Pan-Africanism, and the Integration of Continental and Diaspora Africa

Volume 1

Editors:
Tunde Babawale
Akin Alao
Tony Onwumah

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...re than any other time in history, there's a new wave of shared ...ultural re-awakening, understanding and solidarity between ...ntal and Diaspora Africa. This development, no doubt, owes in part ...persistent and determined deconstructionist and reconstructionist ...ographical efforts of the Centre for Black and African Arts and ...tion (CBAAC) in collaboration with the Pan African Strategic and ...Research Group (PANAFSTRAG), to hold regular international ...ences.

...is book is a product of the 2010 edition held in Abuja, Nigeria in ...ber 2010. It is in two volumes. Volume one contains nineteen ...y papers on such diverse areas as: African Union; Integration and ...ment; Culture, Creativity and the Art; Decolonisation; Na... ...tion and Globalisation; among others. The papers intellectually ...issues that are of interest to Continental and Diaspora African ...s. The last three chapters are written in Portuguese.

...Babawale is a Professor of Political Science, University of Lagos ...rently Director-General/Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Black ...can Arts and Civilization (CBAAC), Lagos, Nigeria.

...lao, an Associate Professor of African History and immediate past ..., Institute of Cultural Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife ...African Intellectual and Legal History. He is editor of *Ife Journal of ...and Dialogue: A Journal of Humanities*, as well as Executive Vice ...n of CBAAC's International Conference Planning Committee and ...of the Editorial Board of *Journal of Black and African Arts and ...on (CBAAC)*.

...nwumah (PhD) is Director, Research and Publications and Head, ...Outreach office of the Centre for Black and African Arts and ...on (CBAAC). He is a member of CBAAC International Conference ...Committee and member of the Editorial Board of the *Journal of ...d African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC)*.

Internal Secessionist Pressures and the Dilemma of Pan-African Integration

Agaptus Nwozor

Introduction

THE wave of political independence in Africa in the 1960s was greeted with great expectations and enthusiasm. The transfer of power to indigenous crops of leaders was envisaged as an opportunity to push the fortunes of the new states to greater heights, especially in terms of economic development. But political independence, in actuality, came with its own challenges. Part of the broader leadership debacle in post-colonial African states was the European creation of "master ethnic groups" and the conferment of political power on them. The effect of this arrangement was the enthronement of exclusionary politics in the body politic of African states with the result that elites of the ethnic groups outside the power equation felt marginalised and began to agitate for self-determination.

Thus, all over Africa, the elites got embroiled in conflicts aimed at capturing state power. Ake (1981:128) avers that the purpose of capturing state power is purely to advance their economic interests. State power in Africa has come to symbolise a licence, a veritable means of creating and consolidating the material well being of the elites. Because of the extreme importance attached to state power on account of its utilitarian value, the contest for its acquisition has been elevated to the status of war (Ake, 1981:128) The premium attached to state power and the pockets of conflict

that dot the political landscape of Africa have made the achievement of integration a herculean task.

Since the decade of African independence in the 1960s, African elites have not pretended about the relevance of Pan-African integration. They recognise its imperativeness as a vehicle, not only to safeguard the fledgling independence, but also to achieve economic development in the face of Africa's peripherality in the global capitalist system. But the problem that has dogged collaboration towards Pan-African integration centres on the issue of sequencing, that is, whether integration would be immediate or gradual. The argument surrounding the sequencing of integration inheres from the reluctance of African leaders to relinquish their powers to a commonwealth.

Regionalisation has been adopted by African leaders as their strategy of ultimately achieving continent-wide integration. But empirical evidence shows that regionalism is inherently incapable of positioning Africa as a force to reckon with in the global arena as would continent-wide political integration. What has consigned Pan-African integration to the realm of utopianism has been the instinctive obsession with state power amongst the elites. Not only does it fuel internal secessionist activism, it tends to preoccupy the states with tasks of survival and sovereign unity in contradistinction to Pan-African integration.

Panoramic Overview of Tension, Conflicts and Secessionist Pressures in Africa

The transmutation of pre-independence optimism to post-colonial pessimism in terms of Africa's development can be located in the failure of the postcolonial African states to operate above the constraints of primordialism. The ethnic composition of African states, as a rule rather than exception, is heterogeneous. The management of these diverse ethnic groups entails the enthronement of all the ingredients of fair play, tolerance and patience. The state in such a volatile environment ought to be neutral and above ethnic characterisations. As Nnoli (2003:14) posits:

Chad has been a volatile entity. There has been four distinct phases in the Chadian civil war namely, 1965-79; 79-82; 1998-2002 and 2005-present. The Chadian situation has trapped it in poverty and serious economic crisis. The Horn of Africa is not enamoured of the conflicts that characterise the Central African region. Eritrea fought wars of independence against Ethiopia between 1962-91 and 98-2000. There were also the Somali border wars with Ethiopia and Kenya between 1964 and 1967. Since 1990 Somali has been in a bitter civil war that has led to the death of millions of people and virtual collapse of the state. Also, Djibouti was embroiled in a civil war that was fought mainly in the Northern part of the country between 1991-94. The Great Lakes region has posed the greatest challenge to African security having spawned the greatest maze of conflicts in terms of magnitude, viciousness, spread and interconnectedness of the countries of this region in conflicts. As Nnoli (2006:59) observes:

> Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville constitute an internal conflict maze with a constantly shifting epicentre from Burundi in 1993 to Rwanda in 1994 back to Burundi in 1996, and to Congo (DRC) in 1998. Some 3.7 milliom people have died in this maze.

The same trend of conflict and instability characterises the Northern Africa region. Sudan has experienced two civil wars (1955-72; 1983-2005) and has currently undergone serious state-sponsored ethnic war which has led to the official splitting of the country with south sudan becoming independent in July 2011. In Algeria, a civil war has been raging since 1992. Interestingly, in most conflicts in Africa both sides have external allies whose support exacerbate and sustain the war with attendant diplomatic consequences. There were also instances of retaliatory support for illegal regimes and dissidents. This was particularly and brazenly the case in the DRC and Congo (Brazzaville) wars. In the DRC civil wars (1996-97 and 1998-2002) both the government and rebels had backing from other states. While Rwanda, Angola and Uganda backed the rebels that successfully overthrew the DRC government in the first phase (1996-97), there was a

realignment of forces leading to Rwanda and Uganda supporting new rebels in the 1998-2002 civil war to oust Laurent Kabila. Angola continued to support the government in league with Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The preoccupation of most African states with the goals of regime survival and preservation of their corporate sovereignty in the face of mounting pressures from secessionist forces detracts from the imperativeness of Pan-African integration.

The Political Economy of Internal Conflicts and Secessions

Even though the root of secessionist pressures across post-colonial Africa is traceable to its colonial heritage, the emergent African leadership undoubtedly deepened the contradictions of state-building. The emergent African leaders did not heed the counsel of Nkrumah that rather than imperialism that it was neocolonialism that posed the greatest danger to the fledgling African states (Nkrumah, 1968:ix). They were obsessed with using the state power to cater for their economic needs. As Ake (1981:128) puts it, 'The indigenous bourgeoisie which took over government at independence lacked a secure material base and used its political power for accumulation.' In this preoccupation they found allies in the retreating European colonialists. The alliance of the African leadership with the West ensured that Europe remained the centre of policy formulation for African states with the attendant consequence that African states served the interests of the amalgamated classes than those of the masses (Kieh and Agbese, 2004:5).

Therefore, the high premium placed on political power made both its use and acquisition a subject of murderous contest, pitting the elites amongst themselves. As such, political contests were elevated to the status of soft war where winning was considered all-important (Ake, 1981:128). The conflicts in Africa inhere from, and centre on, the acquisition of state power. It does not matter the nature of primordial forces invoked, or the end

purported to be served by elite offensive towards the acquisition of state power, the point is that secessionist pressures in African states are purely economic-driven.

The major casualties in the struggle for power amongst the elites are the people and the states. All over Africa internal conflicts have become a permanent characterising feature of statehood. The consequences of internal conflicts are enormous. Apart from internal displacement and consequent dislocation of the lifestyles, many people are turned into refugees with attendant loss to the economies. As at December 2009, about 27.1 million people were internally displaced by conflicts or violence worldwide with 21 African countries accounting for 11.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) or more than 40 percent (IDMC 2009:1).

In this paper, internal displacement connotes the violent and forceful dislodgement of a person or group of persons from their homes or traditional settlements principally to save their lives or to avoid the direct consequences of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural- or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border (UNHCR, 2009:5). Even though environmental and natural disasters are recognised as part of the impetus for displacement, it is conflicts with attendant human rights abuses that are implicated as the leviathan force engendering internal displacement in Africa.

Table I: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa (2009)

Country	Number of IDPs	Percentage of total population	Start of current displacement situation	Peak number of IDPs (Year)	New displacement	Causes of displacement
Algeria	Undetermined	Undetermined	1992	1,500,000 (2002)	Undetermined	Internal armed conflict, human rights violations
Angola	Undetermined	Undetermined	-	-	-	-
Burundi	100,000	1.2%	1993	800,000 (1999)	0	Internationalised and internal armed conflict, human rights violations
Central African Republic	162,000	3.7%	2005	212,000 (2007)	15,000	Internal armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations
Chad	168,000	1.5%	2006	185,000 (2007)	0	Internationalised and internal armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations
Republic of the Congo	7,800	-	-	-	-	-
Cote d'Ivoire	Undetermined	Undetermined	2002	1,100,000 (2003)	500	Internal armed conflict, generalised violence. human rights violations
Democratic Republic of Congo	1,900,000	2.9%	1996	3,400,000 (2003)	1,000,000	Internationalised and internal armed conflict, human rights violations
Eritrea	10,000	0.2%	1998	1,000,000 (2000)	0	International armed conflict
Ethiopia	300,000-350,000	0.4%	2006	Undetermined	200,000	Internal armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations
Kenya	Undetermined	Undetermined	2007 (election-related violence)	600,000 (2008)	Undetermined	Generalised violence, human rights violations
Liberia	Undetermined	-	1989	500,000 (2003)	Undetermined	Internal armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations
Niger	6,500	Up to 0.1%	2007	11,000 (2007)	Undetermined	Internal armed conflict, human rights violations
Nigeria	Undetermined	Undetermined	1999	Undetermined	At least 5,000	Internal armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations
Rwanda	Undetermined	Undetermined	-	-	-	-
Senegal	24,000-40,000	0.2 – 0.3%	1982	70,000 (2007)	1,000	Internal armed conflict

Somalia	1,500,000	16.5%	1991	1,500,000 (2009)	400,000	International and internal armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violation
Sudan	4,900,000	11.6%	1983	2,700,000 in Darfur (2008) 4,000,000 in Southern Sudan (2004)	530,000	Internal armed conflict, generalised violence
Togo	Undetermined	Undetermined	--	-	-	-
Uganda	437,000	1.3%	1988	1,800,000 (2005)	Undetermined	Internal armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violation
Zimbabwe	570,000-1,000,000	4.6 – 8.0%	2000	Undetermined	15,000	Generalised violence, human rights violation

Source: IDMC: 29-47

The distinction between IDPs and refugees lies in whether they remain within state borders. While there is international recognition of refugee status and possibility of international intervention, IDPs do not enjoy such wide latitude of international assistance. As IDMC (2009) corroborates, 'the crucial difference means they [IDPs] do not enjoy the same protection under international law as those with refugee status receive ... Unlike refugees, there is no specifically-mandated body to provide assistance to IDPs.' But in recent times the UN and AU have demonstrated increasing interest in addressing IDPs. But the most potent weapon to address IDPs is to pool efforts towards the containment or elimination of conflicts especially by stepping up all the indices that criminalise conflicts, including the arraignment of domestic elites and their international collaborators. The combined effects of internal conflicts manifest in the multiplication of people's miseries through lack of access to their traditional food, employment, education and healthcare, and the erosion of their human dignity.

The cost of internal conflicts to the African continent is enormous as exemplified by its all-round underdevelopment. According to a report jointly produced by the International Action Network on

Small Arms, Saferworld and Oxfam International, between 1990 and 2005, Africa squandered almost US$300 billion on armed conflict. Apart from the monumental developmental impact that this amount could have made on African economies, armed conflicts rolled back prospects of economic advancement with an average annual loss of 15 per cent of GDP. The costs which conflicts imposed on African economies are calculated to include 50 per cent more infant deaths, 15 per cent more undernourished people, reduced life expectancy (by five years), 20 per cent more adult illiteracy, 2.5 times fewer doctors per patient and 12.4 per cent less food per person (http://www.realtruth.org/news/071019-001-africa.html).

Conflicts naturally engender unfavourable environment that is antithetical to the forces of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In other words, conflict-ridden states foreclose the possibility of external investments which are necessary to power economic growth and development. A characteristic feature of the countries of Africa where conflicts have destabilised the state apparatuses is the prevalence of poverty and underdevelopment. Often, the effects of conflicts are borne more by the civilians, especially women and children, than by the combatants. This is especially so because of the disproportionality in the ratio of civilians and combatants as well as their differently conditioned attitudinal responses to conflicts. The paradox of internal conflicts is that while it lasts, the people are reduced to abject poverty.

Table II: African Refugee Population by UNHCR regions, 2008

UNHCR regions	Start-2008			End-2008			Change (total)	
	Refugees	People in refugee-like situations	Total refugees	Refugees	People in refugee-like situations	Total refugees	Absolute	%
Central Africa and Great Lakes	1,086,200	15,000	1,101,200	978,200	27,800	1,006,000	-95,200	-8.6%
East and Horn of Africa	815,200	-	815,200	763,900	-	763,900	-51,300	-6.3%
Southern Africa	181,000	-	181,000	161,100	-	161,100	-19,900	-11.0%
West Africa	174,700	-	174,700	175,300	-	175,300	600	0.3%
Total *	2,257,100	15,000	2,272,100	2,078,500	27,800	2,106,300	-165,800	-7.3%

* Excluding North Africa.
Source: UNHCR 2009:8

Internal conflicts in Africa retard development as efforts are dissipated on micro-sovereign issues of economic survival, containment of internal pressures, maintenance of sovereign unity and rebuilding of institutions destroyed in insurrectional campaigns. Thus, preoccupation with these issues shifts Pan-African integration to the background.

The Sovereignty Question, Regionalisation and Pan-African Integration

Integration does not just occur. It is a product of conscious, premeditated and well-calculated resolve to cede certain aspects of a state's sovereignty to a common pool. Pan-African integration connotes a seamless interconnectivity amongst African states economically, politically, socially and culturally. This ideal which was propounded in the first wave of African independence in the 1960s polarised the emergent African leaders. This polarisation was not about the desirability of Pan-African integration but the nature of such integration, especially the issue of sequencing. African leaders were not under any form of illusion that their new

political independence signified the end of Western domination. They all knew and recognised the imperativeness of economic, social, cultural and political cooperation and integration as a platform not only for accelerated transformation and sustained development but also to forestall the reversal of the new independence. Such a united front was canvassed as an effective bulwark against neocolonialism (Nkrumah 1968:259).

But several factors such as structural linkages to erstwhile colonialists, egotistic considerations and reluctance to relinquish state sovereignty undermined an all-out co-operation and integration in Africa in the 1960s. It would appear that these factors also underpinned the seeming failure of several efforts at institutionalising workable frameworks for African integration. Despite the objectives of the then OAU to, amongst others, promote unity and solidarity as well as coordinate and intensify co-operation for development among African states, it failed to concretise integration. The nearest it got was the establishment of African Economic Community (AEC) through the auspices of Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), which was a sequel to earlier attempts (OAU Summits in 1973 and 1976) at integration, was adopted at the 1980 OAU Extraordinary Summit. LPA extracted individual and collective commitment from African leaders to pursue economic and social integration of Africa through the establishment of national, regional and sub-regional institutions necessary for interdependency (Nyong'o, 2002). The signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1991 by the OAU Heads of State and Government, which paved the way for the establishment of African Economic Community (AEC), signalled the commitment of African leaders to economic integration. Since May 1994 when the necessary instruments of ratification were deposited with the Secretary General of the OAU and AEC, the AEC Treaty has been in operation.

Despite severe criticisms by the World Bank that LPA was too ambitious and did not give enough room to the private sector, as well as not conceding to reforms necessary in the public sector to

stimulate growth, LPA constituted a tremendous effort at enthroning integration through regionalisation. AEC is patterned in such a way that its building blocks are the regional groupings that populate Africa, ranging from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa; the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in East and Southern Africa amongst others. Paradoxically, these regional institutions have not had the required impact on the development prospects of their member-states, neither have they, in any significant way, integrated regional economies, not to talk of Pan-African integration. The primary hurdle for Pan-African economic integration is the reordering of Africa's economic architecture to make it sufficiently conducive to accomplish minimalist economic goals of industrialisation. This is so because African economies, as at present, are characterised by:

> *Primary production, low share of world trade, low manufactured output and exports, low savings and investment, dominance of ODA and low private capital inflow, rapid population growth, dominance of public sector vis-à-vis weak private sector, heavy external debt burden... (CBN Briefs 2002/2003:35).*

Despite the strides made by Africa in regional integration, it is still very far from achieving economic integration. Even though the 34 year projection through six stages which AEC sets for itself to achieve full integration of African economies might appear realistic, several factors such as monocultural structure of African economies, seeming insolvency of many African economies as exemplified by debt overhang, increasing contraction in their share of global exports which has pitched many African countries in the grim struggle for survival, and the question of true disposition of African countries towards integration, stand between these projections and their realisation. There has been a deliberate trajectory away from political integration.

The question of political integration has been a volatile one. The

antagonism that attended its suggestion in the immediate post-independence era is still very strong. There appears a certain innate recalcitrance among African leaders especially when it has to do with power. No African leader appears prepared to cede his presidential powers for any reason whatsoever, including Pan-African integration. This underscored the seeming opposition of majority of African leaders to the dictum of Nkrumah, 'Seek ye first political unity and the economic union shall be added thereto". The proliferation of regional blocs and the pursuit of wider regionalisation through the auspices of AEC represent a subtle opposition to political integration. Both the obsession with state power and general incapacity of African states are major setbacks to integration. Integration is best achieved when there is an integration leader and all intending component units possess certain minimum attributes including sound economy, political stability and sound macroeconomic policies as well as sound fiscal and monetary policies (Ndulo, 1992:5).

Deconstructing the Dilemma of Pan-African Integration

While there is no dissension amongst African leaders about the desirability of African integration, there is no unanimity in their conceptualisation of the prognosis for action. There were three distinct categories of advocacy and aspiration about the trajectory of Pan-African integration: the Casablanca group consisting of Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Algeria and Morocco which advocated immediate and total union of the African continent; the Brazzaville group comprising mainly former French colonies which favoured a gradualist approach anchored on regional economic and cultural cooperation as a first step. The last group was the Monrovia Group which included some members of the Brazzaville Group and other independent African states not included in the Casablanca group. This group rooted for a gradualist approach. The preponderance of preferences towards gradualism was what undermined the initial idea of a Federation of African States or United States of Africa and the eventual formation of the OAU (now AU) (Manelisi, Francis and Stephen, 2000:1).

For all intents and purposes, the OAU was a mere organisation and therefore, lacked the basic integrative attributes to forge a united Africa. The OAU charter expressly recognised the sanctity of member states' sovereignty and therefore forbade the Organisation from interfering in their internal problems. It also recognised regional institutions as bases for eventual continent-wide integration. Both of these provisions: the reification of regionalism as bastion of integration and the doctrine of non-interference, contracted the space for Pan-African integration. Regionalism in Africa derives its essence from colonial primordialism: erstwhile colonialists using a combination of strategies, namely foreign aid, bi-and multi-lateral economic agreements and military and defence pacts, established larger than life influence within these regional blocs. In other words, regionalism with its many pacts actively reinvented the spectre of neocolonialism as the erstwhile colonialists used and continue to use its platform to direct the affairs of African countries.

The fact that regionalism in Africa follows the boundary lines drawn by erstwhile colonialists underscores its inchoateness and seeming inability to transcend the realm of rhetoric. Indeed, despite the long history of regionalism, progress towards integration has not only been disappointingly slow but failed to positively reverse Africa's dire circumstances (Guy, 2002:123). The explanation for this lies in two factors, namely, the nature of African economies and subsisting leadership crises. There is a basic belief amongst African policy makers and scholars that the panacea for the appalling economic situation in Africa lies in regionalisation. This belief found concrete expression in the 1991 Final Lagos Plan of Action (FLPA) and the subsequent objectives of AEC. AEC is anchored on, and derives its impetus from, regional blocs known as Regional Economic Communities (REC). In other words, regionalism, to AEC, represents the 'most appropriate strategy to achieve autonomous, self-reliant and self-sustained development' (Guy 2002:125). But this belief is faulted in the face of empirical evidence: the reality of African economic experience is ensconced in its peripherality in the global capitalist system which makes independent developmental efforts a mirage.

Table III: Total Merchandise Exports by Blocs

Regional Blocs	Year of Creation	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
CEMAC	1994	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
CEPGL	1976	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COMESA	1994	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
Cross Border Initiative	1992	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
EAC	1996	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
ECCAS	1983	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
ECOWAS	1975	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Indian Ocean Commision	1984	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MRU	1973	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SADC	1992	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8
UDEAC	1964	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
UEMOA	1994	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

Sources: World Development Indicators 2003:324; 2007:334

Regionalisation does not appear to be effective in the face of poor national economic indices. The major reason for the poor showing of African economies is their consignment to, and stagnancy at the periphery where its specialisation is limited to the production of primary commodities (raw material or partially processed goods). Primary commodities in the international arena have been characterised by worsening terms of trade necessitating increment in trade volumes to maintain current levels of income (World Development Indicators 2003:181; Guy, 2002: 124-25).

Another factor that has inhibited regionalisation is the apparent struggle for supremacy among African leadership and the maze of conspiracies that define inter-elite relations. This struggle had often manifested in transnational cliques and deliberate state policies aimed at undermining perceived enemy-countries. In almost all the regions, African leaders have often contributed to intra-regional crises through helping their allies to retain power and ward off opposition or helping rebels to overthrow legitimate governments. For instance, in West Africa, Libya, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire played significant roles in the Liberian crisis as they

backed such rebels as Charles Taylor and Prince Yormie Johnson. Also, beyond the concerns of humanitarian miseries, Nigeria's initial involvement in the Liberian crisis through the ECOMOG was motivated by the need to help the late Samuel Doe, who was General Ibrahim Babangida's (the then Nigerian military leader) friend, from the apocalyptic destruction of rebels (Fawole 2003:157-158). Charles Taylor likewise was allegedly instrumental in stoking the fire of rebellion in Sierra Leone by supporting rebel groups.

The pretensions of micro-patriotism and nationalism constitute serious impediments to African integration. These twin-attributes form the basis for the rationalisation of anti-democratic insurgencies and anti-integration disposition of many African leaders. The various military coups and autocratic regimes in Africa before the current wave of democratisation found justification in the high ideal of patriotism. Patriotism and nationalism have become malleable in the hands of African leaders that they have assumed new connotations: while patriotism has been so narrowly conceptualised as absolute and unquestioning allegiance to the interests of the ruling class, its component, nationalism, refers to fanatical protection of territorial spheres of influence of the ruling elites. This mindset was what derailed earlier attempts at integration and still dog contemporary attempts.

Associated with the issue of Pan-African integration was the leadership question of an integrated Africa. In the build-up to earlier attempts at Pan-African integration, there were palpable personal hostility and accusations of personal ambitions against the advocates of immediate Union government, especially the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The predominant suspicion was that the progressives (the advocates of immediate Union government) were hiding behind Pan-African integration to advance their personal imperialist ambitions. Legum documented that the Head of Nigerian delegation in the 1960 Pan-African conference sarcastically remarked that If anybody makes this mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa, the whole purpose of

Pan Africanism will, I fear, be defeated' (Shivji 2005:7). This mindset still predominates in contemporary times.

The Pathways: Towards Pan-African Integration in a Globalised World

The fear and antagonism that pervaded the quest for Pan-African integration in the period following African independence in the 1960s can be explained within the ambit of crisis of personal ambitions. The emergent African leaders saw state power as something to be coveted, firstly for self and group and secondly, and far less importantly, for the masses. The seeming antithesis to African integration was the personalisation and personification of power. Nyerere captured the mindset of African leaders which informed their failure to establish a Union Government for the African continent in the following way:

> ... too many of us had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided ... Once you multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, seats at the United nations, and individuals entitled to 21 gun salutes, not to speak of a host of ministers, Prime Ministers, and envoys, you would have a whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping Africa balkanised... .

> After the failure to establish the Union Government at the Accra Summit of 1965, I heard one Head of State express with relief that he was happy to be returning home to his country still Head of State (cited in Shivji, 2005:8).

It is the perks of office (influence and privileges) associated with public offices that have formidably undermined Pan-African integration. Unfortunately, it is the occupants of these same political offices that actually determine the necessity or otherwise of Pan-African integration. Because Pan-African integration is akin to committing class suicide, African leaders have kept it in abeyance, notwithstanding its many benefits. The decades of military jackboots in governance symbolised lost decades of Pan-African collaboration for integration. Governments in this era were preoccupied more with survival and general legitimacy question.

The quest for Pan-African integration has always been powered by two factors personal activism and the framework of democracy. The immediate post-independence campaign for Pan-African integration was motorised by such popularly elected leaders as Kwame Nkrumah, Cheikh Anta Diop, Modibo Keita and Sekou Toure. And amongst these leaders it was Nkrumah that epitomised it: that was why when Nkrumah's government was toppled by the military, the ship of Pan-African integration lost steam and subsequently drifted rudderless until it got stuck in the sea of regionalism and later, globalisation. Guy (2002:127) captures it this way, 'with the progressive removal of the Pan-africanists from the African political scene, neo-functionalism has become the dominant approach and serves as the model for most, if not all, current regional integration schemes in Africa.' Neo-functionalists favoured loose cooperation and held that economic integration should precede political integration and that any form of unity among any number of African states was in the right direction (Guy, 2002:127; Shivji, 2005:7).

The seeming hopeless situation of African states, some 50 years after, questions the wisdom of regional strategy of neo-functionalism. Both statism and regionalism have demonstrated acute limitations in the task of positioning Africa in the rapacious global capitalist system: by their very nature they lack the necessary capacity to contain or ward off neo-imperialist manipulations, oppression, looting and pillage orchestrated under different guise. The achievement of African regionalism has been scathingly summarised by Guy (2002:128-29) thus:

> *Many institutions for regional co-operation and integration were created soon after independence in Africa. There are at present more than 200 such organisations on the continent; more than 160 are inter-governmental and the rest non-governmental... This institutional proliferation has resulted in multiple membership, duplication, a waste of human and financial resources, and lack of inter-institutional coordination.*

Even though continent-wide integration is superior to regional

integration in terms of net gains, yet regionalism cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand as if it is completely devoid of positive attributes. Ordinarily, the intentions of regionalisation are to provide a common market to the exclusion of others, protect the interest of domestic capital within the region and confer on it advantages that would make it strong to compete around the world. A verdict on whether regionalism in Africa has fulfilled its cardinal objectives would definitely tilt towards the negative (Shams, 2005:2; Cargill, 2010:18). The two cardinal expectations of regionalism namely, that it would, through economy of scale, unleash economic advantages in the domestic economies of member-states and that it would eventually lead to continent-wide integration have not materialised. Africa, both as individual states and as regional groupings, has continually lost its share of global exports. Efforts at regional integration did not yield dividends because of a number of factors: subsisting structural deficiencies, lack of commitment on the part of African leaders, absence of favourable conditions and lack of acclaimed integration leaders in the regions to serve as the fulcrum and bastion of monetary and fiscal stability.

One of the major drawbacks to Africa's march to integration is the rivalry between personal ambition and common good: the erroneous perception that power should be wielded for its own sake and not as an instrument to achieve higher good for the people such as eradication of poverty, enthronement of better and higher standards of living, creation of opportunities for the full realisation of people's humanity and so on. This parochial perception of the utilitarian value of power undergirds the myriad conflicts and political instability that have placed African states on the precipice of the dustbin of failed states. Regionalism is patently incongruent in the contemporary globalised world and that is why the EU has continued to smooth its integration efforts, sucking up every state in Europe into the vortex of its union. Without the EU, the so-called global financial meltdown might have had much more far-reaching devastating impact on the economies of European countries than it did. The increasing convergence of states into a union is an integral logic of globalisation. As Ake (1995[b]:22-23)

observes,

> It [globalisation] is about growing structural differentiation
> and functional integration in the world economy: it is about
> growing inter-dependence across the globe; it is about the
> nation-state coming under pressure from the surge of
> transnational phenomena, about the emergence of a global
> mass culture driven by mass advertising and technical
> advances in mass communication.

Therefore, the continued relevance of states in our globalised
world lies in their ability to increase their capacity in order to be
big players in the international system. Statism or regionalism as
presently organised in Africa lacks the capacity to provide the right
platform to confront or fit into the globalised world. As it is,
Africa's combined economies amount to less than two percent of
total global income and 3.5 percent of global trade which is mainly
in the extractive sector (Cargill, 2010:19). And yet, Africa is
strategically important to the world on account of its abundant
human and natural resources. As Cargill (2010:20) avers, 'Africa
has almost 40 per cent of the basic mineral resources required to
fuel global industry, as well as 10 percent of the world's freshwater
supplies and 15 percent of the world's agricultural land.' But the
conversion of these distinct advantages to further Africa's
influence in the world arena has remained a very big challenge.
The pathway to overcoming these challenges lies in the reordering
of the domestic arena and the erection of the necessary framework
for Pan-Africn integration.

Conclusion

The Achilles heel of Pan-African integration for the past 50 years has
been the elite perception of the utilitarian value of state power.
African elites covet state power and parochially perceive it in
economic terms. In perceiving power in such narrow way, Pan-
African integration is seen negatively as a surreptitious strategy to
undermine state sovereignty. Regionalism which the African ruling
elites adopted in place of outright continent-wide political

integration represents a clever alternative. While regional groupings
serve useful purposes, evidence has shown that they have not
brought the continent closer to real independence as demonstrated
by the dependence and liabilities of African countries.

Pan-African integration is indispensable if Africa's voice must be
heard in the globalised world. In order to advance the cause of
Pan-African integration, emphasis must be on democratisation of
the African states. Democracy will give power back to the people
and de-emphasise the personalisation of power. It is the
personalisation of power that fuels internal secessionist tension
and erodes the possibilities of a Pan-African integration.

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