Service Pension Board. In no time there was a need for reformation in the scheme as the workforce of the civil service increased in numbers as well as the number of aged retiring annually. And it became clear that the non-contributory scheme was no longer feasible and financially unsustainable. There was a shortfall, deficit and reduction in the annual budget allocated for pensioners (Chand and Jaege 1996; Mackenzie et al. 1997, Ogumbameru and Adesina 2000; Onyeonoru 2002; Oluwo 2001).
Thus in 2004, the Nigeria Pension Scheme had to be reformed, creating a shift from the hitherto existing non-contributory scheme inherited from the colonial government, and was commonly adopted by most developing countries in Africa after independence at that time. However, as the wind of globalisation and neoliberal policies started blowing, it was evident that the centre could not hold, and contributory pension scheme was gradually introduced alongside the incorporation of the private sector into the nation’s pension scheme (Onyeonoru 2009). The 2004 pension reforms were firm and well focused on the civil services (state and federal) and the private sector as shown in its stated objectives:

1. to ascertain that employees are guaranteed of their pension immediately after they proceed for retirement (be it voluntary or compulsory retirement);
2. to ensure that there are investment programmes in place prior to retirement, to enable pensioners tackle and adjust to life after retirement; and
3. to put in place a uniform bureaucratic process of administering the new pension scheme in all states of the federation including the Federal Capital Territory and private sector (Onyeonoru 2009).

As stipulated in Section 9, subsection 1 of the Pension Act 2004, the following were extracted:

(a) in the case of the Public Service of the Federation and Federal Capital Territory
   (i) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employer and
   (ii) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employee.
(b) in the case of the military
   (i) a minimum of 12.5 per cent by the employer and
   (ii) a minimum of 2.5 per cent by the employee.
(c) in other cases
   (i) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employer and
   (ii) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employee.

The above section no doubt clearly shows a neoliberal framework which often emphasises the need for the private sector to be active in the pension scheme, with the popular concept of the ‘pay as you go’ system, which simply means that people should be compensated based on the number of
years they have put in service. This system was highly welcomed but marred with compliance issues, most especially from the private sector, and corruption from the public pension commission, leading to large evasions and hence the inability to meet the objectives for which it was established; thus, there was a need to subsequently repeal the 2004 Pension Reform Act.

A decade after (precisely on July 1, 2014), the president at that time in the person of Goodluck Jonathan finally assented to the bill of a reform to the Pension Act of 2004. Like the former, it was also geared towards enhancing the speedy payment of pension to pensioners as at when due, most especially to alleviate suffering pensioners and contributors categories as spendthrift in order to secure their livelihood thereafter disengagement or if able they can become productive by employing their pension into any small-scale business. The 2014 Act was highly commended, though some of the amendments introduced were said to have been too hasty; thus, several lacunae were evident, as a number of items were not well spelt out in principle and in practice. Excerpts from the 2014 Act reveal the following ambiguities.

1. Multiple interpretations of exemptions from tax. It is clearly stated that any income in the form of profits or interests from investments from the contributory fund should not be taxed. However, in the event warranting the pensioner to withdraw from the fund, it is expected not to be subjected to tax still, with the caveat that it must be a withdrawal made within five years of pension. Issues on the amount of withdrawal were not well spelt out as well as the implications it may have on the general fund if withdrawal goes uncontrolled.

2. The division of the pension fund into retirement savings and deposit accounts. From the above there is also the issue of where withdrawal should be made—is it from the deposit or savings accounts? This is in spite of the fact that employees who are disengaged before they attain the compulsory age of retirement (often 65 years or 35 years in service) are allowed to withdraw (an amount not more than 25 per cent of the entire savings) from their account(s) insofar as they are unable to secure employment four months after disengagement.

3. Options of selecting any Pension Fund Administrator (PFA) by the employee. The Act empowered employees to enjoy the free will to choose any PFA of their choice. The problem this freedom brought was that in a single ministry the employer was exposed to many
PFAs; thus, difficulties and excuses arose of how to disburse funds to the plethora of PFAs, as well as the cost involved in dealing with too many of them unlike in the past where it was the employer who stipulated the PFA for the employees.

4. Right to investment pension funds. The 2014 Act also empowers the PFA to operate and administer pension funds as an investment with other financial institutions. Thus the pension scheme is seen as an avenue to make profit. The ultimate question is profit for whom? Little wonder the number of PFA scouting for employees as well as customers have since multiplied.

5. Stipulated penalties for defaulters. The new Act clearly states a ten-year-imprisonment and a fine of triple the amount that was mismanaged or misappropriated, as well as the forfeiture of assets and properties traced to the unlawful use of the pension fund. Where the PFA is found wanting to use the pension fund to meet the company’s financial obligations, the Act stipulates a ten million naira fine upon conviction, a five million naira fine for personal use by a director in the company or a term of five years or both in prison.

6. Creation of a pension protection fund (PPF). This is an annual 1 per cent subvention on the monthly wage bill payable to employees in the public sector and safeguards contributors in an event of deficit in the investment of the pension fund. There is free will enjoyed by the pension commission to determine the 1 per cent intermittently.

7. Internal wrangling, conflict and dispute resolution. The settlement of disputes or grievances and other internal wrangling was compulsorily left to be handled by the hitherto Arbitration and the Investment and Securities Tribunal; however, in the 2014 ACT, the employer of PFA is free to seek redress beyond the Tribunal (Oyedele 2014).

Notwithstanding the changes brought into the 2014 Pension Act, it has been affected by the following loopholes.

a. The 2014 Pension Act was marked with delay in commencement. The delay in signing it into law also meant that there was little or no time to adequately test run and transit from the 2004 Act. In reality, employers were unable to speedily adjust to the scheme.

b. The inclusion of the private sector into the Nigerian pension scheme was welcomed in all ramifications; however, the modification of terms and conditions in the 2014 Act meant that only
employers with 15 or more employees will be allowed to participate. Participation in the previous Act was pegged at employers with five or more employees. By implication, this resulted in fewer employer and employee registration with the pension commission and PFA thereafter in scope and in coverage.

c. One of the loopholes was the 2014 Act stipulating that contributions by employers should be based on employees’ monthly wages without a clear-cut breakdown of the allowance component of wages (e.g. housing and medical allowances). By implication a number of employers are to contribute heavily to the PFA, if these deductions are not made. It took a long period for employers to eventually settle on an agreed formula to determine what is to be contributed.

d. It was eventually agreed that both employers and employees are to contribute 7.5 per cent each from their basic salary, housing and transport allowance components. On the part of employers, it was discovered that initially many were not in favour of 7.5 per cent, considering it on the higher side. For those who could not afford it, they were left with no option other than to rationalise the staff strength of their workforce (Oyedele 2014). Thus, again most employers could not effectively participate.

From the above challenges and teething problems in the formal industry, regarding pension and old-age security for workers, Nigeria is still left with over 95 per cent of its workers socially insured after retirement. Of the 60 million Nigerians of working age, there are only 2.4 million employees that are captured in the pension scheme in 2014 (Oyedele 2014). To alleviate some of these problems the federal government in 2016 launched new job creation and empowerment initiatives and a social welfare programme to ease the suffering of the ‘poorest of the poor’, where 500,000 graduate teachers were employed to teach in primary schools across Nigeria and others in various ministries as supporting staff. The programme is still very much in its embryonic stage and difficult to assess. This is one of the laudable programmes of the Muhammadu Buhari-led administration called the N-Power programme. In the long run it is meant to empower young university and polytechnic graduates to be self-employed and be a solution provider in any community they find themselves in.
A Clue from the Nordic Countries

There is no doubt as research has shown that the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden have been leading examples when it comes to pension reforms and social security policies; though a reference to these models has a socialist outlook, it is one which Nigeria can take a clue from, incorporating and investing pension funds for national development. In Finland, for example, the pension fund was made available after a severe civil war that almost crippled the nation, to boost the economy industrially. Kangas (2008) noted that the nationally funded pension programme of 1937 was used to provide the country with electricity. Similarly in 1961, the scheme also served to industrialise the rural end of Finland, and the 1966 municipal pension fund was utilised in providing housing. In no time Finland was transformed from being rural to being industrial in every aspect. These were also replicated in Sweden, Norway and Denmark with similar outcomes. It is suggested that the Nigerian government can embrace these strategies as adopted in the Nordic countries. If wholeheartedly adopted, there is no doubt that the snowballing effect will contribute in no small measures to the security of lives and properties as well as guarantee employment, rural-urban transformation and the general well-being of people in Nigeria.

Conclusion

An overview of the security situation in Nigeria shows that there are a lot more problems to be tackled beyond the current insurgency threats and sectarian violence. As highlighted, issues of unemployment, corruption and inconsistencies in economic and social policies have impacted negatively on lives and properties, contributing to the high level of insecurity since independence. Thus, socio-economic development has been hindered vis-à-vis the social institutions to tackle the menace; often the country is left at the mercies of foreign agencies and government for assistance. Foreign investments to create and alleviate poverty are on the decline and the corollary effect is unpleasant. It is expected that Nigeria as a nation should incorporate social policies that are not only realistic, but also of benefit to all Nigerians irrespective of the divide, demographic and location. Be it rural or urban, religious affiliation and formal or informal sectors, everybody within the geographical space should be targeted for good. If the welfare of everyone is captured, there will be a strong commitment
to the Nigerian project of ensuring adequate security that will foster a true sense of a nation state.

In conclusion, the issue is not just ‘social (in)security or social policy for development’ but developing and implementing social security policies within which measures are coherently embedded. That is to say policies on the basics of life, agriculture, health, education, employment, housing and security, among others, should complement and enhance one another. This will no doubt have a snowballing effect on the incessant insecurity being witnessed in Nigeria. A clue from the Nordic countries will no doubt be of help in realising this goal, in both the short and long run. The foregoing discussion on the social (in)security and the challenges of internal security management in Nigeria leads one to the submission that politically, institutionally and in terms of peace and security, the country as a state and as a people is in a flux. Nigerian security challenges are intertwined and complex, as evident in most of the happenings, changes and threats that are destabilising policies and effective governance, which cannot be addressed in isolation. Therefore, multiple and institutional efforts are deemed necessary.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 28

Gender and Nigeria’s Internal Security Management

Aituaje Irene Pogoson and Moses Ugbobi Saleh

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary security concerns have become dominant in the international arena. This phenomenon has been attributed to the obvious diversities in relations, which have influenced states’ and citizens’ relationships. On 29 May 1999, democratic government was inaugurated in Nigeria. Considering the nasty experiences of the previous military regimes in the country, the inauguration of democratic government resuscitated the battered hope for drastic changes in the polity and political stability of the country. Nigeria’s national security was at the brink of collapse before the inauguration of democratic government that was led by former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Immediately, Nigeria began to experience increasing violence across states, local areas and communities. These crises were communal, religious and political in nature, which have threatened national security and cohesion. Security agencies in the country, especially the Nigerian Police which is the lead security agency handling internal security,
have shown to be overwhelmed by these threats. This is the reason why the military is involved in internal security operations in many locations across the country. In carrying out their operational responsibilities, these security operatives and agencies have been alleged to have violated or being involved in human rights abuses. Gender rights and issues are of priority in security operations anywhere in the world. Security is not just for the strong, but it is also for the weak or vulnerable in the society, which the management of internal security in Nigeria cannot avoid.

This chapter extends the perception of security beyond the conventional understanding of security to examine dynamics of gender in internal security management. In this context, gender is not primarily about women only, but about men and women in terms of the diverse roles, characteristics and behaviours that are expected by the society (Scott 1986; UNSSR 2012). There are numerous and critical gender issues that can contribute to the process of identifying strands of crimes and criminality that could possibly be committed by women, girls, men and boys. These crime indicators are normally measured through elements like age, disability, gender, ethnicity and class, which are crucial to the understanding of security (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). In this regard, giving prime consideration to gender issues in internal security management is crucial to efficient and sustainable national security.

**Conceptualizing Internal Security Management, Gender and Theoretical Insights**

There are two major discourses which straddle around internal security management and gender. The eventual termination of Cold War and the succeeding world order of multipolarism that reconfigured international relations appear to have enlarged the domain of international security. Transformation in world order and the enthronement of diverse power centres and players drastically altered the narrow understanding of security (Olusola 2016). Multipolar security challenges have been broadened to encompass factors which straddle around diverse security concerns. Feminism is about the theorization of women’s plight in the society. It believes that the realist approach to national security, with emphasis on protection of sovereignty of the state and territory, appears to deprioritize or undermine other layers of violence and insecurity (Enloe 1980).
Gender roles are often associated with conflict that culminate to negative consequences for women and men. This explains why it is imperative for gender-oriented scholars to investigate the intersections between gender and conflict or crime in the society (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). A rapporteur of gender scholars posits that issues around security and conflict management are the centre point of gender. This explains why Hoogensen and Stuvoy (2006) narrate that war fighting is a decision because the question of who, how and where war must be fought and victims of war are all within the domain of security and conflict management (cited in Romaniuk 2009).

The concept of security threat is a bone of contention among scholars, which they argue is hazy and amorphous. This argument was further strengthened by the analysis that what constitutes security threat is fluid and dynamic, that what constitutes threats in communities varies in time and space. Discussions on security were formally restricted to the domain of war and peace, but other forms of threats like cyber-attacks were not really captured by this conception. State’s capability entails the mobilization of resources (soft and hard powers) to defend the territorial enclave of the state against any form of insurrections and aggression targeting the existence of the state (Baldwin 1997; Wolfers 1952; Buzan 1984, 1992; Sheehan 2005). The major conception was threat of violence and the capacity to successfully deploy the machinery of state forces against the enemy to stop any form of aggression (Rourke 2005). Within the purview of internal security, law-enforcement agencies are mandated to provide requisite security guarantee to the state. The unfolding international security challenges, especially characterized by insurgency and terrorism, have shown that relying entirely on the security approach utilized in the old order that was characterized by two blocs of West and East may not be appropriate in contemporary security issues where states have become more vulnerable than ever. Multipolar order has altered the former security threat conundrum which has been broadened to encompass other elements like human rights, the environment, drug trafficking, epidemics, crime or social injustice. Other vices include underdevelopment, inequality, lack of political accountability and good governance.

Security is not just the capacity and capability of a state to defend itself from external aggression, but the ability to tame myriad of threats within its domain (Pogoson 2013). This type of security connotes that there is
need for the involvement of other components of security which include economic, political and environmental, as well as food, to provide the required effect (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

According to Hettne (2010), the domain of security is very complex and diverse, which to a large extent interferes with precision due to existing social relations from rural to the international stage. In rural communities, security concern encompasses the involvement of citizens in contributing to the conditions leading to precise estimation of security outcomes (Katsina 2012). In other words, the enthronement of a favourable socio-economic condition is vital to regulating behaviours of citizens and enhancing security.

Gender security and conflict management are central to the entire security architecture, with much focus on inclusion and protection of the vulnerable in the society. This is important because, in places where inclusion is demanded by vulnerable and excluded groups, response to such demands in some societies in the developing world could be brutal through the use of force to injure and kill victims (Mobekk 2010). The major concern of gender security is about addressing known and emerging security threats to women and girls who are mostly vulnerable in a violent and conflict environment. This explains why the United Nations Security Council Resolution (2012) note that in any violent environment, the level of security threats differs from each other; therefore, the kind of security threats that confronts women and girls are quite different from men and boys. In this sense, women and girls must be included in the security architecture to participate in planning and implementation to ensure adequate security satisfaction to each group. For instance, the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) stipulates in Chapter 2, Section 14 subsections (2) (b) that the protection of lives and property shall be the primary responsibility of government. This section of the constitution identified security as the essence of government and governance because nothing in terms of development can take place in any environment that is volatile and unsafe for human interactions. The concerns are about ensuring that gender equality perspectives are incorporated into all norm, policy and standard-setting initiatives, including in the areas of safety and security. However, as much as it is about the security of human population, the cry of the people is often neglected or not valued by leaders (Puri 2015).
SECURITIZATION THEORY

According to Buzan et al. (1998), the international security architecture got transformed significantly due to the termination of Cold War which hitherto defined security relations among states in the international system. This transformation evokes new threats that are diverse and complex, which the old order was no longer adequate to deal with effectively. This explains why the Copenhagen thought on security was taken further to encompass other issues that sustain security threats which were not considered as relevant to security discourse. These issues have the capacity to disrupt logical analysis on security (Sulovic 2010). As Weaver (2000) noted earlier, these issues have great influence on security; therefore, it should be given adequate attention if security challenges must be addressed from a broader perspective. However, security threats evoke concern and also raise questions if force or military strategy is adequate and should be deployed to all security threats when discovered (Buzan et al. 1998).

FEMINIST PEACE AND CONFLICT THEORY

The twenty-first century heralded pacifist movements and gender advocacy, which propelled feminists to relate issues that characterize wars to gender abuse. They interrogated earlier position that gender dynamics in relation to war are interrelated which was evident in different conflicts and revolutions that the world has witnessed in human history (Wollstonecraft 1792). Women suffer exclusion in different ways, especially in denial of citizenship status, which confers rights and privileges; this is the bane of women’s agitations and protest in different climes. This explains the issue of women’s rights and would continue to agitate the minds of people because conflict and war are seen as the continuation of man’s penchant to dominate and control women in all spheres (Bertha 1990). In this sense, violence against women at the home front or domestic level is nothing but the continuation of the differences that exist between men and women. In accordance to the doctrine of pacifism, innocent persons who suffered from violence and wars provide the needed moral compass for the mobilization of the entire community to demand for change and other vices that led to the war.

In this context, it is noted that the innocent and vulnerable groups, which are mostly women and children, could be the target of the enemy if it becomes difficult to hit opposing combatants. This approach to war has
caused severe pain and destruction to many communities that have wit-
nessed war where vulnerable members of their families and communities
have been killed and taken as prisoners of war where they are abused sexu-
ally and exploited.

According to Tickner (2001), women are not mostly combatants in
 war, which explains why the nature and character of the effects of conflict
and war on women are significantly different from men. Women suffer
more psychological effect of war than men. Further explanation indicates
that about 90% of the victims of conflicts and wars are women and chil-
dren (Blanchard 2003).

As observed by Puri (2015), it is important to have a clear articulation
of all the gender-related issues that might encompass security; have a clear
articulation of all security regulations and decisions that might compro-
mise the adequate and specific needs of women; and discuss its manifesta-
tions at physical and psychological levels of insecurity for women—where
and why are women insecure? Where and why do women have a percep-
tion of insecurity? How can security forces address this? What creates fear
and intimidation and erosion of trust and constructive relations? What are
the warning signs and how may they be addressed, specifically for women?
How do country’s settings impact how the security system responds to the
security challenges? These entire questions cannot be adequately addressed
by conventional security architecture of a state, therefore, requiring a mul-
tipronged approach which is encompassing and holistic in nature.

**Overview of Nigeria’s Internal Security Situations**

Internal security situation of nations is of major concern to the interna-
tional community as well as domestic security discourses (Obi 1997;
Tyoden 2005). Irrespective of the regime type in control of governmental
powers within a state and the power configuration in the global arena, the
preoccupation of national or internal security has not diminished in impor-
tance since the emergence of the state system. Within the nation state
framework, whether it is military authoritarian regimes or democratic gov-
ergums, considerations surrounding national security are at the apogee of
the hierarchy of states’ national interest. At the core of these considerations
are the twin issues of regime survival and the preservation of the territorial
integrity of the state system. In Nigeria, as similar to post-colonial states, it
is a complex web of many groups which encompass ethnic, cultural and
religious, therefore, polarizing the country along these lines of differences.
Violent conflict threatens internal security of the country, and, to a large extent, these threats are sustained by parochial interest of individuals and groups within and outside the country (Otite 2004; Fayeye 2012).

Nigeria’s internal security architecture is overstretched due to the avalanche of security threats from different parts of the country where security personnel are required for urgent deployment to prevent escalation. According to Onuoha (2012), there are many violent groups in Nigeria that threaten internal security across the country, which include Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Oduduwa Peoples Congress (OPC), and Boko Haram as well as the emerging group in eastern Nigeria known as the Indigenous People of Biafra. Security situation in the country is still fragile and calls for serious concern (Dambazau 2014).

Beginning from 1999, when Nigeria transited from military to civilian government, evolving developments suggest that the country’s national security has been facing considerable internal security threats which is supported by spate of violence and killings recorded across the country (Dambazau 2014). In addition, other security challenges or issues cause violence such as the Fulani herdsmen and farmers’ conflict across the country. Attempts by security agencies to contain these challenges do not appear to be effective. These security challenges also have gender implications. Indeed, the distinct security concerns of women tend to be marginalized and, in some cases, exacerbated. Conflict-related atrocities are inflicted upon non-combatants who are largely women and children and those who are categorized as ‘innocent’ in the conflict-constructed contexts of rationality and irrationality who have served as pawns in the warfare process through systematic rape, forced prostitution and intimidation as well as disappearances and attacks on the enemy carried out through attacks on their women. All these have become horrifyingly common, even expectedly, in front-line accounts of armed conflicts (Nordstrom 1997 and Leahy 1997 cited in Zotto 2002). Gender is concerned with social inclusion, which encompasses how men and women interrelate with each other on a daily basis even in situation of violence (Scott 1986).

According to Enemou (1999), gender evokes certain characteristics and expectations in terms of how women and men should behave and respond to issues. These behaviours are acquired through learning process that are supported by culture and norms. Contrary behaviour to acceptable behaviours and norms could be interpreted as insubordination, especially if the person is a woman (UNDP 1986). In the South-West, armed
robbers are on the rampage, while in the North, cross-border bandits and terrorists operate. Further, in other parts of the country like the South-South and South-Eastern Nigeria, kidnapping is on the rise where even the aged people, women and children are not spared. Violence and criminality in Nigeria have manifested in different forms across the country (Onuoha 2012). Insecurity takes various forms in different parts of the country with great gender implications. Gender is inseparable from conflict in which women often found themselves alone, left to care for their children, relatives, friends and even strangers.

**Gender Considerations in Internal Security Situations in Nigeria**

Internal security management and operations entail security operations which are designed and implemented by security operatives within a country to safeguard security from identified security threats. Such security operatives could involve Police, Immigration, Civil Defence and other paramilitary operatives in the country. Some threats manifest in the form of riots, violent killings and others (Azinge 2013). Maintenance of law and order is the core function of Police, which is clearly stated in Section 4 of the Police Act. Religious and ethnic conflicts as well as insurgency and terrorism have combined to overwhelm the police, thereby requiring the need to engage the military in internal security operations across the country (Zainab-Brown 2014).

The Nigerian military is presently deployed to address internal security problems across the country. Whilst the police are constitutionally mandated as the leading security agency to attend to internal security problems, the military is brought in to stabilize the situation and thereafter retreat to focus on other national threats, especially external aggression. According to Nigeria’s Constitution 1999, the Section 217 stipulates responsibility of the military. It empowers the President of the country to deploy the military with the ratification of legislature to any location that is threatened by insecurity (Azinge 2013).

According to Zainab-Brown (2014), beyond the core function of the military which is to defend the country against external aggression, it can still provide internal security to the country, especially when security threats overwhelm the police and other security operatives. This explains why Okoli and Orinya (2013) posit that the security threats in the country are enormous and overwhelming for the police alone to handle. The need
to draft the military to quell threats and killings in the country is very important. The increasing deployment of the military to not less than 28 states in the country was criticized by the speaker, House of Representatives, describing it as unacceptable (Premium Times 2017).

The gender considerations of these operations are, in most cases, not properly considered before operations are launched. This explains why the issue of human rights violations and abuse of women and children are not typically perceived as a challenge in internal security management in Nigeria. Women and girls are assaulted and raped by security personnel with impunity (Ihayere et al. 2014). In the political realm, electoral politics in Nigeria is not free from violence, and women face significant gender-based vulnerabilities. In the year prior to the elections, Nigeria experienced more political violence than it had during its previous election cycle in 2011, when over 1000 fatalities were reported.

During the presidential election, an attack by Boko Haram killed 41 people, including a legislator and two voters, and scared hundreds away from the polls (The Huffington Post 2015). Additionally, 66 cases of violence during elections were recorded by the Independent National Electoral Commission. However, violence against women in politics and in elections often goes unreported and unmonitored, but it remains a troubling issue with far-reaching implications for democracy, human rights, gender equality and security.

**Gender Implications of Nigeria’s Internal Security Management**

Internal security management and security challenges are collectively undertaken by security agencies towards the restoration of law and order in the society. Some of these activities undertaken by security agencies include crowd dispersal, guarding vulnerable points, guarding important persons, taking over and controlling areas, road blocks, setting up control points, domination of rooftops, patrolling, sweeps, cordon and search, picketing, ambushes, tracking, curfew, counter-insurgency and counterterrorism.

While this operational activity by security agencies has gender implications, most violence and crises are triggered by men due to irreconcilable differences between them. When security operations of this nature are launched, women and children suffer more due to their vulnerability in a crisis situation. Women may lose their husbands, sons and daughters, businesses and other forms of economic activities during times of violence.
For instance, when a curfew is imposed on any community, women and children suffer most; restriction of movement hampers the women from going to the market and farms to get food items and other things for the family. To expatiate further, case studies of the synergy between internal security situations and gender in Nigeria are examined below.

**Gender and Internal Security Situations in Nigeria: Some Case Studies**

**The Niger Delta**: Niger Delta women perform a lot of tasks, especially those in farming and fishing as well as other economic activities to support their families. Therefore, women are largely affected directly by any unpleasant situation in the region. Nonetheless, women have been active in the struggle against repression of which many of them have paid Supreme price for rights agitations with their lives. Women are indiscriminately assaulted and terrorized by security personnel for challenging what appears not to be right. In this sense, there are increasing cases of widowhood and rape which have been alleged to be perpetrated by members of security personnel operating in the Niger Delta. According to Ogunniran (2007) and Ihayere et al. (2014) noted that due to harsh conditions confronting the people of the Niger Delta, husbands have significantly abdicated their matrimonial responsibilities to their wives which have added more burden to the women.

**The Odi Invasion**: Several days of military operations in Odi were very brutal, leading to destruction of some notable infrastructures such as church buildings and sacred halls as well as medical outfits in the area (Dode 2012). At the end of combat operations, the military embarked on mop-up operations to clear the remnants of perceived militants in the community. Several years later, no independent and open inquiry has been instituted to investigate the killings of civilians and unarmed individuals who were victims of military operations in the area. Even after many years of Odi community invasion by the military, that community is still in ruins (Dode 2012). It was noted that about 375 persons in Odi lost their lives during the operation and the majority of the victims were women and children. Besides the spate of killings which characterized the operations in Odi, it was also alleged that there was an increase in the raping of women and young girls by security personnel in the area and was later supported and sustained by increase in prostitution by young girls to survive as they had lost their means of income to the invasion. Some security
personnel employed by the oil companies as well as national security personnel operating in the region were involved in the act of sex for money which exploited the vulnerability of women in the region. In some instances, women were taken as hostages from their homes at night.

**Zaki-Biam Invasion by the Military**

More people have been displaced in Benue State not just as a result of recent crises, but because there have been a series of crisis in the state for a long time. For instance, Zaki-Biam is one of the towns in Benue state which was invaded by Nigeria’s military on the allegation that the town harbours militant groups rampaging communities and threatening national security. Military operation in this area was noted to be very brutal with many civilians and unarmed individuals killed in that operation and where a large number of victims were alleged to be women and children who were mostly vulnerable during conflicts and violence.

**Boko Haram Insurgency and Terrorism in Nigeria’s North-East**

The entire North-Eastern part of Nigeria has been under siege of insurgency and terrorism orchestrated by the terror group popularly referred to as Boko Haram since 2009. Thousands have been killed by the terror group due to guerrilla tactics (Alfred 2015). This deadly group has severely threatened Nigeria’s security by their violent activities which include killing of civilians using improvised explosive devices, kidnapping especially young schoolgirls and so on. This reaffirms the earlier claims in terms of a number of girls kidnapped and taken captive by the group and demanding for ransom from the government before release (Human Rights Watch 2016).

**Fulani Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict in Nigeria**

The Nigeria Watch project, domiciled at the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA), Ibadan, with rich and extensive database on violent conflicts in Nigeria as of 2014, attributed over 615 violent deaths out of over 61,214 violence-related fatalities to cattle grazing alone (Olayoku 2014). This may be the reason why the Nigerian military described the violent Fulani herdsmen as Boko Haram collaborators (McGregor 2014). Fulani herdsmen are on rampage across the
country killing, maiming and raping young girls and women in many communities where violence perpetrated by herdsmen was recorded in the country.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria’s internal security has been quite challenging. Internal security management is fundamental because it could determine to a large extent the preservation of the state and the survival of the government. Decisions on the management or deployment of state security apparatuses to different locations where threats are noticed or reported, in most cases, were not holistic and inclusive. Women and children suffer most in any violence, yet decisions on security issues may not consider their opinion or plights. Violence against women continues unabated in many homes and communities across the country, which violates the human rights of women as well as the manifestations of gender inequality and discrimination. Globally, 35% of women have been subjected to some form of physical or sexual abuse in their lifetime. This is one of those issues that affect all women, regardless of their culture, religion, nationality, education, income level and position at work or in society. This happens at home, at work, in public spaces and even through technology in cyberspace (Puri 2015). The impact of violence against women is multiple in nature, which makes violence one of the biggest threats to women’s existence.

Also, many human rights abuses are perpetrated by security personnel with impunity. Abuses such as assault and rape are commonly reported by the public against security personnel where justice to victims is rare. Some security measures such as curfew, cordon and search, ambushes, patrols and sweeps are carried out without considering the impact of these measures on gender. Women in crises situation are more concerned and active than men in terms of providing for their children and family; curfew and other measures restrict women’s movements to markets and farms, thereby leaving them and their families in more pain and agony.

The management of internal security can no longer be understood from a linear perspective; it has to be broad and encompassing to adequately deal with new and emerging threats to national security, especially as it concerns women. Evidently, when it comes to security issues, women have a different set of needs and concerns than men. These concerns must be given adequate attention in decision-making if security in all ramifications is to effectively and adequately provided to all in the society.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER 29

Youth and Nigeria’s Internal Security Management

Moses M. Duruji, Faith O. Olanrewaju, and Favour U. Duruji-Moses

INTRODUCTION

One of the major banes of Nigeria’s development is the problem of insecurity and youth restiveness that spans across the length and breadth of the country (Ewetan and Urhie 2014). The problem of insecurity includes the menace of ethnic militias across the country, militancy in the Niger Delta, insurgency in the north, kidnapping, herdsmen menace, armed robbery and cultism, which is prevalent in almost all parts of the country. However, it is imperative to note that the government and other partners of national development architecture recognise that national security is a precondition for sustaining the survival, growth and development of a state. Another important fact that is worthy of note is that the army of unemployed and idle youth population around the country have been easy recruits and perpetrators of insecurity across the country (Duruji 2008). The government believes that these challenges of insecurity need to be tackled as panacea to the socio-economic development of the country.
It is believed that when the idle youth population are engaged in meaningful economic activities, then the incentive to engage in crime and criminality will be reduced, thereby creating an atmosphere of peace (Koripamo-Agary 2010). Arising from this, this study examined whether the empowerment programmes such as Amnesty Programme, YouWin and N-Power, among others, have provided adequate economic opportunities for the youth and the militias in the region. This chapter analyses the challenges that have hindered the effectiveness of the programmes. Lastly, the chapter investigates whether the youth empowerment programmes have reduced security challenges in Nigeria. Data for the analysis were sourced largely from documentary materials and analysed descriptively.

**THE CONCEPT OF YOUTH**

Like other concepts in the Social Sciences, there are a myriad of meanings attached to or given to the concept “youth”. However, despite the diversities, they all reflect some common features such as people falling within a particular age group, a state of mind, the quality of being young, a time or era of transiting from childhood to adulthood (Ikelegbe 1998, 2006; Maududi 1989). Nugent (2005, p. 2) defines youth as all the people between ages 10 and 24. This covers a wide range of experiences and transitions that include an early phase (between ages 10 and 14), a middle phase (between 15 and 20), and a later phase (between 21 and 24). Still using similar pattern of introducing numerical figures to the definition, the United Nations, for statistical purposes, defines those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 as youth without prejudice to other definitions by Member States. According to Hornby, youth stage of life occurs when a person is young, especially the time before a child becomes an adult. Similarly, Ikelegbe (2006, p. 24) posits that “youth ordinarily is a category of early adulthood, emerging in activity and involvement in society but somewhat limited by societal values and some levels of dependency and perhaps agency”.

Adepoju (2012) and Chukuezi (2009) aver that youth are the breakers and makers of societies. This view is collaborated by Honwana and De Boeck (2005) who argued that the youth are makers of any society and sources of resilience and resistance as well as a potent political force. Adding to this positive dimension of the roles the youth play in the society, De Boeck (1999) posits that youth are bearers of ingenious politics of identity and via inventive forms of self-realisation mechanisms make themselves and
the society they live in. Discussing the negative impacts this social group has on the society, Adepoju (2012) argues that they constitute a significant ratio of societal deviants that break social norms, rules and conventions, destroy infrastructure and kill. According to Chukuezi (2009), there are two-dimensional statuses of youth in the society. In the first place, they (youth) can constitute a reservoir of energy and dynamism for any national struggle or campaign if they are correctly guided, mobilised and fully integrated into the social fabric of the nation. Second, they may also constitute a threat to national survival and stability if they are allowed to drift, are unemployed, undisciplined and morally bankrupt (cited in Adepoju 2012).

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN NIGERIA

The problem of insecurity in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era when there were sporadic outbursts of crisis in some parts of the country, notably the Jos riots of 1945 and the Kano riot of 1953, which erupted following disagreement and misunderstanding among politicians who were at the forefront of the independence movement in the country (Adinlofu 2009). Also, the activities of pirates in the high seas in the Niger Delta contributed to the insecurity that bedevilled the country at that time. Likewise, intermittent outbreaks of religious uprising, particularly in the northern part of the country, have become perennial, prominent among them was the Maitatsine riots and the Sharia crisis in Kaduna State (Adinlofu 2009).

After independence, other challenges of insecurity ravaging the country include the activities of militants and youth restiveness in the Niger Delta that occasionally cripple the flow of crude oil from the region. The spate of kidnapping across the country has also become worrisome for the government. There are also spates of communal strife and tensions across the country, leading to sacking of communities and displacement. The most recent phenomenon is the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast region and the menace of Fulani herdsmen invading farming communities in the middle belt and southern parts of the country (Ogunbiyi 2016).

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Internal security of a nation state centres on ensuring peace and order within its territorial boundaries. It is a situation where institutions of the state such as police or at extreme times the military are able to uphold the laws of such state and, by so doing, create an environment for civil order,
thus enabling governmental and civil activities to be carried out smoothly (Jennings et al. 2006). In most countries, the responsibility of managing internal security is usually handled by the police, which act to prevent or contain civil disorder, violent riots or even armed insurgency. National internal security can also be said to be threatened when there is prevalence of crime (petty or organised), unrest (political or industrial) and domestic terrorism (Francis et al. 2015).

Though individuals of other ages could be found engaging in these acts that compromise internal security, there is a consensus in literature that youth population largely dominate the age bracket who engage in these acts.

There are many ways of managing internal security, including the use of coercive instruments or through the use of empowerment strategies. The coercive perspective to internal security management focuses on the use of appropriate force to either prevent a threat to internal security or restore order where disruption has occurred. The show of force would deter deviants’ behaviours that may plunge nation states into internal security challenges (Mireanu 2014). These perspectives also involve the use of the youth as informants of security operatives, to build intelligence that can be used to nip threats in the bud (Mireanu 2014). The formation of vigilante groups, mostly managed by the youth of threatened communities, also fits into this perspective.

The other perspective to internal security management is to focus on the empowerment of the youth as a way of creating disincentives for actions that threaten the security and peace of the society. In Nigeria, there are a good number of these empowerment programmes aimed at lifting youth out of poverty, thereby reducing the number that can be recruited into crime.

**The Strategy of Youth Empowerment in the Management of Internal Security in Nigeria**

Empowerment is a process of upliftment instituted to enable individuals to acquire the capacity to take care of their needs. According to Page and Czuba (1999), it is a social process that helps people gain control over their own lives. Page and Czuba (1999) further argue that empowerment is a process that fosters power or capacity in people, to control the own lives, communities and society, to enable them independently decide on issues of their lives. From the perspective of Page and Czuba (1999),
empowerment is multidimensional in the sense that it occurs within socio-
logical, psychological and economic, among others. They equally posit
that empowerment is a social process that occurs at various levels, such as
individual, group and community. This explains the concepts of youth
empowerment, which are programmes tailored towards developing the
young adults in the society to acquire the power or capacity that gives
them control over their lives. Thus, youth empowerment could be seen as
a situation whereby youth gain the skills to impact their own lives and lives
of other individuals, organisations and communities (YES 2017).

According to Small and Memmo (2004), there have been shifts over
the past decades in the efforts to support healthy development and inte-
gration of the youth into the community. As part of the strategies of man-
aging internal security, nation states and governments have devised means
of keeping the youth off the streets. At first, efforts were tailored towards
risk-based preventive approaches, which included the fostering of healthy
youth development and capacity building that involved active community
participants but contemporary efforts have focused on youth empower-
ment (Small and Memmo 2004). Empowerment under this context rep-
resents a multilevel construct of practical approaches and applications,
social action processes, and individual and collective actions. In other
words, individuals, families, organisations and communities gain control
and mastery within the social, economic and political context of their lives
in other to improve equity and quality of life (Rappaport 1987;
Zimmerman 2000).

**Models of Youth Empowerment**

There are different models of youth empowerment that have been de-
veloped in the literature, under which policies and programmes can be
mapped out to empower the youth as strategies of internal security man-
age ment. One such model is the Adolescent Empowerment Cycle (AEC),
which aims to prevent a sense of rolelessness and enhancement of self-
estee m. Chinman and Linney (1998) describe AEC as a development pro-
cess of social bonding that is aimed at achieving skill development and
reinforcement, thereby helping to prevent youth from engaging in nega-
tive social activities that threaten the security of the society.

Another model of youth empowerment is the Youth Development and
Empowerment (YD&E) developed to bring about programmes that pre-
vent risky behaviours such as substance abuse. Kim et al. (1998) posits that
YD&E process is designed to enhance positive social bonding that prepares the youth for participation in the socio-economic and public affairs of their community. A typical YD&E platform recognises the youth as assets and resource for the social affairs and advancement of their community. In YD&E, youth are made to engage with representatives of social agencies and organisations in a community-based task force programmes. The roles of the task force include provision of leadership, expertise and resources to youth teams participating in community service projects. The teams in YD&E programmes are divided in pairs and then trained to acquire core skills, in team building, communication, problem-solving and interpersonal social skills. In turn, the youth-adult pair are to duplicate what they acquired in other youth teams as they work together to produce team-determined service projects. The YD&E projects, according to Kim et al. (1998), must have career-building potential, designed to address local social concerns. These YD&E processes reinforce shared responsibilities among the team members who engage in regular presentations to the task forces, thus creating values to their communities.

The third model is the Transactional Partnering Model which involves a situation where adult practitioners assist youth participants in assessing their own quality of life through initiatives that generates solutions (Cargo et al. 2003). This model lays emphasis on interrelatedness of individual- and community-level empowerment outcome. Transactional Partnering Model aims at the youth taking control of their lives by emphasising youth responsibility and voicing out their opinion, as well as making decisions and taking action to achieve their goal. The essence is to expose the youth to possibilities and problems that are within safe and supportive environment. The expectation being that engagement and reflection would lead to learning and empowerment.

Empowerment Education Model is another model of youth empowerment that emphasises the development of skills and knowledge that support youth effort towards social action and change which links individual empowerment to community organising. It is believed that this process will culminate in increased self-collective and political efficacy that result in self-protective individual behaviours and other protective socially responsible behaviours and group efforts for social change.

The model of empowerment most suitable for Nigeria is the Empowerment Education Model and the Youth Development and Empowerment Model. Most of the programmes conceived and adopted by the various governments of the years fit into these categories.
Youth Militancy and Insecurity in Nigeria

Militancy refers to aggressive or combative engagement or activism in struggles for recognised reasons. For Inokoba and Imbua (2010, p. 102), militancy is “… an aggressive and active behaviour geared towards the defence and support of a cause (mainly political), often to the point of extremism”. Inokoba and Imbua (2010) identify three types of militancy: intellectual militancy in which causes are ideologically pursued via peaceful means such as dialogue; violent militancy which believes that power lies in the power of the use of coercive instruments to achieve an objective; and, lastly, mobilisation of militancy which embraces the conscientisation and enlightenment of people to advance a cause.

Youth militancy can be described as the engagement in which the youth antagonise the state or society due to socio-infrastructural inadequacies, frustration, anger and resentment that result from the diverse issues, awareness of the disavowal of their rights, marginalisation, exclusion from socio-political processes in their society (Sulaiman 2012). In addition to the above, youth militancy refers to the youth being in the front line of the conflicts. They define the methods, strategies and tactics in the fight against the state and other constituted authorities and describe the vitality, momentum, diction and vocalisation of the conflicts. Thus, in this chapter, youth militancy refers to a social movement spearheaded by youth for the pursuit of outlined objectives which are mainly saturated within social justice, human rights defences and developmental issues and conditions.

In Nigeria, militancy orchestrated by the youth has been rampant, particularly in the Niger Delta region of the country which hosts most of the oil companies that lays the golden egg for the country.

Youth militancy in the Niger Delta has taken various forms over time which has been transformed over the years. It has taken the form of intellectual militancy from the beginning to mobilisation of militancy and currently at the violent stage. However, Osaghae et al. (2007) situated the meaning of insurgency within the Niger Delta crisis. They stated that militancy in the Niger Delta refers to “gunmen who make political demands, including the release of imprisoned leaders, cash reparations for communities, change of electoral candidates and a greater share of oil revenues, among other issues”.

Insecurity crept into the Niger Delta region shortly after independence of the country when the Niger Delta liberation group led by Adaka Boro declared a Niger Delta Republic in 1966 (Duruji and Azuh 2016).
However, Ken Saro Wiwa, a writer, was able to organise his Ogoni kinsmen in the 1990s to challenge the Nigerian state over environmental degradation of Ogoniland and deprivation of Ogoni people of their resources (Isumoha 2004). The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) which he founded articulated Ogoni demands in a document called the Ogoni Bill of Rights. That document was signed by 30 traditional rulers and eminent persons of Ogoniland on behalf of Ogoni people and presented to the government and people of Nigeria in November 1990 (Duruji and Azuh 2016).

The Ogoni struggle and the organisational prowess of Ken Saro Wiwa was not only able to raise the consciousness of the entire populace of the Niger Delta to the neglect and destruction oil exploration has brought to the region but also the internationalisation of the plight of the Niger Delta peoples. The advent of the phenomenon of mass protests in Nigerian politics which was marked by the rise of MOSOP came not only in the passionate demand for justice in the distribution of national resources but also in the wake of demand for a fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian state. Central to the quest for political restructuring are issues of changing those who control oil power and the establishment of an equitable basis for distributing oil revenue (Obi 2000).

The Ogoni revolt not only internationalised the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta region but also succeeded in forcing the multinational giant, Shell, to suspend operations in Ogoniland for many years (Duruji and Azuh 2016). Though Ken Saro Wiwa paid the supreme price in 1995 when he was hanged by the military administration of General Sani Abacha on charges of the murder of four prominent Ogoni chiefs, the flame of agitations and activism in the Niger Delta which the Ogoni struggle sparked instead of abating intensified across the region.

Drawing from the Ogoni, the Ijaws, under the auspices of Ijaw Youth Council, launched the Kaiama Declaration; the Oron came out with Oron Bill Of Rights; the Urhobo proclaimed the Urhobo Economic Charter; and the Ikwerres in Rivers State came out with Ikwerre Charter of Demands and the Akalaka Declaration among several others. The primary focus in all these documents was demands for resource control, self-determination, true federalism, environmental and economic justice and reparation for damages that have been inflicted on the people by several decades of oil exploration (Ojakorotu and Dodd 2000; Ojakorotu 2009).

Among all the groups in the Niger Delta, the Ijaw, the largest ethnic group in the region, took the struggle to another level beyond where the
Ogonis left it. The Kaiama Declaration on December 11, 1998, changed the texture of the struggle in the region (Duruji and Azuh 2016). The declaration had called for the immediate withdrawal from Ijaw land of all military forces of occupation and repression posted by the Nigerian state. It warned oil companies not to employ services of Nigerian Armed Forces to protect its operation. Otherwise, they would be viewed as enemy of the Ijaw people. It was also demanded in the document that oil companies should stop all exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area because of gas flaring, oil spillages and blowouts, among others, that result from their operations. Staff and contractors of oil companies were advised to withdraw from Ijaw territory by December 30, 1998, whereas Ijaw youth in all communities in the Niger Delta were admonished to commence the implementation of the Declaration by December 30, 1998. It was this that laid the foundation for the militant struggle that pervaded the Niger Delta region in the turn of the century, giving rise to emergence of various militant groups, including the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Asari Dokubo, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDA) led by Ateke Tom and, the most dangerous of them all, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which operated formlessly with independent leaders such as Charles Okah, John Togo, Government Ekpemupolo, Godwill Tamuno, Soboma George, Britus Ebipade, Tubotamuno Angplia and Ebikabowei Victor-Ben. All these leaders had their own camps and spheres of control in the creeks of the Niger Delta. The activities of MEND crumbled the country’s economy for many years, forcing the government to adopt a negotiated settlement that rewarded the militants with the Amnesty Programme. However, militancy re-emerged again in the Niger Delta, following the defeat of the People’s Democratic Party—that instituted the Amnesty Programme—by the All Progressive Congress in 2015, when the new ruling party attempted to halt the programme and declaring some of the militant leaders as criminals. The emergence of Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), that made a ten-point demand on the government before they started bombing pipelines in February 2016, opened the gate for myriad militant groups to spring up again in the Niger Delta region. The effect of these on the economy compelled the government to abandon the strategy of use of force to that of dialogue and negotiation with stakeholders in the region. The outcome was to continue the empowerment programmes targeted at the militants of the Niger Delta region as a way of securing peaceful business environment for oil exploration.
Amnesty as a state strategy or policy for addressing youth militancy in the region began in 1967 when late Isaac Adaka Boro and some of his core Niger Delta Volunteer Force leaders who were sentenced to death because of their engagement and drives in the insurgency of February 1966 were pardoned. In October 2004, Olusegun Obasanjo, the then President of Nigeria also signed a peace accord with the youth militia groups in the Niger Delta led by Asari’s NDPVF and the NDV. One of the terms of the accord was that general pardon would be granted to all the youth who took up arms against the state. Thus, it included disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Furthermore, there was the promise of about 4000 jobs for the youth (Hazen and Horner 2007). The Amnesty Programme was able to demilitarise the regions a bit. Over 3000 weapons were collected via the demobilisation programme within eight months specifically from October 2004 to June 2005 (Enoh 2009). Apart from the collection of arms, Gilbert (2010) posits that there was decline in youth militancy during that period. Contrary to the agreement, there were no jobs provided for the reintegration of the youth, but this shows that the government was only interested in the collection of arms and not addressing the causes of the conflict (Gilbert 2010). In fact, Asari Dokubo was arrested in September 2005.

It was against this lack of sincerity and mistrust of government stemming from the manner Obasanjo administration handled the Niger Delta militancy that President Yar’Adua in a broadcast proclaimed amnesty for militant Delta youth in June 2009 that was met with doubt and distrust by most people. The Amnesty Programme was projected as a means of realising enhanced development-induced alliance between the people in the oil-producing communities and the government. There was reassurance from Timi Alaibe, honorary special adviser to President Umaru Yar’Adua on Niger Delta, and other prominent Niger Delta indigenes of government’s sincerity and commitment. President Musa Yar’Adua had argued:

This administration understands the challenges of the Niger Delta region and the challenges people are facing and that is why from the beginning I made Niger Delta a top priority in our seven-point agenda. I want to say that the amnesty is not an end in itself but a means to an end. It is a means to peacefully and lovingly with brotherly understanding bring to an end all
insurrection and misunderstanding between brothers. It is a means to bringing stable peace and security to the Niger Delta region. It is a means of making the two of us work together to ensure that our youths do not take up arms again. (Cited in Ogbuenyi 2009, p. 20)

The presidential Amnesty Programme promised to give the repentant militants that drop their weapons and enter into the rehabilitation programme N65,000 (US$450) stipend per month. A total of 15,000 militants embraced the amnesty and turned in their ammunitions (Strouse 2009). Key militants who embraced the amnesty included Henry Okah, supposedly the leader of MEND; Victor Ebikabowei, commonly known as General Boyloaf, and other militant youth leaders from Bayelsa State; Soboma George of Outlaws cult group; and other 20 militants surrendered in Rivers State. Ateke Tom of NDV and Fara Dagogo of Niger Delta Strike Force, Government Ekpemupolo (aka Tompolo or GOC), a notable militant of MEND, all surrendered in Delta State (Gilbert 2010; Amaize et al. 2009). The Amnesty Programme started on August 6, 2009, and lasted till October 4, 2009 (Onuorah 2009). The rehabilitation and empowerment programmes slated for their reintegration into normal societal life also enabled the repentant militants to become self-employed or employable in the oil firms. Some government institutions like the National Directorate of Employment, Petroleum Trust Development Fund, National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and the Ministry of Niger Delta were involved in the rehabilitation of the militants (Ike et al. 2009).

State governments in collaboration with the oil companies have also responded to the Niger Delta crisis. On the eve of MOSOP’s protest against oil production in Ogoni, the Rivers State government created a paramilitary force called the Internal Security Force. Operation Flush and Operation Salvage were also created by Rivers and Bayelsa States, respectively, to protect oil installations in their domain (Ojakorotu 2009). Apart from the use of force, state governments also implemented several programmes in place to address the militancy. For instance, Bayelsa State implemented reorientation, skills acquisition and employment programmes or schemes while Rivers State government introduced the “3E approach”, which means engagement, education and empowerment.

The success of the amnesty strategy helped in the restoration of extractive business activities in the oil sector. The approach has been replicated at state levels as states such as Imo, Ondo and Rivers have engaged gangs causing insecurity in their states to embrace such initiatives in exchange for a government-sponsored rehabilitation programme.
Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YouWin)

YouWin is a private and public initiative established by the administration of Goodluck Jonathan and Woma Mccann to empower Nigerian youth with bright business plans. The idea of the initiative was aimed at financing outstanding business plans of aspiring youth entrepreneurs in Nigeria (CEI 2017). Four ministries of the Federal government were involved in the scheme. They included Ministries of Finance, Communication and Technology, Youth Development, and Women Affairs. At the launch of the programme, in 2011, the government targeted at 3600 entrepreneurship that would be enhanced to create hundreds of thousands of employment for the teeming unemployed youth population of the country (Ihenetu 2015).

The programme, at inception, went through three phases of selecting beneficiaries who were in turn given funds to develop their business ideas through Nigerian banks. Before anyone could qualify to participate, the person needed to be a Nigerian youth with a business name registered in Nigeria and needed to present a business plan that would go through a competitive selection process. The first edition which was tagged YouWin I was aimed at sensitising Nigerian youth entrepreneurs on job creation through the funding of their business ideas. YouWin II, which rewarded 1200 youth, was a mono-gender version that focused on women who were below the age of 45, whereas YouWin III reverted to the poly-gender at the end of which 2500 were selected. (Ihenetu 2015)

However, the inconsistencies that characterise government programmes in Nigeria caught up with the programme with the advent of a new administration at the federal level in 2015, thus slowing down the momentum. Though the Buhari administration says it is continuing with the programme, it expresses willingness at restructuring the programme. Another challenge that bedevilled the programme was the delay in disbursement of funds to the beneficiaries which led to protests by the awardees who complain of lukewarm attitude of the handlers of the programme (Akpedji 2015).

The N-Power Scheme

The N-Power scheme was introduced in June 2016 by the Mohammadu Buhari administration to engage Nigerian youth who were both graduates and undergraduates so as to equip them with relevant skills for career development which would in turn transform the Nigerian economy into a
knowledge-based one. A key component of the N-Power scheme was what was called the volunteer corps that aimed to provide jobs for the teeming Nigerian youth. This facet of the N-Power programme is the only part that has fully kick-started (Uche 2017). With the commencement of the programme, it is reported that about 500,000 previously unemployed graduates shall be engaged in the scheme. The government claims that 200,000 youth have already been engaged as teachers, agricultural extension officers and public health officials, whereas the other 300,000 shall be engaged before the end of 2018 (Nigerian Tribune n.d.).

The N-Power scheme, as one of the strategies of the government to engage the youth, was greeted with wide publicity and acceptance, and this was responsible for the enthusiasm and high subscription it generated amongst Nigerian youth. However, the programme has been facing numerous challenges. One of the problems that marred the scheme was the crash of the website after a few minutes of accepting applications, thereby frustrating many enlistments on the programme by potential beneficiaries. It is also reported that many of the lucky volunteers who managed to be enrolled into the scheme were not given the “super helpful tab” that the designers of the scheme instituted to help them execute their assignments. Furthermore, most of the participants did not get their stipends on time (Uche 2017). There is also the problem of poor monitoring of the enlisted volunteers, some of whom do not turn up for duties and others are said to be combining the programme with other jobs, thereby defeating the purpose of the scheme. Though the government has identified the gaps, very little has been done to prosecute culprits in cases of abuse, so as to serve as deterrence to those who abuse the programme (Uche 2017).

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that the socio-economic development in Nigeria has been marred to a large extent by a series of insecurity challenges plaguing the country. What is also not in doubt is that most perpetrators of the various forms of insecurity in the country are the youth population who are driven into such activities due to prolonged economic crisis and huge youth unemployment in the country.

The idea of solving the problem of insecurity takes two different dimensions—coercion and empowerment. The coercive dimension is more expensive and not sustainable, Consequently, the focus of governments over the years has centred on programmes that aim at empowering the
youth. Some of the bold programmes included the Ibrahim Babangida’s initiative of National Directorate of Employment which has a special programme on youth empowerment. Even the programmes Olusegun Obasanjo instituted shortly after the transition to civil rule such as Poverty Alleviation Programme and NAPEP were aimed at empowering the vulnerable populace—mostly the youth.

However, the specific programmes of the government that targeted the youth were the Amnesty Programme initiated by Umaru Yar’Adua which succeeded in reducing militancy in the Niger Delta region, thus allowing crude oil production to continue in the region. The YouWin initiative of the Jonathan administration targeted a very tiny segment of the youth but with the aim that the businesses supported would in turn employ huge youth population when they succeed. The policy inconsistency that has marred various administrations in Nigeria did not allow the programme to endure. Even the N-Power conceived by the Muhammadu Buhari administration has very little impact on the majority of Nigerian youth.

The implication of this is that insecurity thrives in Nigeria with no hope of abetting. The country is still neck deep in insecurity in spite of the various responses of the government including the option of law enforcement. Even the strategy of youth empowerment has not provided the panacea to peace due to the lackadaisical manner in which the government has managed most of the well-conceived initiatives.

The state of insecurity will indeed persist in Nigeria until a sincere attitude of the men in power changes towards taking responsibility of why they are in power which is not the case in Nigeria today despite the huge potential of the country in achieving greatness.

The chapter recommends a broadening of these empowerment programmes to cover more youth across the country, while prudent administration of the programmes devoid of corruption and partisanship is imperative.

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Conclusion: Rethinking Internal Security Management in Nigeria

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This book has shown that internal security management in Nigeria has faced serious challenges since the end of the civil war in 1970. However, the problem has been exacerbated in the past two decades due to the persistent threats posed by militancy in the Niger Delta region, Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, escalating conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, communal violence, kidnapping and separatist agitations, among others. The return to democracy in 1999 witnessed an upsurge in the level of violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta, perpetrated by diverse militia groups largely made up of youth who were protesting the exploitative and lopsided character of the distribution of oil wealth. The immediate response of the Nigerian state was excessive militarisation of

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the region, and when this failed, government resorted to the granting of presidential amnesty to militants. Although the latter has resulted in the return of relative peace in the region, it has failed to bring about sustainable peace in the region, as insecurity occasioned by sea banditry still persists in the waterways of the region in the post-amnesty era.

The decline in the level of insecurity in the region coincided, however, with the rise of extremist violence in Nigeria’s North-East, waged by the Boko Haram insurgent group. The resilience and resurgence of the group have been the main source of concern to the leadership of Nigeria’s military, security, intelligence and law enforcement institutions. Yet, insecurity has continued to persist in other parts of the country due to the escalation of violent clashes between armed herdsmen and farmers. One of the notable implications of the rising violent clashes is rising food insecurity. In no place is this more evident than in the North, especially the Middle Belt where ethnic cleavages and religious divides have engendered deep mistrust among the people that often results in spiralling violence (ICG 2018).

Attention on the problems of Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram insurgency and escalating violence between herdsmen and farmers has tended to diminish the challenges posed by other security threats such as kidnapping for ransom, illegal revenue collection in urban areas, cybercrimes, human trafficking, illegal migration and arms smuggling. There are equally the dimensions and manifestations of spiritual threats to human and national security in contemporary Nigeria such as ritual rape, ritual murder, yahoo-plus, curses, dream manipulations, violent ghosts and familiar spirits, among others. Underpinning much of the security challenges are the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state, dominance of a rapacious elite class, widespread corruption, weak institutions, rising poverty and high rates of youth unemployment. The porous nature of Nigerian borders has added to these problems, enabling diverse criminal groups to engage in or facilitate human trafficking, cross-border smuggling of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALWs) and irregular migration (Mbachu and Bature 2013). Weak institutional capacity of the Nigerian state not only accounts for the absence of robust fight against these crimes, but it is also implicated in exacerbation of the impact of environmental challenges that threaten internal security such as flooding, pollution, deforestation and desertification.

Notable measures to address these security challenges have included the registration of mobile phone users and enactment of legislations prohibiting acts such as cybercrimes and kidnapping. Others include heightening of physical security measures around vulnerable targets, strengthening of security agencies through the provision of security facilities and
increasing deployment of military forces in Internal Security Operations (ISOs). The use of the coercive instruments and institutions of the state to manage internal security challenges has been the most preferred option by successive Nigerian governments.

In this light, this study also examined the diverse security institutions (both formal and informal) that are charged with the responsibilities of managing these security threats. The first security agency that is constitutionally empowered to manage internal security in Nigeria is the Nigeria Police Force. Although the police have performed well in the past, recent events within the Nigerian security matrix have exposed the police as a corrupt and ill-equipped security institution. The failure of the police force has created a considerable mistrust among the citizens in Nigeria and has resulted in the deployment of the military in internal security matters.

The military is primarily charged with the responsibility of protecting the Nigerian state from external aggression. However, the liberalisation of the political space since May 29, 1999, as well as poor funding of the police has seen a dramatic increase in military deployment for ISOs. The role of the military in internal security matters has largely sustained the unity of Nigeria. However, their heavy deployment in ISOs has exposed their shortcomings, including being implicated in human rights abuses.

The inadequacies of the police and military in the management of internal security have given impetus for the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) usually involving the army, the Navy, the Air Force, the police and other security agencies (Peterside 2014). Over time, the Nigerian government has been accustomed to activating special task force, involving the military and other security agencies in addressing its internal security concerns. This is evident in the deployment of such security management posture in the fight against militancy in the Niger Delta in the South-South, Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, herdsman-farmers clashes in the North-Central, armed banditry in the North-West, separatist agitations in South-East, and oil theft in the South-West. In fact, there is no part of Nigeria that has not played host to such special military operations.

Another paramilitary agency that assists the police in internal security management in Nigeria is the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The institution is expected to assist the other state security institutions, especially the police in the management of threats to internal security in the country. Despite making enormous contribution in safeguarding lives and property, it also faces the problems of corruption,
recruitment and training deficit. The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) equally engages in internal security management. The agency is constitutionally responsible for monitoring, documenting and regulating transborder migration. The institutional weakness that is prevalent in Nigeria has also affected the functionality of NIS. The result is that Nigeria has become vulnerable to trans-border crimes such as terrorism, human trafficking, SALW proliferation and many others.

The last among the formal security agencies examined is the Nigeria Prison Service. The prison service ensures that all imprisoned persons are rehabilitated before rejoining the society. However, the situation in Nigeria is such that those imprisoned come out becoming more hardened criminals than they were before their incarceration. This problem is implicated on the condition of Nigerian prisons, which are overcrowded, underfunded and punitive-oriented. The result is that the prison in Nigeria has further hardened rather than reformed the inmates.

Beyond the formal security institutions that are crucial to the management of internal security, informal security organisations that are involved in the management of internal security which this study examined were the private security companies and the vigilante groups. Private security companies in Nigeria have grown in scale due in part to the rising level of insecurity in the country and the failure of state security institutions in security provisioning. These companies are involved in such internal security tasks like asset protection, guard duties for a host of clientele such as government establishments and corporate business organisations (e.g. banks). While corporate bodies have augmented their security and protection needs with services provided by private security companies, the inability of the state to meet up with internal security requirements has forced members of the local communities to improve their own security arrangement through the formation of vigilante groups. Some of these groups are recognised and empowered by some state governments, while many others survive and operate on contributions of community members and philanthropic individuals. In many communities in Nigeria, these groups serve as community police and are involved, sometimes, in performing judicial functions such as settlement of disputes. Although the existence of vigilante groups has been used to gauge the failure of the police and other security agencies in Nigeria, it has equally proven to serve as a tool for complementing the efforts of the formal security organisations.

Notwithstanding the existence of these agencies, internal security management in Nigeria continues to face stiffer challenges. These range from
the failure of the state to resolve the contradictions that underscore Nigeria’s multi-ethnic nature and post-colonial character, to lack of funding to the security agencies as a result of lack of transparency and accountability in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds. Others include lack of social security, owing to development deficit, lack of sustainable youth empowerment programmes and the growing interconnectedness of the world through globalisation.

As the various analytical chapters in this book demonstrate, the upsurge and persistence of security challenges, coupled with the inability of both the formal and informal security institutions to contain them, have undermined the safety of persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of the Nigerian state. Despite the avalanche of both formal and informal institutions available to successive Nigerian governments in security provisioning, responses to evolving internal security challenges leveraging this motley of institutions have proven grossly inadequate (Nwagboso 2016). The reasons for this situation have been attributed to a mix of historical, structural and contextual factors that underpin weak capacity of state institutions to anticipate, respond and manage the prevalence of multiple security challenges. One key fact that has emerged from the chapters in this book is that the approach of the Nigerian state in managing internal security challenges has been predominantly reactive, coercive and repressive rather than proactive, preventive and inclusive. This situation has undermined the prospect of peace and stability critical for national development.

Therefore, there is a need for a paradigm shift and thorough rethinking of the architecture and posture of internal security management in Nigeria. Rethinking the framework of internal security management in Nigeria will require comprehensive reforms in the area of policy and practice. In this respect, the articulation and adoption of a national security strategy to articulate what constitutes national security in Nigeria and streamline the desperate and conflict responsibilities of a myriad of ineffective security institutions and agencies in Nigeria are fundamental imperatives. Such a national security policy is critical in ensuring that security priorities accurately reflect citizens’ needs, limited resources are effectively allocated across agencies and agencies cooperate professionally in the discharge of assigned responsibilities (Adam Smith International 2016). The failure to effectively manage security challenges confronting the nation is more of a lack of synergy among extant state security institutions than the dearth of such critical institutions. Thus, a national security policy will serve as a
critical enabler for the much-needed cooperation, collaboration and synergy to optimise security delivery.

Furthermore, the diversity of Nigeria and the complexity of the security environment require a shift from a highly centralised structure of internal security management to a decentralised framework (Arase 2013). In particular, the decentralisation of policing functions in two principal forms is highly needed. First is the devolution of more policing powers and responsibilities to states and local communities to optimise local knowledge of the people’s culture, terrain and language in ensuring effective community policing. Second is divesting the federal police of all traffic responsibilities, orderly and guard duties and transferring same to Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) and NSCDC. Achieving this reform will require constitutional amendment.

For too long, Nigeria’s internal security management posture has been predominantly reactive and ineffective. This is not unconnected with the weakness of intelligence gathering—a situation made worse by the absence of a credible and reliable national identification system and the limited application of high-tech gadgets in intelligence gathering. The plethora of identification systems that exist in Nigeria are not harmonised and exist mainly as isolated platforms to serve some vested interests in different sectors of the economy. To meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century and beyond, there is the need for the harmonisation of the country’s diverse national identification frameworks as a prerequisite for national security and development. This is important because a reliable national identification system is critical to evolving a robust crime database as well as intelligence gathering for managing diverse security needs of the state. Poor intelligence gathering has impacted on the ability of the state to effectively anticipate and respond to security threats. To overcome this challenge, the Nigerian government should properly resource its agencies with the acquisition of modern equipment and technological gadgets to enhance their ability to combat security threats. The creation of an Intelligence Fusion Centre that builds up proper records of information with a system of easy retrieval by the various security agencies is critical in enhancing internal security management in the country.

There is also the need to modernise the security agencies with training, intelligence sharing, advanced technology, logistics, motivation and change of orientation. This effort will enhance the operational capabilities of the Nigerian security agencies by identifying avenues that would enable them to respond appropriately to internal security challenges and other threats. Government must avoid the nepoticisation and politicisation of
the recruitment process of security personnel to avoid further polarisation of national security institutions which often have adverse consequences for diligence, loyalty and commitment to service as well as invest on capacity building of security personnel to meet the global best practice and standard.

There is equally the need to review and refocus Nigeria’s conflict management approach. The growing reliance on the military to deal with security challenges ranging from law and order maintenance to combating organised crime has serious implications for the professionalism of the military as an organisation for external defence and the police as the first line of response to internal insecurity. The political leadership should de-emphasise militarisation and prioritise the capacitation of the police and other security and law enforcement agencies to proactively combat crimes and timely douse tension before they assume more dangerous dimensions.

To more effectively address the challenges of internal security management, there is the need for the enthronement of good governance in Nigeria through the conduct of credible elections, vigorous campaign against corruption and equitable distribution of resources. Good governance is key to reducing poverty, unemployment and economic marginalisation that underpin much of the violent security threats that plague Nigeria. The underlying principle of good governance is the focus on human development as key to achieving sustainable security in the society.

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