Confronting the Orthodoxies of Globalisation: Failed State Syndrome, Economic Dependency and the Dilemma of African Development

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Africa is an unequal partner in the globalised world. Despite the neoliberal claims that globalisation provides equal opportunities for growth and development to all players in the global capitalist arena, all indices of growth and development in relation to Africa are in the negative which signify that globalisation has led to retrogression rather than progress. The dilemma of Africa's development is in sync with, and indeed justifies, the seeming suspicion and criticisms of the dependency theorisation of Third World scholarship. No doubt, the nature of Africa's incorporation into the global capitalist system contributed to its peripheral status, but that explanatory model does not satisfactorily subsist in explaining its continued entrapment in underdevelopment given its abundant human and natural endowments. The culpability for Africa's underdevelopment does not only reside in the mechanisms of its integration into global capitalism but extends to the postcolonial conduct of state affairs by its ruling elite. This paper examines the contemporary atlas of Africa's socio-economic formation vis-à-vis the index of failed states and argues that there is urgent need for a model of development outside the precinct of Euro-American orthodoxy of globalisation as presently constituted.

Introduction

Globalisation denotes seamless integration of the world in such a way that national barriers are lowered for unfettered movement of capital, goods and people. There is no doubt that the forces of globalisation have moved the world to greater prosperity. But the major challenge is the persistent inequality and distributional injustice associated with it. As UNCTAD observes, "economic integration and interdependence in the world today have reached an unprecedented level. As a result, the globalized economy cannot function for the benefit of all without international solidarity and cooperation".[1] That is exactly what is not happening. Globalisation functions for the developed countries. Although African economies grew from 5.3 to 5.8 percent in 2007, this growth was as a result of tremendous demand for, and high price of crude oil and minerals. Similarly, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Africa, though on the increase in recent years, are still too limited in geographical spread and narrowly focused on extractive industries that their effects on employment creation and poverty alleviation are not particularly significant.[2]

Gaps between developed and developing countries, as well as within the latter, are widening steadily. For instance, the poorest 49 countries, which make up 10 percent of the world's population accounted for only 0.4 percent of world trade in 1996. In 1965, average GNP per capita for the top 20 per cent of the world's population was 30 times that of the poorest 20 per cent; 25 years later, in 1990, the gap had doubled — to 60 times.[3] This disparity is growing. Its effects on African states are many and include: the erosion of their economic and political independence; failure to meet their obligations to its citizenry; internal instability and conflicts and inability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

What is required to make globalisation have a human face is to fill the valleys and level the mountains of inequality inherent in the global capitalist system as well as dismantle the hypocritically selective application of Keynesianism and neoliberalism by developed countries while insisting that African economies should strictly follow the neoliberal path. Progressive redressing of the biases of globalisation remains an important challenge for the whole international community.

The Foundation and Orthodoxies of Globalisation

Globalisation is ascribed with multi-functionality in terms of its effects on development. Its many interpretations are based on differences in theoretical orientations. Not only is its origin contested, its trajectory and effects are also subjects of varying disputations. The meaning of globalisation, therefore, is encapsulated in multi-layer explications that are not amenable to a straightforward, open and close conceptualisation. Most scholars believe that if there is a contemporary concept within the confines of the social sciences, which lacks consensus regarding its signification, effects, and analytical implications, it must certainly be globalisation[4]. But scholars have, nevertheless, grappled with the concept from both historical and theoretical perspectives and established seemingly certain boundaries, effects and manifestations.

i. Historicising Globalisation

At the historical level, globalisation is believed to have a long history. Indeed, its history coincides with the rise of capitalism. Some even took it further back into history and situated its origin at the early epoch of man's civilisation. They argued that:

> Globalisation in its most generic and broadest sense is part of the movement of history in general. Throughout history people have moved from food-deficit to food-surplus regions taking with them their families and flocks, sometimes conquering the areas to which they moved, sometimes getting absorbed in them and losing their separate identities. This larger movement of history is the movement of civilization itself.[5]

The movement of civilisation is not necessarily globalisation. Globalisation is coterminous with state system. Globalisation exists where state boundaries exist, no matter their inchoateness. Therefore, the invocation of globalisation in a pre-state system is not only superfluous but obfuscates what globalisation stands for. For discourse on globalisation to be analytically fruitful, two key elements must be present: one, there must be a state system, whether fully formed or in the process of being formed; and two, there must be drivers of globalisation, such as advances in science and technology, means of payment for goods and services, means of transportation and mechanisms of trade. Essentially, the ultimate goal of globalisation is to pull down state-erected barriers and contract the globe in a seamless continuum of interdependence. This goal of contracting the globe is not an end in itself but a means to the advancement of broad ends, which span financial, economic, social, political and cultural spheres.

The historical origin of globalisation is therefore locatable in the rise of capitalism, its internationalisation and various expansionist campaigns to conquer new grounds. In specific terms, the seed of contemporary internationalisation is embedded in such epochal events as the emergence of capitalism in Europe in the late Middle Ages; the new scientific and cultural thinking embodied in the Renaissance; the establishment of the great European nations and their empires; the rise of industrial revolution and the embarkation on voyages of discovery.[6] Despite the lack of unanimity among scholars concerning the periodisation of the march and manifestation of globalisation, there is however an agreement that globalisation has mutated from its earlier forms in comparison to its contemporary manifestations. We shall, for analytic convenience, arbitrarily divide the evolution of globalisation into five.

The first phase encompassed the Christian Crusades and the Voyages of Discovery. While the Christian Crusaders embarked on the twin tasks of civilisational and cultural revivalism in the face of Islamic expansionism and the dislodgement of Islam and plantation of Christianity, the Voyages of Discovery expanded the trade advantages of Europe by seizing trade routes and plundering the Amerindian mines, and African population. The enslavement of Africans had far-reaching implications on the continent's development trajectory: while Africa's capacity to develop was circumscribed and weakened on account of the depletion of its human resources, that of Europe and the US was energised. This led Eric Williams to suggest that the profits of slave trade spurred the industrial revolution.[7] This thinking is not misplaced or exaggerated as labour power was the dominant wealth creator in that epoch. These voyages opened up the globe and generated a transfer of technology, plants, animals and diseases on an enormous scale that there was a world trade boom after 1492.[8]

The second phase consisted of the scientific age and the industrial revolution. This epoch was the watershed in the evolution of the world economy as it incorporated new thinking in dealing with human problems. The rise of the industrial revolution and the dismantling of the mercantilist barriers marked the beginning of modern globalisation. The far-reaching changes in the system of production as a result of advances in science and technology brought about major economic and social transformations. These transformations not only conferred on England the global leadership role but also drove the revolution in banking, commerce, transportation as well as politics which dismantled feudal structures in preferences for state systems.[9] The new momentum which the industrial revolution engendered created enormous wealth that needed reinvestment. Without such reinvestment, capitalism stood the risk of atrophying. The catching up by Germany, France, Belgium, the United States and other European countries created new tensions that were resolved by imperialism and colonialism.

The third phase coincided with the era of capitalist imperialism. The enormous capital and goods which the improved production and distribution system threw up required new markets. The need for expansion was necessitated by the imperative of capitalist survival. And that survival was anchored on the exportation and investment of capital in undeveloped economies. In order for capital to generate greater profits and reduce risks, the new bourgeoisie moved away from the model of pure and competitive small-scale capitalism to industrial and banking monopolies, cartels, buying and selling syndicates; holding companies, mergers and association.[10] The new processes of monopoly led to the dismantling of barriers, enthronement of liberalisation and movement towards globalisation through the integration of international commodity markets. However, globalisation fell apart after 1913 as a result of unhealthy rivalry amongst the European countries for the control of markets and ascendency of national monopolies.[11] The rivalry

degenerated to wars and for 30 years globalisation was cut short until after the Second World War.

The fourth phase was the period after the Second World War to 1973. After the Second World War, there was a new impulse toward global integration. This impulse was underpinned by:

> a major effort to develop international institutions for financial and trade cooperation and by a significant expansion of trade in manufactures among industrial countries. It was also characterized by widely varying models of economic organization and limitations on the mobility of capital and labour.[12]

The conditions for the trajectory of globalisation were set by the US on account of its acquired economic ascendancy over imperial Europe that suffered war and was recovering from serious economic reversals from the two World Wars. The US anchored its push for an open-door policy in the international political economy on three new policy pillars, namely: the principle of non-discrimination in trade and investment outlets; the principle of free convertibility of currencies based on the new US gold dollar standard; and the creation of a multilateral institutional framework to supervise and regulate the new system. These principles engendered the Bretton Woods agreements that were adopted in 1944 and the establishment of multilateral institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or the World Bank.[13] These multilateral institutions served two interrelated purposes: they transformed the whole international environment into a truly international system of economic and political relationships and facilitated the opening up of the world to the US transnational corporations (TNCs).

The logic of this period also motorised the obtainment of self-rule by most of the countries that were hitherto under colonial rule. It has been suggested that it was not simply the forces of globalisation that secured self-rule for the colonised peoples around the world but a confluence of other contending factors. It runs against reason that globalisation whose cardinal aim is the removal of barriers imposed by the state system would champion self-rule that would create strong states. The notion of self-rule, by its very nature, flies in the face of globalisation as its corollary, independence and territorial sovereignty, are antithetical to a seamless access to markets. In actuality, it was the Russian demand for self-determination for the colonial peoples and their right to statehood that precipitated actions towards their realisation.[14]

The fifth phase of globalisation could be periodised from 1973 onwards and was not only marked by the consolidation of multilateralism but also globalisation. Despite the stride of globalisation in terms of free trade, ubiquity of TNCs and integration of production systems, the expansion and mobility of capital and the standardisation of development models under the auspices of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), its movement was dogged by three types of contradictions: the persistence of state interventionist approach; the persistence of state barriers and restrictions on labour mobility and the erection of protectionist high walls.

Two developments impacted on, and dictated, the trajectory of globalisation: one was the Washington Consensus of Reagan-Thatcher era; and the other was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Washington Consensus was basically driven by anti-Keynesian policies targeted against state intervention in national economies. The Consensus dispensed with the post-war Keynesian economic policy and embraced the neoliberal economics of the Chicago monetarist school of Milton Friedman, which unlike Keynesianism explains depression in capitalism as due to the quantity of money, state intervention and government errors or those of its agents.[15] It predicated its strategies for economic resuscitation on deregulation of the economies; privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the downsizing of the state. The economic crisis that enveloped most of the Third World countries undermined their negotiating capacity. In fact the institutionalisation of the principles of the Consensus emboldened the TNCs and leveraged their penetration of hitherto regulated states.

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the demise of the last bastion of opposition to the march of capitalism. Before then, communism stood as a regulating policeman against capitalist expansion. Globalisation appears to be a self-protective strategy to protect capitalism from being consumed by its inherent crisis. The capitalist economy is crisis-prone. Its crises range from short-term to long-term and are characterised by alternations between prosperity and relative stagnation.[16]

ii. The Theoretical Templates of Globalisation

The major contests surrounding globalisation centre on: its meaning, viability as a strategy of development and capacity to dispense the dividends of development equitably. The contests pitch the neoliberal school against the anti-globalisation movement comprising

of the neo-Marxist school, alterglobalisation and sundry groups. At the core of neoliberal school is the contention that:

> an interdependent world economy based on free trade, specialization, and an international division of labour facilitates domestic development. Flows of goods, capital, and technology increase optimum efficiency in resource allocation and therefore transmit growth from the developed nations to the less developed countries. Trade can serve as an "engine of growth" as the less developed economy gains capital, technology, and access to world markets. This is a mutually beneficial relationship since the developed economies can obtain cheaper raw materials and outlets for their capital and manufactured goods. Because the less developed economies have smaller markets, opening trade with advanced economies is believed to benefit them relatively more than it does the developed economies. Moreover, since the factors of production flow to those areas where they produce the highest rewards, a less developed economy with a surplus of labour and a deficit of savings can obtain infusions of foreign capital that accelerate growth.[17]

From the prism of this tradition, globalisation represents the march of civilisation to higher heights of prosperity on equitable scale. Thus, globalisation is the best thing to have happened to humanity. This school conceptualises globalisation as a process of both vertical and horizontal integration of the entire world, which is made possible by human innovation and technological progress.[18] The neoliberal theory portrays globalisation as the only possible road to prosperity for all states provided they are fully integrated. The conditions for integration include: dismantling territorial barriers; removing all barriers on trade, investment and investment capital; and free marketisation. Neoliberalism contends that globalisation offers significant opportunities for developing countries to stimulate economic growth and development through broader market access, foreign direct investment (FDI), capital inflows and transfer of technology from the rest of the world. They illustrate the prosperity which globalisation has spawned to be indicated in such indices as: the value of trade (goods and services) and a percentage of world GDP which increased from 42.1 percent in 1980 to 62.1 percent in 2007; FDI stock which increased from 6.5 percent of world GDP in 1980 to 31.8 percent in 2006; the stock of international claims (primarily bank loans) as percentage of world GDP which increased from roughly 10 percent in 1980 to 48 percent in 2006; the number of minutes spent on cross-border telephone calls, on per capita basis, which increased from 7.3 in 1991 to 28.8 in 2006; and, the number of foreign workers which increased from 78 million people (2.4 percent of the world population) in 1965 to 91 million people (3.0 percent of the world population) in 2005.[19] As positive as these indicators are, the prosperity which they depicted were mostly enjoyed by the developed economies.

The anti-globalisation movement refutes the contention of the neoliberal school by questioning the logic of globalisation. The anti-globalisation movement is a "movement of movements", an omnibus collection of individuals and groups critical of the policies of economic neoliberalism, or "corporate globalisation". The contention of anti-globalisation movement is that the policies of globalisation have exacerbated global poverty and increased inequality. The diversity of anti-globalisation movement is mirrored by its constituents, which comprise trade unionists, environmentalists, anarchists, land rights and indigenous rights activists, organizations promoting human rights and sustainable development, opponents of privatization, and anti-sweatshop campaigners. Within the academies, the anti-globalisation movement coalesce around neo-Marxism. It characterises economic globalisation as a historical outcome of capitalist expansionism in which the few powerful rich fleece the majority poor and thus widen further the differences in development, wealth, resources and power. It conceives globalisation as a process propelled by two contradictory movements of centrifugal and centripetal forces. On the one hand, it has the tendency to fragment, differentiate and marginalise those social forces that cannot catch up with the dominant social forces that are in charge of the capitalist transformation and on the other hand, it creates uniformities throughout the world aimed at maximising returns on capital and promoting efficient production systems through innovative technological changes.[20]

There is no doubt that globalisation has brought far-reaching changes and benefits to the world. But the dynamics of globalisation are shaped, to a large extent, by the fact that actors are not on equal footing. The asymmetry in their position and power means that the benefits they derive differ substantially. The industrialised countries, IFIs, World Trade Organisation (WTO), TNCs exert the strongest influence, whereas the developing countries wield less influence leading the anti-globalisation movement to advocate "participatory democracy, seeking to increase popular control of political and economic life in the face of increasingly powerful corporations, unaccountable global financial institutions, and U.S. hegemony."[21]

iii. The Orthodoxies of Globalisation

The orthodoxies of globalisation are encapsulated in the theoretical orientation of neoliberalism. The neoliberal theory canvasses full and extensive integration with global capitalism based on trade and financial liberalisation. The nature of global integration which globalisation envisages is the type that traverses vertically and horizontally and manifests in increasing volume and variety of transnational transactions in goods and services, international capital flows, human migration and rapid and widespread diffusion of technology.[22]

The first orthodoxy of globalisation is that it is an inevitable option and the only path to economic growth and development. Helleiner posits that globalisation is the only one possible road to full liberalisation and integration of world markets and that this path traces the inevitable and desirable fate of all humankind.[23] In fact this orthodoxy was given life by the IMF and World Bank who anchored their development model on neoliberal strategy. Michel Camdessus, the then Managing Director of the IMF captured the indispensability of globalisation as a "development companion" when he asserted that it "offers considerable opportunities to accelerate trade and economic progress throughout the world."[24] The second orthodoxy is that globalisation tends to bridge the inequality in the world system as countries operate on areas of competitive advantage. The Southeast Asian countries were advanced as the success story of the globalisation gospel. In order to market neoliberal development strategy to other developing countries, the IFIs attributed the rapid economic growth and development of Asia's Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) to their religious implementation of the neo-liberal policies of trade liberalisation which facilitated an export-oriented strategy and financial liberalisation, which encouraged foreign capital inflows.[25]

The third is that the more open or globalised a country, the more it is likely to benefit from the prosperity unleashed by the forces of globalisation. The advocates of this myth contended that as some countries have embraced globalisation, and experienced significant income increases, other countries that have rejected globalisation, or embraced it only tepidly, have fallen behind and that globalisation and liberalisation of developing countries have resulted in remarkable upsurge in FDI flows in the 1990s from 25 percent in 1991 to an estimated 42 percent in 1998 compared to 18 percent in 1980.[26] Most leaders of the Third World uncritically subscribe to this myth without taking into consideration the socio-economic cleavages in the world system and the attendant inequality. Because these factors were not considered, Ernesto Zedillo, the former President of Mexico, remarked at the plenary session of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 28, 2000 that in every case where a poor nation has significantly overcome its poverty, this has been achieved while engaging in production for export markets and opening itself to the influx of foreign goods, investment, and technology.[27] The fourth is that the expansion of world trade through the elimination or reduction of trade barriers, such as import tariffs not only provides a wider variety of goods at lower prices through imports but also provides strong incentives for domestic industries to remain competitive. And beyond these points, trade enhances national competiveness, the development of relevant skills as well as promotes economic resilience and flexibility. A checklist of the advantages of greater openness has been prepared to include: stimulation of foreign investment, more sources of employment for the local workforce, new technologies and higher productivity.

The fifth is that greater openness to financial flows has a positive impact on the national economy and that neoliberal policies would resolve problems associated with financial liberalisation or rapid, large, volatile and destabilising capital flows, thereby laying the foundation for a fast-growing and stable global economy. In spite of this, severe economic crisis ravaged the Asian NICs in the late 1990s and currently ravages the industrialised economies, thus raising serious questions about the fundamental assumptions of globalisation. The sixth orthodoxy of globalisation is that it will lead to the collapse of the nation-state with attendant neutralisation of the negative divisive tendencies of ethnicity and other divisive cleavages including the bridging of social inequality in domestic economies.

Globalisation, Economic Dependency and African Development

The structure of African economies throws up contradictions that are essentially anti-development. Although the nature of their integration into the global capitalist system is contributory to the contemporary challenges of African development, it is not the sole reason. At independence, African leaders had the opportunities to extricate the continent from the stranglehold of neo-colonialism but they did not, principally because they saw state power as a tool for primitive accumulation. The explanation that "the monopolistic distribution of power in the global economy makes it extremely difficult for Africa to break out of economic dependence, [and that] class contradictions make it difficult for African leaders to get their priorities right and to engender the unity of purpose and the effort which is needed to tackle the problem of dependence" is not adequate to explain the continued monoculturalism of African economies, the use of state power

and resources to build personal fiefdom and the plunder of Africa's commonwealth by self-acclaimed tin gods and despots.[28] The prospects of development in Africa have remained dismal and characterised by uncertainty. On every conceivable socio-economic and political measurement table, African states are always crowded at the bottom. The African economies are characterised by "primary production, low share of world trade, low manufactured output and exports, low savings and investment, dominance of ODA [overseas development aid] and low private capital inflow, rapid population growth, dominance of public sector vis-à-vis weak private sector, heavy external debt burden."[29]

An economy with this litany of peculiar negativities cannot attract, or be expected to respond to, ordinary development stimuli. Any stimulus to be administered must diagnose the peculiarities of its problem and thereafter customize a package. But, the reforms masterminded by the IFIs did not incorporate the peculiarities of the African economies in their packages, which led to their unqualified failure. Africa's economic problem started in the 1970s and assumed crisis proportions by the 1980s. The crisis deepened its structural defects (characterised by undiversified, monolithic and monocultural production bases and dwindling share of global trade); intensified its institutional distortions (which manifested in weak institutional capacity for economic policy management and coordination, debt overhang, macroeconomic policy inconsistency and public sector dominance of the economy and corruption); and, exacerbated its infrastructural inadequacies (such as energy crisis, poor healthcare system, bad road networks and moribund rail system).[30]

The rescue mission of African economies was grounded in the neoliberal theory, which was given essence by the ten policy reforms of the Washington Consensus. These policy reforms which were projected as the answers to the development dilemma of third world economies included: (a) Fiscal policy discipline: to avert large-scale fiscal deficits relative to GDP; (b) Reordering of public expenditure priorities: as a mechanism to channel subsides towards broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary healthcare and infrastructure investment; (c) Tax reforms: to create a tax system that would combine a broad tax base with moderate marginal tax rates; (d) Liberalisation of interest rates: to make interest rates market-driven and positive in order to discourage capital flight and increase savings; (e) A competitive exchange rate: that will be determined by market forces; (f) Trade liberalisation: which involves the liberalisation of imports by dismantling restrictions to free trade; (g) Liberalisation of in-ward foreign direct investment (FDI): in order to attract foreign capital, skills and technological knowledge necessary to boost the domestic economy or contribute to new exports; (h)Privatization of state-owned enterprises: in order to dislodge the state from the commanding heights of the economy and replace it with the private sector; (i) Deregulation: A strategy to promote competition through the abolition of barriers that impede entry of new firms or restrict their exist; and, (j) Property rights: to provide the informal sector with ability to gain property rights at acceptable costs.[31]

Essentially, Washington Consensus represents the paradigmatic shift from the rigidities of state intervention symbolised by Keynesianism towards free market policies. This new shift achieved in the Reagan-Thatcher era from 1979-1985 was designed as an offensive towards global economic growth and development through seamless integration. The general reaction of African leaders to globalisation was uncritical acceptance. They believed that globalisation provided the magical Midas touch for development. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was modelled to be compatible with the policy prescriptions encapsulated in the Washington Consensus. The NEPAD initiative was conceived and developed by African leaders as a roadmap for accelerated economic growth and sustainable development in the globalisation process. But Africa has not reaped the touted benefits of globalisation despite its immersion, since the 1980s, into the waters of neoliberal reforms. In fact, globalisation has yielded contradictory results.

Globalisation and Failed State Syndrome: Any Connection?

The development challenges facing Africa are enormous. African states are still grappling with the fundamentals of basic sustenance. Since they were sucked into the epicentre of the economic crisis in the late 1970s, most African countries have been lying prostrate in that condition. All the doses of neoliberal theoretical pills that were injected into them ranging from stabilisation policy measures, austerity measures, SAP, PRSP and a host of others, failed to resuscitate them despite the promises made by the IFIs and the sacrifices made by the people. The seeming inefficiency of these reforms in the face of the intractability of the economic malaise led the then Nigeria's military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) to wonder exasperatingly why the Nigerian economy had neither collapsed nor recovered.

At the advent of globalisation, the condition given to Africa to partake in its boundless prosperity was to swallow the policy

prescriptions of the Washington Consensus in varying doses. African leaders subscribed to these promises and thus, religiously dismantled their trade barriers and opened up their economies for trade and FDI. They also rolled back the government through the privatisation of SOEs and the commercialisation of social services. The failure of the reform programmes to rescue African economies and the aloofness of the globalisation to equitably distribute its prosperity underpin the various manifestations of state failure in Africa.

Although the concept of failed state is enshrouded in disputations because of its definitional impreciseness, certain basic facts are conveyed when the term is used. State failure pictures the disconnect between people's expectations and the reality of state's incapacity to meet such expectations. A state is a success or failure within the context of meeting the fundamental objectives of statehood either specifically defined by it or generally defined. The state exists as an organising, regulating and mediating agent in interpersonal or intergroup relationships within a defined territory. Its organising and mediating role is wielded by the dominant class depending on the prevailing socio-economic or political system within the territory.

State failure must be conceptualised within the context of what the state is. What this means is that the various definitions of the state must be included in the delineation of the constituents of state failure. Therefore, the divergence in the conceptualisation and definition of state enriches, rather than impoverishes what state failure connotes. Such divergences in opinion yield broader understanding as they enable the use of multiple tools to set the boundaries of state failure. Thus, whether state is conceptualised in the mould of Machiavellian/ Weberian framework which sees the state as existing to maintain law and order and thus possesses a monopoly of the legitimate use of force; or Lockean/Rousseau/ Hobbesian social contract theory which situates the basic objective of the state within the framework of voluntary agreement amongst members of a territory to surrender and cede some of their freedoms and liberty to attain mutual security; or materialist standpoint which conceives the state as existing to protect the material interest of the dominant class; or in the tradition of patriarchal or matriarchal theories which view the state as a product of some form of an extended family through the male or female line; or the evolutionary theory which sees the state as naturally evolving from simple social formations such as the family and bands into the giant, complex aggregation of modern state system; or the legalistic conceptualisation which denotes the state as an entity with such characteristics as population, territory and monopoly of force[32], the fundamental issue is not what the state is, but whether the state has fulfilled its set or imposed obligations, which in contemporary era cover domestic and international. In other words, the questions, which precede or ought to precede the notion of state failure are: what has been happening to the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy? What is the state of the economic power of the people? Is the state still on top of security of lives and property? Is income distribution still within the threshold of equity and fairness? Are governance and political representations reflective of the wishes of the majority of the people? And, does the state possess the capacity and capability to protect its citizens domestically and internationally?

African statehood suffers from two fundamental flaws which underpin its contemporary dilemma. One is the nature of its formation. African states suffer from arbitrary abstraction as their emergence did not involve the indigenous peoples nor follow any system of aggregation that recognised socio-cultural cleavages. Different peoples and civilisations were banded together in a centrifugal union of opposites. The inherent centrifugalism in the new states ensured the workability of the colonial "divide and rule" strategy as ethnic groups were pitched against themselves in mutual suspicion and distrust. Two is the crisis of post-independence dependency. After independence, African states continued on the path charted by the colonialists instead of evolving a new system based on new sets of norms, values and visions. The emergent African leaders were content in merely replacing the colonialists, forgetting or rather ignoring the fact that the exigencies of the colonial states were dictated by colonial interest. Thus, new Africa maintained the old state structures with their imperfections and incongruence to autonomous development trajectory. The implication of this was that African states became appendages of erstwhile colonial masters instead of independent entities and were thus caught in the neo-colonial trap. The manifestation of this trap was the inability of African countries to chart a path for independent development as they were made to continue to produce raw materials.[33]

The intricate linkage of African economies to the economies of its former colonialists meant that if they sneezed, the African economies would catch cold. And they did so in the 1970s when recession in developed countries led to the implementation of anti-inflationary policies that triggered rapid rise in the rate of borrowing and lending. The effect was the implosion of economic crisis in the African economies that triggered balance of payments problems and crisis in its debt holdings. At this point what confronted African states was the macroeconomic challenge of making their debt burden sustainable. There

was no question of state failure then. It was not until 1992, several years after African economies had been sucked into the whirlwind of globalisation through the IMF/World Bank neoliberal prescriptions with promises of economic prosperity that state failure or failed state entered the political lexicon. But at that initial time it was used to denote war-torn states or a state completely incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.[34] Since 2007, African countries have consistently constituted more than half of the countries categorised as failed states.

The economic reform which the industrialised countries insisted must be imposed on African economies in order to keep up the liquidity of the global capitalist system and thus avert its collapse was also meant to put the economies of the African states on the path of recovery and development. The implementation of these reforms has not materialised into prosperity as all indices of development show serious weaknesses. As a matter of fact, African development stagnated and became fossilised. The survey conducted by UNICEF and UNDP on social spending in Africa before the turn of the new millennium revealed that only three countries in Africa were allocating 20 percent of budget funds for use on basic healthcare, education and nutrition with over 44 percent of all Africans living on absolute poverty.[35] The reason was that the capacity to generate the needed resources had been eroded as Africa doled out enormous portion of its meagre resources for debt servicing. Africa's debt stock rose twenty-four fold from its 1970 levels to a staggering US$320 billion in 1996 and US$350 billion in 1998. The portion of sub-Saharan Africa's debt rose from US$236billio in 1996 to US$281.1 billion in 2001 with debt servicing obligations put at US$23.7 billion.[36] Even with debt forgiveness, Africa's entrapment at the periphery of the world and its role assignment at the agricultural and natural resources production sector in contemporary globalisation undermine its development capacity.

What separates the countries categorised as being under the danger of failure and those showcased as successful is mainly their economic health. All the twelve criteria set out by the *US Foreign Policy* magazine and the US-based Fund for Peace Think Tank namely: mounting demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples; legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance; chronic and sustained human flight; uneven economic development along group lines; poverty and sharp or severe economic decline; criminalization and delegitimisation of the state; progressive deterioration of public services; widespread violation of human rights; security apparatus as "state within a state"; rise of factionalised elites and intervention of other states or external actors[37] are influenced by economic factors and other processes of globalisation.

Globalisation, Crisis of Development and New Challenges to African Development

The standard of living at the time of independence in almost all African countries was far superior to contemporary standards. Up until the 1970s, most African countries were considered "under-borrowed", a conspiratorial criminalisation of the prudent and efficient management of African economies. By this categorisation African economies were inundated with both solicited and unsolicited loans by the IFIs. These loans later led to debt peonage and halted the march of African development. One of the consequences of debt peonage was that it effectively ended the prospects of autonomous African development.

It is true that the capitalist penetration of African economies created some fundamental affinities between the African economies and that of the colonising power[38], but that affinity was broken at some point, which ensured their derailment before maturation. That point of derailment was marked by the debt entrapment. Thus, the implementation of anti-inflationary policies; rapid rise in the rate of borrowing and of lending; and, food crises in the 1970s, were the weapons used to actualise it. To deepen the crisis and thus foreclose the achievement of economic freedom, IMF evolved a plan of debt rescheduling that deemphasised the liquidation of the principal but strongly encouraged the payment of interest. Through debt servicing, rescheduling, and additional loans, African countries were herded into debt peonage and made to pay several times over, the original sums they borrowed. The IFIs, WTO and TNCs are veritable mechanisms of globalisation through which the crisis in African economy were created, nurtured and entrenched. The IMF was used to kick-start the process that entrapped potentially promising African economies and entrenched them at the periphery of global capitalist system.

The IMF reform package located the failure of African economies to meet its debt obligations on domestic market imperfections, economic inefficiencies, and social rigidities and therefore insisted on broad reforms to remedy them. Thus, by 1989, 35 Sub-Saharan African countries had adopted SAP or its variants to tackle balance of payment deficits and facilitate the resumption of economic growth and development. Instructively, while the developed economies preached openness and the ascendancy of market forces in African economies, they closed their economies and raised protective walls around them.

Also, while they frowned at subsidies in African economies, they subsidised their farmers and operated all manner of welfare packages for their citizens. This double standard led Mynall to describe it as Keynes at home and Smith abroad.[39]

Globalisation operates within the logic of imperialism. The dynamics of globalisation are essentially driven by the forces of economic nationalism. The industrialised countries together with the IFIs, the WTO and the TNCs exert the strongest influence whereas developing countries wield much less influence. Undoubtedly, globalisation is creating unprecedented opportunities for wealth creation and the betterment of human condition, but the African experience in the milieu of this prosperity is the prevalence of poverty. In other words, the real story of globalisation is not its prosperity but the huge disproportionateness in its share between the developed and developing countries, especially Africa. For instance, despite development efforts for more than half a century, progress with respect to development and poverty reduction remains uneven and patchy. More than 1.4 billion people in the developing world, representing about 26 per cent of its population, still live below the international poverty line of US$1.25 per person per day. While the world is recording reduction in the incidence of poverty, the story is different in Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of poor in this region increased from 212 million to 388 million during 1981-2005.[40] Out of 50 countries categorised as least developed countries (LDCs), Africa has 34 countries on the list. The term LDCs describes the" wretched" of the globe, the world's poorest countries indicated by low income (under US$750 gross national income [GNI] per capita); human resource weakness in terms of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy; and economic vulnerability based on the indicators of instability of agricultural production, export of goods and services, the economic importance of non-traditional activities, merchandise export concentration, handicap of economic smallness; and percentage of population displaced by natural disasters.[41]

There are emerging forces in the dynamics of globalisation that tend to deepen the challenges of African development. These are in the area of security, climate change and food crisis and migration. At the security level, globalisation has contributed to the intensification of wars in Africa through the weak institutional control over the movement of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Out of between 500 and 650 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide, an estimated 100 million were in Africa with between eight - 10 million concentrated in the West African sub-region. As at 2007, Africa accounted for 38 percent of global armed confrontations. And, during the past 15 years, Africa had squandered almost US $300 billion on armed conflicts. According to the Small Arms Survey, military expenditure rose by 47 percent during the 1990s; while life expectancy declined from 50 years to 46 years. On the other hand, the developed countries benefited extensively as the total arms sales of the world's 100 largest arms-producing companies increased by US$34 billion in 2008 to reach US$385 billion.[42] Apart from the loss of scarce resources, conflicts also led to the loss of human resources to death and displacement. In 2006, out of the global population of 24 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), resulting from conflicts, environmental and other natural disasters, over half or 13 million were in Africa. The same trend continued into 2009. Out of the global figure of 27.1 million IDPs, the highest since 1994, 21 African countries accounted for 11.6 million IDPs.[43]

The menace of climate change has also retarded the development prospects of African nation. Because, the challenges of climate change are complex and global as no country is immune to its effects, actions against its fallouts have not demonstrated the tenets of globalisation. The advanced countries have been lackadaisical in implementing the Kyoto protocols that would help to roll back the negative affects of climate change. The reason is simple: the action required against climate change pitches them against the overall interest of the developed countries as it would bring about substantial changes in the way technology is deployed which ultimately could affect their prosperity. But because the cost of managing the fallouts of climate change appears smaller compared to its effects on these advanced economies, action has been sluggish. It is the developing world that bears the brunt most as droughts, floods and forest fires interfere with their climate-sensitive natural resources resulting in tragic crop failures, reduced agricultural productivity and increased hunger, malnutrition and disease.[44]

Globalisation has shaped migration in many ways. The mix of factors such as prosperity in the industrialised world, high life expectancy, and the changes in its fertility and population growth rates exert particularistic pressure on the economies of the developed countries. The import of this pressure is that in the near future the developed economies would have crisis in its labour formation. Their response to this has been the liberalisation of their immigration policies. Almost all advanced countries have introduced a wide range of immigration policies ranging from points-based systems in Australia, Canada and the UK; H1-B visas in the US; German Green Card; the European Blue Card; the French Immigration "Choisie" as a strategy to supplement their human resource needs. And Africa appears to be the feeder zone. The African Diaspora is estimated in 2009 to consist of over 30 million skilled persons. It is claimed that migration is positive as it provides opportunity to banish poverty in poor countries. As at 2009, Africans in the Diaspora remitted about US$40 billion to their home countries. The World Bank projects that by 2025, migration could put over US$140 billion a year into the pockets of people in poor countries, which exceeds by almost three times, the historic commitments of G8 leaders at Gleneagles in 2005 to double aid.[45] This calculation is one sided as it failed to factor the cost of migration on Africa's prospects for economic growth and development. Despite the enormous financial prospects which migration holds, human resources and not capital are the major drivers of development. In the new world order of globalisation, economic growth and development are driven by people with knowledge. In practical terms, Africa is losing the vital technical expertise, entrepreneurial and managerial skills necessary to motorise its development, and in exchange for their expertise gets a paltry and consolatory fraction of their worth as remittances. For instance, at about US$150,000 yearly, it is calculated that African professionals who emigrated to the US contribute 40 times more wealth to the American economy than to the African economy. No amount of financial capital can translate to development except human knowledge is applied to it. The truth is that money cannot teach your children but teachers can; money cannot bring electricity to your home, engineers can; money cannot cure sick people, only doctors can. Because it is only a nation's human capital that can be converted into real wealth, human capital is much more valuable than its financial capital.[46]

Conclusion

The experience of Africa under globalisation is not any different from that of imperialism. Their dependency has deepened more than at their independence. Now, they have lost the control of policy making and depend on the developed countries, either as G8, OECD or the IFIs, for development policies and trajectory as well as aid. And aid is not what Africa needs but level-playing ground. NEPAD, which was established to reap the gains of globalisation, appears to collude with it in deepening Africa's underdevelopment. One, it is anchored on neoliberal theory and thus sees issues from that theoretical prism. For instance, NEPAD favours agricultural modernisation that is driven by consumers rather than producers; and, two, it envisages the funding of its developmental initiatives to come from aid.

What are required to move Africa from the doldrums of globalisation include: the reinterpretation of Africa's development trajectory within the context of multiplicity of alternatives; opening up and democratisation the multilateral institutions; transparency in WTO operations and justice in implementing WTO decisions. The current problem with Africa's development initiative is that development parameters have for long been set by the aid donors, the G8 and IFIs. Alternative development models as encapsulated in the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the 1989 Alternative Framework must be seriously considered by African leaders.

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