

One world, many voices, that's what scholars in a related discipline described the subject matter of their discipline. The voices show "recognition and appreciation of the world's diversity". The world is not static, it is dynamic. Its dynamism creates the environment for radical departure from traditional orientation to empirical approach.



Fundamentals of International Relations in a New World Order, is an addition to the new prospects of a new world. A new world is only possible when scholars are ready and prepared to "challenge conventional thinking". As Gurtov points out, national and global security should be pursued in the promotion of human interest. Human interest means the satisfaction of the basic material and non-material needs of the overwhelming majority of the planet's people, especially the under-developed countries, but also in the so-called developed world.



FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A NEW WORLD ORDER



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CHAPTER 10

Environmental Variables and the Realisation of State Objectives in International Relations

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Introduction

States do not evolve their foreign policy objectives in isolation. The formulation of state objectives is made within the precincts of domestic and external environment. What this implies is that foreign policy objectives of states are products of environmental variables. When we talk of environmental variables we are referring to the aggregate socio-cultural, economic and political forces that exist at the domestic and external spheres and which motorise and determine *what* constitutes state objectives, *how* states arrive at these objectives and *why* states pursue them and with what tools.

Although states are the major actors in the international arena, there are other actors categorised as sub-state and non-state actors. These actors exert the same pressure and influence as states. What this means, in essence, is that these actors relate in a complex way and this complex relationship determines the influences on state objectives. Stopford & Strange (1991) have termed these complex relations in the international arena as triangular diplomacy. Triangular diplomacy encompasses the range

of relationships in the international arena such as state-state relations; transnational corporations-transnational corporations relations and state-transnational corporations relations.

There is a direct relationship between state objectives and state capability. While a state could set up diverse goals based on its national interest, what determines the realisation of these goals is its capability defined in terms of its level of economic and political development, its set of interests and the power at its disposal to actualise these interests and the nature of its national leadership. An important point to note is that it is not every objective outlined by a state that it has the capability to pursue and realise.

A major determinant of the capability of states to articulate and realise their foreign policy is their positioning in the international capitalist system. The closer a state is positioned at the centre, the more likely it could enjoy some independence in the formulation, pursuit and realisation of its objectives. In contrast, a state that is at the fringe is most unlikely to realise its objectives without interference from the states occupying the centre. The economic crisis, poverty and political instability, among other negative attributes that characterise Third World Countries have made it impossible for them to be the real architects of their domestic and foreign policies.

This chapter examines the domestic and external environmental variables that act as triggers and drivers of state objectives. It also interrogates the link between these environmental variables and the forces that conduce to the realisation of state objectives. The chapter holds that environmental variables are not only the motorising force that spawns state objectives but also contributory factor in their realisation.

The Building Blocks:

The State in the Arena of International Relations

The international arena is filled with a multiplicity of actors that may simply be categorised as state, sub-state and non-state actors. But despite the increasing role, prominence and influence of sub-state and non-state actors in the international arena, the state remains the cornerstone of international relations (Hobson 2000; Lake 2007). Although non-state actors such as the international non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations, regional and continental organisations and inter-continental and global organisations are relevant and important in international relations and have exerted far-reaching influence on the resolution of international issues, one way or the other, the centrality of the state is that it has continued to remain the conduit or agency through which such resolutions are made and effectuated.

The state is a legal entity that embodies sovereignty, political institutions, population, geographic region or territory, relatively coherent and autonomous system of government, legitimate monopoly of force, and body of laws. There have been various conceptions of state ranging from legal, philosophical, sociological to political. No matter the ideological conception of state, it is a concrete manifestation of the "culmination of man's struggles in settled life, embodying and expressing the common interests of the dominant class within the system, and of its derivative ruling class within the government, both of whom are able to attain and sustain such pre-eminence by various designs, including the ultimate application of authoritative force" (Igwe 2002:416-7). Importantly, the state is the "realm of collective action and decision" (Balaam & Veseth 2005:13).

Thus, whether the state is conceptualised holistically and equated with the country or disaggregated and differentiated from the society and government (Thomson 1995), or as public

bureaucracy and administrative collective incorporating a set of personnel who occupy positions of decisional authority in policy formulation and implementation (Nwozor 2012), or the totality of the materiality of political class domination in a society (Ibeanu 1998), or specific modality of class domination or class-related phenomenon (Okolie 2005) or "a creature of the basis, and most decisive element of the superstructure of society" (Igwe 2002:416), the state is the reason for, and motorising force of, international relations. In contemporary times, there have been challenges to the dominance of the state as a major organising force in the international arena as a result of the phenomenon of globalisation.

The emergence of globalisation and its obfuscation of state boundaries led liberal interdependence theorists to contend that the state had become irrelevant or dead in international relations (Hobson 2000). Their argument rested on the unfolding interdependence and erosion of state sovereignty through "economic interdependence, global-scale technologies, and democratic politics" (Thomson 1995:215). Essentially, sovereignty is one of the major attributes of statehood. It encapsulates "the possible powers of independent statehood, including constitutional and legislative supremacy, which entitle its government to make and implement its own decisions in domestic affairs and in conduct of international relations, without the prior consent or permission of an outside power" (Igwe 2002:412). The implication of the last point is that through the instrumentality of sovereignty, a state is, by and of itself, independent and possesses unquestionable authority or what Thomson (1995:214) refers to as "meta-political authority", that is, the ultimate political authority which the state wields without restrictions from any quarters, domestically and internationally.

The contradiction which globalisation introduced in relation to the sovereignty of the state is the erosion of its traditional

boundaries of authority. While sovereignty presupposes the absence of contending entities either within the state or outside it, globalisation symbolises the dismantling of these boundaries. The core of the arguments of liberal interdependence theorists is that the complex interdependence which globalisation epitomises and promotes undermines the capacity of states to control their borders. Thomson (1995: 215) summarises how this manifests thus,

Modern technology empowers nonstate or substate actors to evade state efforts to control the flow of goods, people, money, and information across territorial boundaries. Capital, especially, can flow to another state or another currency to escape state fiscal and monetary policies. Efforts to defend cultural values or bar subversive ideas are stymied by computer and telecommunications technologies in the hands of other states and substate and nonstate actors. At the same time, technological advances have produced weapons of mass destruction which preclude the state from protecting its own people or territory. As a result states cannot ensure economic or military security.

State-centric theorists refute the retreat of the state in international relations. There are two strands in the arguments of state-centric theorists. Thomson (1995) identifies these strands as the denial that interdependence has increased and therefore that state sovereignty has been eroded. This denial is anchored on the contention that "current ratios of trans-border to within-border flows of people, information, and capital are not dramatically different from those of the late nineteenth century. If these ratios are reasonable measures of interdependence, then interdependence is not on the rise and does not reflect an erosion of sovereignty" (Thomson 1995:215). The second strand

is the rationalisation and appropriation of the expansion in interdependence as a depiction of the enhancement of state power and authority (Thomson 1995). Thus, the complex global interdependence, manifesting in expansion in trans-border flows, advances in technological development and dismantling of barriers to global financial flows among others, is predicated on the exercise of state power (Gilpin 1987).

Although other actors exist in the international arena and exercise undue influence, they have not been able to dislodge or diminish the state from its position of dominance. The continued relevance of the state in international relations is acknowledged both at the theoretical and practical levels. At the theoretical level, Lake (2007:1) avers,

Many analysts focus on states and their interactions to explain observed patterns of world politics. The state is fundamental to neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. It is also key in many constructivist and English school theories. Even critical, postmodern, or feminist theories, which have arisen in opposition to existing forms of social power, often focus on problematizing states and state practice.

At the practical level, the dominance of the state is underlined by the fact that non-state actors owe their allegiance to one or more states. In other words, all sub-state and non-state actors have linkages with states and often rely on these states to push their interests in the international arena. But the financial strength of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the quest of states to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost their economies have conferred upon them state-level powers. The financial power of TNCs is demonstrated by the statistics that revealed their relative strength to states. For instance, out of world's 100 largest economic entities in 2010, 42 percent were

corporations. If the number is extended to evaluating the top 150 economic entities, the proportion of corporations rose to 58 percent. Extending the analysis further by relying on the 2010 dataset of top economic entities, what is revealed is that the largest TNC, Wal-Mart Stores, earned revenues that exceeded the GDPs of 171 countries making it the 25th largest economic entity in the world as well as ranking ahead of Norway and Iran, and employing 2.1 million people or the equivalent of 43% of Norway's population (Keys & Malnight 2012). However, Balaam & Veseth (2005:387) have argued that comparing the state and TNCs in strictly monetary terms while ignoring other factors could be misleading. There are several attributes possessed by the state which non-state actors, like the TNCs, do not possess and that is where the dividing line lies. For instance, states possess territories and make binding laws therein, they have sovereignty, citizens; and various categories of law-enforcement agencies. All these confer legitimacy on them that induces international recognition of their decisional authority (Balaam & Veseth 2005; Lake 2007).

Notwithstanding the financial powers of major transnational corporations (TNCs) which place them ahead of many states, they are incapable of acting as states. As Lake (2007:1) has observed, "states decide to go to war. They erect trade barriers. They choose whether and at what level to establish environmental standards. States enter international agreements, or not, and choose whether to abide by their provisions". But the dominance of the state in international relations does not undermine or diminish the relevance and influence of non-state actors, especially the TNCs. TNCs have been known to be used by, and served as, tools of developed countries' hegemonic control, providing the platform for triangular diplomacy (Risse-Kappen 1995; Stopford & Strange 1991; Balaam & Veseth 2005). Triangular diplomacy describes the pattern of state-TNC relations that set the

parameters for the direction of FDIs which are both important to the states as well as to the TNCs. The importance of state-TNC relations has been summarised by Balaam & Veseth (2005:399) thus,

TNCs today face more competition than ever from other TNCs. States face more competition with states for the pool of FDI flows. Attempts to reach agreement on a set of "rules of the game" to govern state-TNC relations have failed at exactly the time when it would be most useful to have them. Lacking in such agreement, the triangular pressures on state-state, TNC-TNC, and state-TNC negotiation will increase and the political and economic struggles... will grow more desperate.

Despite the complexity of contemporary international relations, the place of the state is incontrovertible. As Waltz (1979, 93-94) argues, "states are not and never have been the only international actors....The importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious." States remain both the objects and units of analysis, with sub-state and non-state actors being ancillary to, although not inferior in relevance in the scheme of things in the international arena. This is so because the formulation and pursuit of state objectives often transcend state influence and find expression and fulfillment in the domain of non-state actors.

What Do States Want? Framing State Objectives in International Relations

States do not have uniform objectives. Every state is motivated to pursue certain goals based on, and in accordance with, its overall national interest. Each state determines what it considers vital and hierarchizes same in the order of importance. However, the

objectives of states are not formulated in isolation but within the purview of the objectives of other states. Why this is so is that the formulation and pursuit of antagonistic objectives could snowball into belligerent relationships capable of threatening the stability of the international system. The objectives of states constitute, not just the thrust of, but the essence of their foreign policy. The thrust of foreign policy is synonymous with what states consider important for their wellbeing and maintenance and they are determined by both domestic and international environmental factors (Okolie 2009).

Foreign policy is a set of doctrines or principles, a process or specific set of decisions which encapsulates the *raison d'être* of state interaction in the international arena. Essentially, the foreign policies of states set the agenda for relations in the international arena. Often a state's objective is anchored on its ideology. Ideology serves as a calibrating device that stipulates, and even determines, the choices which a state makes. Ideology is the worldview reflecting the material conditions and the systematised beliefs or ideas that form the basis of state organisation as well as underpin the actions of leaders (Nweke 1986; Igwe 2002). Because states adopt ideologies that could either put them into cooperative or competitive relationships in the international arena, foreign policy becomes a product of actions, inactions and reactions to competing interests of states. This observation underpins Igwe's conceptualisation of foreign policy as "the coordinated application of the elements of national power for the promotion of the national interest as defined by the ruling class in relations between states and other international actors" (2002:157). It was ideological differences that coloured the antagonistic foreign policy thrusts of the cold war era which pitted the US against the former USSR. The negativity of ideology in driving foreign policy has been underlined by Hunt (1987:6) when he asserts, "ideologies blinker and blind, obscuring reality and

justifying in the name of high causes extreme inhumanity and wanton destruction”.

As already observed, state objectives are not uniform and are often antagonistic, especially when states pursue diametrically opposed ideologies. The effect which ideology has had on the formulation of state objectives led Hunt (1987:6) to emphasise the imperative of “a more orderly, clearheaded formulation of policy built on well-defined national goals, displaying a firm grasp of international conditions, and leading to the mobilisation of power sufficient to overcome anticipated obstacles and realise the desired goals”. Every state encapsulates its objectives in their constitutions or legal codes, and their policies, both domestically and internationally, are guided and driven by these objectives. It is not just enough for a state to outline its objectives. If a state ends only in outlining its objectives without the requisite capability for their implementation, these objectives could only stagnate at the realms of utopianism. What this implies is that foreign policy has components that are necessary for its pursuit and implementation. The motorising force of foreign policy is embedded in the bouquet of capabilities at the disposal of a state, which it could employ to enable their realisation. Such capabilities include economic, political, military, technological and scientific advantages, which collectively constitute national power.

State objectives could be diverse depending on the level of development which a particular state enjoys, its set of interests, the power at its disposal to actualise these interests and its national leadership. It will be inconceivable that countries of the developing world and their counterparts in the developed world would have the same objectives and capabilities for their actualisation. Essentially, the major determinant of where states fit in global hierarchization is the degree of the sophistication of their capabilities. For instance, the dismantling of the cold war edifice of bipolarism and its replacement with multipolarism anchored on

US ascendancy conferred hegemonic powers on the US. This altered the thrust of its core objective from the containment of rival communist ideology to preoccupation with maintaining unassailable influence across the world, using its enormous national power to bring it into being. Corollary to exercising influence across the globe is the preoccupation with dismantling terrorist networks. Members of the UN Security Council also share the same concerns in varying degrees based on the composition of their national interests and the level threats against them.

Despite the multiplicity of state interests, a template could be developed to outline what states want that could shape their objectives. Again, it is not every objective outlined by a state that it has the capability of pursuing. The practicality of state objectives is driven by “realistic interests and attainable goals that reflect the country’s geopolitical situation” (Petrovic & Novakovic 2013). This is so because the same level of importance is not accorded to every item on the list of state objectives. Most states have institutions charged with the conduct of their foreign policy (Okolie 2009), but despite their existence, the political elite and state officials often determine the composition and thrust of the objectives of states as well as their international behaviour (Igwe 2002; Nnoli 2003).

Despite the irreducible foreign policy prescriptions encapsulated in national constitutions, the speeches of presidents and heads of government set the parameters that add flesh and direction to their foreign policy. For instance, Barak Obama, the president of US, has travelled round the world, and on such trips he often made speeches, that set the parameters of US foreign policy and objectives. As Scherer affirms, Obama has gone round the world “offering his international vision: a hodgepodge of classic realpolitik, diplomatic determination, community-organizer idealism and charismatic leadership. He has presented what he

Eze (2009) has done that “the greater the natural resources at the disposal of a state, the greater it will have influence in international affairs since the resources will facilitate the bargaining power of states”. Possessing these resources alone without developing the right technology as well as other institutional capacity to exploit and process them locally might not position a state to operate from a position of strength. While African states are home to an assortment of natural resources, none operates from a position of strength. This paradox gave rise to such phrases as “Dutch disease” and “resource curse” syndromes.

- *Socio-economic structure*: The socio-economic structure of a state refers to the social and economic forces at play in that state to foster development. It includes the structure of its production, social relations and overall economic indices that show the healthiness or otherwise of the national economy. A state that has a high level of unemployment due to low absorptive capacity, or whose economy is not effectively in the hands of its citizens or that is dependent on importation for its needs may not be truly independent and may be unable to fashion independent foreign policy objectives. The dependency syndrome that characterises third world economies is a product of the incapacity of their national economies to independently fend for themselves. Again, the level of sophistication of an economy in terms of its productive forces and level of diversification determines its relative strength in the international arena. Thus, a state with mono-cultural economic base, no matter the type of product and its saliency internationally, is structurally incapacitated to pursue a vigorous foreign policy (Nweke 1986; Eze 2009).
- *National morale*: National morale simply denotes the general level of belief and confidence which citizens exude toward

their countries. It is national morale that powers patriotism and loyalty of citizens. As Morgenthau (1985:153) has observed, “national morale is the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or war”. National morale is dependent on the degree to which a state is meeting its obligations to the citizens. A state that deviates from the political typology upon which the citizens voted its government into power or is hijacked and personalised by the political elite or is unable to protect its people or provide for them may not expect high morale from its citizen. High national morale is vital for the realisation of state objectives in the international arena.

- *Domestic institutions for national integration*: Most states are made up of various groups which are motivated by diverse interests. These divisions could be in the form of classes, ethnicity, religious affiliation or socio-cultural pluralism. Every state operates through a constitution or other forms of legal codes wherein modalities for frictionless coexistence are embedded. Where institutions for the seamless integration of disparate interests within a state are not effectively operational, the pursuit of foreign policy might be imperilled as it would be perennially preoccupied with addressing domestic tensions.

Apart from domestic environmental variables, there are external variables that impinge on, and dictate the thrust of state objectives. External environmental variables are the gamut of factors that are outside the territorial sphere of a state but which, nevertheless, have multiplier effects on the trajectory of its foreign policy. External environmental variables include:

- *Regional, continental and international organisations*: The international arena is filled with various organisations which are basically differentiated by size or the interest they

represent. International organisations operate at different levels: while some are formed on the basis of geopolitical boundaries, others are differentiated on the basis of governmental involvement and yet others on the non-involvement of governments. Although these organisations are called international because they operate beyond territorial boundaries of states, their internationality is derived from their building blocks which are the states (Udalla 2012). International organisations are effective fora for defusing likely tensions among states and even building bridges among states for a more effective cooperation and collaboration (Igwe 2002). Many organisations have birthed multilateral agreements that dictate the trajectory of the foreign policy of states.

- *Bilateral, multilateral or unilateral agreements:* as actors in the international arena, states enter into agreements to enhance their objectives. When a state enters into an agreement with another state, it falls under the purview of bilateralism. When the agreement is between a state and several others, it is multilateral. But when a state decides to go it alone by pursuing its preferences, it is unilateralism. An important point to note on the last point is that while unilateralism fundamentally promotes a state's interests, it adequately takes the interests of other states into account in the pursuit of those interests (Igwe 2002). The foreign policy objectives of states build upon the positive attributes of agreements reached by states at any or all of these levels for two important reasons, namely for the purpose of preserving the integrity of a state in the comity of states; and for the stability of the international system.
- *Globalisation and neoliberalism:* The aim of globalisation is to erect a seamless integration of the whole world. The universalisation of the world coincides with the rolling back

of the boundaries of states and the "emergence of a global society in which economic, political, environmental, and cultural events in one part of the world quickly come to have significance for people in other parts of the world" (Tabb 2008:np). The logic of globalisation is anchored on neoliberal theoretical formulation with emphasis on free market, free trade and democratisation (Nwozor 2012). With emphasis on economic reforms and the expansion of the political space through democratisation, globalisation utilises the mechanisms of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organisation (WTO) to meet the goals of universalising the globe. Thus, foreign policy of states, especially the economic and political components must conform to this global trend to be realisable.

- *Climate change:* Climate change is a direct consequence of centuries of anthropogenic exploitation of nature. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) set the parameters of what climate change is in Article 1 section 2, where it denoted it as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods" (cited in Nwozor 2013:164). The negative effects of climate change manifest in the depletion of the ozone layers that protect the earth from harmful solar radiation and the distortion of the climactic condition with multiplier effects on the capacity of states to fend for themselves without global cooperation and collaboration. As Nwozor (2013:165) explains,

The phenomenon of climate change is more like an octopus with its tentacles clawed into every area of

development through the environment. The environmental consequences of climate change such as flooding, drought, desertification, soil degradation, erratic rainfall patterns, heat stress, disease and pest outbreaks on crops and livestock impact negatively on livelihoods, socio-economic orders, peace and conflicts, political stability and sustainability of economies.

The increasing effect of climate change on global productivity and the imperative of global action to tackle its fallout have direct effect on foreign policy objectives of states.

- *Food security and poverty:* It was held by the World Food Summit in 1996 that food security exists "when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO 2006:1). Essentially, food security connotes the availability of food (in the right varieties, nutrients and quantities), unhindered access to it and appropriate use based on knowledge of basic nutrition and care. In other words, if there is no food or the quantity is such that there is a possibility that it may not meet the dietary requirements of a state or access is restricted by whatever reason, or knowledge about nutritional facts of the food is lacking, then there is no food security. Poverty is generally a state of lack. Poverty comprises many dimensions ranging from relative to absolute. A state of poverty is characterised by low incomes arising from unemployment, underemployment or non-employment; the inability to acquire the basic goods and services necessary for survival with dignity; low levels of health and education; poor access to clean water and sanitation; inadequate physical security; and inadequate or absence of opportunity to better one's chances of good life (Offiong 2001; World Bank 2001; Okolie 2010). Despite the

progress made in reversing the trends of poverty (defined as living below US\$1.25 per day), which World Bank sources claimed plummeted from 52 percent in 1981 to 21 percent in 2010, it is estimated that some 1 billion people would still be living in extreme poverty by 2015 (World Bank nd). The state of food security and level of poverty impinge on the capacity of states to articulate their objectives and pursue same.

- *Law of the sea and ocean politics:* The oceans and seas are important to states both for navigation and the enormous resources hidden in their treasures. These resources have, for centuries, been sources of tension among states. It was, therefore, part of global efforts to reduce the prospects of tension, its escalation and degeneration into military actions that the law of the sea was signed by states. The law of the sea, which was a product of three UN Conventions that started in 1958, was signed in 1982 and came into effect in 1994. The essential features of the law of the sea include the fixture of a state's territorial waters at 12 nautical miles; right of innocent passage to foreign commercial vessels through the 12-mile exclusive zone; free passage to all vessels and aircraft beyond states' exclusive zones; exclusive rights to coastal states to the fish and marine life in waters extending 200 nautical miles from shore; and, exclusive rights to every state that has a continental shelf to the oil, gas, and other resources in the shelf up to 200 miles from shore (Vukas 2004; Tanaka 2009; Churchill nd; Encarta Encyclopaedia 2008). To safeguard poor countries of the world as well as those that are technologically backward, the law designated the minerals and other resources domiciled on the ocean floor beneath the high seas as "the common heritage of mankind." The implication of this is that the exploitation of such minerals will be collectively governed.

- The law also set production ceilings for such minerals to prevent economic harm to land-based producers of the same minerals. Foreign policies of states must juxtapose all these provisions with their objectives in order to avoid being on a collision course with other states.
- *Terrorism:* Terrorism has assumed a new dimension in global affairs. This attention is traceable to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Terrorism connotes premeditated, deliberate and targeted deployment of violence or threat of violence to bring about certain envisaged outcome or chains of outcomes. Terrorism relies on the creation and exploitation of fear as its major tool of accomplishing its objectives (Abonyi 2006). Terrorist networks have assumed a complex web and pose serious threats to states. There have been global efforts to undercut the livewire of terrorist networks and their sponsors. The fight against terrorism has reshaped the foreign policy thrust of many countries, leading to bilateral and multilateral agreements.
 - *Nuclear weapons, armament and disarmament:* A major component of national power is one which confers the tag of superiority on the armed forces of a state, is the possession of nuclear weaponry. This understanding underpins the quest by states to develop capability in nuclear power manufacturing. What conferred power on, and attracted international respect to, the superpowers of the cold war era was their possession of this capability. The possession of nuclear weapons by states alters power configuration in interstate relations. The potential dangers of unregulated access to nuclear capability have led to global restrictions on nuclear weapons development. Thus, a country with the resources to build nuclear capability for weapons development would definitely have the

- international community to contend with. Presently, Iran, Pakistan, India and North Korea are facing various forms of inquiries from the international community on account of their nuclear programmes.
- *Democratisation and human rights:* Contemporary wave of democratisation is a component of globalisation and it is directed at setting up accountable governments around the globe. The international emphasis on democratisation was due to the collapse of the former USSR and the attendant ideological antagonism that pitted it against the US in the cold war era. Prior to this era, these super powers had arbitrarily supported unaccountable governments across third World countries, and even imposed some of their own. As Amaraegbu (2012:45) corroborates, "the end of the Cold War changed the balance of forces and removed any compelling need to support corrupt regimes for national security reasons". Thus, the withdrawal of support from most of these regimes led to their collapse and the adoption of liberal democratic system. Human rights are essential components of democratic regimes and are given more attention in the international arena. The particular attention that human rights receive is demonstrated by the activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.
 - *Transnational migration:* The trend in the international arena is the dismantling of restrictions that had, hitherto, made free movement of people difficult. The relaxation of national laws on immigration by most countries, in response to the logic of globalisation, opened up opportunities that made it possible for people to respond to global economic forces and local concerns (Balaam & Veseth 2005). The direct implication of relaxed immigration policies are the creation of complex web of citizenship at home and in diaspora. The

term diaspora is used to denote a community of citizens who are domiciled outside the boundaries of their states. These citizens who find themselves beyond the shores of their homelands form powerful networks that have proved vital in interstate relations. Thus, most countries have miniature replications through the diaspora community across the world. The diaspora have proved to be veritable sources of diplomatic craftsmanship.

The variables we have enumerated in the preceding section are only representative of the forces that shape the formulation of state objectives and, therefore, do not exhaustively cover all. A point to be noted is that these variables influence the formulation of state objectives differently.

Environmental Variables, State Objectives and Interstate Relations: A Linkage

The linkage between environmental variables and state objectives lies in their reciprocal relationship. Domestic and external environmental variables act as the driving force in the formulation of state objectives. The contemporary complexity of the international system is exemplified by the multiplicity of actors and overlapping interests. The task before states is how to balance their objectives and preferences with international morality. In other words, the behaviour of states is moderated to conform to international morality.

As we have enumerated, environmental variables are evident at the domestic and international levels and both levels have had direct and indirect effect in motorising the trajectory of foreign policies of states. But, at the base of how these variables determine the course of a state's actions is the power available to it to drive its objectives. What this implies is that it is not just enough to evolve a bouquet of objectives without the

componential power for their realisation. If a state marshals out its objectives without composite capability for their pursuit, they are as good as not formulated at all.

Even though states are theoretically regarded as equal in the international arena, the practical truth is that this is not so. Several indices set countries apart. The categorisation of countries by their economic status based on their level of development plays a significant role in determining their place in the comity of states. For the sake of international stability, states exercise their power with due cognizance of the interest of other states. While territorial integrity and protection of state sovereignty constitute the core essence of state objectives, what determines if a state could live up to this ideal are the resources at its disposal vis-à-vis the resources at the disposal of rival states.

The reconfiguration of the world since the end of the cold war introduced a new set of morality that placed limits on state sovereignty. State sovereignty was reconceptualised from the prism of power and unquestionable authority to that of obligation of states to behave responsibly in exercising authority within their territories. The United Nations introduced the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) to underline this shift in focus, which was precipitated by gross acts of inhumanity in some states. R2P is preoccupied with, and targets, at crimes. These crimes comprise genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Essentially, R2P is anchored on three pillars: the obligation and responsibility of states to protect their population from mass crimes; the responsibility of the international community to assist states to fulfill their primary obligations; and, the responsibility of the international community to intervene in states, where the citizens are in danger and governments have demonstrated incapacity to act appropriately, through coercive measures ranging from economic sanctions to military interventions (Evans 2008; Glanville 2010).

In Africa where all manner of conflicts ranging from intra and inter-elite to inter-group and state versus group conflicts are prevalent, the African Union (AU) introduced a number of changes that moved it from its traditional paths. Since its rebranding in 2001, the AU shelved its non-interference doctrine and replaced it with the responsibility to protect by making provisions for collective action in grave circumstances such as wars, genocide and crimes against humanity (Ibeike-Jonah 2001:3). The implication of all these is the imposed limitations on, and debarment of, states from invoking the powers associated with sovereignty and territorial integrity as basis for acting arbitrarily and dictatorially.

The disparity in economic development among states has also imposed limitations on state behaviours. Developed countries have often deployed their economic advantages to elicit certain state behaviours from Third World Countries. Foreign aid and various policies of multilateral agencies have been deployed to achieve certain goals including the reordering of state objectives. For instance, the debt crisis of the 1980s which spawned widespread economic crisis across Third World Countries led to the intervention of Bretton Woods institutions in their economies. The reform packages which these countries were made to implement, especially the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) provided an opening for neoliberal entrance that facilitated globalisation. The reforms which were hinged on certain conditionalities effectively compromised the independence of countries with far-reaching implication for evolving independent state objectives (Offiong 2001; Onah & Nyewusira 2006).

There is a reciprocal linkage between the domestic and external environmental variables in dictating and motorising the trajectory of state objectives. The point being made is that the formulation of state objectives is never done in isolation because such objectives must factor in several issues such as, the support

of the citizens; the mood of the international community; the support or otherwise of neighbouring states; compliance or noncompliance with existing international treaties; and general opinion of other states. There is increasing blunting of territorial lines, which makes internal affairs of states the concern of the international community. The unity of the international community against Muammer Gadaffi, the intervention in Mali and subsequent restoration of democratic governance in that country and the sustained interest in the unfolding revolution in Syria are handy demonstrations of the internationalisation of domestic issues which exemplify restrictions on the independence of states in evolving their objectives.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that environmental variables are major determinants of state objectives. Because states do not operate in isolation, the formulation of their objectives is a product of domestic and external environmental variables. A state's objectives are often hierarchised in the order of their importance and overall affinity with its national interest. States do not just set objectives for their sake but with the intension of realising them. The realisation of state objectives in the international arena is hinged on a state's overt and covert capability.

A state's capability is synonymous with the power it wields both internally and externally. But this power is wielded in the arena of competing state interests. Thus, while environmental variables act as a motorising force in spawning state objectives, their realisation is a function of the national power of states. The point being made is that in the arena of international relations, environmental variables engender state objectives but the realisation of these objectives is embedded in the possession of national capability.

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